In this paper I investigate the accounts of conceptual thought of Peter John Olivi (1248–98) and Peter Auriol (1280–1322). While not as widely studied as such near contemporaries as Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham, Olivi and Auriol were important voices in scholastic discussions of cognition and representation. In these discussions, both Franciscans emphasized the activity rather than passivity of our cognitive powers.¹ Both stressed that cognizing the world is not simply a question of taking in data from without. Also, as commentators have pointed out, both were critical of indirect-realist accounts of perception, according to which the immediate objects of perception are inner representations. Thus, Faustino Prezioso has presented Auriol’s critique of such accounts as a “development” of Olivi’s.² More recently, Hans Kraml has written that the problems surrounding indirect-realist theories of perception were the “basis of the criticism of Peter John Olivi on the one hand, and the starting point for Peter Auriol’s conception” of human cognition on the other.³ In like spirit, John Marenbon has underscored the similarities between Olivi’s and Auriol’s efforts to develop a direct-realist account of perceptual cognition: an account according to which we have direct cognitive access to external objects.⁴

While the direct realism of Olivi and Auriol may look attractive as an account of perceptual cognition, it is less clear that direct realism is equally attractive as a theory of conceptual thought.⁵ After all, what is the direct object of my thought of human nature? And what exactly is it that I am thinking about when I think of redness in general? A Platonist might say that this is an easy question. He might say that conceptual thought is not so different from sense-perception after all. Just as in sense-perception our perceptual powers are directed at external objects and their sensory qualities, in conceptual thoughts our intellects are directed at Ideas or Forms. For a philosopher who rejects Platonism, however, it is more difficult to account for conceptual cognition within a direct-realist framework. For such a thinker, indeed, it may well be tempting to make a concession to indirect realism. While perceptual acts immediately reach out to external reality, our conceptual thoughts are directed at inner objects of cognition that represent the kind-specific or generic features of external objects.

Now, both Olivi and Auriol reject Platonism.⁶ In fact, both thinkers believe that external reality is fundamentally built up of singulars. So the question emerges how Olivi and
Auriol accommodate conceptual thought in their accounts of human cognition. More specifically, the question arises whether they are prepared to compromise their direct realism to account for conceptual cognition. It is this question that will be addressed in this paper. I will argue that, despite their shared direct-realist commitments on the level of sense-perception, Olivi and Auriol part ways when it comes to analysing conceptual thought. Olivi’s stance vis-à-vis direct realism differs more from Auriol’s than scholars have recognized.

I will proceed as follows. In Section 1, I discuss Olivi’s theory of conceptual thought. This theory has been interpreted as an extension of Olivi’s direct-realist account of perceptual cognition. I will argue that this picture needs nuancing. In describing the mechanisms at work in conceptual cognition, Olivi sees an important role for inner objects of cognition. This marks a concession to the indirect-realist theory of conceptual thought. As we shall see in Section 2, however, Auriol explains conceptual thought within a consistently direct-realist framework.

I. OLIVI

Olivi’s direct-realist commitments come to the fore most clearly in his discussion of the so-called “species theory” of perceptual representation. According to this theory as Olivi understands it, external objects are represented to our senses by species: image-like devices that function as the primary objects of cognition. On this view, external objects are the secondary objects of cognition, which are accessed by the mediation of species.

As is well known, Olivi rejects this theory. Such an intermediary species “would veil the object, and it would impede rather than contribute to its being seen in itself as present.” Moreover, he argues that proponents of the species theory must face a choice: When a power attends to a species, its attention either moves on so that the thing be seen or not.

According to Olivi, to say that a perceptual power does not “move on” from a species to the thing it represents is to say that the latter is only seen in an image. And Olivi claims that this means that the thing is not genuinely perceived. At most, it is remembered or imagined: if the perceptual power “does not move on, then the power does not presententially see the object, except in that way in which we are said to see a thing when we think of it as absent.” Consequently, our experience of the object “will be more like a recollection or imagination of an absent thing than like vision.” But if the power does move on from a species to the thing it represents, “then after the grasp of the species it will inspect the object in itself, and thus it
will see the object in two ways.”\textsuperscript{13} And this, Olivi believes, “seems too much at odds with the phenomenal feel of perception to be a serious possibility.”\textsuperscript{14} The proponents of the species theory, then, are caught in a dilemma. And the only way out is to give up the idea that reality is represented by imagelike species that are the primary objects of cognition.

Olivi’s alternative is not to deny the basic idea that reality is represented to our senses. Rather, Olivi holds that it is our perceptual acts themselves that represent external objects. It is because my current perceptual act is internally structured or “configured” in a certain way that it pertains to, say, Peter.\textsuperscript{15} There is no need to invoke intermediary images to account for perceptual representation. In Olivi’s own words, “the act of cognition is the actual cognitive representation.”\textsuperscript{16} This is the nucleus of Olivi’s direct realism. But does he believe that it can also be sustained at the level of conceptual cognition? In order to answer that question we must turn to Olivi’s \textit{Tractatus de Verbo}, which occurs at the beginning of his commentary on the Gospel of John. While the setting of the \textit{Tractatus} is thus theological, Claude Panaccio has written that “the essentials of Olivi’s discussion are properly philosophical.”\textsuperscript{17} Indeed, the treatment of concepts in the \textit{Tractatus} has been described as an integral part of Olivi’s critique of indirect realism.\textsuperscript{18} Again, the account of concepts that Olivi develops in the \textit{Tractatus} has been cast as “a direct realist theory of intellectual cognition.”\textsuperscript{19}

In the remainder of this section I offer a discussion of the \textit{Tractatus} that qualifies this interpretation of Olivi. In Section 1.1, I outline the way in which Olivi criticizes a certain indirect-realist theory of conceptual thought in the \textit{Tractatus}. In Section 1.2, I turn to Olivi’s alternative to that theory. While there is a clearly direct-realist tenor to this alternative, I argue in Section 1.3 that, nevertheless, Olivi retains significant elements of indirect realism. In the \textit{Tractatus}, Olivi’s first concern is not so much the philosophical idea that conceptual thought involves representations that function as inner objects of cognition. Rather, it is theological considerations that for the most part drive his critique of the indirect realism laid out in the \textit{Tractatus}.

\textbf{1.1 Olivi’s \textit{Tractatus}}

At one point in his \textit{Sentences}-commentary, Olivi discusses an indirect-realist theory according to which conceptual thoughts are directed at “concepts” or “words” that function as the primary objects of conceptual cognition:
Some say that by an act of abstraction, investigation or invention, some kind of concept or word is formed, in which real objects are understood as in a mirror. For they say that this is the first thing understood and the immediate object, and it is a kind of intention and conception and characterization of things.\textsuperscript{20}

Suppose that abstraction leads me to insight into human nature in general: it leads me to grasp that human beings are universally rational, for instance. According to the theory that Olivi describes, the abstractive act that leads me to this insight is productive of “a concept or word.” It is in this concept or word that I contemplate the universally human features that I have abstracted. I grasp human nature in this concept or word “as in a mirror.” Olivi does not name the “some” he has in mind, but commentators have pointed out that his formulations suggest that he is thinking of Aquinas in laying out the theory sketched above.\textsuperscript{21}

As he makes clear in the \textit{Tractatus}, Olivi recognizes two versions of this theory. According to the first, the concept or word is the primary object of the very act that produced it. Thus, the abstractive act that led me to see that humans are universally rational produces a concept, which is the object to which that act is primarily directed.\textsuperscript{22} According to the second version of the theory, the offspring of my abstractive act is meant to function as the primary object of subsequent intellectual acts.\textsuperscript{23} To see how this works, suppose that a process of abstraction has just led me to discover that humans are universally rational. This is a result that I can call to mind any time after the initial process of abstraction has been completed. It is not necessary that I engage in an abstractive process anew any time that I want to think of human nature in general. The best explanation of this, according to the theory that Olivi is describing, is that my initial act of abstraction produced a representational device to which I can turn my mind’s eye any time afterwards. Thus, the concept theory under discussion in the \textit{Tractatus} comes in two versions:

A Abstractive acts produce concepts or words, which concepts or words are the principal objects of those very abstractive acts.

