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Despite its tremendous influence, Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy is often criticized as being too abstract, rigid, and rooted in a Eurocentric view of morality. Critics argue that Kant's moral universalism undermines cultural diversity and different ways of understanding human agency. This dissertation asks whether these criticisms are justified.
In this dissertation, I argue that Kant’s moral philosophy can, in fact, accommodate cultural pluralism without abandoning its commitment to universal moral principles. The key claim is that, within the Kantian framework, moral and legal judgments should focus not only on outward actions but also on the maxims – the subjective principles on which people act. As a result, actions that look identical on the surface may have different moral or legal connotations depending on their cultural context.
Across four chapters, I defend Kant's thesis that all rational agents necessarily act under the idea of freedom, regardless of cultural background. I also contend that Kant’s ethics allows considerable flexibility in applying universal duties to diverse social contexts. A case study of Kant’s remarks on Inuit senicide illustrates how context can affect the moral evaluation of (cultural) practices. Finally, I argue that Kant’s philosophy of right, like his ethics, must take an agent’s maxim into account rather than judging actions solely by their outward appearance.
The overall conclusion is that Kant’s moral philosophy is far more adaptable than commonly assumed. Rather than imposing a narrowly European moral framework, it provides a universal ethical theory that can recognize and accommodate diverse cultural practices while maintaining its commitment to universal freedom and respect for persons.