Reasonableness as a Character Trait
This paper is part of a larger project of attempting to work out how reasonableness should be understood for some purposes in the criminal law where a reasonable person standard, or a requirement on the part of persons of reasonableness, plays a significant role. Here I step back from the legal issues to reflect on how reasonableness, as a quality of (some) persons, is best understood.
is Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of St. Andrews and Rudy Professor of Philosophy at Indiana University. Her interests lie in moral philosophy (both historical and contemporary) and philosophy of criminal law. Her publications include Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology, Cornell, 1995) Three Methods of Ethics: A Debate (with Philip Pettit and Michael Slote), Blackwell, 1997, and articles on such topics as the heat of passion defence, the imminence requirement for self-defence, justifications and excuses, remorse and agent-regret, friendship and impartiality, and manipulativeness.
When & Where?
Wednesday May 15th, 2013, 15:15-17:00
Oude Boteringestraat 52, Groningen, Room Omega
All are welcome!
|Last modified:||25 April 2013 11.39 a.m.|