Explanatory Unification in Experimental Philosophy: Let's Keep It RealHindriks, F., 21-Apr-2019, In : Review of Philosophy and Psychology. 10, 1, p. 219-242 24 p.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review
Experimental philosophers have discovered a large number of asymmetries in our intuitions about philosophically significant notions. Often those intuitions turned out to be sensitive to normative factors. Whereas optimists have insisted on a unified explanation of these findings, pessimists have argued that it is impossible to formulate a single factor explanation. I defend the intermediate position according to which unification is possible to some extent, but should be pursued within limits. The key issue that I address is how it is possible to set such limits in a way that is true to the phenomena.
|Number of pages||24|
|Journal||Review of Philosophy and Psychology|
|Early online date||Mar-2019|
|Publication status||Published - 21-Apr-2019|
- INTENTIONAL ACTION, INDIVIDUAL-DIFFERENCES, JUDGMENTS, ACCOUNT, INTUITIONS, BELIEF, BLAME
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