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It's not Economic Interventionism, Stupid! Reassessing the Political Economy of Radical Right-wing Populist Parties

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Abstract: *This paper engages in a comparative analysis of the economic positions of radical right-wing populist parties in Western Europe. Following Ennser-Jedenastik (2016), we argue that those parties' political economy is best captured in terms of the nativist, populist and authoritarian features of their core ideology, each of which produces a specific set of economic policies independent from the issue of government intervention in the economy. On basis of an analysis of the election manifestos of seven radical right-wing populist parties in Western Europe in the period 2005-2015, we argue that those parties share similarities in their economic nativism, authoritarianism and populism, whilst their positions on the traditional role of the state in the economy are more diverse. The findings indicate also a unified 'nativist' response to the global financial crisis both in terms of welfare chauvinism and economic protectionism. We discuss the role of internal and external factors in explaining the economic profile of radical right-wing populist parties.*

KEYWORDS: Radical right-wing populist parties, Economic policies, Populism, Welfare chauvinism, deserving poor

Introduction¹

Recently, there is a growing interest in the economic agendas of radical right-wing populist parties (RRPPs) (Mudde 2016: 11). Indeed, there are important reasons to study their economic agendas: economic issues are becoming more salient for these parties (Akkerman et al. 2016; Eger and Valdez 2015; Lefkofridi and Michel 2014). The global financial crisis in particular may have forced all parties, including RRPPs to address these issues, as they had to face the question who would pay the cost of the crisis (Mudde 2016). The government participation of RRPPs has also forced these parties to develop and expand

¹ The authors would like to thank Andrej Zaslove and Sarah de Lange for their extensive contributions to development of this research project. We are grateful to Riina Leppänen and Jørgen Eikva Axelsen for their coding assistance. We would also like to thank Leonce Röth, Thomas Widmer and the anonymous reviewers of this journal for their useful comments and suggestions. This paper was previously presented at the 2014 ECPR General Conference in Glasgow. The research project was graciously supported by the Montesquieu Institute and Radboud University.

their programmes. As these parties move closer to the steering wheel, the question of which economic policy direction RRPPs take becomes more important because they may be able to put their agendas into practice (Jørgensen and Thomsen 2016).

As the economic agendas of radical right-wing populist parties become increasingly important, important questions persist. The most important of these is *what policy positions do RRPPs take on economic matters and how these positions relate to their radical right-wing populist ideology*. Kitschelt and McGann (1995) and Kriesi et al. (2008) place them on the economic right, while others such as Lefkofridi and Michel (2014) see these parties moving further to the left on the economy. Rovny (2013) and Afonso and Rennwald (2018) argue that RRPPs cannot be characterized consistently on the left-right dimension. In this paper, we seek to extend the approach developed by Ennser-Jedenastik (2016), who builds on Mudde (2007) and argues that the economic ideology of RRPPs is best captured not in terms of left and right but in terms of those parties' core ideology which consists of nativism, populism and authoritarianism. The core idea of this approach is that these parties may diverge on a traditional economic left-right dimension that divides between those which favour government intervention and those which support market-based solutions, but that they share a commitment to economic nativism, economic populism and economic authoritarianism. Each of these has economic implications such as limiting welfare state access for immigrants, reducing the number of civil servants and punishing welfare fraudsters. Ennser-Jedenastik studied this for the Austrian Freedom Party.

We seek to extend this approach in three dimensions: first, we take a comparative perspective to test whether the patterns that Ennser-Jedenastik (2016) hold for more cases. Our selection of cases covers most RRPPs in Western Europe, thus providing an appropriately diverse sample for the analysis of differences and similarities in the economic agenda of those parties. Second, we extend the approach of Ennser-Jedenastik (2016), who only looked at the welfare state agenda of the FPÖ to a broader range of economic issues, including macro-economic management, housing and education policies. Finally, we look at change over time and examine the impact of the global financial crisis on the economic agendas of RRPPs. We examine whether the crisis may have been an impetus for parties to become more similar in terms of economic nativism, authoritarianism and populism, choosing to let foreigners, undeserving poor and elites pay the cost of the crisis.

We use the confrontational method to estimate the economic policy positions of our parties of interest (Louwse and Pellikaan 2018). While essentially explorative and descriptive, the empirical analysis in this paper gives ample support for the argument that the economic policies of the RRPPs can be understood as deriving from their ideological core of their nativism primarily as well as their populism and, to a lesser extent, their authoritarianism. We see diversity between RRPPs in terms of their position on the left-right dimension, and find that these parties share similarities in their economic nativism, populism and authoritarianism. Our findings do suggest a unified nativist response to the global financial crisis both in terms of welfare chauvinism and economic protectionism.

RRPP and the Economy

Most accounts of the economic policies of the RRPPs are based on traditional left-right economic positions. There is a lack of academic consensus regarding the economic positions of these parties. Until recently, most authors agreed that RRPPs were right-wing, neo-liberal on economic matters. Kitschelt and McGann (1995) considered the combination of authoritarian positions on cultural matters and right-wing positions on

economic matters a ‘winning formula’. The electoral success of these parties in the 1980s and early 1990s could be understood, they argued, by the combination of market-oriented solutions to economic problems and repressive, nationalist answers to cultural problems. In the decade that followed, RRPPs distanced themselves from their opposition to government intervention to adopt a more moderate economic policy profile (McGann and Kitschelt 2005). De Lange (2007) showed that RRPPs actually advance centrist economic views and this may actually offer a ‘new winning formula’ of moderate positions on economic issues and culturally authoritarian positions.