B Abstractive acts produce concepts or words, which concepts or words are the principal objects of subsequent acts of thought.

Olivi has little patience with (A). He finds it hard to see how one concept or word can both be the offspring and the immediate object of one and the same thought.\textsuperscript{24} Moreover, he explains
that our capacity to retain concepts over time was the principal motivation for his opponents to embrace their indirect-realist theory of the concept or word:

When we abstract and form the universal characteristics of individuals that we have seen or imagined, we conceive and form these characteristics in ourselves, and we return to them when we want to contemplate these universals.25

Similarly, his opponents’ indirect-realist account of the concept is suggested by our capacity to store and recall propositional concepts. When through an act of “investigation or invention,” we have come to understand an argument, we form concepts of both its premises and its conclusion. It is to these concepts that we turn when we later want to call to mind the argument in question, “as if we wanted to contemplate the truth of such propositions as in mirrors.”26

Olivi offers four main reasons to reject (A) and (B). Discussing these arguments in some detail will help to see the extent to which Olivi’s opposition to the theories from the Tractatus is theologically motivated. That is, it will help to put philosophical readings of the Tractatus in the right perspective. Olivi’s first argument against theories that identify concepts with objects of cognition that result from acts of thought is that they contradict authorities such as Augustine. The latter, indeed, “says in several places that our verbum is our actual act of cognition and vice versa.”27 In terms of the above example, this means that the very abstractive act that provides me with insight in human nature is to be identified as the verbum. The word or concept is not something over and above that act of thought.

Secondly, Olivi argues that according to version (B), the verbum is identified with what Augustine had called a memory-species. On Augustine’s account, a memory-species is a representational device that allows us to call to mind previous acts of thought and their objects.28 Such a memory-species, as Augustine understands it, serves as an inner terminus of cognition: “Augustine has it that when we think of something that is absent, the intellect is turned to a species that is in the memory as if to its primary object.”29 But then, this is precisely the function that theory (B) assigns to the verbum. On this theory, indeed, the verbum “appears to be nothing but a memory-species that is retained in memory after an act of cognition. But it is absurd to call this a verbum.”30

Olivi’s third objection regards the relation between (A) and (B) on the one hand and Trinitarian theology on the other. For Olivi as for many of his contemporaries, Trinitarian theology and human psychology were intimately intertwined. The reliance on psychological
theories to come to grips with Trinitarian questions goes back as far as Augustine. But, as Russell Friedman has shown, Henry of Ghent in the thirteenth century took the psychological approach to the Trinity a step farther. More than previous authors had done, Henry emphasized that the production of the Son was an intellectual emanation, whereas the Holy Spirit emanated from the divine will. On his view, then, the Son of God can literally be seen as a kind of concept or word that springs from the divine intellect. Consequently, Henry’s “strong use” of philosophical psychology in Trinitarian contexts demanded that concept theory be somehow “directly applicable to the study of the Son in the Trinity.” To be sure, authors after Henry continued to harken back to more traditional approaches to Trinitarian questions. Yet, as Friedman points out, Henry’s view of concept theory and Trinitarian theology as intimately intertwined was to become an important constituent of much Franciscan Trinitarian thought.

In order to situate Olivi in the complex Trinitarian discussions of his time, one would ideally be able to rely on critical editions of all texts where Olivi deals with God’s Triune nature. But even lacking such editions, one finds ideas and themes in Olivi’s writings that appear to align him with such proponents of the strong use of psychology in Trinitarian theology as Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus. Thus, Olivi stresses that the generation of the Son is an intellectual production. Moreover, Olivi is clearly committed to the idea that concept theory can serve to cast light on Trinitarian mysteries. Thus, he explains that the Son is rightly called a Word because “in divine matters, it is easier to be brought to the proper notion of the Son via the common notion of a word.” Since “the common notion of a word” extends not only to spoken and written words but also to mental words or concepts, this means that the proper notion of the Son can be approached via a better understanding of the concept.

It is against this background that we should understand Olivi’s third objection. According to this objection, an application of concept theory to Trinitarian theology is hampered by the concept theory under discussion in the Tractatus. After all,

the Word of God the Father is not generated from the Father as some kind of mirror and some kind of first object in which and by means of which the Father contemplates the things that he understands.

To embrace the concept theory under discussion in the Tractatus, then, is to jeopardize the parallelism between human verbum and divine Word.
In order to better understand why Olivi thinks that accounts like (A) and (B) are unfit to be applied to a Triune God, I will briefly turn to Olivi’s question “whether there is a personal production and plurality in God.” There, he explains that to safeguard the real union of the divine persons, certain views on how the divine intellect works must be rejected. One of them goes as follows:

The highest intelligence [summa intelligentia] apprehends its essence either by means of what is identical with it, or by means of that which is its object. It does not apprehend its essence in the first way [ … ] If, therefore, it understands itself by means of that which is its object (that is, in virtue of the fact it is turned and bent towards itself as to its object), then either from such a turn to itself some cognition or some kind of other thing is begotten for the intelligence itself, or not. If not, then it does not cognize itself in this way. If it is, then there is some kind of cognition here that originated or something that has been produced.

Thus, if God is to know himself, he must turn to himself “as to an object.” If this turn to himself as to an object is to result in divine self-knowledge, something must result from it; namely, “some cognition or some kind of other thing.” Hence, God’s turn to himself results in the generation of a cognition, or in the production of something else. On the account that Olivi describes, it is this residue of God’s intellectual turn to himself that is the divine Word. But such a view, Olivi submits, is “heretical, and exterminates God’s entire unity and perfection.” For the residue of God’s turn to himself would be something that can only be understood as produced, “in such a way that it cannot be without the characteristic of having been originated or without a relation to its origin.” But to postulate something of this kind in God is to postulate “an essential diversity in God.” Also, something of this kind would essentially be dependent on God’s intellectual turn to himself. But then, relations of dependence can “in no way” be in God without compromising his unity.

Hence, Olivi concludes, all that is needed for divine self-cognition to occur is for God to intellectually turn to himself. Nothing that is essentially produced by and dependent on this turn must be postulated. In fact, to think of God’s self-cognition as a product of his intellectual turn to himself is conceptually flawed. For God to intellectually turn to himself as to an object simply is for God to cognize himself. Divine self-cognition is not something different from and essentially produced by God’s turn to himself as to an object.
general note, indeed, “God does not cognize anything by means of something that is like a productive principle.”

We can now see more clearly why Olivi should say that (A) and (B) cannot successfully be applied to the Triune God. Applying these views to God would yield that when God thinks of himself, his thought is productive of a further concept of himself. But this comes very close to saying that from God’s turn to himself, “some cognition or some kind of other thing is begotten.” But as we have seen, Olivi believes that this idea “exterminates God’s entire unity.” Moreover, both (A) and (B) hold that intellectual acts produce concepts that are dependent upon these acts. The dependence of concepts on acts is perhaps most clear in the case of (B), which casts memory-species as mental words. For according to Olivi, memory-species depend on cognitive acts in the way in which figures imprinted in a piece of wax depend on the impression of a signet ring. Hence, an application of (B) or (A) to God would probably yield that from God’s cognitive turn to himself, something dependent upon that turn must ensue. As a result, there would be relations of dependence in God. And, as we have seen, Olivi thinks that to postulate such relations in God is to hazard his Triune nature.

