Moksadharma 187 and 239-241 reconsidered

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Objekttyp: Article
Band (Jahr): 53 (1999)
Heft 3

PDF erstellt am: 31.05.2018
Persistenter Link: http://doi.org/10.5169/seals-147462

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In his \textit{Untersuchungen zum Moksadharma (Die \sāmkhyistischen Texte)} (1925) and in the chapter on Sāmkhya of his \textit{Geschichte der indischen Philosophie} (1953) FRAUWALLNER has shown \textit{Moksadharma} 187 and 239-241\textsuperscript{1} to be of crucial importance for understanding the development of the Sāmkhya-system. The great Viennese scholar dealt with yet another chapter (\textit{MBh (B) 12.286}), which however has been omitted in the critical edition, but is preserved in the critical apparatus to 187. Conceived as different versions of one and the same "Grundtext," they must, FRAUWALLNER argued, have been held to be of great significance at the time and probably led an independent existence before they were included in the collection of doctrines of the \textit{Moksadharma}. FRAUWALLNER attempted a reconstruction of this "Grundtext" by sorting out words and passages that were judged by him not to have belonged to this text originally. He succeeded in giving a clear description of a distinctive philosophy, which he denominated "die epische Urform des Sāmkhya."\textsuperscript{2} An important conclusion of his reconstruction is that the so called "evolution theory" had not yet been developed; according to FRAUWALLNER the evolution theory was adopted by the Sāmkhya later from circles that taught an evolution out of \textit{Brahman}.\textsuperscript{3}

VAN BUITENEN (1956) also stressed the importance of these texts, but contrary to FRAUWALLNER’s conclusions, he maintained that an evolution theory can be traced in them. Out of both texts he reconstructed a small tract, which somehow had come to be included in this text-group. He recovered this tract by isolating and arranging those verses in which the

\textsuperscript{*} We thank our colleague David ATKINSON for correcting the English of this article.

\textsuperscript{1} FRAUWALLNER uses a different numbering, based on the Bombay edition: 194 and 247-249. \textit{MBh 12.239-241} is also transmitted as part of the \textit{Brahmapurāṇa}: BrP 237.43-238.14.

\textsuperscript{2} FRAUWALLNER 1953, 288-299.

\textsuperscript{3} Two texts according to FRAUWALLNER have been a major influence upon the development of the evolution theory: \textit{MBh 12.224} and the first book of the \textit{Manusmrtyi} (FRAUWALLNER 1925a). Cf. HACKER 1961 and RÜPING 1977.
term bhāva has apparently an other meaning than it has in the rest of the texts.4 He emphasized the evolution process taught in this tract, which, as he put it, has a “horizontal pattern” in contrast to a “vertical pattern”:

not buddhi into manas, manas into senses etc., but buddhi into manas, buddhi into senses.5

BAKKER (1982) accepted VAN BUIJ TenEN’s reconstruction as a “working-hypothesis,” but criticized the interpretations of some passages; moreover he questioned VAN BUIJ TenEN’s claim to have discovered an authentic text. He drew attention to an agreement of the reconstructed tract with the teachings of Kausītaki Upanisad 3.6

From all these different interpretations we may infer that the chapters under discussion contain a diversity of ideas, which are not necessarily consistent with each other. In this paper we want to look at three themes central to both texts that are relevant to the question put forward by VAN BUIJ TENEN, viz. whether or not we encounter an evolution theory in these chapters. It will be shown that this question is related to a difference between both texts with respect to their conception of buddhi. The three themes are the following:7

