Pares inter pares? The bargaining success of the commission, the council, and the parliament in European Union legislative negotiations

T.J. Selck

doi:10.1002/j.1662-6370.2005.tb00365.x

Publication

Pares inter pares? The bargaining success of the commission, the council, and the parliament in European Union legislative negotiations

Selck, T. J., 2005, In : Swiss Political Science Review. 11, 3, p. 123-140 18 p.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

APA

Selck, T. J. (2005). Pares inter pares? The bargaining success of the commission, the council, and the parliament in European Union legislative negotiations. Swiss Political Science Review, 11(3), 123-140. https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1662-6370.2005.tb00365.x

Author

Selck, T.J. / Pares inter pares? The bargaining success of the commission, the council, and the parliament in European Union legislative negotiations. In: Swiss Political Science Review. 2005 ; Vol. 11, No. 3. pp. 123-140.

Harvard

Selck, TJ 2005, 'Pares inter pares? The bargaining success of the commission, the council, and the parliament in European Union legislative negotiations', Swiss Political Science Review, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 123-140. https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1662-6370.2005.tb00365.x

Standard

Pares inter pares? The bargaining success of the commission, the council, and the parliament in European Union legislative negotiations. / Selck, T.J.

In: Swiss Political Science Review, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2005, p. 123-140.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Vancouver

Selck TJ. Pares inter pares? The bargaining success of the commission, the council, and the parliament in European Union legislative negotiations. Swiss Political Science Review. 2005;11(3):123-140. https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1662-6370.2005.tb00365.x

BibTeX

@article{59b7f348298c4993a0a58b0a745a300e,

title = "Pares inter pares? The bargaining success of the commission, the council, and the parliament in European Union legislative negotiations",

abstract = "This research note tries to determine how politically successful the Council, the Commission, and the European Parliament are in the area of EU legislative decision-making. After reviewing the literature, a research design is presented which incorporates information on the policy preferences of the different institutional actors for 70 recent EU legislative decisions that were negotiated under the consultation and the codecision procedure. We use correlation and OLS regression to analyze the distances between what the EU institutional actors want and what they eventually get out of the process. The findings of the analysis are that (1) the preference profiles of the three actors are rather dissimilar, and that (2) the success rates of the Council are higher than the rates of the Commission and Parliament.",

keywords = "European Union, council, commission, parliament, policy-making, bargaining success, CONDITIONAL AGENDA SETTER, DECISION-MAKING, COMMUNITY, POLITICS, CODECISION, INFORMANTS, POWERFUL, CRITIQUE, LUCKY",

author = "T.J. Selck",

note = "Nella 11 nov No. 508",

year = "2005",

doi = "10.1002/j.1662-6370.2005.tb00365.x",

language = "English",

volume = "11",

pages = "123--140",

journal = "Swiss Political Science Review",

issn = "1424-7755",

publisher = "Wiley",

number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Pares inter pares? The bargaining success of the commission, the council, and the parliament in European Union legislative negotiations

AU - Selck, T.J.

N1 - Nella 11 nov No. 508

PY - 2005

Y1 - 2005

N2 - This research note tries to determine how politically successful the Council, the Commission, and the European Parliament are in the area of EU legislative decision-making. After reviewing the literature, a research design is presented which incorporates information on the policy preferences of the different institutional actors for 70 recent EU legislative decisions that were negotiated under the consultation and the codecision procedure. We use correlation and OLS regression to analyze the distances between what the EU institutional actors want and what they eventually get out of the process. The findings of the analysis are that (1) the preference profiles of the three actors are rather dissimilar, and that (2) the success rates of the Council are higher than the rates of the Commission and Parliament.

AB - This research note tries to determine how politically successful the Council, the Commission, and the European Parliament are in the area of EU legislative decision-making. After reviewing the literature, a research design is presented which incorporates information on the policy preferences of the different institutional actors for 70 recent EU legislative decisions that were negotiated under the consultation and the codecision procedure. We use correlation and OLS regression to analyze the distances between what the EU institutional actors want and what they eventually get out of the process. The findings of the analysis are that (1) the preference profiles of the three actors are rather dissimilar, and that (2) the success rates of the Council are higher than the rates of the Commission and Parliament.

KW - European Union

KW - council

KW - commission

KW - parliament

KW - policy-making

KW - bargaining success

KW - CONDITIONAL AGENDA SETTER

KW - DECISION-MAKING

KW - COMMUNITY

KW - POLITICS

KW - CODECISION

KW - INFORMANTS

KW - POWERFUL

KW - CRITIQUE

KW - LUCKY

U2 - 10.1002/j.1662-6370.2005.tb00365.x

DO - 10.1002/j.1662-6370.2005.tb00365.x

M3 - Article

VL - 11

SP - 123

EP - 140

JO - Swiss Political Science Review

JF - Swiss Political Science Review

SN - 1424-7755

IS - 3

ER -

ID: 1145679

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