So far, we have come across three objections. First, (A) and (B) fly in the face of Augustine’s authority. Second, it is absurd to speak of memory-species as concepts or mental words. Third, (A) and (B) sit uneasily with Trinitarian theology. In Section 1.2 I turn to Olivi’s fourth objection. According to Olivi’s fourth objection, another, more parsimonious account of conceptual cognition can be given. While Olivi’s direct-realist commitments are certainly recognizable in his discussion of that alternative account, we shall see in Section 1.3 that Olivi is prepared to make a number of concessions to indirect realism in order to account for conceptual thought. Also, we shall see that Olivi’s philosophical disagreement with (B) is minimal. His objections to (B)—to which Olivi dedicates rather more attention than to (A)—are ultimately theological.

1.2 Olivi’s alternative

According to Olivi, concepts or words are not products of intellectual acts. A concept is nothing but the act by means of which the intellect selectively attends to the kind-specific characteristics of an object, ignoring whatever individuating features it might have. In Olivi’s own words:

The first abstraction of universal characteristics occurs in the mere act of abstractive consideration of the real ratio of a common or specific nature without attending or
considering the *ratio* of its individuation. But nothing objective that is different from the foresaid act of consideration is really abstracted or formed from this.⁴⁷

It is my intellectual act itself that represents the kind-specific characteristics of an object. In Olivi’s own words, when I selectively attend to the kind-specific characteristics of an object, these come to exist “intentionally or representatively in the act itself.”⁴⁸ Clearly, this is in line with Olivi’s analysis of sense-perception. Acts are internally structured according to their objects, and this is what makes the former representative of the latter. The production of a further object in which universals would be contemplated as if in a mirror is unnecessary. In fact, such an inner mirror “would rather be an impediment” to our comprehension of, say, human nature, or redness in general.⁴⁹

Thus far, Olivi has resisted the temptation of postulating anything but external objects and inner acts of cognition in order to account for conceptual thought. But the previous passage raises at least one problem. For according to Olivi, “in no way does anything exist outside of the intellect that is not particular.”⁵⁰ So what is this “real ratio of a common or specific nature” that the intellect allegedly has access to? As Pasnau has critically remarked, Olivi speaks “as if he has an unproblematic account of the intellect’s relationship to the outside world.”⁵¹

Yet, in question 13 of his *Sentences*-commentary’s second book, Olivi does try to clarify what he means when he speaks of the “real *ratio* of a common or specific nature” of a thing. In that question, Olivi argues that, even though the world is fundamentally composed of singulars, general concepts do have some footing in reality. He thinks that individual human beings such as John have at least two different *rationes* or “aspects.” Viewed under one aspect, John is this individual human being. Viewed under another, he is a member of the human species. These aspects are not things that we project upon John. John’s individuality and his specific human nature are not in the eye of the beholder. Even so, John’s individuality and his humanity are not two separable parts of him. Olivi says that there is “no real distinction” between John’s individuality and his humanity. Rather, they are distinct in the way in which God qua origin of the Son is different from God qua origin of the Holy Spirit.⁵² Olivi’s concept of *rationes*, then, is an attempt to strike a compromise between his anti-realism and the idea that our general concepts are somehow grounded in external reality. It marks Olivi’s effort to tie together his beliefs that whatever exists is singular and that, yet, external things have kind-specific features that we can access intellectually by selectively attending to them.
The success of Olivi’s compromise is debatable. For one, if John’s kind-specific human ratio is not really distinct from his individuality, how can selectively attending to it give me a truly general concept of human nature—one that pertains to more than the particular human nature of John? Further discussion of the problems surrounding Olivi’s concept of rationes is beyond the scope of this paper.\textsuperscript{53} For now, it is important to note that, so far, Olivi’s account of conceptual thought eschews inner objects of cognition. As in his account of sense-perception, cognitive representations are acts, not objects of cognition.

Indeed, it appears that Olivi is willing to have a direct-realist account of conceptual thought even at the cost of a difficult ontology. It is not surprising, then, that Olivi’s discussion in the Tractatus has been understood as an attempt to extend his direct-realist theory of perception to the domain of conceptual thought.\textsuperscript{54} Nevertheless, as I will point out in Section 1.3, Olivi’s account of conceptual cognition features significant concessions to indirect realism.

1.3 Concessions to indirect realism

These concessions come to the fore most clearly by looking at his explanation of how we recall to mind a concept that was abstracted earlier. As we have seen above, Olivi believes that cognitive acts leave species in our memory just as signet rings leave their imprints on a piece of wax. For example, when I engage in a thought of John’s human aspect exclusively, a memory-species pertaining to John’s human aspect is generated and subsequently stored in intellectual memory. When, after John has disappeared, I want to think of his humanity again (rather than of his individuality), I, as it were, return to this memory-species. In Olivi’s own words, my initial thought of John’s human nature causes “some species in memory, which afterwards remains in us after the act of thought has ceased to be, and we return to it when afterwards we want to recall the things that we first intellectually considered as present in their absence.”\textsuperscript{55}

As Pasnau has pointed out, Olivi’s allowance of memory-species marks “something of a concession to the object-theory, inasmuch as it puts Olivi in agreement that conceptual thought produces some internal representations.” Nevertheless, the concession really is a minor one, Pasnau argues. For according to indirect realism, the mental word “becomes a kind of object of intellectual thought.” By contrast, Olivi’s memory-species plays no such role: memory-species “explain our ability to retain concepts over time, but they fulfill this
role without themselves being the objects of intellect.”\textsuperscript{56} But this view must be qualified. For like Augustine, Olivi does treat memory-species as image-like devices that are objects of cognition. Indeed, Olivi makes it clear that memory-species are not simply forms that actualize a certain cognitive power: “the memory-species does not inform the gaze of a power, so that by means of such a form a cognitive act flows out and is produced.” Such forms after all, do not function as the “extrinsic termini of their acts and of attention.” The memory-species, by contrast, “is required as the extrinsic terminus of attention and of an act.”\textsuperscript{57} Memory-species, then, are objects of cognition:

> Now, the similitudes of things that exist in the cognitive powers are either cognitive acts or the principles of such acts, or memory-species, which take the place of an object, and which do not contribute to an act of cognition, unless a cognitive power is actually turned to them and looks at them and is directed to them.\textsuperscript{58}

Or again, “memory-species only serve as an object that terminates the act and the attention of a power and which represents an absent object to them.”\textsuperscript{59} Olivi further specifies the claim that memory-species are objects of cognition as follows. A memory-species must be cognized “insofar as it is representative of the absent object, rather than insofar as it is in itself an essence quite different from the absent object.”\textsuperscript{60} Only when it is cognized thus do we manage to cognize a past object in a memory-species. Should a memory-species be cognized only “insofar as it is in itself an essence quite different from the absent object,” acts that are directed at memory-species could never pertain to anything but intramental entities. Also, Olivi specifies that a memory-species “takes the place of an immediate object.”\textsuperscript{61} Hence, when I recall to mind a concept, a memory-species stored in intellectual memory is the primary object of my intellect’s activity. This, then, is Olivi’s first concession to indirect realism.

