PERESTROIKA IM/POSSIBLE
Why do autocratic leaders often fail to implement the economic reforms they themselves recognise as necessary? This thesis shows that the answer does not primarily lie in incompetence or ideology, but in the political logic of survival in authoritarian systems.In autocratic regimes, political power and economic interests are generally tightly intertwined. The groups that sustain a leader’s rule often benefit from existing economic inefficiencies such as subsidies, monopolies, privileges, and informal networks. While economic reform may improve performance, it also threatens these established interests and, in doing so, the political foundation of the regime.As a result, reforms are typically only partially implemented. These partial reforms create new groups that benefit from the partially changed system and therefore have a stake in blocking further change. When economic problems re-emerge, leaders face renewed pressure to reform, but with each cycle the political space for meaningful change becomes smaller.The thesis develops a theoretical framework to explain this dynamic and applies it to three reform periods in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev. It shows that authoritarian systems have a limited capacity for self-reform, and offers new insights into why economic reforms in authoritarian regimes often stall.