Department of the History of Philosophy
The sentient character of Reality.
Francis Bradley and the concept of Experience
The thesis focuses on the work of the British Idealist philosopher Francis Herbert Bradley (1846-1924), especially on his interpretation of the concept of experience. The thesis begins with the analysis of the main postulates of Bradley in relation to the way we perceive “objects” such as extension, selfness and relations. By discussing the contradictory character Bradley ascribes to them, I explain why his notion of experience is necessarily derived from that contradictory character.
Moreover, I argue that only by understanding experience as something different than mere empirical evidence we can properly acknowledge the notion of the Absolute he presented as ultimate reality. I conclude that if we interpret Bradley’s position as a kind of Objective Idealism we can grasp the robustness of his thought, and that empiricist and subjective-centred interpretations lead to inconsistencies in it which seem to leave it infertile.
|Laatst gewijzigd:||31 maart 2017 14:00|