This concession is rooted in a more general claim that Olivi makes about cognitive acts that pertain to absent or non-existent entities. All such acts, Olivi believes, are directed at inner species. While this retreat from direct realism may look surprising in light of Olivi’s views on perception, I do not think that there is a genuine conflict here. In fact, when Olivi says that for a perceptual act to stop at a species (to grasp an object in its image) is more like remembering or imagining the object than like seeing it, he seems to be implicitly relying on an indirect-realist account of recollection and imagination. And when Olivi claims that access
to a species is always inferior to access to the object itself, he need not be disqualifying species as objects of either recollection or imagination. Instead, he may just be pointing to a real qualitative difference between imagining or remembering an object on the one hand and perceiving it on the other.\(^6\) More importantly, throughout his discussions of the different sorts of cognitive activity, Olivi seems to be committed to the idea that for every cognitive act, there is something at which it is directed.\(^6\) In ordinary sense-perception, external objects fulfill this role, and no inner objects are needed. But this changes when I think of something that does not exist. In this case, some kind of inner proxy is needed for my thought to be directed at. Similarly, Olivi finds it hard to see how an act of cognition can be directed at something that is absent. Therefore, when I cognize an absent object, my cognitive act is directed at an inner representation of that object.\(^6\)

Against this background, it is important to observe that Olivi sees an important role for the imagination in conceptual thought. This comes to the fore when Olivi discusses the way in which intellect is dependent on the inner senses for its activities. In this discussion we are told that in order for the intellect to recall material objects, it must collaborate with the inner senses: “thus, the memory-species of the intellect itself cannot sufficiently represent something sensible to the intellect, unless it is undergirded and assisted by an act of the imagination.”\(^6\) Consequently, when I recall a general concept that pertains to something sensible, it is necessary that I also imagine an individual falling under that concept, albeit in a vague and unspecified way:

Thus, the intellect cannot cognize the universal species of sensible objects, unless it cognizes some vague or designated particular that is presented to it by an act of the imagination.\(^6\) For example, whenever I recall the concept “man,” it is necessary that I at the same time imagine a man in at least a vague and unspecified way. How does this work? As Juhana Toivanen has explained, Olivi believes that the imagination draws on memory-species that are stored in the sensory memory.\(^6\) Olivi characterizes such species as “images” of their objects.\(^6\) Hence, he appears to be saying that recalling the concept “man” at a minimum involves scrutinizing a coarse-grained, low-resolution memory-image of a particular human being.

Thus, in analysing conceptual recollection, Olivi makes at least two concessions to indirect realism. (1) For the intellect to recall an object is for it to directly cognize a species that is stored in intellectual memory. (2) In order for such conceptual recollection to take place, it is also required that my intellect scrutinize a (low-resolution) image that is presented to it by the imagination. Olivi’s formulations sometimes suggest that he makes a third
concession: namely, (3) that (low-resolution) images are necessary for all sorts of conceptual cognition. This would mean that such images are needed even when selective attention to John’s human nature causes me to form the general concept “man” for the first time. What (3) suggests, indeed, is that the intellect can concentrate successfully on the kind-specific features of John only if it simultaneously cognizes a (coarse-grained) image of a man.

These concessions cast new light on what exactly is at stake between Olivi and his opponents in the *Tractatus*. According to the proponents of (A), newly acquired concepts are both the products and the immediate objects of abstractive acts. Olivi denies this, and holds that it is the abstractive acts of the intellect themselves that deserve to be called concepts or *verba*. If (3) is correct, however, Olivi does not deny that the acquisition of a concept involves the intellect’s turning to some kind of inner object at some level. While this may look like a modest concession to indirect realism, there is more substantial agreement between Olivi and the proponents of (B).

As (2) makes clear, Olivi believes that conceptual recollection also involves the mind’s turning to images presented to it by the imagination. But moreover, (1) says that we recall concepts by turning our intellects to inner representations stored in intellectual memory. And this is much like what (B) says. According to (B), after all, conceptual recollection is a matter of turning to inner objects of cognition that are somehow stored in the intellect. The main difference between Olivi’s theory of conceptual recollection and (B), it seems, is that whereas Olivi’s opponents refer to the primary objects of conceptual recollection as *verba*, Olivi calls them “memory-species” and maintains that it is “absurd” to speak of memory-species as if they were *verba*.

The rationale behind this latter claim may very well be theological. For as we have seen, Olivi stresses that the divine Word is not “some kind of first object in which and by means of which the Father contemplates the things that he understands.” But then, memory-species as Olivi understands them are precisely immediate objects in which and by means of which things are grasped. So if the parallelism between our word and the divine Word is to be maintained, it would be absurd indeed to identify our words with memory-species. Moreover, the generation of memory-species can be understood along the lines of the way in which figures in wax are imprinted by signet-rings. But arguably, the same cannot be said of the divine Word without introducing relations of dependence in God. So if the mental word is to be the equivalent of the divine Word, the mental word must not be cast as a kind of memory-species.
What this suggests is that, in the end, what is in dispute between Olivi and the proponents of (B) is not the philosophical claim that the recollection of a concept somehow involves the intellect’s turning to an inner object. Rather, what is in dispute is the theological claim that this object deserves to be called a *verbum*. Since, as we have seen, Olivi saw (B) as the most important theory to take issue with in the *Tractatus*, it appears that for Olivi the *Tractatus* was about theology rather than philosophy. This makes it problematic to say that “the essentials of Olivi’s discussion are properly philosophical.”

Again, the *Tractatus* has been cast as an extension of Olivi’s direct-realist theory of perception to the domain of perceptual thought. But such readings underestimate the concessions that Olivi is willing to make to indirect realism. In the end, the *Tractatus* was about safeguarding the Trinity rather than about extending direct realism from the domain of sense-perception to that of conceptual thought.

In Section 2, I turn to Auriol’s account of conceptual thought. As we shall see, Auriol does not make the kind of concessions to indirect realism that Olivi did. Despite the points of agreement between the two authors that we shall also come across, then, their stances *vis-à-vis* indirect realism diverge more than scholars have recognized.

### 2. AURIOL AND INDIRECT REALISM

According to Auriol, we all experience that something “meets the mind’s eye” in conceptual cognition. At several junctures of his *Sentences* commentary, Auriol points out that philosophers have been prone to say that what meets the mind’s eye in conceptual thought is some kind of inner representation. While these representations come in different sorts, Auriol typically portrays indirect realism as saying that intellectual species are the objects of conceptual cognition: representational devices that represent the kind-specific features of an object to the intellect. In what follows, therefore, I shall discuss Auriol’s critique of object-theories mainly in terms of species.

What are the problems that Auriol sees for indirect realism? Auriol’s principal epistemological critique of indirect realism most clearly comes to the fore in a dilemma that he sets up for his opponents. It is on the way in which he develops this dilemma, then, that I shall concentrate in this section. This will also allow me to draw attention to a number of parallels and differences between Auriol and Olivi. Auriol introduces his dilemma by confronting the proponents of indirect realism with a choice. Either the intellect “stops at” scrutinizing an inner object that represents, say, human nature, or it “moves on” from
beholding such a representation to conceiving of human nature as it extramentally exists in individual men. In his own words:

If this be before the intellect and be seen by it, the intellect either stops here [...] or the intuition of the intellect does not stop at this species, but protrudes to the thing through its mediation.74

As Auriol will go on to argue, both options are undesirable for the proponents of indirect realism. The choice that he presents to his opponents, then, amounts to a dilemma. The only way out is to reject the indirect-realist theory of conceptual thought.

Auriol’s line of argument here is reminiscent of one of Olivi’s arguments against the species theory of perceptual representation.75 As we have seen, Olivi presented the proponents of that theory with the following choice: either the perceptual power moves on from a species to a thing, or it does not. Neither option is open to the proponent of the species theory, so he must drop the assumption that perceptual acts take species as their primary objects. Auriol’s critique of the indirect-realist theory of conceptual thought here appears to run parallel to Olivi’s critique of the species theory of perceptual representation, then. Neither Prezioso nor Kraml or Marenbon have compared the ways in which Olivi and Auriol confront their opponents with a dilemma. Yet, Olivi’s and Auriol’s usage of dilemmas to target indirect realist theories clearly makes it tempting to see Auriol as picking things up where Olivi left them, so to speak. While Olivi criticized indirect-realist accounts of perception by presenting them with a dilemma, Auriol reused that same dilemma to target indirect-realist theories of conceptual cognition. It is in the light of passages such as the above, then, that it becomes tempting to cast Olivi and Auriol as like-minded foes of inner cognitive objects.

