Publication

Unpaid overtime in the Netherlands: forward- or backward-looking incentives?

Van der Meer, P. H. & Wielers, R., 2015, In : International Journal of Manpower. 36, 3, p. 254-270 17 p.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

APA

Van der Meer, P. H., & Wielers, R. (2015). Unpaid overtime in the Netherlands: forward- or backward-looking incentives? International Journal of Manpower, 36(3), 254-270. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJM-12-2012-0185

Author

Van der Meer, Peter H. ; Wielers, Rudi. / Unpaid overtime in the Netherlands : forward- or backward-looking incentives?. In: International Journal of Manpower. 2015 ; Vol. 36, No. 3. pp. 254-270.

Harvard

Van der Meer, PH & Wielers, R 2015, 'Unpaid overtime in the Netherlands: forward- or backward-looking incentives?', International Journal of Manpower, vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 254-270. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJM-12-2012-0185

Standard

Unpaid overtime in the Netherlands : forward- or backward-looking incentives? / Van der Meer, Peter H.; Wielers, Rudi.

In: International Journal of Manpower, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2015, p. 254-270.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Vancouver

Van der Meer PH, Wielers R. Unpaid overtime in the Netherlands: forward- or backward-looking incentives? International Journal of Manpower. 2015;36(3):254-270. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJM-12-2012-0185


BibTeX

@article{8a774d1b59524fbc932816b4d247eff7,
title = "Unpaid overtime in the Netherlands: forward- or backward-looking incentives?",
abstract = "The purpose of this paper is to test forward-looking incentives against backward-looking incentives. Design/methodology/approach ? Wage growth model to estimate forward-looking effects of unpaid overtime and a probit model of participation in unpaid overtime controlling for excessive pay to estimate backward-looking effects. The authors use data form the OSA labour supply panel (years 1994, 1996 and 1998). Findings ? The importance of backward-looking incentives is demonstrated in an empirical analysis of participation in unpaid overtime. The authors show that employees who have relatively good wages now or who have had relatively good wages in the recent past participate more often in unpaid overtime. The authors also show that participation in unpaid overtime does not lead to extra wage growth. Research limitations/implications ? These results imply that involvement in unpaid overtime is to be explained from backward-looking incentives, not from forward-looking incentives. The paper concludes that backward-looking incentives deserve more attention in the economic literature, especially as they are well-accepted as work motivation devices by employees. Limitations are the length of the panel study (four years) and the fact that the data are restricted to one country (the Netherlands). Social implications ? Personnel policies should focus more on the intrinsic motivation of personnel rather than on extrinsic motivation. Originality/value ? This is the first paper to test both forward- and backward-looking incentives simultaneously.",
author = "{Van der Meer}, {Peter H.} and Rudi Wielers",
note = "doi: 10.1108/IJM-12-2012-0185; 08 M1 - Journal Article",
year = "2015",
doi = "10.1108/IJM-12-2012-0185",
language = "English",
volume = "36",
pages = "254--270",
journal = "International Journal of Manpower",
issn = "0143-7720",
publisher = "Emerald Group Publishing Limited",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Unpaid overtime in the Netherlands

T2 - forward- or backward-looking incentives?

AU - Van der Meer, Peter H.

AU - Wielers, Rudi

N1 - doi: 10.1108/IJM-12-2012-0185; 08 M1 - Journal Article

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - The purpose of this paper is to test forward-looking incentives against backward-looking incentives. Design/methodology/approach ? Wage growth model to estimate forward-looking effects of unpaid overtime and a probit model of participation in unpaid overtime controlling for excessive pay to estimate backward-looking effects. The authors use data form the OSA labour supply panel (years 1994, 1996 and 1998). Findings ? The importance of backward-looking incentives is demonstrated in an empirical analysis of participation in unpaid overtime. The authors show that employees who have relatively good wages now or who have had relatively good wages in the recent past participate more often in unpaid overtime. The authors also show that participation in unpaid overtime does not lead to extra wage growth. Research limitations/implications ? These results imply that involvement in unpaid overtime is to be explained from backward-looking incentives, not from forward-looking incentives. The paper concludes that backward-looking incentives deserve more attention in the economic literature, especially as they are well-accepted as work motivation devices by employees. Limitations are the length of the panel study (four years) and the fact that the data are restricted to one country (the Netherlands). Social implications ? Personnel policies should focus more on the intrinsic motivation of personnel rather than on extrinsic motivation. Originality/value ? This is the first paper to test both forward- and backward-looking incentives simultaneously.

AB - The purpose of this paper is to test forward-looking incentives against backward-looking incentives. Design/methodology/approach ? Wage growth model to estimate forward-looking effects of unpaid overtime and a probit model of participation in unpaid overtime controlling for excessive pay to estimate backward-looking effects. The authors use data form the OSA labour supply panel (years 1994, 1996 and 1998). Findings ? The importance of backward-looking incentives is demonstrated in an empirical analysis of participation in unpaid overtime. The authors show that employees who have relatively good wages now or who have had relatively good wages in the recent past participate more often in unpaid overtime. The authors also show that participation in unpaid overtime does not lead to extra wage growth. Research limitations/implications ? These results imply that involvement in unpaid overtime is to be explained from backward-looking incentives, not from forward-looking incentives. The paper concludes that backward-looking incentives deserve more attention in the economic literature, especially as they are well-accepted as work motivation devices by employees. Limitations are the length of the panel study (four years) and the fact that the data are restricted to one country (the Netherlands). Social implications ? Personnel policies should focus more on the intrinsic motivation of personnel rather than on extrinsic motivation. Originality/value ? This is the first paper to test both forward- and backward-looking incentives simultaneously.

U2 - 10.1108/IJM-12-2012-0185

DO - 10.1108/IJM-12-2012-0185

M3 - Article

VL - 36

SP - 254

EP - 270

JO - International Journal of Manpower

JF - International Journal of Manpower

SN - 0143-7720

IS - 3

ER -

ID: 20211622