4 “When we read through the two versions we are struck by the fact that the term bhāva occurs in two altogether different situations: first in connection with such ‘sensations, qualities and conditions’ as sukha/priti, duḥkha/soka, moha, praharsa etc., atuṣṭi etc., āviveka etc.; secondly in connection with a process by which the buddhi modifies itself into manas as its bhāva.” VAN BUIJ TENEN 1956, 153.
5 VAN BUIJ TENEN 1957a, 22.
6 “... the most striking agreement of the epic with the Upanisad appears from the fact that the act of consciousness itself, when it has actualized the senses, evolves the objects (epic: artha / KauU.: bhūtamātra) of the latter. Or rather, at the very moment buddhi (or prajñā) actualizes the senses it evolves (epic: vikurute / KauU.: abhivyasiṣṭate) the object that is apprehended.” BAKKER 1982, 144.
7 In addition to these three, there may be distinguished three more themes (in both texts): an introductory question concerning the self (adhyātman) which forms the beginning of both texts (MBh 12.187.1-3; 239.1-2), a teaching about the three bhāvās (“states of mind”) sattva, rajas and tamas (MBh 12.187.14, 21-35; 239.16, 20-25; 240.6cd-8, 10-11) and a soteriology (MBh 12.187.44-47, 51-60; 240.13-15; 241.5-14). Many of these themes, or parts of them, have parallels in other chapters of the Mokṣadharma; so, for example, part of the teaching about the three bhāvās is found also in MBh 12.212.25-31. Study of these parallels may throw light on the composition and transmission of the Mokṣadharma, as, mutatis mutandis, the Nārāyaniya-Studien by Peter SCHREINER and others (1997) has recently demonstrated.
1. A teaching about the five elements and their respective differentiation into sense-organ, sense-faculty and sense-impression. 

2. A teaching about the intellect (buddhi) and its relation to the “knower of the field” (kṣetrajña), the mind (manas) and the senses (indriyāṇi).

3. A teaching about the relationship between the sattva and the kṣetrajña.

The first theme (the teaching about the elements) forms a coherent whole, which can be separated quite easily from the rest of the texts (187.4-10 and 239.3-12). The five elements are regarded as the (material) cause of all sentient beings. They evolve into three modifications (guna): a sense-organ, a sense-faculty and a sense-impression. So, for instance, the element ākāśa evolves into the ears, hearing and sound. The characteristic feature of this treatment of the elements is the epistemological point of view, which entails that the essential qualities of the elements are characterized by their impression on the senses.

In addition to the five elements as the material cause, this section speaks of the bhūtakṛt (“creator of beings”) as a kind of efficient cause (Appendix: A). The bhūtakṛt appears to cause the differentiation of the elements into the triple modification of sense-organ, sense-faculty and sense-impression (187.7; 239.6-7). The conclusion seems justified that in this section of both texts a consistent doctrine is presented, which considers the elements to be the material out of which sentient beings (bhūta) are made, a process set in motion by a bhūtakṛt. This section forms a teaching

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8 MBh 12.187.4-10; 239.3-12.
9 MBh 12.187.11-20; 239.13-15, 17-19; 240.1-6ab, 9-10ab, 12.
11 MBh 12.187.8ab: śabdaḥ śrotram tathā khāni trayam ākāśayoni jam /.
12 This epistemological perspective remains in classical Sāmkhya, where the five elements are considered to originate from the so called “subtle elements” (tanmātra). These tanmātrās, in fact, are the sense-impressions: śabda, sparśa, rūpa, rasa and gandha.
13 The Appendix contains the text of some passages of the critical edition. It is meant to facilitate comparison: the left column contains a passage of MBh 12.187, the right column contains the parallel of MBh 12.239-241 and vice versa. A blank means there is no parallel for a passage.
of its own; this is evident also from the fact that none of the words playing a key role in the rest of the texts, such as kṣetrajña, buddhi, manas, bhāva and sattva, are used here.

The transition to the next theme can be illustrated by 187.10cd-11ab (Appendix: B). Whereas 10cd enumerates the five elements with the manas as sixth, the following verse 11ab enumerates the five senses and the manas; the buddhi and the kṣetrajña being respectively the seventh and the eighth (11cd). These verses indicate a transition in both texts: nothing is said about the elements any more, the senses are given and the teaching about their origin out of the elements seems to be forgotten. Whereas up to this point we had a description of material nature, after it both texts seem to be dealing with ideal nature only. Although the following teaching about the buddhi does not form such a clear section as the foregoing teaching about the elements, the verses which we consider to belong to this teaching all have one thing in common: they deal with a psychic or ideal principle distinct from the (material) elements.

