A prospect-theory model of voter turnout

Herrmann, O., Jong A Pin, R. & Schoonbeek, L., Dec-2019, In : Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 168, p. 362-373 12 p.

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  • A prospect-theory model of voter turnout

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We incorporate prospect-theory preferences in a game-theoretic model to study voter turnout. We show that voter turnout is heavily affected by agents having subjective reference points with respect to the vote or abstain decision and their subjective probability weighting in the decision-making process. Using empirically based parameter values, we show that our model has lower prediction error than other game-theoretic models with standard expected-utility preferences. We also find that our model maintains desirable comparative statics effects and leads to higher turnout predictions in larger electorates.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)362-373
Number of pages12
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Publication statusPublished - Dec-2019


  • Voting behavior, Downsian paradox, Prospect-theory preferences, LOSS AVERSION, PARTICIPATION, PARADOX, CHOICE, DECISION, CALCULUS, UTILITY

ID: 99432582