Recent studies such as Kriesi et al. (2008, 2012) and Eger and Valdez (2015) still place these parties on the economic right, although they both recognize that these parties are not as right-wing as they used to be. Others such as Lefkofridi and Michel (2014) take this argument one step further and argue that RRPPs parties have moved to the left on economic issues. In a similar vein, Betz and Meret (2013: 121) contend that those parties increasingly propose a mix of leftist economic solutions and nativist cultural policies, which, as research of Van der Brug and Van Spanje (2009) suggest, could represent a new winning formula. Hartevelde (2016) sees a similar left-wing shift, but his findings suggest that RRPPs that are economically left-wing have less support among higher educated and upper middle class voters.

The uncertainty concerning the current economic policy positions of the RRPPs stems predominantly from the variation between RRPPs across countries and over-time. As Mudde (2007: 123) observed “the party family spread a significant part of the whole dimension between the two poles of *laissez faire* and state economy”. Eastern European RRPPs have generally been observed to be closer to the political left, while RRPPs in Western Europe have generally been considered parties of the right. Because traditional economic views are not at the core of the RRPP message, those parties have considerable flexibility in choosing their economic position on the basis of those circumstances. Even when particular free market policies were “employed successfully, as it was by the French Front National in the mid-1980s, it was a tactical tool to be abandoned as soon as the political wind changed and protectionism and welfare chauvinism seemed more promising” (Minkenberg, 2000: 173-174). During the 1990s, many RRPPs shifted to the centre on economic issues while broadening their appeal to voters (De Lange 2007). Bernhard (2017: 513-514) observes considerable diversity in the positioning of different radical right-wing populist parties in Switzerland on the economic left-right dimension. Rovny (2013: 5-6) argues that RRPPs project vague, contradictory and ambiguous positions on economic issues in order to attract as many voters as possible with their nativist cultural agenda. Afonso and Rennwald (2018) open up a different perspective suggesting that the nativist agenda of RRPPs does not produce any ‘natural’ type of economic policy on traditional left-right issues. Instead, we should examine the economic agenda of radical right-wing populist parties from the perspective of their core ideology.

Ennsner-Jedenastik’s ‘Group-based Approach’

The variability and flexibility of the positions of RRPPs on the traditional issue of state intervention in the economy make it more difficult to characterize a common economic profile for RRPPs. To identify what those parties actually share in the economic realm, we take a different approach. This approach is inspired by the work of Ennsner-Jedenastik (2016) and based on the idea that we should understand the economics of RRPPs on their own terms, that is as epiphenomena of their nativist, populist and authoritarian ideology.

In his examination of the Austrian FPÖ's social policy profile, Ennser-Jedenastik (2016) defines this approach as a 'group-based' account because the core ideology of RRPPs produce economic policies that are favorable to some specific social groups (e.g. natives, common people, deserving poor groups such as the elderly) and unfavorable to others (e.g. non-natives, the elites and undeserving poor groups). In this paper, we look at the broader economic implications of the core ideology of RRPPs and how nativist, authoritarian and populist elements are reflected in the economic policy of those parties. We extend the approach of Ennser-Jedenastik (2016), who only looked at welfare state policies, to all economic issues defined as *all ways in which the government can intervene or abstain from intervening in the economy*. We do not only include welfare state or healthcare issues, but also macro-economic management, housing and education policies inasmuch as they have implications for, for example, the budget, economic growth, or economic (in)equality.

The approach of Ennser-Jedenastik explicitly builds further on the work of other authors, in particular Mudde (2007) who proposed that the core ideology of these parties is characterized by populism, nativism and authoritarianism. What is innovative in Ennser-Jedenastik's approach is that he claims that all three elements inform the economic agenda's of these parties, while Mudde (2007), who only sees nativism informing the economic agendas of RRPPs. Ennser-Jedenastik's approach stands in contrast to most political scientists who distinguish between one economic dimension and one or more non-economic dimensions that structure the political space (Hooghe et al. 2002; Kitschelt 2001: 279; Kriesi et al. 2008). This non-economic dimension is sometimes explicitly labelled as 'post-materialist' (Inglehart 1981). Hooghe et al. (2002: 976) are an illustrative case. They talk about their Green-Alternative-Libertarian/Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist dimension, which taps into similar issues, as being the result of the contestation of "issues concerned with lifestyle, ecology, cultural diversity, nationalism, and immigration". They argue that "certain substantive issues, including . . . asylum policy and environmental policy, are closely tied to new politics concerns." Rather than conceptualizing particular ideological dimensions as pertaining specific (economic or non-economic) issue areas, Ennser-Jedenastik shows that what appear to be cultural concerns related to authoritarianism, populism and nativism can also inform economic policy. In other words, he argues that social-economic politics is multidimensional (see also Häusermann and Kriesi 2015).