The teaching starts with an enumeration of eight principles: the five senses, the manas, the buddhi and the kṣetrajña. Their respective functions are given:

The eye is for seeing, the mind causes reflection, the intellect serves determination, the knower of the field is called the onlooker.\(^\text{15}\)

While both texts agree on these functions they disagree about the relationship between the buddhi and the kṣetrajña. This disagreement can be deduced from a small, but important variation in the parallel passages 187.20 and 240.6 (Appendix: C). According to both passages the “invisible one” governs the senses, but whereas 187.20 uses the masculine adrśyah, 240.6 uses the feminine adrśyā.\(^\text{16}\) Therefore in 187.20 the term “invisible one” refers to the kṣetrajña, whereas in 240.6 it refers to the buddhi. In the parallel passages 187.13 and 239.18 (Appendix: D) there is a similar variation. Both verses deal with the question who is the one that sees

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\(^\text{14}\) That we are here concerned with a break is also evident from the parallel passage which omits 187.11ab, and instead of mahābhūtāni pañcaiva (MBh 187.10c) reads indriyāni nare pañca (MBh 239.14a).

\(^\text{15}\) MBh 12.239.15: caksur ālocaṇāyaśaṃ saṃvayaṃ kuruṇe manah / buddhir adhyāvasānaśā kṣetrajña ucyate //.

\(^\text{16}\) Some manuscripts of 240.6 also read adrśyah. No manuscript of 187.20 reads adrśyā.
everything that is above the soles of the feet and inhabits all this. 187.13 seems to teach that it is the ksetrajña, as in the preceding verse the ksetrajña is called the onlooker. 239.18 however explicitly states it is the buddhir uttamā (“supreme intellect”). These variations indicate a difference with respect to the relationship between the buddhi and the ksetrajña. Whereas according to 187 the buddhi and the ksetrajña are utterly distinct, in that the one is the active knowledge-principle responsible for the activity of the senses and the other an absolute, non-active onlooker or subject, in some parts of 239-241 the buddhi and the ksetrajña seem to be two sides of one and the same principle.

The difference between the two texts can be illustrated by comparing those verses that explain the relation of the buddhi to the senses (appendix: E). In 187.18-19 the senses are characterized as instruments which the buddhi employs for apperception:

The eye is what it sees with, what it hears with is called the ear, the nose they say is what it smells with, with the tongue it experiences flavour and with the skin it feels touches.

In the parallel passage of 240.4-5, however, it is not the instrumental case (yena paśyati) that is used, but the active present participle together with the finite verb bhavati:

While hearing it becomes hearing, while touching it is called touch, while seeing it becomes sight, while tasting it becomes taste, while smelling it becomes smell.

The buddhi does not employ the senses as instruments, but it is or becomes itself the senses. The word indriyāṇi used in both text passages (187.20; 240.6) does not seem to have exactly the same meaning: in 240 it denotes the sense-faculties, whereas in 187 its connotation seems to encompass the sense-organs as well.17 In 240 a sense is not so much an instrument, as a

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17 Although in classical Sāmkhya the indriyāṇi as faculties are explicitly distinguished from the organs, which are called their “seats” (adhiṣṭhāṇāṇi) — e.g. in the Yuktidipikā (YD ad SK 26cd, 197): ucye: adhiṣṭhānād indriyaprthaktvam śaktiviśeṣopalamḥāt / yathā sarirāsambhavino viṣayavyavasāyalaksanasya śaktiviśeṣasyopalambhād arthāntaram buddhir anumāyata evam adhiṣṭhānāsambhavino viṣayagrahaṇalaksanasya śaktiviśeṣasyopalamḥād arthāntaram indriyām iti — the use of the term in these texts of the Moksadharma is not unambiguous. Thus in MBh 12.239.11cd the “complex of the senses” (indriyāgrāma) is described as “derived
modification of the *buddhi*, viz. a state of mind characterized by sense-perception. In this way it is said that the *buddhi* evolves the complex of the senses, just as a tortoise sticks out its limbs (239.17).

However, despite this occasional ambiguity, the verses in this section do not deal with material nature, but with ideal nature. The *buddhi* is therefore not looked upon as a material entity as it is in classical Sāṃkhya. In this connection some remarks have to be made on FRAUWALLNER’s observation – in the introduction to his translation of the reconstructed “Grundtext,” published in his *Nachgelassene Werke II* – to the effect that the *buddhi* in this text-group is ranked among material nature.

In our opinion this is certainly not true for some passages in *adhyāya* 240. This becomes evident when we consider MBh 240.3 (Appendix: F). After the progressive enumeration of the *indriyāṇi*, the *arthāś*, the *manas*, the *buddhi* and the *ātman*, which we also encounter with some variations in the *Katha Upaniṣad*, it is said that:

> The intellect is the self of man; the intellect indeed is the essence of the self; when it produces a *bhāva* it is / becomes mind.

