Shifting Identifications in Dutch-South African Migration Policies (1910–1961)

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Shifting Identifications in Dutch-South African Migration Policies (1910–1961)

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Abstract

This article examines the migratory movement from the Netherlands to South Africa and the associated migration policies in both countries over the years 1910 to 1961. Migration acts as a lens through which shifting constructions of national, transnational and racial identities can be observed. Depending on the politicians in charge, the contribution of Dutch migrants to the South African nation was alternately framed in terms of their white, civilised Europeanness (as opposed to black, uncivilised Africanness), and in terms of their alleged ‘kinship’ (stamverwantschap) with the Afrikaners (as opposed to the British). Under the restrained immigration policy of the Nationalist Party in the 1950s this gave Dutch immigrants a privileged position regarding admission to South Africa, and it gave South Africa a special appeal as country of destination for Dutch emigrants. This changed only when the ethnic identification with white Afrikaners, and European settlers in general, since 1960 gradually gave way to an internationally shared political identification with the struggles of black Africans against apartheid. By studying the migration dynamics between both countries we may gain insight into the making and unmaking of both Dutch and South African national and racial identifications, against the backdrop of a colonial heritage.

Key words: construction of national identities; Dutchness; Afrikaner nationalism; stamverwantschap; migration policies; Europeanness; two great European races

In the historiography of Dutch-South African relations there was never much interest in the twentieth-century migration from the Netherlands to South Africa. The lack of historical interest in the emigration to South Africa as opposed to other settler societies can be

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explained by the taboo surrounding the emigration from the Netherlands to the ‘land of apartheid’ since the 1960s. Inevitably, the historiography of Dutch-South African relationships in the twentieth century was influenced by the anti-apartheid discourse and its related narratives, which are often framed in terms of ‘black’ and ‘white’.\(^1\) In those rare instances where Dutch post-war emigration was linked to South African immigration policies, authors – like myself – assumed that the South African authorities were primarily focused on reinforcing the position of the white minority by attracting European migrants.\(^2\)

Although the growth of the white population did indeed constitute a decisive part of South Africa’s twentieth-century immigration policies, it is not true that all whites from Europe were always treated equally. Which of them were at what time deemed fit or unfit to help shape the country – and why? These questions bring me to the dynamics by which nationality, race, and religion intersect and lend each other meaning when it comes to migration policies. I shall explore how race – in the form of white privilege and entitlement – was implicated in and subject of permanent negotiations in the relations between South Africa and European countries, in particular the Netherlands. The discursive practice around *stamverwantschap*, which has been translated in terms of ‘kinship ties’, is central to this exploration.

For a long time, Dutch migration to South Africa was framed in terms of *stamverwantschap* in order to create ethnic identifications with white, protestant, Afrikaans-speaking South Africans.\(^3\)

The colonial past and the geo-political reality played an important though far from stable role in the admission of certain groups of European immigrants into South Africa. This theme has already been explored by Sally Peberdy in her book *Selecting Immigrants: National Identity and South Africa’s Immigration Policies, 1910–2008*.\(^4\) Her thought-provoking analysis of South Africa’s immigration policies, based on a wealth of South African archival sources, opens up new possibilities for further research. In order to take a closer look at the Dutch emigration to the Union of South Africa, I decided to combine Peberdy’s work on South Africa’s immigration policies with an analysis of Dutch emigration policies. Thus, I hope to shed light on the intertwining of the sending and receiving ends of the migration processes to South Africa, and on the way in which categories of race were involved. These twentieth-century dynamics were necessarily embedded in South Africa’s heritage of both Dutch and British colonialism. Regarding the Dutch emigration policies

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1. I will use the notion of ‘blacks’ and Africans, together with ‘people of colour’, as a way to describe non–white people in South Africa. One can correctly argue that ‘white’ people are people of colour, too, or that some so-called Asians or Coloureds can be identified as white. However, it seems useful to use a common phrase to describe people who are commonly thought of as not being white by the white majority in this country.


to South Africa, the earlier work by Wayne Hendrickse, based on the archives of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was especially helpful.\(^5\) In addition I was able to study the archives of the former Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, recently made accessible, in particular those of the Commission for Emigration for the Netherlands. The monthly *Zuid-Afrika* (South Africa) of the Netherlands South Africa Association (*Nederlandsch Zuid-Afrikaanse Vereeniging*, NZAV) also proved a significant source.

I have taken the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910 as the starting point for this article, because it is a landmark in the process of modern nation building. The year 1961, when South Africa disentangled itself from the British Empire and declared itself the autonomous republic of South Africa, marks the end of my contribution. Not until that date did the Nationalist government start an active campaign to recruit white Europeans, including British migrants, with the intention to boost the white population of South Africa. This change coincided with the reversal of Dutch foreign policies towards South Africa: post-war emigration to ‘the country where the sun always shines’ was no longer encouraged by the Dutch government after ‘Sharpeville’ in 1960 had caused a growing public revulsion against apartheid. From that moment there was a change of perspective that created ample space for new forms of identification, and solidarity with South Africans flourished. In the concluding remarks I shall come back to this shift, when I consider the suggestion that this Dutch reorientation on South African society from the 1960s onward can be described as ‘renewed cultural imperialism’.\(^6\)

**Two great European races**

‘Let them come, the good and the bad, let them come in their thousands, their tens of thousands, their hundreds of thousands, we shall absorb them all’, Prime Minister Jan Smuts stated in a fiery speech at a regional United Party meeting in August 1946.\(^7\) He was referring to the many Europeans who after the Second World War wanted to exchange their war-torn home countries for a place under the sun. His call was certainly not restricted to British immigrants, although they were the largest group to enter the British dominion of South Africa.\(^8\) Europeans from other allied countries such as the Netherlands, Scandinavia and the Mediterranean were equally encouraged, as indicated by the installation of Immigrant

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8. Daniel Conway and Pauline Leonard in *Migration, Space and Transnational Identities* (p. 37) state that Smuts ‘sought to encourage mass British migration to the country’. Indeed, he did, but he definitely did not limit his policy to the British. See also Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009) 181. Mazower stresses that in 1946 Smuts was convinced that ‘a substantial influx of Europeans offered the only possible means to relax segregationism at home’.
Selection Committees in London, The Hague, and Rome. Only Germans were, so soon after the war, not welcome. The election victory of Malan and the Nationalist Party two years later put an end to Smuts’s pro-active immigration policy. The Nationalists called a halt to immigration from Europe, except for Germans who wanted to settle in South Africa. Such shifts in the immigration policy show that white Europeanness – and therefore also white Dutchness – was a highly flexible and contested category.

In order to understand the twentieth-century shifts in South Africa’s immigration policy and the associated vision of the future of the Union of South Africa, it is necessary to look briefly at the well-known story of the successive establishments of European settlers. The early Cape settlers, who had arrived from 1652 onwards in the wake of the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oostindische Compagny, VOC) were mainly seamen from Dutch, German and Scandinavian descent. Soon they were joined by Huguenot refugees, Scottish Presbyterians, Jews from the Baltics, and other Europeans. They had merged, also with the local Khoisan and slaves (but that last heritage was denied soon) into a group known as ‘Afrikaners’ or ‘Boers’. Although for a long time Dutch was their official language, it should be emphasised that they were never simply ‘Dutch’ settlers with the Netherlands as a shared country of origin.

After the British government took control of the Cape in 1806, groups of Afrikaner ‘Voor-trekkers’ began to leave the Cape Colony in search of land and to free themselves from British rules. The ‘Great Trek’ (1830–1850) brought them further inland, and after bloody struggles with the Africans known as San, Xhosa and Zulu they founded the independent South African Republic (SAR), also known as Transvaal (1852) and Orange Free State (1854). The discovery of diamonds and gold only increased the wish of the British authorities to incorporate these republics, along with the coastal provinces, the Cape Province and the Colony of Natal, into a South African Confederation under British control. The first armed conflict on this issue (1880–1881) was won by the Transvaal.

