Social freedom and emancipatory interests
A central concern of theories developed in the Frankfurt School tradition of criticaltheory is the question of how social structures constrain individual freedom. This dissertation addresses this question by examining the concept of social freedom.
It argues that a robust theory of social freedom must integrate its objective conditions (freedom-promoting social norms and institutions) with its subjective requirements (the individual capacity for self-determination and critique). The central thesis is that this happens only when the realization of social freedom possible.
Collectively, the dissertation argues that a comprehensive theory of social freedom must show how institutions can be both binding and simultaneously open to transformation through individual critique and agency, thereby integrating the objective and subjective sides of freedom. The solution I propose is that a theory of social freedom must demonstrate more precisely how social institutions can be structured to support both the objective conditions that make freedom possible and the subjective capacity for critique and self-determination.
This requires showing how institutions can be both binding and open to transformation through individual agency.Good, democratic, institutions must therefore meet specific requirements for individuals to be able to live freely.