The *buddhi* is regarded as the essence of the self in this verse. In the preceding verse however the self is stated to be higher than the *buddhi*. Consequently the *buddhi* seems to exist in two ways: 1) as an absolute, non-intentional self, corresponding to the *kṣetrajña*; 2) as an empirical, intentional activity, when it evolves through the *manas* into the senses. In the latter case the *buddhi* exists as a *bhāva*, i.e. in a “state of modification.” It is obvious that this doctrine differs materially from the one found in MBh 187, where the *buddhi* is treated as an hypostasis of empirical

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from the five elements” (*pāṇcabhautika*), thereby implying its material nature, whereas MBh 187.20 seems to conflate the *adhiśṭhānāṇi* and the *indriyāṇi*.

18 FRAUWALLNER 1992, 78.
19 *Katha Upaniṣad* III.10-11; VI.7-8a.
20 MBh 12.240.3: *buddhir ātmā manusyasya buddhir evātmano ’tmikā / yadā vikurute bhāvaṁ tadā bhavati sā manah //.*
intellect, fundamentally distinct from the transcendental subject, kṣetrajña, as well as separated from the senses.

The difference between the two texts can be illustrated further by comparing the passages that deal with the relationship between sattva and kṣetrajña (Appendix: G). If we understand sattva here, not as referring to a material principle comparable to the prakṛti, but as referring to the buddhi, a remarkable agreement with the foregoing appears. According to both texts the sattva creates (srjate) the guṇās, whereas the kṣetrajña is only their observer. The guṇās are to be interpreted here as the modifications of the buddhi, just as in the teaching about the elements the word guṇa denotes the modification of the elements. The difference between the two texts lies in the relationship of kṣetrajña and sattva to the self (ātman). For, whereas 187.40cd states that the self is the one who observes the guṇās (i.e. is the kṣetrajña) but wrongly thinks himself to be their creator, according to the parallel passage 240.19ab the self in reality (yathātatham) is both, the observer (paridraṣṭṛ) and the creator (sraṣṭṛ) of the guṇās. The doctrine underlying MBh 240 therefore seems to be that kṣetrajña and sattva are two

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21 This difference may also explain the parallel verses 187.23 and 240.8. According to 187.23 the essence of the buddhi consists of the three bhāvās (viz. sattva, rajas and tamas) and it never transcends them; according to 240.8 however it does transcend the three bhāvās, although its essence is said to consist in them (bhāvatmikā). In both chapters the passage at issue has variant readings – some manuscripts of 187.23 read ativartate instead of nātivartate, while some manuscripts of 240.8 read nātivartate instead of ativartate – yet this variance may be significant and point to an original difference of doctrine rather than being due to mere textual corruption. In 187.23 the buddhi does not transcend the three bhāvās, because only the "invisible one," viz. the kṣetrajña, transcends them. In 240.8 the buddhi does transcend them, since it is equated to the absolute self and as such is the transcendental "invisible one."

22 FRAUWALLNER (1992) translates sattva in this part of the texts with "die Güte"; EDGERTON (1965) translates it with "essential (material) reality." VAN BUITENEN (1957b, 95) distinguishes five meanings of the word sattva in the context of proto-Sāmkhya: “1. sattva as the material counterpart of the kṣetrajña; 2. as the buddhi; 3. as a bhāva of the buddhi; 4. as a state of well-being amounting to release; 5. as the first of the three guṇās.” Although VAN BUITENEN takes sattva here in the first meaning, he observes that there is no real difference between the first and the second meaning: “In these early forms of Sāmkhya creation does not necessarily start from a higher principle than the buddhi, e.g., avyakta, pradhāna or prakṛti, but from the buddhi itself; nor has the ahamkāra yet taken over the evolutionary functions of the buddhi. As the buddhisattva is indeed creation and thus the ‘material’ counterpart of the unaffected kṣetrajña” (1957b, 96-97). Cf. also JOHNSTON 1937, 50-51.
aspects of one and the same principle, viz. the buddhi, which is defined as the Self of man (MBh 240.3ab). If our analysis of these chapters is correct, it may explain a statement in the Anugītā.

Some wise men who are well established in knowledge declare the identity of the kṣetrajña and the sattva, this is not correct.