The 1881 victory of the Boer republic over the British Empire strengthened a rapidly growing movement of Boer sympathisers around the globe, and particularly in the Netherlands. In that same year the Netherlands South Africa Association was founded. It aimed to reinforce the transnational ties between the Dutch and their Afrikaner ‘descendants’, as the Boers were perceived at the time. This was also the time that the notion of stamverwantschap became popular as an indication of a special bond between the Dutch and the Afrikaner people. This Dutch nationalist identification with the ‘distant cousins’ in South Africa, who successfully defended themselves against British imperialism, caused sympathisers to emigrate to the Boer republics. By the end of the nineteenth century their politically and

9. Peberdy, Selecting Immigrants, 89.
12. Martin Bossenbroek, Holland op zijn breedst. Indië en Zuid-Afrika in de Nederlandse cultuur omstreeks 1900 (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Bert Bakker, 1996); Maarten Kuitenbrouwer, Nederland en de opkomst van het modern imperialisme: koloniën en buitenlandse politiek 1870–1902 (Amsterdam: De Bataafse Leeuw, 1985); Vincent Kuitenbrouwer, A War of Words: Dutch Pro-Boer Propaganda and the South African War,
ideologically motivated emigration had brought around 6,500 Dutch to the Transvaal. Although they constituted no more than a few per cent of the population they had a distinct influence due to their prominent positions in government and education.13 Emigration from the Netherlands ground to a halt at the outbreak of the South African War of 1899–1902, although there were quite a few Dutch volunteers who managed to join the Boer guerrilla fighters.14

Many of the European migrants who had fought on the side of the Boers were forced to leave the country after the British troops had emerged as the victors. At the same time the United Kingdom encouraged British soldiers to settle in South Africa, especially in the Boer republics, in order to increase British influence. Stimulating British emigration to South Africa was also part of this Anglicisation policy; these measures did not do much for the fragile relations between the British and the Afrikaners, who had to come to terms with each other after their violent clashes during the recent war. When the Boer republics formally became part of the Union of South Africa in 1910 the new government still needed to resolve the remaining tensions between Brit and Boer in the young nation state. These tensions were to hold the country in thrall for decades, which in turn affected the immigration from Europe to South Africa. In order to promote unity amongst the white population, the South-African government formulated a common endeavour shared by all white settlers to bring the ‘light’ of European civilisation to the ‘darkness’ of Africa, and imposed judicial measures limiting black’s civil rights. Besides, it considered stimulating white immigration from overseas to ensure the country’s development in a proper European manner. Consequently, South African immigration policy reflected a shared sense of colonial identity based on a racial ordering of society.15

However, the development of an effective white immigration policy was hindered by the continuing tensions between the European settler communities in South Africa. Large-scale immigration from Europe, in particular from Great Britain, was considered a threat to the emancipation of the Afrikaners. The 1921 census both reflected and constructed this antagonism, when it distinguished ‘two great European races’, the Brits and the Afrikaners, that supposedly made up the population of South Africa.16 Although the black population did not appear in the census, it was present in its absence: whiteness was always defined against blackness. The absence of blacks shows that white supremacy was thought essential, despite internal frictions amongst the white population. The same goes for the immigration policy: black immigrants from other parts of Africa were not mentioned at all, notwithstanding their indispensable contribution to the country’s prosperity. Just like the established black South Africans they were excluded from a regulated

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13. Schutte, Nederlanders en de Afrikaners, 52.
14. Kuitenbrouwer, War of Words, 135–139, 190–192, refers to ca. 150 Dutchmen united in the so-called Hollander corps.
16. Peberdy, Selecting Immigrants, 74.
South African society, which was seen as a ‘White Man’s Land’. Still, not even a shared interest in safeguarding European civilisation from black ‘infestation’ helped to overcome the ‘British’ and ‘Afrikaners’ antagonisms. White privilege in various forms was a constant factor in the Union of South Africa, though whiteness itself remained subject to all kinds of contests.

‘Poor whites’ versus blacks and European immigrants

The Immigration Regulation Act of 1913 and the creation of the Ministry of Immigration suggest that the newly formed Union of South Africa aimed to support white migration into the country. However, immigration was to disappear from the political agenda with the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. During this war, the old tensions resurfaced between ‘Brit’ and ‘Boer’ – or rather, between those who wished to remain loyal to the British Empire, including Afrikaner Unionists (or so-called ‘smelters’) such as Prime Minister Louis Botha on the one hand, and those who wished to distance themselves from Great Britain and advocated neutrality on the other. Ultimately, a narrow majority of the South African parliament supported joining the war. Nonetheless, the occupation of the neighbouring German colony of South-west Africa (now Namibia) on behalf of the British Imperial Government led to an armed resistance movement of radical Afrikaner Nationalists. These Nationalists viewed the Germans (as they saw the Dutch) as stamverwant, or genealogically (hence racially) and culturally cognate with the Afrikaner people. Moreover, the Nationalists regarded the Germans as political allies in their fight against the perfidious Albion from which they wished to disentangle themselves. Although the rebellion was suppressed by the regular South African army, this episode highlights the polarisation among white South Africans concerning the future of South Africa in relation to an embattled Europe. The Afrikaner Nationalists’ pursuit of an independent Republic of South Africa, cut loose from the British Empire-Commonwealth, was decisive for the immigration debates that took place after the First World War.

Much to the dismay of Afrikaner Nationalists, British immigrants had unrestricted access to the Union of South Africa, since it was part of the all-encompassing British Empire. Because of the Nationalist’s desire to halt the influx of British competitors, the issue of the ‘poor whites’ – impoverished by the South African War and in need of education and work – appeared in the political discourse. The issue was framed in racial terms, since poverty among whites might harm the supposed respect of blacks for their white superiors and thereby threaten the order of colonial society. Legal measures were needed to prevent poor whites and blacks from reaching out to or competing with each other. The fear of ‘racial degeneration’ of those poor whites who, together with poor blacks, moved from the countryside to the cities in search of work became a prominent political topic during the

17. Ibid., 32–54.
interwar years. The foundations for the apartheid discourse that was to come were laid during these years, when segregation of ‘whites’ and ‘blacks’ was further institutionalised. Strengthening the white population via immigration disappeared altogether from the political agenda after the global recession of 1929 also manifested itself in South Africa. The Immigration Quota Act of 1930 was implemented, following the lead of the United States (1921 and 1924) and other British settler societies such as Canada and Australia. But once the South African mining industry, trading business and construction companies took off again after 1934, due to the early decision to come off the Gold Standard, the shortage of skilled professionals offered new opportunities to a growing number of Europeans. Dutch newcomers also seized this opportunity to improve their living conditions. They were primarily motivated by economic interests, as opposed to those Dutch immigrants who had come to the Boer republics at the end of the nineteenth century to reinforce the Afrikaner ranks. Still, the memory of their brave ‘cousins’ who had fought British rule continued to play a role in Dutch immigrants’ choice of South Africa and their identification with Afrikaner nationalism (see Figure 1).

At the same time the South African government showed concern about the ‘ethnic composition’ of its white population: the immigration from Europe should be in line with the relative ratio of the ‘original stocks of the Union’. Like ‘different European races’ before, the ‘original stock’ referred to the successive groups of white settlers who had taken control since the seventeenth century: the so-called ‘Afrikaners’ who were considered the descendants of Dutch, French, Germans and other non-British Europeans, and those who arrived after them in the wake of the British expansion. Apart from the political need for a ‘balance’ between the different white settler communities, there were Europeans whose entry into South Africa was by definition controversial: Jews who tried to escape the growing anti-Semitism in Europe were once more confronted with anti-Semitism in South Africa.

