Publication

Contractualism and the Significance of Perspective-Taking

Timmerman, P., Nov-2015, In : Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 18, 5, p. 909-925 17 p.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

APA

Timmerman, P. (2015). Contractualism and the Significance of Perspective-Taking. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 18(5), 909-925. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-014-9543-7

Author

Timmerman, Peter. / Contractualism and the Significance of Perspective-Taking. In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 2015 ; Vol. 18, No. 5. pp. 909-925.

Harvard

Timmerman, P 2015, 'Contractualism and the Significance of Perspective-Taking', Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, vol. 18, no. 5, pp. 909-925. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-014-9543-7

Standard

Contractualism and the Significance of Perspective-Taking. / Timmerman, Peter.

In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 18, No. 5, 11.2015, p. 909-925.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Vancouver

Timmerman P. Contractualism and the Significance of Perspective-Taking. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 2015 Nov;18(5):909-925. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-014-9543-7


BibTeX

@article{67a9439ee7dd403f872e274fb98b0c48,
title = "Contractualism and the Significance of Perspective-Taking",
abstract = "Many of us think that perspective-taking is relevant to moral judgment. In this paper I claim that Scanlon{\textquoteright}s contractualism provides an appealing and distinctive account of why this is so. Contractualism interprets our moral judgments as making claims about the reasons of individuals in various situations, reasons that we can only recognise by considering their perspectives. Contractualism thereby commits itself to the view that our capacity for moral judgment depends on our capacity for perspective-taking. I show that neither utilitarianism nor Kantianism assign a similar significance to our capacity for perspective-taking.",
keywords = "Contractualism, Moral judgment, Perspective-Taking, Empathy, Scanlon",
author = "Peter Timmerman",
year = "2015",
month = nov,
doi = "10.1007/s10677-014-9543-7",
language = "English",
volume = "18",
pages = "909--925",
journal = "Ethical Theory and Moral Practice",
issn = "1386-2820",
publisher = "SPRINGER",
number = "5",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Contractualism and the Significance of Perspective-Taking

AU - Timmerman, Peter

PY - 2015/11

Y1 - 2015/11

N2 - Many of us think that perspective-taking is relevant to moral judgment. In this paper I claim that Scanlon’s contractualism provides an appealing and distinctive account of why this is so. Contractualism interprets our moral judgments as making claims about the reasons of individuals in various situations, reasons that we can only recognise by considering their perspectives. Contractualism thereby commits itself to the view that our capacity for moral judgment depends on our capacity for perspective-taking. I show that neither utilitarianism nor Kantianism assign a similar significance to our capacity for perspective-taking.

AB - Many of us think that perspective-taking is relevant to moral judgment. In this paper I claim that Scanlon’s contractualism provides an appealing and distinctive account of why this is so. Contractualism interprets our moral judgments as making claims about the reasons of individuals in various situations, reasons that we can only recognise by considering their perspectives. Contractualism thereby commits itself to the view that our capacity for moral judgment depends on our capacity for perspective-taking. I show that neither utilitarianism nor Kantianism assign a similar significance to our capacity for perspective-taking.

KW - Contractualism

KW - Moral judgment

KW - Perspective-Taking

KW - Empathy

KW - Scanlon

U2 - 10.1007/s10677-014-9543-7

DO - 10.1007/s10677-014-9543-7

M3 - Article

VL - 18

SP - 909

EP - 925

JO - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

JF - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

SN - 1386-2820

IS - 5

ER -

ID: 14181368