Can the Behavioral Sciences Self-Correct? A Social Epistemic StudyRomero, F., Dec-2016, In : Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. Part A. 60, p. 55-69 15 p.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review
Advocates of the self-corrective thesis argue that scientific method will refute false theories and find closer approximations to the truth in the long run. I discuss a contemporary interpretation of this thesis in terms of frequentist statistics in the context of the behavioral sciences. First, I identify experimental replications and systematic aggregation of evidence (meta-analysis) as the self-corrective mechanism. Then, I present a computer simulation study of scientific communities that implement this mechanism to argue that frequentist statistics may converge upon a correct estimate or not depending on the social structure of the community that uses it. Based on this study, I argue that methodological explanations of the “replicability crisis” in psychology are limited and propose an alternative explanation in terms of biases. Finally, I conclude suggesting that scientific self-correction should be understood as an interaction effect between inference methods and social structures.
|Number of pages||15|
|Journal||Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. Part A|
|Early online date||10-Nov-2016|
|Publication status||Published - Dec-2016|
- CUMULATIVE KNOWLEDGE, STATISTICAL POWER, PSYCHOLOGY, REPLICABILITY, METAANALYSIS, REPLICATION, RELIABILITY, THESIS