This verse may be taken to refer to those passages of 239-241 that teach the unity of the kṣetrajña and the sattva within the self. This unity appears as two aspects (dialectical moments) of the buddhi: on the one hand as the transcendental subject, styled “kṣetrajña,” on the other hand as the phenomenality (intentionality) of consciousness, styled “sattva” (“being”), that is intellect (buddhi) as activity, which comprises manas, the senses and their objects.

We now return to the “evolution theory” that VAN BUITENEN found in his reconstructed tract. The verses VAN BUITENEN used for his tract are those that deal with the modification of the buddhi. However, he mixes passages from 187 and 239-241, thereby blurring the difference between them. FRAUWALLNER also conflates the texts, selecting material from all three dialogues and blending them into one “Grundtext.” The unacceptable consequences of this conflation can be seen when we look at the important difference between the buddhi using the sense-organs in 187 and the buddhi becoming the sense-faculties in 240, which difference is obliterated in the verses 18-19 of his “Grundtext.”


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23 Although the expression prthagbhūtau prakṛtyā tau (187.39a; 240.20c) seems to suggest that the two are essentially different, the expression paridraṣṭā guṇānām sa sraṣṭā caiva yathātatham (240.19ab) contradicts this; hence our conclusion that the difference is one of appearance, not of essence. Cf. also the example in 240.22 which has no parallel in 187. Whereas the simile of the fish in the water (187.39cd; 240.21ab) and the gnat in the fig-tree (187.38ab; 240.21cd) suggest a difference in essence, the simile peculiar to 240 implies a unity instead: “Or as the blade inside the reed-stalk is both separate and yet associated, just so these two are associated and fixed in one another” (transl. EDGERTON 1956, 279).

24 MBh 14.48.9: āhur eke ca vidvāmo ye jñāne supratīṣṭhitāḥ / kṣetrajñasattvayaṃ aikyam ity etan nopapadyate //.
Berührung. Vielfach wandelt sich das Erkennen. Wenn es etwas begehrt, dann wird es zum Denken.  

However, FRAUWALLNER was right in his observation that the evolution theory of the Sāmkhya is not attested in this text-group. FRAUWALLNER has given three features of the evolution theory:

die Vorstellung der Urmaterie (prakṛti), die Lehre von den drei Eigenschaften (gūṇās) der Urmaterie und die Lehre von den 25 Wesenheiten.

We find none of them in these texts. What VAN BUITENEN has styled a “horizontal evolution theory” is different from what FRAUWALLNER called an “evolution theory.” We would prefer to call the former a “teaching about the modification of the buddhi.” This teaching does not have a cosmological but a psychological status: it explains how the buddhi evolves the manas as its bhāva and subsequently differentiates into the sense-faculties. The ontological implications of this teaching conflict with the teaching about the elements in the first part of both texts, where it is said that not only the sense-organs and the sense-impressions, but also the sense-faculties have their origin in the elements. These texts therefore do not contain a consistent philosophy, but display the same diversity as so much of the Moksadharma.

The above analysis raises a number of questions, which – though, admittedly, they cannot all be answered – need to be addressed, if any progress into the early history of the Sāmkhya philosophical tradition is to be made. These questions are closely connected with the source material from which we have to reconstruct that history; in this particular case: how do we conceive of the coming into being of the Mahābhārata text corpus, especially its largest book, the Śāntiparvan. FRAUWALLNER’s hypothesis of one “Grundtext” that had been transmitted independently for a long time, had consequently developed into three different recensions, before the latter were included in the text of the Moksadharma by one or more redactors,

25 FRAUWALLNER 1992, 82-83. FRAUWALLNER’s eclectic translation finds some support in MBh (B) 12.286.19-20, since this text also seems to be a mixture of both theories: yena paśyati tac caksuḥ śṛṇvati śrōtram ucye / jighrati bhavati ghrānam rasati rasānā rasān // 19 // sparśanam sparśati sparśan buddhir vikriyate ’sakṛt / yadā prāṛthayate kimcit tadā bhavati sā manah // 20 //. Cf. FRAUWALLNER 1992, 82, n. 34-36.

