On Presumptions, Burdens of Proof, and Explanations

Bodlovic, P., 2020, In : Informal logic. 40, 2, p. 255-294 40 p.

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On the standard view, all presumptions share the same deontic function: they asymmetrically allocate the burden of proof. But what, exactly, does this function amount to? Once presumptions are rejected, do they place the burden of arguing, the burden of explanation, or the most general burden of reasoning on their opponents? In this paper, I take into account the differences between cognitive and practical presumptions and argue that the standard accounts of deontic function are at least ambiguous (because two types of presumptions entail distinct conceptions of the "burden of proof"), and likely implausible. As a result, they require qualifications.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)255-294
Number of pages40
JournalInformal logic
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 2020


  • adequacy, asymmetrical allocation, burden of explanation, burden of proof, cognitive presumption, deontic function, Flat Earth, practical presumption, ARGUMENTATION

ID: 133337544