But this picture needs nuancing. Firstly, as we will see in Section 2.1, Auriol’s presentation and development of the dilemma are somewhat different from Olivi’s. Secondly and more importantly, Auriol’s own account of conceptual cognition does not feature the kind of concessions to indirect realism that Olivi’s account did. I turn to Auriol’s own theory in Section 2.2.

2.1 Auriol’s dilemma

As we have seen above, Olivi thought that if the perceptual power does not move on from a species to a thing, the latter will not really be seen. At most, it will be remembered or
imagined. According to Auriol, for the intellect to stop at an inner representation has a more radical consequence. To stop at an inner representation is to view that representation as an autonomous object of cognition rather than as a device that somehow points to another object. Consequently, when our intellects stop at an inner representation, they have no kind of cognitive engagement whatsoever with anything but the representation itself. Hence, an intellect that stops at inner representations does not form judgments about external reality. It only judges of the cognitive objects that are internal to it, and consequently that is all it has knowledge about:

If [the intellect] is stopped here, we never speak or have knowledge of external things, and we are blind with respect to them.  

Thus, when I stop at, say, the species of a rose, I am caused to think of a species, not of externally existent roses. Similarly, stopping at the species that represents the genus flower, I am not led to think of real flowers, but only of an accident that informs my intellect: the species itself.

Consequently, when my intellect connects the two aforementioned species by means of the copula “is,” this does not cause me to judge that a rose is a flower, but rather that the species of a rose is the species of a flower. And this judgment will be false. For Auriol believes that propositions of the form $S$ is $P$ are true only if “it is truly the same thing that is posited in the subject and in the predicate.” But then, the species of a rose and the species of the genus flower are not “truly the same thing.” In Auriol’s own words:

The conception whereby we internally intuit that roses are flowers would be false, if the rose and flower that we experience as present were intelligible species [ … ] For the one would not be the other.

Clearly, this is too high a price to pay for indirect realism (or indeed for any theory). So what about the dilemma’s second horn, according to which the intellect does not stop at intellectual species, but rather moves on to scrutinizing general natures as they exist in external reality? We have seen that, for Olivi, to say that a perceptual power moves on from a species to a thing is to say that the latter is cognized twice, which Olivi deemed phenomenologically implausible. Auriol makes much the same argument. To opt for the dilemma’s second horn “is against experience: we do not experience that we look at the form of a rose and are
But Auriol goes farther. If the intellect were to move on from beholding the species of a rose to the nature of roses as it is realized in externally existent roses, access to the latter would be indirect. In Auriol’s own terms, the “first” object of cognition would always be a species. Consequently, the intellect would only grasp the nature of roses “as in a mirror.” In Auriol’s own words:

Second, because then the first object of the intellect would be something that exists within the intellect, not the external thing. And in the same way, the first object of a scientific habit and its act [knowing, that is] would be some accidental form in which things are seen as in a mirror.\textsuperscript{80}

In distinction 11 of book II of his Sentences-commentary, Auriol puts forth a related argument. If we would access the nature of roses by first contemplating the species of a rose, our understanding of the former would become discursive:

The intellect, when it cognizes a rose, either stops at the species of the rose, or it moves on from the species to the thing. But if the first is said, it follows that the intellect has no cognition with respect to things; if the second is said, it follows that every act of the intellect regarding things is discursive. Neither of these is the case.\textsuperscript{81}

Two remarks about the context of this passage are in order. First, the context makes it clear that when Auriol speaks of “cognizing a rose,” he means “cognizing a rose simpliciter.”\textsuperscript{82} And for Auriol, to cognize something simpliciter is to cognize it in general.\textsuperscript{83} Second, the above passage stems from Auriol’s article “whether in the angelic intellect, a species is really distinct from the act of thought itself.” But Auriol makes it clear that his conclusions regard the angelic and the human intellect alike.\textsuperscript{84} Hence, the argument that Auriol makes in the above passage may be reconstructed as follows. (a) If the human intellect must move on from species to the nature of roses, it cognizes the latter in a discursive way. But (b) that is not the case.\textsuperscript{85} Therefore (c), the human intellect need not move on from a species to the nature of roses in order to cognize the latter.

In sum, it initially seemed as if the proponent of the indirect-realist theory of conceptual thought could say either that the intellect stops at inner species or that it moves on from species to externally existent natures. On closer inspection, however, neither option turns out to be truly available. The indirect-realist theory of conceptual thought must therefore
be given up. What meets the mind’s eye in conceptual thought, in other words, is not an inner representational device such as a species.

But this is not an unproblematic claim for Auriol to make. For, like Olivi, Auriol is committed to a lean ontology, according to which “everything, insofar as it exists, exists as a singular.” So what exactly is it that the intellect directly has access to when it grasps, say, the nature of roses or when it thinks of humanity in general, if not an inner representation? This question will be addressed in Section 2.2, where I outline Auriol’s own account of conceptual thought.

2.2 Auriol’s alternative

Although he denies that universals exist external to the intellect, Auriol wants to maintain that our general concepts have some fundament in reality. Using language that is reminiscent of Olivi, Auriol explains that objects have several aspects or indeed rationes. Thus, there is an individual aspect to John, but also a more generally human aspect. These aspects, Auriol believes, are not in the eye of the beholder: “the difference between rationes is grounded in the object.” What this means is that John is naturally apt to be conceived of in different ways. It is due to John that I can conceive of him either qua individual or qua man. For Auriol, to conceive of John qua man is to conceive of John as similar to other men. Thus, Auriol thinks that John is naturally apt to be conceived of as similar to his fellow human beings. This similarity, then, is not something that I project upon him, but rather something that is genuinely rooted in John and his fellow men.

This is not to say that there is a human essence that is somehow instantiated in all human beings. According to Auriol, indeed, things can be “highly similar” to each other without literally sharing a property: “there is nothing in me that is in you, and yet there is nothing in me that cannot be highly similar to something that exists in you.” The claim that the similarity between John and his fellow men is rooted in external reality does not compromise Auriol’s anti-realism.

Thus, the following picture of Auriol on conceptual thought begins to emerge. When I look at John qua man rather than qua individual, John appears to my intellect insofar as he is similar to other human beings. This appearance is not mediated by species or other representative devices that become objects of cognition. What appears to the mind’s eye, then, is John’s similarity to Peter, Mary, and all other human beings. It is not some special
representational device. Of course, this picture needs to be further fleshed out. Specifically, we need to ask how Auriol analyses John’s appearance to me as similar to his fellow men. According to Auriol, John’s similarity to his fellow men is represented to me by the very act by means of which I first grasp that similarity: “the cognitive act is that by means of which the universal is represented.” Auriol characterizes this act as a “similitude” that pertains to the humanity of John, Peter, and all other men. This much is reminiscent of Olivi. But contrary to Olivi, Auriol refuses to say of intellectual acts that they are concepts. But then, what are concepts for Auriol?

Auriol believes that when my intellect is informed or configured by a similitude that pertains to the humanity of John and his fellow men, the similarity between John and other human beings appears to me. And he maintains that when something appears to a human cognizer, what appears acquires a special mode of being. When, say, a tree appears to me, the tree acquires the being of what appears: apparent being. Auriol also says that when the tree is an object of my perceptual activity, it acquires the being of an object of cognition: objective being. Thus, when I see a tree, the tree is generated in objective or apparent being by my perceptual act. This analysis applies to intellectual cognition as well. When I think of John, John begets apparent being by an act of my intellect. According to Auriol, John in apparent being is at the same time product and object of an intellectual act. Contrary to Olivi, then, Auriol is not bothered by the idea that one entity is both product and object of a single thought.

