Two Reasons Why Epistemic Reasons are not Object-Given Reasons

Booth, A., 2014, In : Philosophy and phenomenological research. 89, 7, p. 1-14 14 p.

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  • Anthony Booth
In this paper I discuss two claims; the first is the claim that state-given reasons for belief are of a radically different kind to object-given reasons for belief. The second is that, where this last claim is true, epistemic reasons are object-given reasons for belief (EOG). I argue that EOG has two implausible consequences: (i) that suspension of judgement can never be epistemically justified, and (ii) that the reason that epistemically justifies a belief that p can never be the reason for which one believes that p.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-14
Number of pages14
JournalPhilosophy and phenomenological research
Issue number7
Publication statusPublished - 2014


  • Epistemic Justification, Epistemic Reasons, Parfit, Object Given Reasons, Evidentialism , Non-epistemic reasons for belief

ID: 15017881