For many, Jewish ‘whiteness’ had a different sheen than that of non-Jewish Europeans. A growing number of Nazi sympathisers among Afrikaner Nationalists propagated a ban on Jewish immigration. With the adoption of the Alien Act in 1937, intended to protect South Africa against the immigration of European ‘aliens incapable of assimilation’, the arrival of Jewish refugees and European immigration in general was substantially impeded (See Table 1). Sally Peberdy rightly classifies the South African immigration policy at the end of the 1930s as anti-Semitic. After all, Jews as a group were considered incapable of assimilation and were therefore labelled undesirable. Jewish protests in South Africa were dismissed with the argument that admitting Jews would increase anti-Semitism in the country. This line of reasoning was also used in many European countries, including the Netherlands, to exclude Jewish refugees. Apart from these anti-Semitic tendencies there was concern in the Netherlands, also within the NZAV, about the susceptibility of Afrikaner

Figure 1. Front page of the 1935 leaflet *Emigrating to South Africa in the 1930s*. The arrival of the Dutchman Jan van Riebeeck to the Cape Colony was represented as the advent of civilization and the birth of the South-African nation (NZAV archive Amsterdam).
nationalism to ‘German propaganda’, though it did not result in a more cautious approach concerning the promotion of Dutch emigration to South Africa.\(^{26}\)

The aversion to Jewish immigrants, the problem of the ‘poor whites’, and the associated fears of ‘racial degeneration’, together with the relatively large share of British immigrants in the group of newcomers, hindered an active immigration policy aimed at reinforcing ‘European civilisation’ in a ‘white’ South Africa. During the years leading up to the Second World War political and cultural controversies between the so-called Boers and Brits remained visible in many areas of South African society. However, these controversies cannot be traced to a clear division between either Afrikaans- and English-speaking whites, or between inhabitants of the former Boer republics and the remainder of South Africa. While there were many British South Africans who preferred neutrality because they feared the destabilising effects of participation in the war, many Afrikaner South Africans felt compelled to join the international fight against National Socialism. Moreover, both parties were struggling with conflicting loyalties.\(^{27}\) Once again, divergent views of the future of a sovereign South Africa were at stake. Should South Africa remain loyal to the British Empire and combat the German Nazis? Should the country join the Germans in their fight against British imperialism? Or should South Africa remain neutral in the war? In the end, under Prime Minister Jan Smuts, South Africa chose to join the allied forces. However, as had been the case in the First World War, the nation and its white voters remained deeply divided on the issue of war participation. Meanwhile, the inequality between white and black continued to grow. After the Second World War, this racialised gap would radically alienate the people of South Africa from each another.

**Stimulating post-war European emigration to South Africa**

Soon after the war was over South Africa’s immigration policy took a new turn. Prime Minister Smuts was convinced that the nation’s future was best guaranteed within the confines of the British Empire-Commonwealth and as a member of the United Nations.\(^{28}\) For that reason he wished to accede to the requests by Britain and other European countries to absorb their perceived overpopulation.\(^{29}\) Economic and political developments in South Africa also stimulated an active immigration policy. Since the late 1930s, and increasingly during the Second World War, the South African economy had been propelled forward by swift industrialisation and urbanisation. Migration to the cities and the growth of a black working class was accompanied by the emergence of organisations such as the Council for Non-European Trade Unions (1941); the Non-European Unity Movement (1943); and the militant Youth League (1944), which reinvigorated the African National Congress (ANC). In addition, the participation of black war volunteers alongside white soldiers had reinforced the self-consciousness of the black population. In South Africa and other

\(^{26}\) ‘Speech by Prof. Geyl’, *Zuid-Afrika* 15 (June 1938) 6: 76–77. Reports in the rubric ‘Landverhuizing’ (Migration) in *De Arbeidsmarkt*, a monthly published by the Dutch Unemployment Council (Nederlandsche Werkloosheidsraad) from 1937 to 1940.


\(^{29}\) Peberdy, *Selecting Immigrants*, 88.
(former) colonies inside and outside Africa, the war had boosted resistance against colonial rule.\textsuperscript{30} Smuts and the Unionists therefore regarded immigration from Europe necessary not only because of a shortage of skilled labour, but also as a counterweight to the rapidly proliferating and emancipating black population. Whereas the census of 1936 still put the ratio of whites to non-whites at 1:4, estimates suggested that this ‘imbalance’ would grow to 1:6 within 40 years.\textsuperscript{31} Consequently, Smuts announced an active recruitment policy in 1946 that was to lead to mass immigration from Europe. In addition to the installation of Immigrant Selection Committees in three European countries, the South African government reached an agreement with the \textit{Union Castle Shipping Company} to facilitate the transportation of European immigrants from Bremen, Rotterdam, Antwerp, and other ports to South Africa via Southampton.\textsuperscript{32}

An equal proportion of immigrants from Britain and from the European continent was considered ideal, although the Aliens Act of 1937 still granted the British easier access. The Smuts government was clearly cautious about immigration from Nazi Germany, particularly because the radical Afrikaner nationalist movement had sympathised with the German Nazis. A similar reserve was maintained towards Nazi collaborators from the Allied countries. The Dutch ambassador in Pretoria, for instance, wrote in 1946 that the South African government had explicitly rejected the idea of the Netherlands transporting her ‘Quislings’ to South Africa.\textsuperscript{33} He felt comfortable with this rejection, since there had been quite a few Nazi sympathisers among the Dutch immigrants who had come to South Africa before the war. Only by including ‘good elements’ could help form a migrant community ‘which would be useful to both the Union and the Motherland’.\textsuperscript{34}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{jaar} & \textbf{Totaal} & \textbf{Nederlanders} & \textbf{Duitsers} & \textbf{Engelsen (1)} \\
\hline
\hline
1938 & 7.427 & 5.608 & 770 & 96 & 677 & 123 & 5.017 & 1.457 \\
1939 & 6.304 & 3.382* & 378 & 108* & 1.249 & 103* & 3.850 & 1.118* \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Registered number of immigrants to and emigrants from South Africa.\textsuperscript{1}}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{1}Annual Report on Statistics of Migration, 1938 en Statistics of Migration 1948, cited by Peberdy, Selecting Immigrants, appendix 2, 263-267. For the remarkable increase of German immigrants in 1939 I have not yet an explanation.

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{jaar} & \textbf{Totaal} & \textbf{Nederlanders} \\
\hline
1935 & 6.500 & 1.865 \\
1936 & 10.837 & 2.713 \\
1937 & 7.927 & 3.716 \\
1938 & 7.427 & 5.608 \\
1939 & 6.304 & 3.382* \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\textsuperscript{31} J.L. de Beer, Rassesamstelling van die bevolking van die Unie (1949), cited by A.P. du Plessis, \textit{The Dutch Emigration to South Africa: sekere aspekte rakende voorbereiding tot aanpassing} (Amsterdam: Teerhuis & Klinkenberg, 1956), 72.
\textsuperscript{32} Peberdy, \textit{Selecting Immigrants}, 89.
\textsuperscript{33} National Archives, The Hague, Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, Directorate of Immigration, access number 2.15.68, inventory number 2611 (Henceforth NL-Hana, SZW/ Emigration, 2.15.68, inv. nr.) Letter 28 December 1946 from Visser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, henceforth: MoFA.
\textsuperscript{34} NL-Hana, MoSZW/Emigratie, 2..15.68, inv.nr. 2611: \textit{Memorandum} 12 November 1945 from Visser to MoFA.
reliability was an important criterion during the first years after the Second World War. This resulted in the exclusion of former National Socialists as well as Communists from entering South Africa.

While the whiteness of Europeans may have been considered self-evident, certain groups of Europeans were considered less ‘white’ than others. Some reluctance remained, for instance towards Italians, who had joined the Allies only in the final stage of the war. Consequently, there were those within Smuts’s United Party who argued that Italians should be viewed as former enemies. In addition, according to the Dutch attaché for emigration in Pretoria, they were presented as not keeping ‘a proper distance’ from the non-white population and as being ‘dirty by nature’.

As Matthew Jacobson already pointed out for the United States, there was ‘a system of “difference” by which one might be both white and racially distinct from other whites’. The arrival of Jewish survivors in South Africa posed another dilemma. Nationalist proponent Hendrik Verwoerd, then chief editor of the Afrikaans newspaper *Die Transvaler*, continued his pre-war campaign against these Jewish immigrants, who he claimed would bring about ‘the downfall’ of South Africa.

