about racism among French intellectuals, is chiefly known (especially in Europe) for his encyclopedic histories of European anti-Semitism. Poliakov was the first serious historian to assess critically (in a more nuanced and balanced way than some later commentators) the role of the Vatican during the Nazi era. He wrote about this shortly after the war, most famously in a 1950 article in the American magazine *Commentary*. What is especially interesting, in view of Olender’s contention elsewhere in the book that history can be liberating, is the melancholy reflection, shared by Poliakov and Olender, that in exposing the link between racism and the most exalted values of Western civilization, historians may provoke those very sentiments they intend to extirpate.

Other essays in the book worth mentioning include several on the prominent historian of religion and myth, Mircea Eliade. Eliade, a figure often linked with Carl Jung, is also controversial because of his reputed involvement in the 1930s with the Iron Guard, a Romanian fascist organization. In his writing on myth, Eliade evokes a transhistorical reality. One question Olender raises is whether this evocation represents Eliade’s desire to escape history, perhaps because of his own personal and political tribulations. Olender also has a chapter on the French sociologist Marcel Mauss, whose work represents a blend of politics and scholarship.

This is a very rich book, well worth reading. It will be especially valuable for those interested in the history of racism and anti-Semitism who are unfamiliar with the European, and especially the French, literature on the topic. My only complaint is that some of the topics deserve more extended treatment. One hopes that Olender will remedy that in subsequent work.

Reviewed by Fredric Weizmann, Department of Psychology, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada.


When I first heard that Rod Buchanan was writing a new biography of psychologist Hans J. Eysenck (1916–1997), I thought: “an impossible task!” The author of over 1,000 articles and 80 books spanning personality, authoritarianism, aesthetics, abnormality, therapy, intelligence, race, neuropsychology, smoking, cancer, parapsychology, astrology, and more, with opposing camps of serious detractors and defenders, Eysenck seemed an overwhelmingly difficult subject. But Buchanan has succeeded beautifully and *Playing with Fire* is an outstanding scholarly achievement. The work required extensive knowledge of multivariate psychology, clinical psychology, the disciplinary and university context of psychology in postwar Britain, the functioning of modern scientific communities, the history of modern science, and resurgent scientific racism. Buchanan has demonstrated a fine grasp of all of these, and has made excellent use of Eysenck’s own work, that of his critics, the available correspondence, and a very extensive set of interviews with those who worked with Eysenck.
Buchanan begins with a thorough analysis of Eysenck’s early life in Germany, and provides new details regarding young Eysenck’s status as a “Mischlinge of the second degree” under Nazi law. Buchanan carefully threads through Eysenck’s versions of his childhood in Germany and the conditions of his departure, while treating his recollections critically. The death of Eysenck’s Jewish maternal grandmother in a concentration camp and his problematic relationship to his partial Jewish ancestry provide significant background for Eysenck’s sense of outsider status and his later self-characterization as a lifelong opponent of fascism.

In Chapter 3, Eysenck’s arrival in London and his complex relationship with his mentor, Sir Cyril Burt, are well handled. We get an excellent sense of Eysenck’s ambition and competitiveness, and his treatment of scientific argument as a tennis match to be won every time. The remaining chapters are divided according to the main topics of Eysenck’s research, writings, and public presence. Although I was quite familiar with the comprehensive personality theory Eysenck developed starting in the 1940s, a theory remarkable for its integration of psychometrics, learning theory, and physiology, I never understood how this theory emerged. Buchanan makes explicit the relationship with the earlier work of Donald MacKinnon, Dael Wolfle, and Gordon Allport. Providing a careful treatment of the limitations of factor analysis, Buchanan also explains how Eysenck’s personality theory could be taken as an attack on the psychiatric community. Playing with Fire is extremely helpful for understanding the disciplinary conflicts between psychiatry and psychology in postwar Britain.