If John in apparent being is an object of thought, it is nothing like a “veil” (pallium) between me and John. Rather, John in apparent being is John himself, albeit in a special mode of being. Auriol identifies John in apparent being with the intellect’s concept of John. Thus, he identifies the concept of John with John himself in objective being. As Friedman elegantly puts it: “Auriol has made the concept invisible by identifying it with the thing understood.” In the same vein, when John appears as similar to other men he begets apparent being according to his kind-specific ratio. And the concept “man” is nothing but John in apparent being according to his human ratio. This is to say that the concept “man” is nothing but John himself, albeit according to a specific aspect of him and in a special mode of being.

For Auriol, this account of the concept provides the key to understanding the divine Word too. If concepts can be identified with the things understood through them, a concept or Word of God just is God himself. And thus “everything that is said of the Word can be sustained.” Other theories of the concept jeopardize the unity of God. This also goes for
theories that, like Olivi’s, identify concepts and intellectual acts, “for an act of the intellect is something that inheres and which is really different from the thing of which it is.”\textsuperscript{102} A divine thought inheres in God, and does not coincide with him. Hence, if his concept or Word were an act of thought, God and the Word would fail to coincide, thus introducing diversity within the Triune God.\textsuperscript{103}

On the basis of the foregoing, we can already draw some conclusions about Olivi’s and Auriol’s accounts of conceptual cognition. Firstly, both thinkers practice what has been called a “back-to-the-thing” approach.\textsuperscript{104} But while Olivi goes “back to the thing” by identifying newly acquired concepts with acts of abstraction, Auriol refuses to identify concepts and intellectual acts. For him, a concept is the offspring of an act. This offspring does not come in between subject and object of cognition. On the contrary, concept and object are identical. Secondly, both Franciscans use concept theory to better understand the Trinity. But while Olivi thinks that God’s Triune nature can only be saved by identifying concepts with intellectual acts, Auriol thinks that this approach is detrimental to God’s unity. In at least two respects, then, Olivi and Auriol seek to obtain the same goals through opposite means.

In Section 1 we found that Olivi’s theory of the concept went hand in hand with a number of concessions to indirect realism. These came to the fore in his analyses of conceptual recollection and the collaboration between intellect and imagination in conceptual thought. Thus, the question arises of whether Auriol thinks similarly of the role played by the imagination in conceptual thought. Auriol’s views on recollection and the role that he sees for the imagination in conceptual cognition will be taken up in Section 2.3.

\textbf{2.3 Auriol on recollection and imagination}

Auriol’s analysis of recollection eschews inner images or species. Auriol believes that after I have abstracted the concept “man,” my intellect remains informed or configured by the initial similitude that made human nature appear to me. This does not mean, however, that once I have abstracted the concept “man” I will think ceaselessly of human nature for the rest of my life. While my intellect remains configured by the similitude through which human nature first appeared to me, it does not always “make use” of that similitude. That is, the similitude does not permanently reproduce human nature in apparent being. But like a dormant volcano that can suddenly erupt, a temporarily inert similitude can at a certain moment of time
reproduce the appearance of human nature. This, indeed, is what happens when I recollect the concept “man.” As Auriol formulates the point:

> And thus, after such an appearance, the intellect remains informed by the similitude, but it is not said to actually consider something, because it does not make use of that similitude so that the same object is formed or posited in apparent being and the same conception is formed. And thus Augustine says in book XIV.6 of *De trinitate* that what is known by him who is versed in many disciplines is contained in his memory.\(^\text{105}\)

Thus, Auriol’s analysis of recollection involves no intermediary species or images between me and the object of my mnemonic act. When I recall to mind my concept of human nature, it is human nature itself that appears to me, not a representational device that somehow pertains to it. In a nutshell, then, Auriol’s analysis of recollection does not involve the kind of concession to indirect realism that we found in Olivi.

But, like Olivi, Auriol believes that I cannot recall the concept “man” without some assistance from my imagination: “the recollection of universals does not take place without the assistance of the sensitive powers, which present a particular intention that falls under that universal.”\(^\text{106}\) Indeed, Auriol attaches particular importance to the collaboration between intellect and imagination, which he believes to be emblematic of the unity between body and soul.\(^\text{107}\)

> The body and the soul come to some kind of single undividedness in a special and ultimate perfection, which is the act of the understanding, which results from the imagination and the intellect, both of which concur in an undivided way in that operation.\(^\text{108}\)

Or as he puts it elsewhere: “we do not understand anything that we do not actually imagine.”\(^\text{109}\) Part of what this means is that we cannot think of a universal without at the same time imagining something falling under that universal.\(^\text{110}\) For instance, it is possible to simply engage with the concept “line in general.” When thinking of the concept “line in general,” we always imagine simultaneously some particular line with specific spatial dimensions.\(^\text{111}\)

But how does this work? As we have seen above, Olivi believed that to imagine something was to process an image-like species of it. But Auriol explicitly rejects such a
view. Auriol draws a distinction between “intuitive” and “abstractive” cognition.\textsuperscript{112} Intuitive cognitions are perception-like cognitions through which objects appear to me as present and existent.

To abstractively cognize an object, however, is more like imagining it, and abstractive cognitions do not present their objects as either existent or present. Now, according to Auriol, the exact same object that is now intuited can be imagined later on: intuitive and abstractive cognition “do not differ anyhow as regards their object.”\textsuperscript{113} On this ground, Auriol rejects a way of distinguishing between intuitive and abstractive cognition that he ascribes to Gerard of Bologna.\textsuperscript{114} On the account that Auriol finds in Gerard, an intuition is “a cognition, by means of which a thing is cognized in a totally direct way, without the mediation of a species and an exemplary image,” while abstractive cognition falls short of such directness.\textsuperscript{115} This account would have my perception of Rome terminate at the city of Rome itself but my imagination of Rome at an inner image or species. But, Auriol objects, that means that when I imagine Rome, the object of my cognition is not the same object as when I sense-perceive Rome, which goes against his claim that intuition and abstraction “do not differ anyhow as regards their object.” Thus, Auriol writes:

[Imagination] does not occur via any kind of exemplar, or image, or any other object that someone who imagines beholds when cognizing. Otherwise the Rome that is imagined by the founder of Rome would not be Rome itself, but some image of it.\textsuperscript{116}

On Auriol’s own account, when I imagine, say, my father, the object of that act is my father himself, even though he is present to me in intentional or apparent being only: “the father who is imagined by me is the man himself posited in intentional being, not, indeed, a species, because then the imagination would not pertain to the thing, but to a species only.”\textsuperscript{117} Thus, Auriol criticizes species-theories of the imagination and proposes his own account in terms of apparent being in order to rescue direct cognitive access to external reality even for cognitions that pertain to absent objects. Even imagination reaches out to the external world. It is not confined to an inner realm of species or images.

Consequently, when Auriol says that the grasp of a universal concept always involves imagining an object falling under it, he does not mean that universal cognition always involves processing an image-like species. Again, his analysis of conceptual cognition is significantly different from Olivi’s.
3. CONCLUSIONS

Direct realism is plausible as an account of sense-perception, but it seems more difficult to maintain at the level of conceptual thought. This makes it interesting to see how thinkers with direct-realist commitments such as Olivi and Auriol deal with such thought. Do they extend their direct-realist analyses of perception to the realm of conceptual cognition, or are inner objects of cognition needed to account for conceptual thought?

