“As long as our Motherland remains this island of freedom,” Patriarch Kirill declared in 2022, Russia could still help “prevent the global apocalyptic end.”[1] (Patriarch Kirill, XXIV World Russian People’s Council, 25 Oct. 2022)

When Patriarch Kirill frames Russia’s confrontation with the West as a spiritual struggle between good and evil, he blurs the line between theology and politics. This convergence is not a wartime aberration but the result of a decades-long rapprochement between the Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), culminating in the 2020 constitutional amendments (Blitt, 2022; Uran Kyzy, 2020). Religion has thus become not only a source of moral legitimacy for the state but also a strategic instrument of Russian power.

Why is this relationship so important for the Kremlin?

The ROC provides the Kremlin with a sacred vocabulary and historical legitimacy, framing Russia as a nation with a unique spiritual mission in global politics. The Kremlin draws on older religious and historical ideas to present Russia as more than just a nation-state. Concepts such as Russkiy Mir, the idea of a wider “Russian world,” Moscow as the “Third Rome,” and the Katechon, the force that holds back evil, all support the image of Russia as a civilization with a special spiritual mission. In this narrative, defending Russian interests becomes inseparable from defending faith, tradition, and moral order (Curanović, 2019; Engström, 2014; Geifman, 2016).

Yet the Kremlin’s use of religion is pragmatic rather than exclusively Orthodox. The ROC occupies a privileged symbolic position as guardian of Russia’s spiritual identity, but Moscow also cultivates alliances with other “traditional” religions. In practice, these religions also help Russia build relationships abroad.
Especially, the Moscow Patriarchate’s Department for External Church Relations maintains contacts with religious communities, political actors, and civil society groups, often presenting Russia’s interests through the language of shared moral values and interreligious dialogue (O’Beara, 2022; Uran Kyzy, 2020).

For religious institutions, this alliance offers visibility, protection, and access to state resources after decades of Soviet repression. In return, they help legitimize the Kremlin’s vision of Russia as a civilization rooted in faith, tradition, and moral conservatism (Bremer, 2015; Kenworthy & Agadjanian, 2021).

Global outreach – where lies the focus?

Russia’s religious soft power is especially visible abroad. In Africa, ROC-linked humanitarian and educational initiatives serve both religious and diplomatic purposes. Russia’s language of “traditional values” often resonate with local elites critical of Western liberal norms (McGlynn, 2021; Ray, 2024).

In Syria, the ROC similarly framed Russia’s military intervention as a mission to protect Christian communities and restore order against terrorism (Adamsky, 2020).

Across these contexts, the audience changes, but the narrative remains constant: Russia presents itself as a defender of tradition against what it portrays as Western moral decline.

What are the risks arising from these partnerships?

The close alignment between state and religion may strengthen Russia’s moral narrative and expand its soft-power reach. Yet, it also generates profound risks for both the Kremlin and the religious institutions involved.

The first risk is the loss of spiritual autonomy. The closer religious institutions move toward political power, the more they risk becoming instruments of state strategy. In the ROC, this is visible in the treatment of priests who refuse to support the invasion of Ukraine and face sanctions, loss of parish positions, or public vilification. Faith thereby becomes conditional on loyalty, weakening the Church’s credibility as a moral authority.(Engström, 2014; Johnson, 2022; Merdjanova, 2022)

A second risk is the fragmentation of global Orthodoxy. The idea of Russkiy Mir, intended to unite Russian-speaking Orthodox communities, has instead deepened divisions. The 2022 Volos Declaration denounced this fusion of theology and nationalism, while the conflict over Ukrainian church independence had already exposed the geopolitical fault lines within Orthodoxy. Rather than strengthening Moscow’s claim to spiritual leadership, Russkiy Mir has turned Orthodoxy itself into a geopolitical battlefield. (“A Declaration on the ‘Russian World’ (Russkii Mir) Teaching,” 2022; “Volos Declaration,” 2025; Blitt, 2022; Johnson, 2022; Merdjanova, 2022; Prodromou, 2023)

