ESPF Colloquium "Mental Health, Suffering, and Value"

Speaker: Sofia Jeppsson (Umea University)

Prominent bioethicists argue that we should strive towards eliminating disabilities and chronic illnesses with strong genetic components. Prominent disability scholars argue against this. However, these arguments are often tied to a “mere difference” view of disability, which might be true for many conditions, but not all. In this talk, I will examine the possibility that a condition might be inherently distressing and yet, we ought not to wipe it out. My focus will be on distressing psychosis conditions. Some anti-eugenic arguments are purely instrumental, simultaneously strong and unsatisfying. After recounting and setting these aside, I move on to another possibility: psychotic experiences might directly acquaint one with aspects of reality, knowledge, and a number of philosophical problems, which philosophers normally merely read about. This direct acquaintance might hold positive value, even as any accompanying distress is negative. I further discuss how broad this argument can become; if it can be extended beyond the narrow field of academic philosophy.