First, Ennser-Jedenastik (2016) makes it credible that *nativism* is visible in the economic agenda of RRPPs. Mudde (2007: 19) conceptualizes nativism as an ideology that holds that the state should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group. It creates a dichotomy between 'us' and 'them' and sees nonnative elements as fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation state. The core of economic nativism is that the national economic interest is under threat from foreign forces which can take two different forms: immigration and free trade. The opposition to immigration on economic grounds has a long history in anti-immigrant populist parties and it can be seen for instance in the opposition to Catholic migration to the United States by the Know-Nothing Party (Betz 2017: 340). In European welfare states, welfare chauvinism has developed the belief that in order to maintain solidarity within the welfare state, the welfare state should be restricted to native people while foreigners should be excluded (Betz 1994: 173-174). We can see economic nativism for instance in the way the Austrian Freedom Party, the party which Ennser-Jedenastik uses to illustrate his typology, presents itself: the party explicitly positioned itself as the 'social homeland party' (Ennser-Jedenastik 2016: 416), combining social economic protection with attachment to the homeland. Welfare chauvinism is the most widely identified element of the economic policies of RRPPs (Lefkofridi and Michel

2014; Mudde 2007; Norocel 2016; Schumacher and Van Kersbergen 2016). Second, however, there is economic protectionism. Whereas welfare state chauvinism is about protecting the welfare state against the external threat of immigrants, economic protectionism is about protecting the country against the external threat of unregulated free trade. Among right-wing populist voters nativism is closely tied to opposition to trade openness (Van der Waal and De Koster 2017). While liberal proponents of free trade argue that, in the long term, it is beneficial for economies to be open because it allows them to specialize, radical right-wing populists see trade in the short-term as a zero-sum game where the production of goods can either employ people in the one's own country or abroad. Since the 1990s, RRPPs have emerged as strong opponents of economic globalization (Zaslave 2008). These parties believe that “the economy should serve the nation and should be controlled by it” (Mudde 2007: 186–187). This could mean protecting national industry and closing borders to international trade.

Mudde (2007: 23) conceptualizes *authoritarianism* as a belief in a “strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are punished severely”. It shows clear links with the law-and-order policies that radical right-wing populists favour and, for many parties, it is associated with their moral conservatism. Ennser-Jedenastik (2016), Ivaldi (2015) and Afonso and Papadopolous (2015) link authoritarianism to the distinction between deserving and undeserving poor, that is between those who cannot work because of their old age or disability and therefore deserve government benefits and those who can work but prefer to live off social benefits. The poverty of the first group is a consequence of circumstances outside their control, the poverty of the second group is seen as a consequence of their moral failing. The overlap between this undeserving-deserving dichotomy and authoritarianism lies in the idea that those who break the rules and norms should be punished severely. Undeserving poor may break existing laws if they commit welfare fraud; they also break norms about the welfare state when they live off benefits when they do not need them or when they receive benefits without having worked (hard) for them. The undeserving poor constitute an internal threat to the welfare state which in order to maintain solidarity between working and deserving poor people, must be excluded from the welfare state. So punishing the undeserving poor is an economic expression of authoritarianism. To test whether radical right-wing populists use this deserving-undeserving schema, we will also check whether they identify specific groups as deserving of (more) social assistance. The idea of ‘deservingness’ has been developed further in the sociological literature on welfare state support (Will 1993). Van Oorschot (2006) has shown that pensioners and disabled people are generally seen as deserving poor. Pensioners have worked hard their entire lives; the handicapped are poor because of circumstances beyond their control.

Finally, *populism* postulates a struggle between the ‘pure people’ and the ‘corrupt elite’. Politics should translate the views of the people into policy, which the current ruling elite refuses to do. Populism is commonly seen as a ‘thin-centered ideology’ that must attach to other more substantive sets of ideas (Mudde 2007; Stanley, 2008). As such, populism may be combined either with a right-wing or a left-wing ideology. In the European context, populism has been predominantly associated with parties of the right, either neo-liberal or radical right-wing populists (Mudde 2007; Pauwels 2010), although Rooduijn and Akkerman (2017) show that populism is increasingly found among parties of the contemporary European radical left. Latin American populism, on the other hand, has been mostly associated with a left-wing ideology of social inclusion (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013). While social, neo-liberal and radical right-wing populists clearly express

divergent economic policy preferences, these are primarily rooted in the “thicker” ideologies these parties attach to their populism, such as socialism or neoliberalism. In this paper, we follow Ennser-Jedenastik (2016) and reason from the core of populism, that is the opposition between the elite and the people, independent from left and right. Economic policies specifically meant to limit the economic role of elites can be considered populist. These can be political elites, whose salaries should be cut. In the public sector, populists could oppose privileged insiders such as managers, board members, directors and bureaucrats, who focus too much on their own self-interest and neglect the interests of the teachers, students, doctors and patients their institutions are supposed to cater to. The central idea is that populists oppose ‘rent-seeking’ behaviour: that instead of serving the general good as they are supposed to, economic or political elites use their power to their own benefit. Moreover, populists may oppose too much control for managers and bureaucrats in the public sector if that means that the real experts (e.g. teachers and nurses) can no longer exercise their expertise.

Based on the premise that the economic positions of RRPPs reflect primarily their core nativist, authoritarian and populist ideology, we formulate the following expectations:

- 1 **Economic Nativism:** RRPPs have similar economic protectionist and welfare chauvinist positions.
- 2 **Economic Authoritarianism:** RRPPs have similar positions that benefit the deserving poor and exclude or punish the undeserving poor.
- 3 **Economic Populism:** RRPPs have similar economic anti-elite positions.

In contrast with the expectations above that RRPPs will converge around nativist, authoritarian and populist economic policies, we anticipate that those parties will exhibit less consistency in the economic positions they assume on a common left-right axis of competition. The left-right dimension is conceptualized here in terms of the issue of economic interventionism, which reflects the traditional polarity between state and market (Downs 1957). The left favours regulation of business and high taxes, while the right favours lower taxes and smaller government. In this paper, we use party positions concerning taxes and regulations to tap into the position on the issue of interventionism. We formulate an additional expectation:

- 4 **Economic Interventionism:** RRPPs show diverging positions on issue of government intervention in the economy.