The arrival of Jews of any nationality was definitely not ‘encouraged’, as the Dutch attaché for migration stated euphemistically.

Such anti-Semitic remarks from the Nationalists reinforced the Dutch affinity with the United Party led by Smuts. He had already become popular by opposing the Nationalists’ sympathy for Nazi Germany. Nevertheless, the Dutch government was at first reluctant to cooperate with the attempts by Smuts’s government to recruit immigrants from the Allied countries, fearing the loss of ‘strong, able young men who could help rebuild the war-torn nation’.

Until the end of 1946, emigration to South Africa was therefore restricted to ‘individuals who could be missed’. After that, post-war unemployment, the perceived overpopulation, and the apparent desire of many Dutchmen to leave the ravaged country encouraged the Dutch government to change its migration policy. Since emigration was seen as a form of international labour exchange, the Ministry for Social Affairs and Employment became actively involved. It started to streamline the growing number of private and semi-private organisations which supported Dutch emigrants by giving them information, processing their applications for residence permits, and providing financial aid to enable

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35. See also Cf. Peberdy, *Selecting Immigrants*, 90.
40. NL-Hana, MoSZW/Emigratie, 2.15.68, inv.nr. 2583: Recommendation by the emigration attaché dd. 12 August 1946 concerning Dutch emigration policies. Also Peberdy, *Selecting Immigrants*, 90.
their departure. From 1952 all these organisations were centralised by the Dutch government and headed by a General Commissioner for Emigration.42

One of these organisations was the Netherlands South Africa Association (NZA V) mentioned earlier, which renewed its pre-war cooperation with the Netherlands Foundation for Emigration (Stichting Landverhuizing Nederland, SLN) in order to support Dutch emigration to South Africa.43 The NZA V, which all these years had felt loyal to Afrikaner nationalism, was warned by the Dutch ambassador in Pretoria: Dutch organisations that engaged themselves with Afrikaner Nationalists should realise that the ‘the time of Kruger’ and ‘the Anglo-Boer war’ was over.44 Instead of identifying with this particular group of South Africans on the basis of the emotionally charged notion of stamverwantschap, which referred to a cultural and genealogical bond between the Dutch and the Afrikaners, these organisations should be aware that political developments had changed the transnational relationships between the Netherlands and South Africa. The Second World War had united the Dutch and the British against National-Socialism; this meant inevitably a distancing from Afrikaner Nationalists who had supported the German regime. However, this warning had little effect, judging by a contribution on ‘Emigration’ in the NZA V monthly Zuid-Afrika of February 1947. The author stated that Dutch emigrants formed a ‘well-nigh vital counter to the English-speaking population and to groups alien to South Africa’, by which he implied Roman Catholic Greeks and Italians.

While the NZA V maintained its orientation towards those they defined as stamverwant, the existing feelings of solidarity with the Afrikaner Nationalists in the Netherlands diminished as a consequence of their German sympathies and the British support of the Netherlands during the Second World War. There was a strong appreciation for the Smuts government, which had sided with the British Allies against the Nazis, although after 1946 this did not prevent the Dutch government from criticising the fact that British migrants were favoured over the Dutch who wanted to leave for South Africa. Dutch authorities pleaded for equal access for immigrants from the Netherlands and Britain by emphasising the equally important roles both nations had played in creating a European ‘civilisation’ in South Africa.45

South Africa’s position within the British Commonwealth and its membership of the United Nations confirmed its status as a western, ‘civilised’ country. The subordinate position of the black population continued to be taken for granted in Dutch debates on migration to South Africa and other settler societies. If the position of Africans in the receiving country was subject of debate at all this restricted itself to mundane advice on such matters as wages or the proper conduct towards a kaffermeid (nigger maid) or kafferboy

44. NL-Hana, MoSZW/Emigratie, 2.15.68, inv.nr. 2611: Report dd. 12 November 1945 from the Dutch ambassador in Pretoria. The gist of this report was repeated in a report dd. 17 January 1946 to the MoFA; it was also in line with a memorandum from July 1945 send to the NZAV, referred to by Gerrit Schutte, Stamverwantschap onder druk. De betrekkingen tussen Nederland en Zuid-Afrika 1940–1947 (Amsterdam: SAI, 2011), 14–16.
45. NL-Hana, MoSZW/Emigratie, 2.15.68, inv.nr. 2611: Report dd.12 November 1945 from the Dutch ambassador in Pretoria.
Such advice was in line with the approach to colonial relations in the pre-war Netherlands East Indies and other overseas regions within the Dutch Empire. Although the war between the Netherlands and the Indonesian liberation movement sparked critical debates on colonial relations after the Second World War, the colonial discourse on ‘western civilisation’ was to retain its dominance for many more years. Since Dutch emigrants were designated ‘white’, they generally did not have to face the restrictive procedures applied to ‘non-whites’ nor the inferior position assigned to ‘non-whites’ in countries of destination. They were in a privileged position, as long as ‘white’ continued to be the standard in a settler society such as South Africa. Dutch institutions and organisations supporting emigration proved blind to politics of inclusion or exclusion on racial grounds, or they did not want to take position on the issue, thus implicitly supporting racial policies.

**Immigration or segregation to strengthen the South African nation-state**

The pro-active immigration policy of Smuts and his United Party was heavily criticised by Afrikaner Nationalists, united in the Nasionale Party. They feared that mass immigration, in particular the large numbers of British immigrants, would change the composition of the white population and so undermine the pursuit of a predominantly Protestant Christian character of their nation. In addition, they feared that an influx of immigrants from Great Britain and the Allied countries would impede their political aspirations towards establishing an autonomous republic independent of the British Empire-Commonwealth. Consequently, rather than increased immigration the Nationalists saw a more rigorous segregation as the better way to deal with the rapid growth of the African population in South Africa. They continuously employed the well-known theme of the ‘poor whites’ to advocate their approach. Despite a shortage of skilled professionals, unemployment still rose among the uneducated, white, Afrikaner population. In the eyes of the Afrikaner Nationalists, their ‘own people’ had to come first, and it was these people that the government should invest in, rather than in white newcomers from abroad. This argument persuaded the small South African Labour Party to collaborate with the Nationalists in 1948.

In the run-up to the elections of 1948 immigration became a key issue. Prime Minister Smuts was repeatedly confronted with the brash ‘Let-them-come’-rhetoric with which he had announced his pro-active immigration policy. Smuts’s political opponents relentlessly emphasised that the ‘absorptive capacity’ of the white share of the South African nation had reached its limits. According to the Nationalists, the tens of thousands of migrants which the government wished to reel in would monopolise the advantageous job positions, exacerbate the housing shortage, and weaken the ‘true’ South African identity through their

50. See for references to Smuts’s statement the *Debatte van die Volksraad* derde sitting 9e parlement 1946–1947: 1115–1116.
connections with their European countries of origin. It was particularly British immigrants that were targeted: they were called *soutpiele* (salty pricks), because they stood with one leg in Great Britain and the other in South Africa with their penises dangling in the briny waves. The electoral battle shows to what extent criticism of the immigration policy was bound up with the common goal of safeguarding the future of South Africa as a ‘white men’s country’. Because such a country could only be imagined in relation to the implied notions of blackness, the pursuit of whiteness took shape through the proposed policies concerning the African population. D.F. Malan and his Nationalist Party accused the Smuts government of threatening to abandon the country to the tender mercies of the black heathens, with its pragmatic attitude towards the migration of Africans into the cities, where they were needed in the growing industries. On their part, the Nationalists advocated a strong interventionist policy that involved combating the increased ‘blackening’ of the cities, decreasing white reliance on black labour, and stimulating tribal self-government in black so-called ‘homelands’ (*thuislanden*) or Bantustans. This policy should result in ‘total apartheid’ between white settlers on the one hand, and Africans together with any people of colour on the other.

