A Centrality-Based Security Game for Multi-Hop Networks

Riehl, J. R. & Cao, M. 2-May-2017 (Accepted/In press) In : IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems. 12 p.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

We formulate a network security problem as a zero-sum game between an attacker who tries to disrupt a network by disabling one or more nodes, and the nodes of the network who must allocate limited resources in defense of the network. The utility of the zero-sum game can be one of several network performance metrics that correspond to node centrality measures. We first present a fast centralized algorithm that uses a monotone property of the utility function to compute saddle-point equilibrium strategies for the case of single-node attacks and single- or multiple-node defense. We then extend the approach to the distributed setting by computing the necessary quantities using a finite-time distributed averaging algorithm. For simultaneous attacks to multiple nodes the computational complexity becomes quite high, so we propose a method to approximate the saddle-point equilibrium strategies based on a sequential simplification, which performs well in simulations.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages12
JournalIEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems
StateAccepted/In press - 2-May-2017

View graph of relations

Download statistics

No data available

ID: 42637345