Finally, we are also interested in the possible effect of the global financial crisis and the Eurozone crisis on the economic agendas of RRPPs. In the wake of the crisis, governments have proposed far-reaching cuts, austerity measures and privatizations aimed at making welfare states more competitive and balancing budgets. In the Eurozone, these measures were taken under pressure of the European Commission. While we acknowledge that some important economic policy shifts by RRPPs may have occurred prior to the 2008 crisis, possibly relating to other factors, we propose that RRPPs may have responded in different ways. We expect that RRPPs have become more economically nativist, populist and authoritarian during the crisis. The rationale behind our expectation is that the cost of the crisis has to be put somewhere. These parties may want to send the bill to elites, immigrants and the undeserving poor, by cutting on bureaucracy, limiting the access of immigrants to the welfare state and increasing penalties for committing social fraud. The crisis may in this sense unify RRPPs and make them more similar in terms of their economic populism, authoritarianism and nativism.

5 **Economic Crisis:** RRPPs have more similar positions where it comes to economic authoritarianism, nativism and populism, after the crisis than before the crisis.

On the other side, the crisis may have diversified parties. As it may have created an opportunity for some RRPPs, most particularly within the Eurozone, to redefine their position and move to the left in opposition to austerity policies pursued by governments and the the European Commission. Alternatively, some RRPPs may have felt vindicated and pursued an even sharper policy of budget cuts and tax reduction. This may be particularly the case for parties with a neo-liberal populist background, and those outside the Eurozone.

Case Selection

This article examines the positions of eleven RRPPs in West European countries for the period before and during the European sovereign debt crisis (see Table 1). We cover practically all major West-European radical-right-wing populist parties.² This selection provides a good mix of parties from countries that are inside of the Eurozone (FPÖ, PVV, FN, PS, LN, and VB) and those outside of it (UKIP, SD, DF) or the EU all together (SVP and FrP). The development of the economic agendas of these parties may not necessarily only reflect the Eurozone crisis and it may be the result of other external or internal circumstances. While the N of this study is too small to compare explanatory factors in a systematic way, our selection of cases offers sufficient variance on other aspects, which may help explain the economic positions of these parties. First, this selection gives a good mix of parties that are transformations from centre-right parties (FPÖ, PS and SVP), splits from centre-right parties (PVV and UKIP) and parties that have their roots in a nationalist subculture (FN, SD and VB) or parties with a more idiosyncratic background (FrP, DF and PS). RRPPs with their origins in the traditional centre-right or with an anti-tax legacy may be more likely to take right-wing anti-interventionist economic positions. Moreover, our selection includes parties that have been in government (SVP, LN and FPÖ), that have supported minority governments (DF, FrP³ and PVV) as well as parties that have been traditionally blocked from government and secluded behind a 'cordon sanitaire' (FN, SD and VB). Government participation may lead RRPPs to adopt economic policies similar to their coalition partners. Finally, our selection includes two RRPPs with a distinctly regionalist orientation (VB and LN), which may or may not impact on those parties' economic policies.

As regards our selection of data, we chose manifestos for every party from years before the sudden on-set of the financial crisis (in 2008) and after it had devolved into the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis (which started in the end of 2009). One should note here that these countries are all Western European countries where the impact of the financial and Eurozone sovereign debt crisis has been much weaker than in Southern European countries such as Greece, Spain and Portugal which were bailed out, and which has led to a different regional political landscape (Otjes and Katsanidou 2017), but note that in Spain and Portugal there is no radical right-wing populist party in parliament, while in Greece the crisis caused the demise of one right-wing populist party and the formation of another.

² One exception is the Alternative for Germany/*Alternative für Deutschland* which did not exist before the European sovereign debt crisis and therefore cannot be included in the analysis.

³ The FrP and PS entered government in 2013 after the last election manifesto that was studied was written.

Table 1: Selected Cases of Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties

Country	Name			History			Manifesto			
	EU	English	National Language	Abbr.	Type	From	Founded	Level	Pre	Post
Austria	Euro	Freedom Party of Austria	<i>Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs</i>	FPÖ	Transformation ^a	Centre right	1955	National	2006	2013
Belgium	Euro	Flemish Interest	<i>Vlaams Belang</i>	VB	Transformation	Extreme right	2004	Regional	2007	2014
Denmark	EU	Danish People's Party	<i>Dansk Folkeparti</i>	O	Split	Anti-tax	1995	National	2001	2009
Finland	Euro	Finns Party	<i>Perussuomalaiset</i>	PS	Transformation	Agrarian populist	1995	National	2007	2011
France	Euro	National Front	<i>Front National</i>	FN	Transformation	Extreme right	1972	National	2007	2012
Italy	Euro	Northern League	<i>Lega Nord</i>	LN	Merger	Regionalist	1991	Regional	2008	2013
Netherlands	Euro	Freedom Party	<i>Partij voor de Vrijheid</i>	PVV	Split	Centre right	2005	National	2006	2012
Norway	Not EU	Progress Party	<i>Fremskrittspartiet</i>	FrP	Birth	–	1973	National	2005	2013
Sweden	EU	Sweden Democrats	<i>Sverigedemokraterna</i>	SD	Transformation	Extreme right	1988	National	2006	2010
Switzerland	Not EU	Swiss People's Party	<i>Schweizerische Volkspartei</i>	SVP	Transformation ^b	Centre right	1971	National	2007	2015
United Kingdom	EU	United Kingdom Independence Party	Independence Party	UKIP	Split	Centre right	1993	National	2005	2015

^aWe argue that the FPÖ as a radical right-wing party is a transformation of the FPÖ as a conservative liberal party. This transformation occurred around 1986 (Ennsner-Jedenastik 2016).