On 24 May 1948, the *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant* (NRC), a national Dutch newspaper, featured a headline stating that Smuts’s election victory was ‘guaranteed despite strong opposition’. According to the NRC, the National Party led by Malan would attempt to remove all inhabitants of British-Indian origin from the country, and aimed at ‘deporting all non-white people to special areas where they have to fend for themselves’. By contrast, the NRC presented the policy advocated by Smuts and his party as ‘Christian guardianship’. The question, according to the liberal newspaper, was ‘whether persons of non-white origin should be set back even further, or whether such persons should remain in a controlled environment while some concessions to their demands are made’. On 28 May, when Smuts’s narrow defeat was an indisputable fact, the newspaper remarked that ‘the victory of the old Boer mind-set, that of the supremacy of the white race’ was the most disturbing part of this outcome. On 5 June the progressive weekly *Vrij Nederland* linked the Nationalists’ pro-German stance to its proposed apartheid policy and the Nazis’ ‘racial delusions’. The issues of racism and anti-Semitism became inextricably mingled with the comments in the Dutch media on the electoral success of the National Party.

By contrast, the NZA V in its monthly periodical called for ‘a certain restraint concerning a country whose social relations differ so greatly from ours’. The editor, the historian P.J. van Winter, perceived a ‘British influence’ in the ‘excitement and rejection’ in the Dutch

55. ‘Verslagen’ (defeated), *NRC* dd. 28 May 1948.
newspapers, which consistently chose to side with Smuts. In line with his predecessors in the NZAV during the South African War\textsuperscript{57} van Winter argued that the Nationalists ‘have no means of influencing public opinion outside the Union’, and countered any criticism by emphasising that the National Party’s racial policies ‘advocated aims that differed fundamentally from those espoused by the Germans’.\textsuperscript{58} Unfortunately, van Winter did not elaborate on what he considered these fundamental differences to be. The Netherlands Foundation for Emigration (SLN) also, in view of the options the country offered to Dutch emigrants, urged readers to be ‘most careful’ when taking a stance on political developments in South Africa. It hoped that ‘the Malan ministry’s meagre enthusiasm for a further increase of British immigration, combined with its desire to reinforce the white share of the population, would lead to a more generous stance towards immigration from the Netherlands’\textsuperscript{59}.

Shortly afterwards, however, it became clear that the Nationalists intended to restrict immigration not only from the United Kingdom. In a meeting with the Dutch ambassador in Pretoria, the South African minister of Internal Affairs made clear that the government’s first priority was ‘to prepare the sons of the land for jobs in the private sector’, adding that ‘the founding of new vocational schools will solve any existing shortages’.\textsuperscript{60} Just as important was the political aim of reinforcing the Nationalist ranks. Ever since the Netherlands had turned its back on the Nationalists through their ‘Smuts adoration’, the restrictive immigration laws had affected immigrants from the Dutch ‘homeland’ (stamland) as much as they had immigrants from other countries.\textsuperscript{61} The emigration data reflect this development. The number of Dutch emigrants who travelled to South Africa had risen from 279 in 1946 to 2,052 in 1948, but the year following the elections saw a decline to 1,756 immigrants despite the continuing rise of the total number of Dutch emigrants to other destinations overseas. However, the decreased Dutch immigration appeared negligible in comparison to the fall in British immigration figures: the number of Britons entering South Africa dwindled from 30,730 in 1948 to 10,506 in 1949.\textsuperscript{62} German immigration, on the other hand, immediately rose sharply, and German political prisoners were no longer repatriated.\textsuperscript{63} All this demonstrates the extent to which Malan’s election influenced border policies, and in particular the processes by which certain white Europeans were designated as potential South Africans and others were not. The Nationalists’ views clearly differed from the previous government’s position on who could contribute to the ‘spiritual development’ of the country and who fitted the ‘national pattern’ of South Africa (see Figure 2).\textsuperscript{64}

\textsuperscript{57} Kuitenbrouwer, \textit{A War of Words}.
\textsuperscript{58} ‘Opwinding in de Nederlandse Pers’ [Excitement in the Dutch Press], \textit{Zuid-Afrika} 25 (July 1948), 99–100.
\textsuperscript{59} NL-Hana, MoSZW/Emigratie, 2.15.68, inv.nr. 2611: letter dd. 15 July 1948 from the SLN to the national labour exchange.
\textsuperscript{60} NL-hana, szw/Emigratie, 2.15.68, Idem, inv.nr. 2611: Report dd. 10 July 1948 concerning the meeting with the Minister of Internal Affairs, T.E. Dönges.
\textsuperscript{61} NL-hana, szw/Emigratie, 2.15.68, inv.nr. 2583: 17th Report of the emigration attaché over the period 22 August 1948 until 6 September 1948.
\textsuperscript{64} Memorandum of the South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cited by Peberdy, \textit{Selecting Immigrants}, 100.
The declining Dutch emigration to South Africa has been taken as evidence that Malan and his National Party had little support in the Netherlands. Although the influence of critical news reports on emigrants’ choices should not be understated, this line of reasoning fails to take into account the decisive influence of the South African immigration policy restricting admission to the country. Since the Nationalists had strongly criticised the pro-British and pro-active immigration policy of Smuts, and had even made the matter a central issue in their electoral campaign, it was imperative that they took immediate action to stop the influx of immigrants. The first step in this direction was cancelling the contract with the Union Castle Shipping Company, which transported many British emigrants from Southampton as well as emigrants from other parts of Europe. This forced immigrants to postpone or even cancel their departure, or choose a different country of destination. Despite all this, the Dutch attaché for emigration at the Pretoria embassy reassured the Dutch government that Dutch immigrants would soon be welcomed again ‘as long as their immigration means a reinforcement of the Nationalists ranks’. Considering the Dutch criticism of Malan and his National Party following their electoral victory, this was unlikely to happen in the immediate future.


65. Schutte, Nederland en de Afrikaners, 64; Meijers, Blanke broeders, 37.
66. NL-Hana, MoSZW/Emigratie, 2.15.68, inv.nr. 2611: Report dd. 10 July 1948 concerning the meeting with the Minister of Internal Affairs, T.E. Dönges.
The years of rapprochement between the Netherlands and South Africa

However, within a year after the election, the Dutch condemnation of Nationalist racism and anti-Semitism was replaced by a desire for renewed relations and an understanding of ‘the problems’ inherent to the coexistence of blacks and whites. After a goodwill visit to the Netherlands by Prime Minister Malan in April 1949, a Dutch delegate was in turn present in December at the solemn inauguration of the Voortrekker monument: the very symbol of Afrikaner nationalism.68 Gerardus van der Leeuw, a prominent professor of theology and former minister of Education, Arts and Sciences (1945–1946), gave a speech on this special occasion. He was heading a distinguished Dutch delegation promoting closer ties between the two countries. As the sole representative of a foreign nation, Van der Leeuw shared the stage with Malan and other South African dignitaries. Facing an audience of 200,000 white Afrikaners, he spoke with glowing enthusiasm about stamverwantschap and the ‘blood ties, history, religion, and language’ that connected the Dutch with the Afrikaners.69 With his speech Van der Leeuw continued the legacy of F. Beelaerts van Blokland, former vice president of the Council of State and prominent member of the Netherlands South Africa Society, who in 1938 attended the ceremony that marked the start of the building of the Voortrekker monument.70 In the eyes of the Afrikaner newspaper Die Burger, Van der Leeuw’s presence showed that although the Dutch and Afrikaner people had been drifting apart recently this development would ultimately prove reversible.71

