Distributive justice and the burdens of bad work
Paid work is a central social institution and a primary way in which individuals contribute to society. However, some forms of work impose serious disadvantages on individuals, which can significantly affect their life prospects and their ability to successfully pursue their conceptions of the good life. I refer to such work as “bad work.” Classifying what constitutes bad work and outlining why it should be considered a concern of justice can help address the issue more effectively.
From Karl Marx and Adam Smith to John Rawls and the contemporary discussions on labour market justice, there has been a longstanding critique of how work is organised and the conditions under which it is performed. This historical continuity underscores both the persistent nature of the problem and its continued relevance to questions of justice.
At the centre of this thesis lies the question of how a just society should address bad work, particularly from the perspective of distributive justice. Some forms of work may resist meaningful reform yet remain socially necessary, making the option of simply leaving such bad work undone unfeasible.
Given the uneven distribution of the disadvantages associated with bad work, which disproportionally burdens the less privileged members of society and hence poses a threat to justice, we must ask how to fairly distribute not only the benefits but also the burdens of work – especially “bad” work – among all members of society.