Buchanan provides a full chapter on Eysenck’s studies of left-wing authoritarianism. Eysenck attempted to show empirically what he had come to believe as an adolescent in Germany: Extreme communists were as bad as the fascists; both were authoritarians. Buchanan uses the subsequent debates with Richard Christie and Milton Rokeach over this issue as a lesson in the more personal aspects of academic conflict, although I do not think that the combination of substantive critique with personalized attack is particularly unusual. This microhistory also illustrates Eysenck’s frequently vague and unsatisfying replies to his critics, and his highly selective use of data that verged on misreporting. Buchanan deals with these issues in the context of “trust” as an essential ingredient in scientific practice. Although some readers may object to the extensive discussion of Eysenck’s style and character, this analysis is essential to understanding Eysenck’s ability to attract both devotion and animosity.

I have one concern regarding Buchanan’s very fair treatment of Eysenck’s role in the race and intelligence debates of the 1970s. There is no doubt Eysenck was convinced that people of African ancestry were, on average, less intelligent than “Whites” for partially genetic reasons. The student protests against Eysenck that created his sense of martyrdom, the use of Eysenck’s writings by neo-Nazi groups, and his 1977 interview in the extremist National Party magazine, The Beacon, are handled in a sensitive and thorough fashion. But the reader is unlikely to fully appreciate Eysenck’s important role in keeping race science alive. By mentoring and encouraging the three most important contributors to contemporary scientific racism, Arthur Jensen, Philippe Rushton, and Richard Lynn, and by providing a journal, Personality and Individual Differences, where new race science could be published, Eysenck helped make it possible for scientific racism to endure into the twenty-first century. Moreover, Eysenck bequeathed to Jensen, Rushton, and Lynn a highly combative style of argument, a style of highly selective data presentation, and an extraordinary blindness to what a heritability index does and does not tell us.

The final chapter outlines the most unusual phase of Eysenck’s career: his collaboration with the notorious Ronald Grossarth-Maticek to argue that personality was the primary cause of both lung cancer and smoking, and that personality factors strongly affected the course of many kinds of cancer. Funded by tobacco companies, their research was of doubtful value but
useful to an industry embroiled in legal liabilities. As with so much of Eysenck’s empirical work, replication was not forthcoming, and serious questions were raised regarding Grossarth-Maticek’s research practices. Eysenck’s continued involvement with this dubious enterprise can only be understood in the context of his intense desire to see himself as the heroic rebel who would overturn established wisdom, whether on therapy or race or smoking.

Further information and correspondence on the founding and editorial practices of Eysenck’s journal Personality and Individual Differences would have been illuminating, but the gaps in the record that lead Buchanan to occasionally speculate (“One wonders . . .,” p. 93) are understandable given that Eysenck’s collaborator and widow, psychologist Sybil Eysenck, destroyed most of his papers. Playing with Fire opens with the following disclaimer by her: “The views expressed in this book are not shared by me.” In contrast to the hagiography by Gibson (1981) and Eysenck’s (1990) autobiography, Playing with Fire allows us to understand why Eysenck’s work was so often distrusted. That Buchanan could accomplish this aim and still be praised as “remarkably accurate” and “scrupulously fair minded” by Eysenck’s son, psychologist Michael Eysenck (2010), indicates the success of Buchanan’s work. By illuminating the tension between Eysenck’s positioning of himself as both a detached scientist and a popularizer of psychology and its application, Playing with Fire challenges us to think carefully about the nature of scientific practices and scientific communities.

REFERENCES


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This book offers yet another account of the chronological development of Freud’s thought, differing from other such studies in the attention it devotes to his evolving conceptualization of the sense of guilt. At the conclusion of his text the author writes:

Despite the centrality of the sense of guilt in Freud’s thought and, in the debates of his followers, despite the importance of these discussions for current debates between psychoanalytic schools, and despite the fact that the sense of guilt is the central issue in Freud’s studies on culture and religion, studies on Freud’s thought on the issue are rare. My reconstruction of Freud’s theories on the sense of guilt fills that lacuna. (p. 302)

Although the book does not claim to do more than follow “a dark trace” in Freud’s work, it nevertheless seems odd in 2010 to read a contemporary publication that might well have