Publication

European Energy Regulators: An Empirical Analysis of Legal Competences

Jong, T. & Woerdman, M., 1-Mar-2016, In : Competition and Regulation in Network Industries. 17, 1, p. 2-31 30 p.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

APA

Jong, T., & Woerdman, M. (2016). European Energy Regulators: An Empirical Analysis of Legal Competences. Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, 17(1), 2-31.

Author

Jong, T. ; Woerdman, M. / European Energy Regulators : An Empirical Analysis of Legal Competences. In: Competition and Regulation in Network Industries. 2016 ; Vol. 17, No. 1. pp. 2-31.

Harvard

Jong, T & Woerdman, M 2016, 'European Energy Regulators: An Empirical Analysis of Legal Competences', Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 2-31.

Standard

European Energy Regulators : An Empirical Analysis of Legal Competences. / Jong, T.; Woerdman, M.

In: Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, Vol. 17, No. 1, 01.03.2016, p. 2-31.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Vancouver

Jong T, Woerdman M. European Energy Regulators: An Empirical Analysis of Legal Competences. Competition and Regulation in Network Industries. 2016 Mar 1;17(1):2-31.


BibTeX

@article{19f938b4b54c49e082b496efb81e3101,
title = "European Energy Regulators: An Empirical Analysis of Legal Competences",
abstract = "This paper examines empirically whether the differences in legal competences of National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) of European gas and electricity markets are aligned to the corresponding countries{\textquoteright} divergent levels of 1) security, 2) competitiveness, and 3) carbon-neutrality of energy supply. Scores are derived (a) on the extent to which these energy supply characteristics are realized and (b) on how many competences NRAs have regarding these policy objectives. Although higher energy scores should reduce the need for regulatory intervention and thus legal competences, it appears that this does not hold for most of the policy objectives. In fact, gas and electricity market unbundling and liberalization imply higher degrees of regulatory intervention. Finally, the legal competences do not completely follow the {\textquoteleft}optimal{\textquoteright} competence arrangement for regulatory authorities; compared with a theoretical benchmark there are relatively more {\textquoteleft}tough{\textquoteright} than {\textquoteleft}soft{\textquoteright} competences, while the latter are less costly to exercise. These potential regulatory {\textquoteleft}mismatches{\textquoteright} could be corrected by adjusting the number and intrusiveness of the NRAs{\textquoteright} legal powers.",
keywords = "energy markets, National Regulatory Authorities, legal competences, multilevel analysis, security of supply",
author = "T. Jong and M. Woerdman",
year = "2016",
month = mar,
day = "1",
language = "English",
volume = "17",
pages = "2--31",
journal = "Competition and Regulation in Network Industries",
issn = "1783-5917",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - European Energy Regulators

T2 - An Empirical Analysis of Legal Competences

AU - Jong, T.

AU - Woerdman, M.

PY - 2016/3/1

Y1 - 2016/3/1

N2 - This paper examines empirically whether the differences in legal competences of National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) of European gas and electricity markets are aligned to the corresponding countries’ divergent levels of 1) security, 2) competitiveness, and 3) carbon-neutrality of energy supply. Scores are derived (a) on the extent to which these energy supply characteristics are realized and (b) on how many competences NRAs have regarding these policy objectives. Although higher energy scores should reduce the need for regulatory intervention and thus legal competences, it appears that this does not hold for most of the policy objectives. In fact, gas and electricity market unbundling and liberalization imply higher degrees of regulatory intervention. Finally, the legal competences do not completely follow the ‘optimal’ competence arrangement for regulatory authorities; compared with a theoretical benchmark there are relatively more ‘tough’ than ‘soft’ competences, while the latter are less costly to exercise. These potential regulatory ‘mismatches’ could be corrected by adjusting the number and intrusiveness of the NRAs’ legal powers.

AB - This paper examines empirically whether the differences in legal competences of National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) of European gas and electricity markets are aligned to the corresponding countries’ divergent levels of 1) security, 2) competitiveness, and 3) carbon-neutrality of energy supply. Scores are derived (a) on the extent to which these energy supply characteristics are realized and (b) on how many competences NRAs have regarding these policy objectives. Although higher energy scores should reduce the need for regulatory intervention and thus legal competences, it appears that this does not hold for most of the policy objectives. In fact, gas and electricity market unbundling and liberalization imply higher degrees of regulatory intervention. Finally, the legal competences do not completely follow the ‘optimal’ competence arrangement for regulatory authorities; compared with a theoretical benchmark there are relatively more ‘tough’ than ‘soft’ competences, while the latter are less costly to exercise. These potential regulatory ‘mismatches’ could be corrected by adjusting the number and intrusiveness of the NRAs’ legal powers.

KW - energy markets

KW - National Regulatory Authorities

KW - legal competences

KW - multilevel analysis

KW - security of supply

M3 - Article

VL - 17

SP - 2

EP - 31

JO - Competition and Regulation in Network Industries

JF - Competition and Regulation in Network Industries

SN - 1783-5917

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 36726868