Publication

The Macroeconomic Effects of Longevity Risk Under Private and Public Insurance and Asymmetric Information

Heijdra, B. J., Jiang, Y. & Mierau, J. O., Jun-2019, In : Economist-Netherlands. 167, 2, p. 177-213 37 p.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

APA

Heijdra, B. J., Jiang, Y., & Mierau, J. O. (2019). The Macroeconomic Effects of Longevity Risk Under Private and Public Insurance and Asymmetric Information. Economist-Netherlands, 167(2), 177-213. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10645-019-09336-y

Author

Heijdra, Ben J. ; Jiang, Yang ; Mierau, Jochen O. / The Macroeconomic Effects of Longevity Risk Under Private and Public Insurance and Asymmetric Information. In: Economist-Netherlands. 2019 ; Vol. 167, No. 2. pp. 177-213.

Harvard

Heijdra, BJ, Jiang, Y & Mierau, JO 2019, 'The Macroeconomic Effects of Longevity Risk Under Private and Public Insurance and Asymmetric Information', Economist-Netherlands, vol. 167, no. 2, pp. 177-213. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10645-019-09336-y

Standard

The Macroeconomic Effects of Longevity Risk Under Private and Public Insurance and Asymmetric Information. / Heijdra, Ben J.; Jiang, Yang; Mierau, Jochen O.

In: Economist-Netherlands, Vol. 167, No. 2, 06.2019, p. 177-213.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Vancouver

Heijdra BJ, Jiang Y, Mierau JO. The Macroeconomic Effects of Longevity Risk Under Private and Public Insurance and Asymmetric Information. Economist-Netherlands. 2019 Jun;167(2):177-213. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10645-019-09336-y


BibTeX

@article{cedcc2c7000b49538910a7d7eba04e95,
title = "The Macroeconomic Effects of Longevity Risk Under Private and Public Insurance and Asymmetric Information",
abstract = "We study the impact of a fully-funded social security system in an economy with heterogeneous consumers. The unobservability of individual health conditions leads to adverse selection in the private annuity market. Introducing social security—which is immune to adverse selection—affects capital accumulation and individual welfare depending on its size and on the pension benefit rule that is adopted. If this rule incorporates some implicit or explicit redistribution from healthy to unhealthy individuals then the latter types are better off as a result of the pension system. In the absence of redistribution the public pension system makes everybody worse off in the long run. Though attractive to distant generations, privatization of social security is not generally Pareto improving to all generations.",
keywords = "ADVERSE SELECTION, LIFE-INSURANCE, ANNUITIES, MARKET",
author = "Heijdra, {Ben J.} and Yang Jiang and Mierau, {Jochen O.}",
year = "2019",
month = "6",
doi = "10.1007/s10645-019-09336-y",
language = "English",
volume = "167",
pages = "177--213",
journal = "Economist-Netherlands",
issn = "0013-063X",
publisher = "SPRINGER",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Macroeconomic Effects of Longevity Risk Under Private and Public Insurance and Asymmetric Information

AU - Heijdra, Ben J.

AU - Jiang, Yang

AU - Mierau, Jochen O.

PY - 2019/6

Y1 - 2019/6

N2 - We study the impact of a fully-funded social security system in an economy with heterogeneous consumers. The unobservability of individual health conditions leads to adverse selection in the private annuity market. Introducing social security—which is immune to adverse selection—affects capital accumulation and individual welfare depending on its size and on the pension benefit rule that is adopted. If this rule incorporates some implicit or explicit redistribution from healthy to unhealthy individuals then the latter types are better off as a result of the pension system. In the absence of redistribution the public pension system makes everybody worse off in the long run. Though attractive to distant generations, privatization of social security is not generally Pareto improving to all generations.

AB - We study the impact of a fully-funded social security system in an economy with heterogeneous consumers. The unobservability of individual health conditions leads to adverse selection in the private annuity market. Introducing social security—which is immune to adverse selection—affects capital accumulation and individual welfare depending on its size and on the pension benefit rule that is adopted. If this rule incorporates some implicit or explicit redistribution from healthy to unhealthy individuals then the latter types are better off as a result of the pension system. In the absence of redistribution the public pension system makes everybody worse off in the long run. Though attractive to distant generations, privatization of social security is not generally Pareto improving to all generations.

KW - ADVERSE SELECTION

KW - LIFE-INSURANCE

KW - ANNUITIES

KW - MARKET

U2 - 10.1007/s10645-019-09336-y

DO - 10.1007/s10645-019-09336-y

M3 - Article

VL - 167

SP - 177

EP - 213

JO - Economist-Netherlands

JF - Economist-Netherlands

SN - 0013-063X

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 83582429