Workshop on Deterministic Chance
Christian List (joint work with Marcus Pivato)
We offer a new argument for the claim that there can be non-degenerate objective chance ("true randomness") in a deterministic world. Using a formal model of the relationship between different levels of description of a system, we show how objective chance at a higher level can coexist with its absence at a lower level. Unlike previous arguments for the level-specificity of chance, our argument shows, in a precise sense, that higher-level chance does not collapse into epistemic probability, despite higher-level properties supervening on lower-level ones. We show that the distinction between objective chance and epistemic probability can be drawn, and operationalized, at every level of description. There is, therefore, not a single distinction between objective and epistemic probability, but a family of such distinctions.
Chance in Explanation
I will identify three distinct roles that "chance" plays in scientific explanations. These roles often go unappreciated by philosophers, and that is a problem because they correspond to three concepts of "chance". I will show that once we distinguish these three concepts, some philosophical disputes involving "chance" become trivial. The currently popular debate over so-called "deterministic chance" is a case in point.
15:00 Christian List "Emergent Chance"
16:00 Aidan Lyon "Chance in Explanation"
17:30 Drinks and dinner
There are five-minute breaks between all items.
Time & place
January 22nd from 15:00 to 18:00
University of Groningen, Faculty of Philosophy, Oude Boteringestraat 52, room Omega
|Last modified:||05 December 2017 2.59 p.m.|