Around 1950 this did indeed seem to be the case, although the Malan government showed little restraint in the execution of its apartheid policies. While Dutch media paid some attention to measures such as the Immorality Act, the Population Registration Act and the Group Areas Act, the coverage of South Africa was no longer dominated by criticism of these racist regulations. Additionally, the Dutch seemed to have forgotten about the National-Socialist sympathies of several prominent Nationalist politicians and their supporters. Instead, the Dutch media emphasised the necessity of showing understanding for the difficulties arising from the ‘colour issue’ – in particular the differences in numbers and ‘cultural level’ between whites and blacks – in South Africa.72 This rapid shift in the public debate on apartheid policy can be explained in part by the developments in the former Netherlands East Indies. Dutch soldiers had been fighting Indonesian freedom fighters ever since the summer of 1947. In this context, the political contradictions were explained within a racial framework that pitted ‘white’, European civilisation against ‘black’, native savagery – as did the South African regime in response to black freedom fighters. In the General Assembly of the United Nations, South Africa was one of the few countries that in 1949 did not condemn Dutch aggression in Indonesia.73

68. Hendrickse, Die betrekkinge, 100–102, 123–125.
69. Ibid., 125. Hendrickse refers to the text of a speech by Van der Leeuw in the Archive if the MoFA 912.1 and an article in Die Burger dd. 17 December 1949.
70. Schutte, Nederland en de Afrikaners, 55.
71. Die Burger dd. 20 December 1949, cited by Hendrickse, Die betrekkinge, 125.
The positive turn towards the Malan government was also influenced by the urge to emigrate that manifested itself in post-war Netherlands. A growing number of Dutch citizens wished to leave ravaged post-war Europe, a tendency further strengthened by the fear of a Third World War. The collisions between the communist ‘East’ and the capitalist ‘West’ brought about a ‘War’ that remained ‘Cold’. Soon post-war emigration was encouraged by the Dutch government, which aimed to reduce unemployment among a growing populace that could no longer pursue a career in the East Indies. Together with other settler societies South Africa was seen as a potential country of destination. The institutions involved in stimulating emigration promoted South Africa as a country especially suited to the Dutch, by emphasising the similarities in language, religion – in particular Protestantism – and other stamverwante characteristics that promised a quick and easy integration.74 Forgotten were the previous warnings by the Dutch ambassador in South Africa against a complete identification with Afrikaner nationalists, which had led pre-war Dutch immigrants to sympathise with Hitler’s Germany. Moreover, the decision by the South African Minister of Internal Affairs no longer to ‘refuse entrance to South Africa to each and every individual designated as a member of the NSB (Dutch National-Socialist Movement)’ was welcomed by the new Dutch emigration attaché in Pretoria. He suggested that Dutch emigrants who wished to come to South Africa had best ‘work, hear, observe, and remain silent’.75 The critical stance towards the Afrikaner Nationalists and their Nazi sympathies had changed, also in Dutch diplomatic circles.

The Dutch government, meanwhile, did whatever it took to convince the South African government to let go of its reserve towards Dutch immigrants (See Figure 3). The 1950s are often described as ‘the years of rapprochement’ between the Netherlands and South Africa.76 A Cultural Agreement between both nations, signed in 1951, was intended to foster to the utmost extent, by means of friendly exchange and co-operation between both countries, knowledge and understanding in areas spiritual, intellectual, artistic, scientific, educational, and technical, as well as for the history, morals and habits of the other country.77

There was little or no attention either inside or outside the Dutch parliament to the objections formulated by the spokesman of the Communist Party against the moral support granted to the South African apartheid regime.78 The United Nations’ criticism of the increasingly invasive apartheid policy was also dismissed by the Dutch government as merely an ‘internal affair’ of South Africa.79

75. NL-Hana, MoSZW/Emigratie, 2.15.68, inv.nr. 2583: 17e Report of the emigration attaché over the period 22 August 1948 until 6 September 1948 and the 22th Report over the period 16–31 December 1948.
76. Hendrickse, Die betrekkinge, 127.
77. Ibid., 264.
The mutual interest in amicable cooperation and acceptance is reflected in the presence of a distinguished Dutch delegation during the April 1952 festivities honouring the memory of the Dutch Jan van Riebeeck, who had brought ‘civilisation’ to South Africa 300 years earlier. On behalf of the Dutch people a statue of Maria de la Queillerie, Van Riebeeck’s wife, was offered as a gift to the South African nation. The delegation failed to notice the demonstrations in Cape Town against this celebration of 300 years of colonial presence in South Africa. In the Netherlands the commemoration was also eagerly celebrated, with special Van Riebeeck stamps, a celebratory KLM-flight from Amsterdam to Johannesburg, a reenactment in his hometown Culemborg of Van Riebeeck’s landing at the Cape, and several displays. The Royal Tropical Institute (Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen) in Amsterdam organised an exhibition on ‘three hundred years of South Africa’ that opened in March of that year. In a press release the Institute stated that the Dutch, ‘as ethnically related (stamverwant) to the Afrikaners’, wished to share ‘wholeheartedly and completely in these great celebrations in honour of Jan van Riebeeck’.

Compared to these exclamations of joy, the criticism in the newspaper *Het Parool* represented a lone voice. This newspaper, previously associated with the resistance movement during the Second World War, commented that ‘the celebrations in South Africa are celebratory only for the white minority in the Union. There are millions of non-white people, coloured, Indian, and black, for whom it is impossible to share in these festivities.’ In general, however, criticism of the apartheid policies in South Africa had been pushed into obscurity; instead, the notion of *stamverwantschap* with the Afrikaner people was recovered. This was apparent during both festive commemorations and dramatic events. After the Netherlands were hit by the 1953 North Sea flood (*Watersnoodramp*), the South African ambassador donated a cheque of one and a half million guilders with the assurance that the money should be seen as both an expression of kinship (*verwantschap*) and the hope of a reinforcement of the ties between the two nations. When Malan visited the Netherlands in June that same year, he received a silver medal of the Relief Fund in gratitude for the aid provided by South Africa. He used that same opportunity to emphasise that the Dutch would always be welcome in South Africa.

Not all Dutch were welcome, however, as prospective emigrants, more especially their colour, had to be approved by the selection board (*Keurraad*) of the South African embassy in The Hague. Moreover, people could only enter the country if they were in possession of a work permit, a health certificate and sufficient financial means. Nevertheless, Malan’s declaration suggested a change in his government’s immigration policy. After the pro-active immigration policy of the Smuts government was terminated in 1948 by Malan’s administration, the number of white immigrants had been reduced drastically. In fact, the year 1950 saw more whites leave than enter the country. At the same time the South African economy grew, causing a significant shortage of skilled labour. As the apartheid policies, in particular the extended Job Reservation Acts, prohibited Africans from undertaking skilled labour that was reserved for white workers, black South Africans could not solve this shortage. Furthermore, the so-called homeland policy with its strict separation of black and white living areas demanded a rapid increase of the white labour force.

In an attempt to find a solution for the rising demand for skilled white labour, the 1950s witnessed a cautious opening up to immigrants, although the South African immigration policy retained its selective admission procedures. Protestant Dutch and Germans were the preferred candidates, after they had convinced the authorities of their ability to contribute to the ‘material welfare or the spiritual development’ of the country. The idea was that these *stamverwant* newcomers would smoothly adjust to an Afrikaner

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84. ‘Met gemengde gevoelens’, *Het Parool*, 5 April 1952.
85. *NRC* of 30 July 1953.
86. Hendrickse, *Die betrekkinge*, 170–171
(and not British) lifestyle and culture. To facilitate this process, the Organisation for European Immigration (Maatskappy vir Europese Immigrasie, MEI) was founded, along the lines of the 1820 Memorial Settlers Association, which helped British immigrants to settle.\(^8^9\) From its start in 1954 the MEI, by establishing local departments for West-European Immigration (Buro’s vir die Immigrasie uit Wes-Europa), attempted to assimilate the non-British immigrants into a Nationalist, Afrikaner way of life. To what extent they actually succeeded in bringing about this straightforward identification is another question.\(^9^0\)

The promotion of emigration from the Netherlands to South Africa was defended and stimulated in both countries by appealing to the stamverwantschap. Using this notion, the idea of a shared cultural and genealogical (and therefore also racial) origin between the Dutch and white Afrikaners was revitalised and promoted in a language riddled with familiar metaphors. The close relationship between both countries was praised repeatedly by the Dutch Prime Minister, the Social-Democrat Willem Drees, during his visit to South Africa in the autumn of 1953. For instance, after the South African Prime Minister Malan stated that the Afrikaner people would never forget that they were ‘a daughter of the Netherlands’, Drees answered that ‘viewed in those terms the daughter has reached a marvellous adulthood’ and he voiced his hopes of forever perpetuating the close ties between the two countries.\(^9^1\)