26 FRAUWALLNER 1953, 300.
only to be further mutilated in the course of transmission, that hypothesis proves untenable. As we have shown there are clearly different views underlying the dialogues of Yudhishtira and Bhismä (adhyāya 187) on the one hand, and that of Śuka and Vyāsa (adhyāyas 239-241) on the other. An irreconcilable discrepancy had also been VAN BUITENEN’s starting point, but to explain it this scholar applied basically the same method as FRAUWALLNER, though in more textual detail, when he constructed a new, smaller text out of both dialogues: “simply a text legitimately restored on the basis of two incomplete and corrupt versions.”

However, instead of postulating or “restoring” a “Grundtext,” we may make another assumption, namely that the redactor(s) of the Moksadharma was acquainted with various guru-traditions which he aimed to represent in different dialogues. These philosophical lineages may have been closely related, enough to employ the same jargon, including technical terms, expressions, metaphors and even verses; but within them different techniques to obtain inner tranquillity (yoga) may have developed, and accordingly different views to account for these experiences.

A scenario opposite to the one proposed by FRAUWALLNER may be envisaged: in the course of composition, redaction, transmission, further revision, and fixation of the Moksadharma a tendency may have been at work to straighten out contradicting views. If this were the case, the starting point may not have been one “Grundtext” that degenerated into various distorted representations, but rather a plurality of theories and views that found textual expression and was amalgamated in a parvan or sub-parvan, which became gradually more homogeneous in a process of composition-in-transmission. This process may have been concomitant with the rise of the classical school of Sāmkhya. In other words, rather than for an underlying unity we should search for diversity behind the apparent homogeneity. Paradoxically, greater philosophical homogeneity may have been accomplished at the cost of more textual inconsistencies. This genetic model would imply that, though the Moksadharma as we have it offers already a bewildering diversity of often contradicting views, the historical reality at the time of its first composition was still more complex – each ashram, so to speak, having its own competing version of proto-Sāmkhya philosophy and being keen on having it canonized in the Smṛti.

27 VAN BUITENEN 1956, 156.
An original plurality may not only account for the essential differences between both dialogues, but also for unsolved philosophical problems within each. How does the theory of the five mahābhūtas and their differentiation within sensitive beings concord with the psychological or ideal world treated in the rest of both dialogues? We are here apparently concerned with a cosmological theory in which God, the bhūtakrt mentioned in 187.7 and 239.6, plays a key role.28 This same theory is found in other chapters of the Moksadharmaccha, which by FRAUWALLNER are not styled “epische Urform des Sāmkhya.”

This brings us to our final point. What justification, if any, is there to annex the two dialogues at issue to the Sāmkhya tradition and not, for instance, the dialogue between Manu and Bṛhaspati? If the hallmark of Sāmkhya is a rift between the material and ideal world, all three dialogues may be said to belong to the same multifarious stream from which classical Sāmkhya emerged.

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND ABBREVIATIONS


28 Cf. MBh 12.121.55, 12.175.16.
HANS BAKKER & PETER BISSCHOP


MBh: Mahābhārata, for the first time critically edited by S. K. BELVALKAR, 19 volumes, Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1949-1953.


YD: Yuktidipikā, the most significant commentary on the Sāṃkhya-kārikā, critically edited by A. WEZLER and S. MOTEGI (Alt- und neu-indische Studien; 44), Stuttgart 1998.

APPENDIX

Some parallels of Mokṣadharma 187 and 239-241

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\begin{align*}
\text{A} & \quad \text{iti tanmayam evedam} \\
& \quad \text{sarvam sthāvarajaṅgamam} \\
& \quad \text{sarge ca pralaye caiva} \\
& \quad \text{tasmān nirdiṣyate tathā} //239.5// \\
& \quad \text{mahābhūtani paṅcaiva} \\
& \quad \text{mahābhūtani paṅcaiva} \\
& \quad \text{mahābhūtesu bhūtakrt} \\
& \quad \text{mahābhūtesu bhūtakrt} \\
& \quad \text{araot teṣu vaiṣāmyam} \\
& \quad \text{araot tāṭa vaiṣāmyam}
\end{align*}
\]
tat tu jīvo 'nu paśyati //187.7//
yasmin yad anupaśyati //239.6//
Śuka uvāca
akarod yac charīresu
katham tad upalakṣayet /
indriyāṇi guṇāh kecit
katham tān upalakṣayet //239.7//

