A Centrality-Based Security Game for Multi-Hop NetworksRiehl, J. R. & Cao, M. 2-May-2017 (Accepted/In press) In : IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems. 12 p.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
We formulate a network security problem as a zero-sum game between an attacker who tries to disrupt a network by disabling one or more nodes, and the nodes of the network who must allocate limited resources in defense of the network. The utility of the zero-sum game can be one of several network performance metrics that correspond to node centrality measures. We first present a fast centralized algorithm that uses a monotone property of the utility function to compute saddle-point equilibrium strategies for the case of single-node attacks and single- or multiple-node defense. We then extend the approach to the distributed setting by computing the necessary quantities using a finite-time distributed averaging algorithm. For simultaneous attacks to multiple nodes the computational complexity becomes quite high, so we propose a method to approximate the saddle-point equilibrium strategies based on a sequential simplification, which performs well in simulations.
|Number of pages||12|
|Journal||IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems|
|State||Accepted/In press - 2-May-2017|
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