Finally, the politicization of religion incurs significant foreign policy costs. As Merdjanova argues, Russia’s “faith-based diplomacy” has lost credibility precisely because the ROC is now widely perceived as an extension of state power (Merdjanova, 2022). When religious engagement becomes indistinguishable from political strategy, it alienates potential partners and erodes the moral legitimacy on which faith-based diplomacy depends.
Western policymakers, however, have often been slow to grasp the depth of this church–state alliance. This matters because Russia’s religious diplomacy is not merely symbolic. It shapes how Russia explains its actions, builds alliances, and presents itself as an alternative to the liberal West. Understanding this religious dimension is therefore essential for understanding Russian foreign policy itself.

Bibliography

A Declaration on the “Russian World” (Russkii mir) Teaching. (2022, March 13). Public Orthodoxy. https://publicorthodoxy.org/2022/03/13/a-declaration-on-the-russian-world-russkii-mir-teaching/

Adamsky, D. (2020). The Role of the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow’s Syrian Campaign.

Blitt, R. C. (2022, February). Religious Soft Power in Russian Foreign Policy: Constitutional Change and the Russian Orthodox Church. University of Tennessee College of Law.

Bremer, T. (2015). Kreuz und Kreml. Herder Verlag.

Curanović, A. (2019). Russia’s Mission in the World: The Perspective of the Russian Orthodox Church. Problems of Post-Communism, 66(4), 253–267. https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2018.1530940

Engström, M. (2014). Contemporary Russian Messianism and New Russian Foreign Policy. Contemporary Security Policy, 35(3), 356–379. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2014.965888

Geifman, D. A. (2016). Putin’s “Sacred Mission” in Syria. BESA Center Perspectives Paper, No. 335.

Johnson, S. R. C. (2022, April 5). Consequences for the Orthodox who reject the Russkii Mir—Centre for Geopolitics. Centre for Geopolitics -. https://www.cfg.cam.ac.uk/news/consequences-russkii-mir/

Kenworthy, S. M., & Agadjanian, A. (2021). Understanding World Christianity: Russia (Vol. 5). Augsburg Fortress. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv17vf4mn.8

Kirill, P. (2022, October 25). Православие и мир в XXI веке. Русская Православная Церковь. https://www.patriarchia.ru/article/103843

McGlynn, J. (with Henry Jackson Society). (2021). Defender of the faiths: How the Russian government uses religious diplomacy. The Henry Jackson Society.

Merdjanova, I. (2022). Russia’s War in Ukraine and the Limits of Religious Diplomacy. Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe, 42(4). https://doi.org/10.55221/2693-2148.2349

O’Beara, F. (2022, May 20). Russia’s war on Ukraine: The Kremlin’s use of religion as a foreign policy instrument. Epthinktank. https://epthinktank.eu/2022/05/20/russias-war-on-ukraine-the-kremlins-use-of-religion-as-a-foreign-policy-instrument/

Prodromou, E. H. (2023, November). Diplomacy, Geopolitics, and Global Orthodox Christanity in the Twenty-First Century. Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs.

Ray, C. A. (2024, October). Russia’s Influence in Africa_ The Role of the Russian Orthodox Church. Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Uran Kyzy, A. (2020, June). The Rising Influence of  the Russian Orthodox Church in Russian Politics. TRT World Research Centre.

Volos Declaration. (2025). In Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Volos_Declaration&oldid=1301254812

[1] Другими словами, наша борьба не против плоти и крови, но против мироправителей тьмы века всего, духов злобы поднебесных, как об этом сказал апостол (см. Ефес. 6:12). Сегодня эти слова обретают видимое выражение, и каждый может понять, о чем идет речь, а с пониманием открывается и возможность сопротивления. И наше сопротивление всем этим разрушительным тенденциям — это возрастание в нашей вере, это верность нашим традициям, это любовь к Отечеству, это забота о его духовном и материальном благе. И покуда будет наше Отечество этим островом свободы, будет и у остального мира некий знак надежды на возможность изменить течение истории и предотвратить глобальный апокалиптический конец — по крайней мере, отодвинуть его в ту (Kirill, 2022)