In this paper we have encountered a number of similarities between Olivi and Auriol. Firstly and most obviously, both thinkers defend direct realism at the level of sense-perception. Image-like species, indeed, would veil rather than reveal external reality. Secondly, both Franciscans believe that reality is fundamentally composed of singulars. At the same time, however, they want to maintain that our conceptual or abstract conceptions are somehow grounded in external reality. Both express this by saying that individuals have certain kind-specific rationes that our intellects can attend to, and which justify our usage of general concepts. Thirdly, we have seen that the dilemma that Auriol presents for the indirect-realist theory of conceptual thought is reminiscent of (though not identical with) one of Olivi’s most important arguments against the species theory of perceptual representation.

Nevertheless, there are important differences between Olivi and Auriol. As we have seen in Section 1, Olivi is prepared to make a number of concessions to indirect realism. While commentators such as Perler, Pasnau, and Panaccio are certainly right to draw attention to the direct-realist themes in Olivi’s Tractatus de Verbo, this work is ultimately about theology rather than about applying direct realism to the domain of conceptual thought. As Friedman has shown, Auriol was deeply committed to using concept theory in order to come to grips with Trinitarian theology too. But in Auriol, this goes hand in hand with an uncompromising stance towards indirect realism. In all sorts of conceptual thought it is external things themselves that appear to us according to their kind-specific rationes. And while Auriol, like Olivi, stresses the role of the imagination even in conceptual thought, he does not believe that to imagine an object is to cognitively engage with an image or representation of it. Rather, when my imagination presents some individual man to me in order to enable an intellectual grasp of human nature, that man himself is present to me in objective being, not some image or species representative of him. Indeed, Auriol would object to Olivi’s account of the imagination, which, as Toivanen has evinced, relies crucially on inner images that function as objects of cognition. What this goes to show is that Olivi’s and
Auriol’s attitudes towards indirect realism differ more than scholars have recognized. The two Franciscans concur in their rejection of indirect-realist accounts of perceptual cognition. To this extent, commentators such as Prezioso, Kraml, and Marenbon are right to see Auriol and Olivi as like-minded foes of indirect realism. But the two philosophers part ways as soon as it comes to analysing the workings of the imagination or indeed conceptual thought.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Peter Auriol. Scriptum super primum sententiarum, ed. E. M. Buytaert (St Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, 1956).


**NOTES**


6 For Olivi, see *II Sent.* q. 13 (I, 246–7). References are to the volumes of Jansen’s edition of the *Quaestiones in secundum librum sententiarum* (Florence: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1922–6). For Auriol, see *Scriptum super primum sententiarum* d. 27 q. 2, a. 2 (ES, ll. 494–5). 


8 See *II Sent.* q. 58 (II, 467–9).


10 *II Sent.* q. 58 (II, 469).

11 *II Sent.* q. 58 (II, 469).

12 *II Sent.* q. 58 (II, 469–70). Perler claims that if the cognitive power does not move on from a species, there will be “keinen kognitiven Zugang zum äußeren Gegenstand” (Perler, *Theorien*, 123). But this is too strong. To imagine or to remember an object is to have some kind of epistemic access to it.

13 *II Sent.* q. 58 (II, 469).


15 “… ipsum etiam obiectum se ipsum praesentat […] et per actum sibi configuratum est quaedam repraesentatio eius.” *II Sent.* q. 72 (III, 35–6).

16 *II Sent.* q. 74 (III, 130).


20 *II Sent.* q. 74 (III, 120–1).

See “Tractatus.” 146: “[verbum] dicit primum objectum eiusdem considerationis a qua efficitur et formatur.”

23 See “Tractatus.” 141: “ipsi ponunt quod verbum serviat de primo objecto non cogitationi illi per quem formatur, sed potius cuidam alteri quae illi primae succedit.”

24 See “Tractatus,” 146.

25 “Tractatus,” 144.

26 “… nos in nobis experimur nos in mente nostra formare novos conceptus et plurium propositionum et conclusionum, qui conceptus in nobis postmodum manent et ad ipsos redimus cum talium propositionum volumus recordari, acsi in ipsis tanquam in speculis veritates huiusmodi propositionum speculari velimus.” (“Tractatus,” 144.)


29 “Tractatus,” 142.

30 “Tractatus,” 141.


32 See Friedman, *Intellectual Traditions*, 275. For discussion of the way in which Franciscans such as Richard of Mediavilla drew on more traditional accounts of the Trinity, see Friedman, *Intellectual Traditions*, 301–14.


34 For Olivi as a forerunner of Scotus, see Friedman, *Intellectual Traditions*, 352.

35 “Erat enim hic sui propositi astruere quod persona Verbi erat coaeterna et intrin- seca Deo Patri, et ab ipso intellectualiter genita.” (“Tractatus,” 137.)

36 “Tractatus,” 137.

37 “Tractatus,” 145.

I Sent. q. 5, in Schmaus, Der Liber Propugnatorius, 169*-70*.

I Sent. q. 5, in Schmaus, Der Liber Propugnatorius, 171*.

I Sent. q. 5, in Schmaus, Der Liber Propugnatorius, 172*.

I Sent. q. 5, in Schmaus, Der Liber Propugnatorius, 172*.

“Quicumque [ … ] in Deo ponit aliquid essentiale absolute et universaliter acceptum esse productum vel principium, in quo quod nullo modo sit ipsum dare nisi cum ratione principiati et cum relatione ad suum principium, ponit in Deo essentialem diversitatem.” I Sent. q. 5, in Schmaus, Der Liber Propugnatorius, 172*.

I Sent. q. 5, in Schmaus, Der Liber Propugnatorius, 172* and 212*.


I Sent. q. 5, in Schmaus, Der Liber Propugnatorius, 172*.


“Tractatus,” 145.

“Tractatus,” 145.

“Tractatus,” 144.

II Sent. q. 13 (I, 234).

Pasnau, “Tractatus,” 130. See also Pasnau, Theories, 276.

“ … inter duas rationes quae in re nullam habent distinctionem, licet utraque veraciter sit in re, sicut in Deo distinguuit rationem intellectus a ratione voluntatis et in Patre rationem productivam Filii a ratione productive Spiritus Sancti [ … ] intellectus potest distinguere inter rationem essentiae et inter rationem individuationis suae” II Sent. q. 13 (I, 248–9). Olivi’s views on the kind of distinction that obtains between John’s individuality and his human
nature are reminiscent of the formal distinction that Scotus sees between *haecceitas* and *quidditas*. For a discussion of the way in which Olivi’s distinction between *rationes* relates to Henry of Ghent’s intentional distinction and Scotus’ formal distinction, see Efrem Bettoni, *Le dottrine filosofiche di Pier di Giovanni Olivi* (Milan: Vita e pensiero, 1959), 237–43. See also Bernhard Jansen, “Beiträge zur geschichtlichen Entwicklung der Distinctio formalis,” *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 53 (1929), 317–44 and 517–44, esp. 519, 528.


See the references at note 7 above.

“Tractatus,” 145.


*II Sent.* q. 74 (III, 116).

*II Sent.* q. 72 (III, 26).

*II Sent.* q. 74 (III, 119).

*II Sent.* q. 74 (III, 115–16).

*II Sent.* q. 76 (III, 149). For memory-species as “similitudines,” see q. 72 (III, 26).

See *II Sent.* q. 58 (II, 468): “nulla species ita repraesentat obiectum sicut ipsummet obiectum repraesentat se ipsum.”

See Toivanen, *Perception and the Internal Senses*, 294–5: “According to Olivi, the cognitive acts of the soul are structured in the following way: (1) a power which is the subject of the cognitive act brings about (2) an act that is intentionally directed at (3) an object.”