^bWe argue that the SVP as a radical right-wing party is a transformation of the SVP as a conservative agrarian party. This transformation occurred in the 1980s and the 1990s.

Data and Methods

This paper uses the confrontational method to estimating party policy positions from election manifestos (De Lange 2007; Gemenis and Dinas 2010; Louwse and Pellikaan 2018; Pellikaan et al. 2007). This method works from a positional approach to party competition, assuming that parties that are further to one extreme on an ideological scale are more likely to take consistent and similar positions on this scale. So, an extreme left-wing party is likely to take left-wing positions on a range of issues, while a centre-left party is likely to take centrist positions on some issues, left-wing positions on other issues and perhaps even right-wing positions on some issues.

We construct four issue scales: an interventionism scale, an economic populism scale, an economic nativism scale and an economic authoritarianism scale. We do not claim that these are the dimensions that structure the political conflict on the economy in general, but rather that these issue scales allow us to measure to what extent economic interventionism, populism, authoritarianism and nativism inform the economic views of RRPPs. This gives us a yardstick for comparisons over time and between countries. For each issue scale, we included at least four statements that related to the issue under consideration. All items are listed in the Appendix. An example of an item measuring economic protectionism is: "Foreign imports should be limited". Any proposal to limit foreign imports, such as tariffs and quota would lead a party scoring a one on this item. For instance, the French Front National wrote in its 2012 manifesto:

*"Smart protection at borders will be implemented to fight against unfair competition from countries with very low cost of labour and the offshoring that is the consequence of that."*⁴

If a party only makes statements against tariffs and quota and in favour of foreign trade, it scores a minus one. For instance, the Progress Party wrote in 2013:

"The Progress Party wants Norwegian tariff rates and protection regulations to be gradually removed as part of international negotiations"

If a party makes some statements against tariffs and some in favour, it scores a zero. If a party makes no statement on foreign trade whatsoever, it scores a zero.⁵ Four experienced coders coded the manifestos of the eleven RRPPs both before and after the crisis, leading to twenty-two manifestos in total.

In order to move beyond the positions of these parties on individual policies to some aggregate measures, a scaling method is necessary to ensure that the dimensions pick up on meaningful variation. The strength of the underlying issue scales is assessed using Mokken scaling (Van der Schuur 2003). Mokken scaling is a type of scaling specifically developed for items with a limited number of answering categories, where the distributions are unlikely to follow a normal distribution, which applies to the dichotomies we are employing. The best way to think of the method is to think of answers that students give to a test. These answers can be either correct or incorrect. Mokken scaling seeks to order questions from those that are easy (that a lot of students answer correctly) to questions that are difficult (that a lot of students answer incorrectly). The idea is that all items measure the same underlying concept. If too many answer patterns do not follow this pattern (e.g. students who answer difficult questions correctly do not know the answer to

⁴ All translations are by the authors.


⁵ Most zeros are assigned because a party has no declared position.

easy questions), the items do not measure the same underlying concept. This error is expressed in terms of the H-value. If the H-value is lower than 0.3, a scale is considered too poor to be used.⁶ We present scales for items that form a scale of at least minimum scalability. The values of the economic nativism and economic authoritarianism are comparatively low, indicating that not all the items pick up on the same variance. The higher H-value of the interventionism dimension may reflect that this dimension traditionally structures party competition.

Economic Nativism

First, we examine to what extent these parties incorporate their nativism, which is usually seen as part of their cultural agenda, into their economic agenda. Figure 1 shows the positions of RRPPs on an issue scale of economic nativism items as measured pre-crisis (on the x-axis) and post-crisis (on the y-axis). This issue scale consists of six items. Four of these tap into welfare chauvinism and two into economic protectionism. These six items form a barely sufficient scale (H=0.32). Before the crisis (examining the values on the x-

Figure 1: Economic Interventionism Before and After the Crisis



⁶ One might argue that in this paper however we do not test the idea that different parties have *diverse* positions on an issue that are structured by some latent dimension, but rather that they have a similar position. One could go as far as to claim that if all these parties have the same position, most of the variations within the group are random. If, however, positions are more heterogeneous and positions are the result of substantive differences between these parties, scaling methods will yield more meaningful results. We can check whether the relatively low scalability values are due to parties being concentrated on one side of the scales. If we use the current three-value coding (minus one, zero, one), most values are one side of the dimension. If we instead use two-value coding (zero and one), the values instead cover the entirety of the scale. Doing this only increases the scalability by 0.02 on average. This indicates that the low scalability values are not due to the concentration on one side of the dimension. The low H-values do not reflect the fact that the parties are relatively homogeneous but rather that these items do not pick upon the same variance.

axis), the FN, DF and FPÖ score quite high on economic nativism. Schumacher and Van Kersbergen (2016) have suggested that DF is a pioneer in its explicit welfare chauvinism, advocating that welfare should be restricted to natives. The FN has also promoted such policies, arguing that “when it comes to social housing, all else being equal, housing should be offered to people with the French nationality”. On the other side of the scale, UKIP has a negative score on the dimension. This is because of its commitment to free trade, which it proposes as an alternative to European integration. This party has only recently taken a populist radical right course, therefore its previous economic platforms remained unaffected by this (Ford and Goodwin 2014).


