Epistemic Ought is a Commensurable Ought

Booth, A. R., Dec-2014, In : European Journal of Philosophy. 22, 4, p. 529-539 11 p.

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  • Epistemic Ought is a Commensurable Ought

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  • Anthony Robert Booth
I argue that the claim that epistemic ought is incommensurable is self‐defeating. My argument, however, depends on the truth of the premise that there can be not only epistemic reasons for belief, but also non‐epistemic (e.g., moral) reasons for belief. So I also provide some support for that claim.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)529-539
Number of pages11
JournalEuropean Journal of Philosophy
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - Dec-2014

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