Katalin Farkas: Two Versions of the Extended Mind Thesis
Lecture organised by the department of Theoretical Philosophy
Andy Clark *with support by David Chalmers* has been arguing for years that the mind extends beyond the skull or the skin: that subjects have cognitive processes and propositional attitudes in virtue of their relations to some external device, like a computer or a notebook (Clark and Chalmers, 1998, Clark 2008). The Extended Mind thesis has drawn both support and criticism.
However, most discussions *including those by Clark and Chalmers themselves* fail to distinguish between two very different theses that follow from the original setup. The first version claims that the physical basis of all mental features can be located spatially outside the body. Once we accept that the mind depends to some extent on physical events, this thesis is not particularly interesting. The second version applies to standing states only, and has to do with the extension of the role of such states. This second version is much more interesting, because it points to a potential tension in our conception of minds or selves.
Katalin Farkas is Professor of Philosophy at Central European University in Budapest. She graduated in mathematics and philosophy at the Eotvos Lorand University in Budapest and obtained a PhD in philosophy at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Her main interest is the philosophy of mind *especially the debate about externalism and the philosophy of perception* and some issues in metaphysics, especially the nature of necessity. She also has an historical interest in Descartes' work. She is co-author and co-editor, with Tim Crane, of Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology (OUP 2004) and the author of The subject's point of view (OUP 2008). In the academic year 2008/9, she was Kerstin Hesselgren visiting professor at the University of Stockholm.
|Laatst gewijzigd:||30 oktober 2012 20:39|