Embedded cognition and mental causation: setting empirical bounds on metaphysics

Keijzer, F. & Schouten, M. Sep-2007 In : Synthese. 158, 1, p. 109-125 17 p.

Research output: Scientific - peer-reviewArticle

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In this paper, we challenge Jaegwon Kim's version of neural reductionism according to which the causal powers of mental properties are pre-empted by those of neural properties. Using empirical and theoretical developments from the field of embedded cognition, we articulate and defend a notion of process externalism that extends Clark and Chalmers' notion of an extended mind. We argue that process externalism undermines one of Kim's key premises leading to the alternative conclusion that mental causation cannot be reduced to neural causation. Instead, mental properties have their own new causal powers just like other scientifically established macroproperties.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)109-125
Number of pages17
Issue number1
StatePublished - Sep-2007


  • Kim, mental causation, embedded cognition, externalism, EXTERNALISM, DEFENSE, VIEWS, MIND

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ID: 4590942