ghreyam ghrānam śarīram ca
te tu bhūmigunās trayāḥ /
mahābhūtāni paṇcaiva
śaṣṭham tu mana ucyate //187.10//
indriyāṇi manaś caiva
vijñānāṇy asya bhūrata /
saptamī buddhir ity āhuḥ
kṣetrajñāḥ punar aṣṭamah //187.11//
ghreyam ghrānam śarīram ca
bhūmer ete guṇās trayāḥ //239.11ab//
indriyāṇi nare paṇca
saṣṭham tu mana ucyate /
saptamīḥ buddhim evāhuh
kṣetrajñāḥ punar aṣṭamam //239.14//

adhiṣṭhānāṇi buddher hi
prthagarthāṇi paṇcadhā /
paṇcendriyāṇi yāṇy āhus
tāny advṛtyo 'dhitisthati //187.20//
adhiṣṭhānāṇi vai buddhyā
prthag etāni samsmaret //240.9cd//
indriyāṇiti tāny āhus
tesv advṛtyadhitisthati //240.6ab//

caṣṣur ālokanāyaiva
samśayam kurute manah /
buddhir adhyavasāyāya
kṣetrajñāḥ sāksīvat sthitah //187.12//
cakṣur ālokanāyaiva
samśayam kurute manah /
buddhir adhyavasāyāya
sākṣi kṣetrajñā ucyate //239.15//
yathā kūrma ihāḥgāni
prasārya viniyacchati /
evam evendriyagrāmam
buddhih srṣṭvā niyacchati //239.17//
yad urdhvam pādatalāhyām yad
avān mūrdhaṃ ca paśyati /
etena sarvam evedam
iddhy abhivyāptam antaram //187.13//
urdhvam pādatalāhyām yad
avān mūrdhaṃ ca paśyati /
etasminn eva kṛtye vai
vartate buddhir uttama //239.18//

yena paśyati tac caṣṣuh
śṛṇoti śrotram ucyate /
jīghrati ghrāṇam ity āha
rasam jānāti jihvāyā //187.18//
śṛṇvati bhavati śrotram
sprṣati sparśa ucyate //240.4cd//
paśyanti bhavate drṣṭi
rasati rasanaṃ bhavet /
tvacā sprṣati ca sparśān
buddhir vikriyate 'sakṛt /
yena samkalpayaty arthām
kimcid bhavati tan manāḥ //187.19//

jighratī bhavati ghrāṇām
buddhir vikriyate prthak //240.5//
yadā prārthayate kīmci
tadā bhavati sā manah //240.9ab//

indriyebhyāḥ parā hy arthā
arihebhyaḥ paramāṃ manah /
manasas tu parā buddhir
buddhir ātmā paro mātah //240.2//
buddhir ātmā manusyasya
buddhir evātmāno 'mikā /
yadā vikurute bhāvam
tadā bhavati sā manah //240.3//
indriyānām prthag bhāvād
buddhir vikriyate hy ānu //240.4ab//

sattvakṣetraṇjayor etad
antaraṃ paśya sūkṣmayoh /
sṛjate tu guṇān eka
eko na sṛjate guṇān //187.37//
maśakodumbarau cāpi
samprayuktau yathā sadā /

sattvakṣetraṇjayor etad
antaraṃ viddhi sūkṣmayoh //240.19cd//
sṛjate tu guṇān eka
eko na sṛjate guṇān //240.20ab//
maśakodumbarau cāpi
samprayuktau yathā saha //240.21cd//
iśīkā vā yathā muṇje
prthag ca saha caiva ca /
tathaiva sahitāv etāv
anyonyasmin pratiṣṭhitau //240.22//

anyonyam anyau ca yathā
samprayogas tathā tayoḥ //187.38//
prthagbhūtāu prakṛtyāu tau
samprayuktau ca sarvadā /
yathā matsyo jalam caiva
samprayuktau tathaiva tau //187.39//
na guṇā vidur ātmāṇām
sa guṇān vetti sarvaśaḥ /
paridraṣṭā guṇānām ca
samsraṣṭā manyate sadā //187.40//

prthagbhūtāu prakṛtyāu tau
samprayuktau ca sarvadā //240.20cd//
yathā matsyo 'dbhir anyah san
samprayuktau tathaiva tau //240.21ab//
na guṇā vidur ātmāṇām
guṇān veda sa sarvadā //240.18cd//
paridraṣṭā guṇānām sa
sraṣṭā caiva yathātatham //240.19ab//