Clarke's Rejection of Superadded Gravity in the Clarke-Collins Correspondence

Wolf, L., 1-Jul-2019, In : History of Philosophy Quarterly. 36, 3, p. 237-255 19 p.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Copy link to clipboard


  • clarke-collins 27-6

    Submitted manuscript, 314 KB, PDF document

  • Clarke-Collins 11-3

    Final author's version, 323 KB, PDF document

  • Clarke's Rejection of Superadded Gravity in the Clarke-Collins Correspondence

    Final publisher's version, 149 KB, PDF document

    Request copy


In the past, experts have disagreed about whether Samuel Clarke accepted the idea that gravity is a power superadded to matter by God. Most scholars now agree that Clarke did not support superaddition. But the argumentation employed by Clarke to reject superaddition has not been studied before in detail. In this paper, I explicate Clarke's argumentation by relating it to an important discussion about the possibility of superadded gravity in the Clarke-Collins correspondence. I examine Clarke's responses to Collins and draw on his other works to reconstruct Clarke's reasons for rejecting superadded gravity.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)237-255
Number of pages19
JournalHistory of Philosophy Quarterly
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 1-Jul-2019


  • superaddition, active principles, gravity, isaac newton, samuel clarke, anthony collins

Download statistics

No data available

ID: 99352355