A year later the Dutch Prince Bernhard reaffirmed the commitment of the Netherlands as the old homeland (die ou stamland) to South Africa by placing garlands on the sarcophagus of the Voortrekker Monument in Pretoria, as well as at the Women’s Monument in Bloemfontein and at the feet of Jan van Riebeeck’s statue in Cape Town.\(^9^2\) Criticism of the increasingly invasive apartheid policy was pushed aside by both the Dutch Prime Minister and His Royal Highness. During their stay in South Africa they managed to avoid the subject, and upon their return they stated that a thorough understanding of the issue could be reached only after one had lived in the country for many years.\(^9^3\) The government took their cue from this approach and stated that the apartheid policy was an ‘internal affair’ for South Africa. The same argument was used by the Dutch delegation to the United Nations, when in December 1954 it voted once more against a resolution condemning the South African apartheid policy.\(^9^4\)

\(^8^9\). Peberdy, Selecting Immigrants, 104–105.
\(^9^0\). NL-Hana, MoSZW/Emigratie, 2.15.68, inv.nr. 2624: Maatskappy vir Europese Immigrasie (MEI) 1954–1970 with the emigration-attaché’s critical comments on the rejection of secular and Catholic immigrants from the Netherlands.
\(^9^1\). Hendrickse, Die betrekkinge, 174–175, with references to articles in the Afrikaner dailies Die Burger and Die Transvaler of 7 October 1953.
\(^9^3\). ‘Dr. Drees uit Zuid–Afrika teruggekeerd’, report from 14 October 1953 in the archives of the MoF (912.1), cited by Hendrickse, Die betrekkinge, 177; en nl-hana, szw/Emigratie, 2.15.68, inv.nr. 2623; various articles after the press conference held by Prince Bernhard upon his return to the Netherlands on 23 October 1954.
Global reorientations; changing identifications

Despite the revamped relationship between both countries, the influx of Dutch emigrants in South Africa gradually decreased after its peak in 1952.\textsuperscript{95} Several years later, people began to wonder whether this development was the result of the economic boom in the Netherlands or the growing unease with South Africa’s apartheid policies. Considering the general decline of Dutch emigration after 1952,\textsuperscript{96} it seems likely that the economic boom was the more important cause. Regardless, criticism of apartheid began to increase and would severely affect Dutch-South African relations. For instance, in 1955, upon his return from a three-month stay in South Africa, the charismatic Protestant socialist minister J.J. Buskes published his book \textit{South Africa’s Apartheid Policy: Unacceptable!} (\textit{Zuid-Afrika’s apartheidsbeleid: onaanvaardbaar!}). Within Protestant circles this is seen as the spark that ignited an intense debate on apartheid: for quite a while orthodox groups within the Protestant churches would continue to defend apartheid against the rejection by other Protestant communities.\textsuperscript{97} In February 1957, the Dutch Senate (\textit{Eerste Kamer}) debated whether the Dutch government should continue subsidising emigration to a country where human rights were trampled on a daily basis. For the first time in the political debate, emigration from the Netherlands to South Africa was linked to the apartheid policies. Nevertheless, the emigration grants were maintained.\textsuperscript{98}

The connection between emigration and apartheid also came to the fore in the dissertation on the Dutch emigration to South Africa (\textit{`Die Nederlandse emigrasie na Suid-Afrika’}), with which the South African sociologist A.P. du Plessis obtained his doctoral degree at the University of Utrecht in 1956. Supervised by professor of sociology and prominent Social Democrat J.P. Kruijt, he observed the ‘increasing tendency to integrate immigration into the policy of apartheid in order to maintain the “white civilisation” (\textit{die blanke beskawing}) in South Africa’.\textsuperscript{99} A similar conclusion can be found in the 1960 dissertation by South African sociologist J.K. Loedolff about Dutch Immigrants in Pretoria, in which he states that the Dutch newcomers were meant to reinforce the white population in South Africa.\textsuperscript{100} It became increasingly difficult to discuss Dutch emigration to South Africa independently from South African policies aimed at establishing a ‘pure’ white nation-state. This affected not only academic research on Dutch emigration to South Africa, but also the political debates and reports in the Dutch media. In the late 1950s more and more critical articles about South Africa’s apartheid policy were published. Some authors wondered to what extent the white population – including Dutch white immigrants – might become victims of the inhumane nature of the apartheid system and the resistance it fostered.\textsuperscript{101}

\textsuperscript{95} Peberdy, \textit{Selecting Immigrants}, 270–271.
\textsuperscript{96} Hofstede, \textit{Thwarted Exodus}, 29.
\textsuperscript{99} Du Plessis, \textit{The Dutch Emigration to South Africa}, 78.
\textsuperscript{100} J.K. Loedolff, \textit{Nederlandse immigrante. ‘n sociologiese ondersoek van hul inskakeling in die gemeenskapslewe van Pretoria} (Kaapstad/Pretoria: Haum, 1960), 21.
After 1952 Dutch enthusiasm for emigration overseas in general decreased despite governmental stimuli. In 1960, however, the number of Dutch emigrants actually departing for South Africa dropped from 1,823 emigrants in the previous year to a meagre 538. The atrocities in Sharpeville and elsewhere in the country in March of that year had had an immediate impact. By postponing or cancelling their departure, many aspiring emigrants, even if they lacked all interest in politics and were indifferent to apartheid, made clear that there was an obvious link between emigration and the racist policies of the South African government. The Protestant newspaper Trouw wrote about the ‘bankruptcy of the apartheid policy’, while the liberal NRC expressed its ‘indignation and revulsion’ over the acts of violence. Even the conservative daily De Telegraaf, which had until then abstained from commenting on the developments in South Africa and which would, a few years later, attempt to rekindle understanding for apartheid, stated that ‘the apartheid policy is morally indefensible and ultimately untenable’. The reports in the Dutch

102. Peberdy, Selecting Immigrants, 272.
media, portraying a ‘bloody’ South Africa, darkened the image of a ‘sunny’ South Africa.104

‘Sharpeville’ caused a decisive turn in the debate on South African apartheid policy. From that moment, apartheid became an international human rights issue. In the Netherlands, Buskes and others had recently founded the South Africa Committee (Comité Zuid-Afrika, CZA) to inform people about the violent nature of apartheid and to aid the persecuted. The Committee managed to gather support from a broad political spectrum. It was the beginning of the influential Anti-Apartheid Movement in the Netherlands (Anti-Apartheidsbeweging Nederland, AABN). Together with organisations such as the Kairos study group (Werkgroep Kairos) they would set the tone of Dutch public opinion concerning the white, nationalist regime in South Africa.105 Immediately after the bloodbath in Sharpeville, the Committee sent a letter to members of parliament urging them to vote against apartheid in the United Nations and to advocate humanitarian intervention in South Africa.106

In parliament the Social Democrat J.A.W. Burger took up the cause. Supported by representatives of the Communist and Pacifist-Socialist parties (CPN and PSP, respectively) he urged the government – in vain at the time – to unambiguously condemn apartheid and consequently adapt the emigration policy concerning South Africa.107 Outside parliament, political parties and civil society organisations also condemned the apartheid regime. At the offices of the emigrant transportation company the Holland-Afrika Lijn in Amsterdam protesters wielded such slogans as ‘Boycott South Africa’ and ‘Emigrating to South Africa means supporting murder’.108 The indignation also became visible at the entrances to the South African embassy in The Hague and the Van Riebeeckhuis at the Amsterdam Keizersgracht, which housed the emigration desk of the NZA V. Protesters chalked ‘Murderers’ on the façades of both buildings, warning passers-by about the collaboration with a criminal regime that took place inside.109 The responses of Dutch emigrants in South Africa varied: while according to the emigration attaché in Pretoria some did appreciate ‘the push for reform from abroad’, others sided with the South African authorities.110

Unable to maintain the view that apartheid was an internal affair of South Africa, the Dutch government reviewed its policy. In 1961, the Dutch representative in the United

104. After the title of the book Een Hollandse Familie in Zonnig Zuid-Afrika (A Dutch family in sunny South Africa), Amsterdam 1949, by the director of the emigration bureau of the de NZA V. The book was meant as propaganda material to promote emigration to South Africa.


