Lilian Bermejo Luque: Being justified as the effect of justifying
Argumentation Theory is frequently seen as the task of putting together all that we know about ways of arguing that have proven to be safe, in the sense of warranting –one way or another, and to a certain extent— their outcome. From this perspective, the relationship between Argumentation Theory and Epistemology would be a matter of epistemic justification becoming the main standard of argumentative goodness, so that Argumentation Theory turns into a particular type of applied epistemology.
Yet, it is also possible to think of Argumentation Theory as the endeavour of characterizing the very notion of justification. On this view, justification is but the output of argumentation goodness, for to say of something that it is justified is to say that good reasons can be adduced for it, and adducing reasons is arguing. So understood, Argumentation Theory would be the framework to characterize notions such as justification, reasons or the basing relation.
The main goal of this paper is to characterize this transcendental approach to Argumentation Theory, to explain its rewards for the field and to analyze its philosophical consequences.
When & where?
Wednesday 06-12-2017, from 15:15 to 17:00
Room Omega, Faculty of Philosophy, Oude Boteringestraat 52, Groningen
|Last modified:||26 September 2017 11.12 a.m.|