One can see changes after the crisis by examining how parties deviate from the diagonal line. Those on the left of the diagonal line have become more nativist (their nativism after the crisis is higher than their nativism before the crisis). Practically all our RRP parties have increased their nativism during the crisis. The changes for the PS and SVP are quite marked. They are at the top of the figure. Some parties take more moderate positions such as Lega Nord. Its intermediate position reflects the specific leadership of the Lega at the time. In 2013, the Lega under Roberto Maroni adopted a more moderate anti-immigration platform, compared to its previous leadership. Significant changes have occurred since Matteo Salvini took over the party in December 2013, however. As Ivaldi et al. (2017) show, the Lega under Salvini has returned to a clear nativist profile: the party calls to stop the ‘invasion’ of migrants and advocates priority to nationals (*prima i nostri*) in welfare and jobs. It has endorsed economic nativism, strongly opposing financial interests and large corporations, while simultaneously rejecting the EU and free trade agreements such as Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Finally, three parties (FPÖ, DF, FN) decreased albeit marginally their economic nativism. However, in the case of DF, the party did reinforce its economic nativism as the crisis became more politically salient in the public debate (Jupskås 2015: 30).

Thus, our findings suggest that, in line with our expectations, nativism is present in nearly all radical right-wing populist parties. This is particularly true after the on-set of the economic crisis, as we expected. However, the level of nativism differs between countries and over time. All in all, this shows that while demand for the welfare state grew during the crisis, radical right-wing populists proposed to limit access for immigrants to the welfare state and, while unemployment rose, these parties proposed limiting free trade.

Economic Authoritarianism

Second, we look at economic authoritarianism that is whether these parties distinguish between groups that deserve government aid, such as seniors, and other groups that do not deserve government aid, such as individuals who scam the welfare state. Our scale of economic authoritarianism consists of a mix of three policies oriented at limiting welfare state support for those who exploit it (that is to punish the undeserving beneficiaries of the welfare state) and two policies oriented at expanding welfare state support for those who need it (in particular pensioners). The items meet the minimum requirement of scalability ($H=0.34$). Figure 2 shows the positions of our parties of interest. Four parties, the PS, SD, FPÖ and UKIP show little economic authoritarian tendencies. The PS even scores negatively because of the belief that former convicts (typically an undeserving group) need socially viable conditions instead of lower benefits to break the cycle of crime. Other parties, such as the SVP and FrP, pick a greater number of economic authoritarian

Figure 2: Economic Nativism Before and After the Crisis



policies. FrP pledged for instance “to introduce an activity obligation for all recipients of social benefits. Failure to take part in such activities [would] have consequences for the recipient”.


Looking at change over time, our parties fall into three categories. Three parties have maintained their low levels of economic authoritarianism (UKIP, SD and FPÖ). Five parties have become more economically authoritarian during the crisis (PS, LN, FN, PVV and VB), but another three have become less economically authoritarian (DF, FrP and SVP). PVV scores highest on economic authoritarianism. This party makes a clear distinction between those who do not deserve government support and those who actually do, in particular the elderly. Most notably, the PVV’s opposition to budget cuts to pensions, required by the European Union, led to the fall of the Rutte I government that the PVV supported (Afonso 2015).

In general, compared to economic nativism there are two notable differences: first, there is no clear move towards more authoritarian positions, in contrast to our expectation. After the crisis, some parties have increased while others have decreased their economic authoritarianism. Moreover, a large number of parties show continuously low levels of economic authoritarianism, indicating clearly that economical authoritarianism is not necessarily a feature of the economic program of every RRPP. This suggests that support for the expectation concerning economic authoritarianism is considerably weaker than for economic nativism.

Economic Populism

Next up is economic populism: this is specifically understood as a kind of economic anti-elitism, opposed to elites and privileged insiders, such as managers in the public sector, civil servants and ‘the political class’. The items form a consistent scale ($H=0.40$). As can

Figure 3: Economic Authoritarianism Before and After the Crisis



be seen in Figure 3, the PVV has a consistently high score on this scale. Its anti-elitist attitudes inform clearly how the party approaches the public sector: the party describes the current state of Dutch education as “education-molochs with thick layers of management” and proposes to put “the axe to the layers of management”. The FPÖ, the SVP and the LN also voice opposition to spending on and the power of elite groups. Most of their criticism concerns civil servants. In the case of the Swiss SVP, the rising relevance of economic populism fits with the party’s persistent anti-establishment profile (Mazzoleni 2016). The Finnish PS consistently scores zero on these items while the Danish DF in 2001 actually called for more power to managers in higher education and the “strengthening of management tools, [to] prioritize business plans and [to] strengthen the management’s responsibility on all levels”, thus leading to a negative score on this item.

When it comes to change over time, we see a pattern: six of our RRPPs increased their economic populism during the crisis. The Dutch PVV, the Austrian FPÖ and the Finnish PS exhibit stability over time, at high, medium and low scores, respectively. In contrast, the FrP and SD show a clear moderation of their economic populist agenda. In the case of the FrP, the party embarked on a process of mainstreaming from 2006 onwards under the new leadership of Siv Jensen, which culminated in being accepted as governing party for the first time in 2013 (Jupskås 2016). While the party has kept its radical positions on important niche issues (i.e. anti-immigration and law and order), it has become significantly less anti-establishment oriented in recent years. The SD also tried to become a more respectable party during the same period in order to gain parliamentary representation for the first time (Jungar 2015: 55). In both cases, the deliberate attempt to moderate may account for the weakening of their economic populism. Overall, our findings suggest that most RRPPs became more populist after the crisis. Our expectation was that radical right-wing populist parties should all share economic populism. With the

Finnish PS as a notable exception, we find that most RRPPs share at least some elements of economic populism.

