Publication

« Qui ne risque rien, n’a rien »: Conflict, distributional outcomes, and property rights in the copper- and cobalt-mining sector of the DRC

Katz-Lavigne, S., 2020, [Groningen]: University of Groningen. 318 p.

Research output: ThesisThesis fully internal (DIV)

APA

Katz-Lavigne, S. (2020). « Qui ne risque rien, n’a rien »: Conflict, distributional outcomes, and property rights in the copper- and cobalt-mining sector of the DRC. University of Groningen. https://doi.org/10.33612/diss.112662976

Author

Katz-Lavigne, Sarah. / « Qui ne risque rien, n’a rien » : Conflict, distributional outcomes, and property rights in the copper- and cobalt-mining sector of the DRC. [Groningen] : University of Groningen, 2020. 318 p.

Harvard

Katz-Lavigne, S 2020, '« Qui ne risque rien, n’a rien »: Conflict, distributional outcomes, and property rights in the copper- and cobalt-mining sector of the DRC', Doctor of Philosophy, University of Groningen, [Groningen]. https://doi.org/10.33612/diss.112662976

Standard

« Qui ne risque rien, n’a rien » : Conflict, distributional outcomes, and property rights in the copper- and cobalt-mining sector of the DRC. / Katz-Lavigne, Sarah.

[Groningen] : University of Groningen, 2020. 318 p.

Research output: ThesisThesis fully internal (DIV)

Vancouver

Katz-Lavigne S. « Qui ne risque rien, n’a rien »: Conflict, distributional outcomes, and property rights in the copper- and cobalt-mining sector of the DRC. [Groningen]: University of Groningen, 2020. 318 p. https://doi.org/10.33612/diss.112662976


BibTeX

@phdthesis{a360064288a94b4e88e5b76b8cb9456b,
title = "« Qui ne risque rien, n{\textquoteright}a rien »: Conflict, distributional outcomes, and property rights in the copper- and cobalt-mining sector of the DRC",
abstract = "The Democratic Republic of Congo is rich in the copper and cobalt in high demand on the world market. In southeastern DRC, large-scale mining (LSM) has a long history, with a resurgence following the end of civil war in 2003. This revival of LSM investment resulted in the displacement of artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) by companies. These dynamics are sometimes conceptualised in academic literature and policymaking as resulting in constant conflict between LSM companies and artisanal miners, yet there is variation in conflict. I link this variation to the interactions between three key facets of the property rights (PR) regime at and around LSM sites, which I call corporate enforcement, authorised clandestine extraction, and unauthorised clandestine extraction. Clandestine mining persists as outside actors push into LSM concessions. The security forces use coercive tactics to try to “close” LSM sites to unpaid access by artisanal miners. Conflict erupts when the cost of providing property rights and enforcing informal agreements becomes too high for security guards whose employment is at risk, and for companies with reputational concerns. The interactions of the different facets also have consequences for resource distribution among groups including women, different categories of traders, and ethnic communities. Therefore, corporate property rights are negotiated and contested: the security forces and government actors define and enforce other PR in contexts of “illegality”. These findings help explain why artisanal miners frequently operate peacefully at LSM sites. My findings have relevance for other African countries where artisanal miners operate “illegally”.",
author = "Sarah Katz-Lavigne",
year = "2020",
doi = "10.33612/diss.112662976",
language = "English",
isbn = "978-94-034-2328-9",
publisher = "University of Groningen",
school = "University of Groningen",

}

RIS

TY - THES

T1 - « Qui ne risque rien, n’a rien »

T2 - Conflict, distributional outcomes, and property rights in the copper- and cobalt-mining sector of the DRC

AU - Katz-Lavigne, Sarah

PY - 2020

Y1 - 2020

N2 - The Democratic Republic of Congo is rich in the copper and cobalt in high demand on the world market. In southeastern DRC, large-scale mining (LSM) has a long history, with a resurgence following the end of civil war in 2003. This revival of LSM investment resulted in the displacement of artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) by companies. These dynamics are sometimes conceptualised in academic literature and policymaking as resulting in constant conflict between LSM companies and artisanal miners, yet there is variation in conflict. I link this variation to the interactions between three key facets of the property rights (PR) regime at and around LSM sites, which I call corporate enforcement, authorised clandestine extraction, and unauthorised clandestine extraction. Clandestine mining persists as outside actors push into LSM concessions. The security forces use coercive tactics to try to “close” LSM sites to unpaid access by artisanal miners. Conflict erupts when the cost of providing property rights and enforcing informal agreements becomes too high for security guards whose employment is at risk, and for companies with reputational concerns. The interactions of the different facets also have consequences for resource distribution among groups including women, different categories of traders, and ethnic communities. Therefore, corporate property rights are negotiated and contested: the security forces and government actors define and enforce other PR in contexts of “illegality”. These findings help explain why artisanal miners frequently operate peacefully at LSM sites. My findings have relevance for other African countries where artisanal miners operate “illegally”.

AB - The Democratic Republic of Congo is rich in the copper and cobalt in high demand on the world market. In southeastern DRC, large-scale mining (LSM) has a long history, with a resurgence following the end of civil war in 2003. This revival of LSM investment resulted in the displacement of artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) by companies. These dynamics are sometimes conceptualised in academic literature and policymaking as resulting in constant conflict between LSM companies and artisanal miners, yet there is variation in conflict. I link this variation to the interactions between three key facets of the property rights (PR) regime at and around LSM sites, which I call corporate enforcement, authorised clandestine extraction, and unauthorised clandestine extraction. Clandestine mining persists as outside actors push into LSM concessions. The security forces use coercive tactics to try to “close” LSM sites to unpaid access by artisanal miners. Conflict erupts when the cost of providing property rights and enforcing informal agreements becomes too high for security guards whose employment is at risk, and for companies with reputational concerns. The interactions of the different facets also have consequences for resource distribution among groups including women, different categories of traders, and ethnic communities. Therefore, corporate property rights are negotiated and contested: the security forces and government actors define and enforce other PR in contexts of “illegality”. These findings help explain why artisanal miners frequently operate peacefully at LSM sites. My findings have relevance for other African countries where artisanal miners operate “illegally”.

U2 - 10.33612/diss.112662976

DO - 10.33612/diss.112662976

M3 - Thesis fully internal (DIV)

SN - 978-94-034-2328-9

PB - University of Groningen

CY - [Groningen]

ER -

ID: 112662976