A survey on the analysis and control of evolutionary matrix gamesRiehl, J. R., Ramazi, P. & Cao, M., 2018, In : Annual Reviews in Control. 45, p. 87-106 20 p.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Review article › Academic › peer-review
In support of the growing interest in how to efficiently influence complex systems of interacting self interested agents, we present this review of fundamental concepts, emerging research, and open problems related to the analysis and control of evolutionary matrix games, with particular emphasis on applications in social, economic, and biological networks. (C) 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
|Number of pages||20|
|Journal||Annual Reviews in Control|
|Early online date||6-Jun-2018|
|Publication status||Published - 2018|
- Evolutionary games, Population dynamics, Equilibrium convergence, Control strategies, LOTKA-VOLTERRA EQUATION, REPLICATOR DYNAMICS, STABLE STRATEGIES, RESPONSE DYNAMICS, POPULATION GAMES, FICTITIOUS PLAY, SNOWDRIFT GAMES, CONTINUOUS-TIME, NETWORKS, CONVERGENCE