Auteur: Coos Engelsma
Afstudeerjaar: 2010 (Research Master)
Vakgroep: Geschiedenis van de filosofie
In his ‘Lecture on Ethics’ Wittgenstein distinguishes between the use of words in a trivial or relative sense and the use of words in an ethical or absolute sense, and says that in religion many words are used in an absolute sense. As what he says, in this lecture, about the use words in an absolute sense is remarkably similar to what says, in the Investigations, about the use words in a ‘secondary sense’, in my thesis I attempt to analyse the use of words in religion, or the use of words of God, in terms of this latter notion. To use a word in a secondary sense is to use a word that already has a primary sense for one differently, but with its familiar meaning and in such a way that one cannot justify or paraphrase what one says by using words in a primary sense. Therefore, I first consider the use of words in connection with God, and establish that, in the sense that they are used of a being of a sort completely different from the sort of beings they are originally used of, are not used in a primary sense. Then I consider the meaning these words, when used of God, are used with. I argue that they, though being used differently, are not used with a different, analogous or metaphorical meaning, but with the same meaning as the one they are primarily used with. Third, I try to account for the fact that these words are used differently but yet with the same meaning. I argue that as it is impossible to justify or paraphrase (much of) what is said of God by using words in a primary sense, and as people using words of God are familiar with the use of these words in a primary sense, (many) words used of God are used in a secondary sense.
|Laatst gewijzigd:||01 november 2013 14:03|