Are economic populism, authoritarianism and nativism strongly empirically related or do they represent different phenomena? Table 2 shows the correlations between the different dimensions. We see that economic nativism and economic authoritarianism show an intermediate correlation. There is also a moderate correlation between economic authoritarianism and economic populism. This suggests that the parties that have tend to score high on one of these dimensions also score high on the others. This is true in particular of the FN, SVP and PVV, which all score high on the three dimensions. Their economic message is clearly informed by their radical right-wing populist ideology. The FPÖ has intermediate scores, but it shows a lesser degree of economic authoritarianism. This corroborates Ennser-Jedenastik's (2016) finding that the FPÖ does not explicitly seek to limit welfare state access for undeserving poor in its program. The economic platforms of the SD and the VB reflect albeit to a lesser extent their authoritarianism, populism and nativism. For the SD this seems partly related to the lack of specific policy proposals in its manifesto. After all, the infamous campaign video in 2010 was all about welfare chauvinism, portraying a group of women in burkas and niqabs with strollers running to take the welfare resources of an elderly lady with a walker (Widfeldt 2015: 188). The VB was clearly an economically right-wing party before the crisis, with less pronounced positions on economic nativism, populism and authoritarianism. Because of its regionalist profile, the VB differs however from most other parties in this study and may not fit entirely our definition of nativism. For instance, the 'others' against whom the VB seeks to defend the interests of Flemish natives are not necessarily immigrants but also French-speaking Walloons. As indicated in the party's 2007 manifesto: "Belgium is one large transfer engine that systematically takes the wealth from Flanders and transfers it to Wallonia". For the VB, it is not welfare chauvinism or protectionism that advances the economic interests of the 'in-group' but rather separatism and the decentralization of competences on social security and pension policies. A similar conclusion applies to the Italian Lega Nord, which exhibits a strong regionalist profile both in 2008 and 2013, advocating regional autonomy and pitting the interests and values of Northern Italy against the South and the central state (Figure 4).


Economic Interventionism

Finally, we look at the economic left-right ideology of the RRPPs with the expectation that on these issues these parties should be more diverse. We see that the four items concerning taxes and regulations form a homogeneous scale ($H=0.51$), particularly when compared to the other scales. We specifically excluded social security items from this scale because support for such services may reflect economic authoritarianism rather than pro-government intervention positions. In doing so, we seek to measure economic interventionism in these parties without any interference from their economic authoritarianism, nativism or populism. Our findings show that most of our RRP parties have an essentially right-wing economic orientation. This is particularly the case with the FrP and the SVP. These findings are in line with earlier research, which sees these parties as essentially mainstream liberal parties in respect to economic issues (Bernhard 2017: 514; Jupskås 2015). A similar orientation is also found in the VB, FN and UKIP, which all advocate traditional right-wing economic policies. The Finns Party takes a notably centrist position, making it the most to the economic left of all our parties before the crisis. This

Table 2: Correlations among Items

Scale	Items	H	Econ. Auth.	Econ. Pop.	Econ. Inter.
Economic Nativism	6	0.32	0.43	0.12	-0.10
Economic Authoritarianism	5	0.34		0.43	-0.30
Economic Populism	4	0.41			-0.09
Economic Interventionism	4	0.51			

Figure 4: Economic Populism Before and After the Crisis



reflects the PS’s position in national politics, whereby the party defines itself as an alternative to both the “cold market economy” and “socialist policy of centralisation”. Ylä-Anttilla and Ylä-Anttilla (2015) go even further to emphasize that this party has adopted a “left-wing populist” position, however we see no such evidence of a left-wing drift in terms of the items that we use here. Thus, looking at pre-crisis RRP economic positions, the pattern here is very much in line with our initial expectation that parties with a previous mainstream right or anti-tax legacy are consistently economically right-wing.

If we compare the positions before and after the crisis, one thing clearly stands out: the clear move from the economic right to the economic left of the French FN. The Eurozone crisis has created an opportunity for the FN to portray itself as the defender of the French welfare state and of voters in the lower social strata, blaming the EU and its agenda of austerity for attacking France’s generous welfare state. These findings are consistent with those of Ivaldi (2015) who shows that the FN has significantly shifted its economic platform from a predominantly right-wing to a left-wing location in 2012, adopting a social populist agenda, and that this strategic move has been associated with the change in

party leader which occurred in 2011.⁷ Unlike the FN, most of our RRP parties stayed the same or moved only marginally during the crisis. For instance, the Norwegian FrP and the Swiss SVP maintained their clear right-wing position. Both the Norwegian and Swiss economies were fairly mildly affected by the financial crisis and were spared from rising unemployment (Jupskås 2015). Moreover, being outside the Eurozone meant also that these two countries were largely unaffected by the subsequent Euro-crisis. Norwegian politics was thus primarily characterized by 'business as usual' (Jupskås 2015). In line with our initial expectation, our data show no clear pattern of a unified left-right economic RRPP response to the crisis. There is only a moderate correlation between the economic interventionism scale and Eurozone membership indicating that RRPPs outside the Eurozone are more classically right-wing than those inside.

It is not necessarily the case that the position of these parties on economic authoritarianism, populism or nationalism is an articulation of their position on state intervention in the economy. We can see this in the absence of strong correlations between the positions of these specific parties on the economic interventionism scale, on the one hand, and the other scales in Table 2, on the other hand. This demonstrates the usefulness of our extended 'group-based approach'. Our expectation was that parties should have more diverging positions on the economic interventionism dimension compared with the other dimensions deriving from their core RRP ideology. The FN in particular and the PS to a lesser extent contribute to this diversity.

