Publication

A behavioral study of “noise” in coordination games

Maes, M. & Nax, H. H., 1-Mar-2016, In : Journal of Economic Theory. 162, p. 195-208

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

APA

Maes, M., & Nax, H. H. (2016). A behavioral study of “noise” in coordination games. Journal of Economic Theory, 162, 195-208. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.010

Author

Maes, Michael ; Nax, Heinrich H. / A behavioral study of “noise” in coordination games. In: Journal of Economic Theory. 2016 ; Vol. 162. pp. 195-208.

Harvard

Maes, M & Nax, HH 2016, 'A behavioral study of “noise” in coordination games', Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 162, pp. 195-208. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.010

Standard

A behavioral study of “noise” in coordination games. / Maes, Michael; Nax, Heinrich H.

In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 162, 01.03.2016, p. 195-208.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Vancouver

Maes M, Nax HH. A behavioral study of “noise” in coordination games. Journal of Economic Theory. 2016 Mar 1;162:195-208. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.010


BibTeX

@article{f390d1d711b7443abb1f14aa5cff8c46,
title = "A behavioral study of “noise” in coordination games",
abstract = "‘Noise’ in this study, in the sense of evolutionary game theory, refers to deviations from prevailing behavioral rules. Analyzing data from a laboratory experiment on coordination in networks, we tested ‘what kind of noise’ is supported by behavioral evidence. This empirical analysis complements a growing theoretical literature on ‘how noise matters’ for equilibrium selection. We find that the vast majority of decisions (96{\%}96{\%}) constitute myopic best responses, but deviations continue to occur with probabilities that are sensitive to their costs, that is, less frequent when implying larger payoff losses relative to the myopic best response. In addition, deviation rates vary with patterns of realized payoffs that are related to trial-and-error behavior. While there is little evidence that deviations are clustered in time or space, there is evidence of individual heterogeneity",
author = "Michael Maes and Nax, {Heinrich H.}",
year = "2016",
month = "3",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.010",
language = "English",
volume = "162",
pages = "195--208",
journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",
issn = "0022-0531",
publisher = "ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - A behavioral study of “noise” in coordination games

AU - Maes, Michael

AU - Nax, Heinrich H.

PY - 2016/3/1

Y1 - 2016/3/1

N2 - ‘Noise’ in this study, in the sense of evolutionary game theory, refers to deviations from prevailing behavioral rules. Analyzing data from a laboratory experiment on coordination in networks, we tested ‘what kind of noise’ is supported by behavioral evidence. This empirical analysis complements a growing theoretical literature on ‘how noise matters’ for equilibrium selection. We find that the vast majority of decisions (96%96%) constitute myopic best responses, but deviations continue to occur with probabilities that are sensitive to their costs, that is, less frequent when implying larger payoff losses relative to the myopic best response. In addition, deviation rates vary with patterns of realized payoffs that are related to trial-and-error behavior. While there is little evidence that deviations are clustered in time or space, there is evidence of individual heterogeneity

AB - ‘Noise’ in this study, in the sense of evolutionary game theory, refers to deviations from prevailing behavioral rules. Analyzing data from a laboratory experiment on coordination in networks, we tested ‘what kind of noise’ is supported by behavioral evidence. This empirical analysis complements a growing theoretical literature on ‘how noise matters’ for equilibrium selection. We find that the vast majority of decisions (96%96%) constitute myopic best responses, but deviations continue to occur with probabilities that are sensitive to their costs, that is, less frequent when implying larger payoff losses relative to the myopic best response. In addition, deviation rates vary with patterns of realized payoffs that are related to trial-and-error behavior. While there is little evidence that deviations are clustered in time or space, there is evidence of individual heterogeneity

U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.010

DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.010

M3 - Article

VL - 162

SP - 195

EP - 208

JO - Journal of Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Economic Theory

SN - 0022-0531

ER -

ID: 28700134