“… quod scilicet ad cognitionem vel cogitationem absentium sit necessaria aliqua species pro obiecto, probatur primo, quia omnis aspectus ad obiectum directus terminatur necessario in aliquo, non enim potest aspicere nihil nec terminari in nihil. Oportet etiam quod illud in quo terminatur sit sibi praesens, ita quod virtualiter attingatur ab ipso aspectu. Sed cum cogitamus aliquam rem quae non est actu, aut si est, non est nostro aspectui praesens: tunc aspectus non potest figi et terminari in illa. Ergo oportet quod aliqua rei imago obiciatur tunc aspectui et terminetur ipsum” (*II Sent.* q. 74 [III, 115]).

*II Sent.* q. 74; III, 117. The imagination is not a faculty over and above the common sense for Olivi. Rather, it is a function of the common sense. See *II Sent.* q. 63 (II, 596–602). For discussion, see Toivanen, *Perception and the Internal Senses*, 296–300.

*II Sent.* q. 74; II, 117. Olivi’s position here is reminiscent of Aquinas’. See *Summa theologiae*, pars prima, q. 84, a. 7.

68 For instance, *II Sent.* q. 36 (I, 653).

69 Continuing the passage at note 66: “Nec mirum, quia nec aliquod universale rerum intellectualium potest intelligere, nisi simul cogitet aliquod particulare vagum vel signatum illius universalis” (*II Sent.* q. 74 [III, 117]).

70 See the discussion around note 46.

71 Repeated from note 17.

72 See *Scriptum super primum sententiarum* d. 3, sectio 14, ed. E. M. Buytaert (St Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, 1956), 713.

73 Auriol’s theory of cognition has been the focus of much scholarly discussion, but his critique of indirect realism has received less attention. An exception here is is Prezioso, *La species medievale*, 81–4. Spruit also emphasizes Auriol’s criticism of species, but does not offer a detailed discussion of Auriol’s arguments. See Leen Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge* (Leiden: Brill, 1994), vol. 1, 286–90.

74 *Scriptum*, d. 3, sectio 14, q. 3 (Buytaert, 713). The same dilemma is presented in *Scriptum* d. 9, q. 1, a. 1 (*ES*, ll. 282–91) and d. 27, q. 2, a. 2 (*ES*, ll. 469–89).

75 Given the similarity between Olivi’s and Auriol’s formulations, it is tempting to assume that Auriol was influenced by Olivi in wording his dilemma. I cannot here substantiate that assumption.

76 *Scriptum* d. 27, q. 2, a. 2 (*ES*, ll. 480–3).


78 *Scriptum* d. 27 (*ES*, ll. 470–4). See also *Scriptum* d. 3, sectio 14, Buytaert, 714.

79 *Scriptum* d. 9, q. 1, a.1 (*ES*, ll. 286–7).

80 *Scriptum* I, d. 9, q. 1, a.1 (*ES*, ll. 287–90).

81 *II Sent.*, d. 11, q. 3, a. 1 (129aC).

82 See *II Sent.*, d. 11, q. 3, a. 1 (129aB).

additum ‘rosae’ non dat unitatem alicuius rationis, sed dat carentiam distinctionis quam ponit ‘haec rosa.’”

84 “… pono Propositionem intentam, quod species et intellectio tam in nobis, quam in Angelis, est realiter idem quod actus intelligendi.” II Sent. d. 11, q. 3, a. 1 (127bF).


86 II Sent. d. 9, q. 3, a. 3 (114aF).

87 See Friedman, “Peter Auriol on Intentions.”


89 Auriol defines a ratio as “id quod est conceptibile.” Scriptum, d. 2, sectio 10 (Buytaert, 929). Elsewhere, he writes: “… loquendo de re in ordine ad intellectum, qui cognoscit eandem rem alio et alio conceptu, cum accipit Sortem, ut Sortem, et ut hominem; quaelibet enim res singularis nata est facere de se alium conceptum.” II Sent. d. 9, q. 2, a. 1 (105bF–106aA).

90 “… eadem res potest concipi sub duplici conceptu, uno quidem rei, ut res est absolute, et alio similitudinario et qualitativo [ … ] Sed conceptus specificus est de re, ut simillima alteri rei; conceptus autem individui est de re absolute in se.” II Sent. d. 9, q. 2, a. 3 (114bF–115aA).

91 II Sent. d. 9, q. 1, a. 3 (115aF).

92 Scriptum d. 35, q.1, a.1 (ES, ll. 611–12).

93 For the characterization of intellectual acts as “similitudes,” see Scriptum d. 35, q. 1, a. 1 (ES, ll. 635–42) and II Sent. d. 11, q. 3, a. 1 (128aE).


96 See Scriptum, d. 3, sectio 14 (Buytaert, 696): “actus exterioris sensus ponit rem in esse intentionalii.”

97 “… in omni intellectione necesse est quod res emanet in esse intentionalii.” Scriptum, d. 9, q. 1, a. 1 (ES, l. 324).

98 “Actus autem iste habet duplicem habituidinem ad rem postam in tali esse. Habet enim habituidinem ut quo ponitur productive et habituidinem ut cui obicitur obiective.” Scriptum, d. 3, sectio 14 (Buytaert 709).
99 See *Scriptum*, d. 27, q. 2, a. 2 (*ES*, 598–9). Also d. 3, sectio 14 (Buytaert, 698).

100 Friedman, *Intellectual Traditions*, 585.

101 “Sed si emanet ut Deus positus in esse obiectivo et terminativo ac apparenti, salvantur omnia quae dicuntur de Verbo.” *Scriptum*, d. 27, q. 2, a. 2 (*ES*, l. 865–6).

102 *Scriptum*, d. 27, q. 2, a. 2 (*ES*, l. 872).


105 *Scriptum* d. 35, q. 1, a. 1 (*ES*, l. 640–5). Also *Scriptum* d. 3, sectio 14 (Buytaert, 708) and *Scriptum* d. 27, q. 2, a. 2 (*ES*, l. 696–705).

106 *Scriptum* d. 3, sectio 14, Buytaert, 706–7.


108 *II Sent.*, d. 16, q. 1, a. 1 (221bE).

109 *II Sent.* d. 11, q. 3, a. 3 (139bD). See also *II Sent.* d. 11, q. 3, a. 1 (130bB): “in omni intellectione oportet recurrere ad fantasiata.” Again, one is reminded of Aquinas here. See the reference at note 66 above.

110 See *II Sent.* d. 16, q. 1, a. 1 (222aA): “qui enim necessario intelligit universale, necessario intelligit illud in particulari aliquo.”

111 “… non intelligimus lineam simpliciter, nisi materiata pedali.” *II Sent.* d. 11, q. 3, a. 1 (130aF). Also d. 16, q. 1, a. 1 (222aB). For discussion, see also Michael Renemann, *Gedanken als Wirkursachen: Francisco Suárez zur geistigen Hervorbringung* (Amsterdam: B.R. Grüner, 2010), 32.


113 *Scriptum*, prooemium, sectio 2, Buytaert, 204.

114 David Piché, “L’intuition du non-existant selon Gérard de Bologne et Hervé de Nédellec,” *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 77 (2010), 97 challenges the correctness of this ascription.

115 *Scriptum*, prooemium, sectio 2 (Buytaert, 206).
116 *Scriptum*, proemium, sectio 2 (Buytaert, 206).

117 *Scriptum*, d. 3, sectio 14 (Buytaert, 697–8). Note, however, that Olivi would probably not accept this conclusion without further qualification. As we have seen previously, Olivi believed that if a species is looked at precisely qua representation (and not “insofar as it is in itself an essence quite different from the absent object”), contemplating a species allows for some kind of cognitive access to reality. See note 60.

118 Friedman, *Intellectual Traditions*, 563–94. See also note 103.