Conclusion

This paper has given an account of the economic agenda of RRPPs in Western Europe, and the extent to which these parties have adapted their economic policies in the context of the global financial crisis. While most studies of the economic agenda of RRPPs are concerned with the left-right economic placement of those parties rather than disaggregating their policy positions, we followed Ennsner-Jedenastik (2016) group-based account which argues that the economic agenda of RRPPs is shaped by their nativist, authoritarian and populist ideology, each of which produces a specific set of economic policies, independent from the parties' positions on the more traditional issue of state intervention in the economy.

Our expectation was that RRPPs would share a common nativist, authoritarian and populist economic profile, while simultaneously showing more variability in their positions on classic left-right economic issues. We found such similarities in particular on economic nativism and populism, as well as differences in terms of the positions assumed by our parties of interest on the issue of state intervention, which gives ample support to Ennsner-Jedenastik's (2016) group-based approach. The French FN, the Dutch PVV and the Swiss SVP have consistently pursued economic policies informed by their populist radical right ideology since the mid-2000s. Lower or more mixed scores were found for the Progress Party, the Danish People's Party, the VB, the Lega Nord, the True Finns and UKIP, reflecting differences in the historical roots of those parties. Other factors, such as the separatism of the VB and Lega Nord and UKIP Euroscepticism, may be equally relevant to these parties' economic profiles. Overall, we find that parties that tend to be border

⁷ There are also indications that after their poor performance in the 2011 Danish election, the DF became more concerned with economic policies and moved to left emphasizing public sector growth and unemployment benefits as a consequence of poor campaign performance in 2011 election (Christiansen 2016: 98-99). However, we do not see this change in our data because the DF manifesto is from 2009 before this switch.

cases in terms of their inclusion in the RRPP family tend to have economic agendas that are to a lesser extent informed by these aspects.

Our findings suggest marked diversity and flexibility of RRPPs' positions on issues of state intervention. Only one party, the French FN, has made a clear dash towards the left on the economic interventionism scale during the crisis. Other parties, however, such as the Norwegian Progress Party and the Swiss People's Party, have maintained a right-wing economic course. These parties come from countries that were affected least by the impact of the financial crisis. Moreover, we found no evidence of any clear relationship between the positions on the issue of economic interventionism and those deriving from the core features of the populist radical right ideology.

These findings make a significant contribution to the existing literature on West European RRPPs by suggesting that those parties have developed a distinctive economic policy which is primarily derived from their core ideology and which is independent from traditional left-right economic issues. Economic nativism appears to be the most important unifying factor of RRPPs, most evidently in the post-crisis period. These findings corroborate the central place taken by welfare chauvinism in the literature on the economic policy of RRPPs. Most of the parties in this study show a high score on the economic nativism scale, which includes both welfare chauvinism and protectionism. These parties pledge to spare native citizens and let foreigners pay for the crisis by cutting expenditures that would benefit these groups. Conceptually, however, welfare chauvinism is only one part of the story of nativism. Many of these parties have embraced anti-globalization policies and pursue economically protectionist trade policies. These parties exhibit also a common and relatively consistent agenda of economic populism, which claims to restrict the influence of and spending on elite groups and privileged insiders. Finally, some of these parties share economic authoritarianism: many of these parties, but not all, are in favour of limiting support for the undeserving beneficiaries of the welfare state, while simultaneously expanding it for deserving groups.

We found some evidence of a unified response to the global financial crisis across all our cases. RRPPs have grown more similar after the crisis in ramping up economic nativism, in the form of restricting access to the welfare state for immigrants. They have also become more prone to show economic populism, advocating for instance cuts on bureaucracy and managerial positions. Rather than turning to more economically interventionist positions, West European RRPPs have made the nativist and populist aspects of their ideology an even more integral part of their increasingly distinct economic agenda. The absence of an economic authoritarian response to the crisis might be the result of an unfavourable discursive opportunity structure as undeserving poor within the nation-state could hardly be blamed for rising unemployment.

Future research on RRPP parties should continue to focus on economic issues, including, first, the extent to which the saliency (and not only policy positions) may have shifted because of the crisis and, second, the extent to which economic nativism, authoritarianism and populism are increasingly important also for the voters of these parties. This may have important implications not only for our understanding of electoral behaviour, but also for patterns of coalition formation.

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Appendix

Table A1: List of Items

#	Category	Item
1	Nativism	When determining housing assignment a greater preference should be given to nationals.
2	Nativism	In social security a greater preference should be given to nationals.
3	Nativism	In healthcare a greater preference should be given to nationals.
4	Nativism	Immigrants will only receive welfare benefits if they integrate into the national society.
5	Nativism	Foreign imports should be limited.
6	Nativism	Crucial national sectors should be in national hands.
7	Authoritarianism	Those who receive welfare but refuse to work should receive less welfare.
8	Authoritarianism	Criminals should receive less welfare
9	Authoritarianism	Those who scam the welfare system should receive less welfare.
10	Authoritarianism	Disability benefits should be limited to those who really cannot work.
11	Authoritarianism	The disability benefit should be increased.
12	Populism	The role of managers in education should be limited.
13	Populism	The number of civil servants should be reduced.
14	Populism	Spending on the 'political class' should be cut.
15	Interventionism	Taxes for companies should be lowered. (flipped)
16	Interventionism	Income taxes should be lowered in general. (flipped)
17	Interventionism	Regulations for companies should be cut. (flipped)
18	Interventionism	Labour markets should be liberalized. (flipped)

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