108. Meijers, Blanke broeders, 185; Beppechien Bruins Slot, De CPN en de anti-apartheidsstrijd in Nederland (Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit, 1996).


110. NL-Hana, MoSZW/Emigratie, 2.15.68, inv.nr. 2601: a confidential message dd. 21 April 1960 sent by the emigration-attaché to the Governmental Commissioner for Emigration (hereafter: Commissioner for Emigration).
Nations voted in favour of a resolution condemning the apartheid policy, although the Dutch Ministers’ Council (Ministerraad) remained divided on the issue. Again, groups of (former) Dutch emigrants in South Africa voiced their opinion: this time letters, telegrams and petitions from Durban, Johannesburg, Potchefstroom and Pretoria were sent to the Dutch government to protest against this ‘hostile act against stamverwant South Africa’. These migrants not only feared that Dutch criticism would harm their reputation and commercial interests in South Africa, but also genuinely wished to express their loyalty to the South African government. The Afrikaner nationalist newspaper Die Transvaler extensively discussed the Dutch positions on apartheid in October 1961. They contrasted the rejection of apartheid by the Dutch government with the assent of the Dutch who had settled in South Africa. These immigrants’ dislike of the Dutch government’s criticism encouraged the Afrikaners and ‘warmed their hearts’, because it proved that Dutch immigrants were able to ‘assimilate completely into South Africa society’, according to the mouthpiece of the National Party. The Nationalist daily continued to stress that these settlers could truly be seen as part of the South African people, and consequently ‘thousands of well-meaning Dutchmen’ should be encouraged to settle in South Africa. Clearly, a governmental revision of the immigration policy was imminent.

After South Africa had become independent from the British Commonwealth in 1961, the Nationalist government developed and subsidised policies which focused on boosting immigration from Europe. In this effort the government was supported by the opposition, which never failed to stress that exactly such a policy had been retracted after the electoral victory of the National Party in 1948. All parties agreed, however, that a turnaround was absolutely required to ‘reinforce through immigration the white population in the southernmost part of Africa’. This was all the more urgent as since ‘Sharpeville’ more white people had left the country than entered it. The revision of the immigration policy was supported by the assertion that an overwhelming majority of those immigrants who had come to South Africa since the end of the Second World War had seamlessly assimilated, and had contributed a great deal to the prosperity of the country. This argument was supported by those Dutch immigrants who, through their criticism of the Dutch government, showed their loyalty to the white men’s country where they had settled.

In 1961 the South African government, intending to attract 30,000 white immigrants on a yearly basis, founded a Department for Immigration. In addition, a large sum was put aside to fund the newcomers’ overseas crossings and provide financial support upon their arrival. The admission and selection procedures at the embassies and recently founded immigration offices in Europe were accelerated. Emigrants from South-European countries such as the predominantly Roman Catholic countries Italy, Spain, and Portugal were now also

113. Die Transvaler van 16 October 1961, cited by Hendrickse, Die betrekkinge, 244–245.
115. Peberdy, Selecting Immigrants, 258.
granted easy access. Fugitives from Eastern Europe who could strengthen anti-Communism were allowed to enter as well. After 1961 it looked as though all white people were welcome in South Africa, provided they were not Communists. However, the three large Afrikaans-speaking churches, led by the influential Dutch Reformed Church (Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk, NGK) in South Africa, were not enamoured of Roman Catholic newcomers, as these threatened to compromise the ‘inheritance of our Protestant forebears’. The Protestant character of the South African nation needed to be safeguarded against not only the ‘black’ (swarte) and ‘red’ (rode), but also the ‘Romish’ (Roomse) menaces. Although the government emphasised that there was no religious discrimination, Protestant immigrants from Calvinist countries were preferred. One of these countries was the Netherlands; nevertheless, the total number of Dutch immigrants remained extremely low from 1960 until the end of apartheid.

After 1960 the Dutch government and the General Centre for Emigration (Algemene Emigratie Centrale, AEC) discouraged emigration to South Africa, although the choice was ultimately the aspiring emigrants’ to make. Additional efforts were made to inform emigrants about the tense situation in this ‘multiracial society’. If people nevertheless decided to leave for South Africa, they were entitled to the same facilities and support that emigrants to other countries received from the state. Emigration to South Africa continued to be propagated, in particular by the Netherlands South African Association (NZAV) and the Christian Centre for Emigration (Christelijke Emigratie Centrale, CEC). Within these organisations the notion of western civilisation, combined with the idea of stamverwantschap, resulted in a continued identification with the white, Protestant and Afrikaans-speaking part of the South African population. By contrast, a growing part of Dutch society began to identify with ‘black’ South Africa. The global human rights movement provided this majority with an influential basis from which to experiment with new expressions of ‘international solidarity’, aimed at deconstructing inequality based not only on class, race and gender but also on religion, nationality and ethnicity. Whenever Dutch individuals or families wished to emigrate to the ‘country of apartheid’ they could expect considerable criticism from their immediate surroundings. While white South

116. NL-Hana, MoSZW/Emigratie, 2.15.68, inv.nr. 2601: Zuid-Afrika van Week tot Week, published by the intelligence attaché of the embassy of the Union of South Africa in the Netherlands dd. 2 February 1961, and a letter dd. 21 May 1962 from the emigration attaché to the Commissioner for Emigration.
117. Peberdy, Selecting Immigrants, 123.
118. NL-Hana, MoSZW/Emigratie, 2.15.68, inv.nr. 2601: Letters dd. 8 August 1962 and 4 February 1964 from the emigration attaché to the Commissioner for Emigration.
120. NL-Hana, MoSZW/Emigratie, 2.15.68, inv.nr. 2602: letter from the emigration attaché dd. 4 February 64 to the Commissioner for Emigration.
121. Vooruitzien (Previse), Monthly of the AEC, May 1960.
122. NL-Hana, MoSZW/Emigratie, 2.15.68, inv.nr. 15: letter dd. 1 August 1960 to the Commissioner for Emigration.
123. Pedro de Wit, Wegen wijzen overzee. 65 jaar christelijk emigratiewerk (Kampen: Kok, 1993).
Africa threw its gates wide open to white Europeans, only a few hundred left the Netherlands through the back door.

**Final remarks and follow-up**

In this article I have tried to demonstrate how the inclusion and exclusion of migrants acts as a lens through which different conceptions of the nation state and shifting constructions of national and racial identities can be observed, and also that the intertwining of the ‘sending’ and ‘receiving’ ends of migration processes produces different categories of race. In the years 1910 to 1961, when the Union of South Africa took shape as a nation state, the admission of immigrants from Europe – and hence from the Netherlands – was directly dependent on the struggle for political power fought by the Unionists and the Nationalists. The former considered the future of a ‘civilised’ South Africa to be best served by an influx of white immigrants from Europe, as a means to safeguard white supremacy within the confines of the British Commonwealth. The Nationalists, on the other hand, aimed at strengthening their version of a white South African nation primarily through reinforcing the established white Afrikaner community. It was not the embedding in the British Commonwealth, or the influx of more whites from abroad, but an absolute segregation of ‘black’ and ‘white’ within the boundaries of South Africa that they thought would lead to that goal. Only after the Nationalists obtained a firm hold on power in the course of the 1950s did they become more lenient towards immigration from Europe, especially from *stamverwanten* such as the Dutch. However, only after South Africa, led by the Nationalists, broke away from the British Commonwealth in 1961 were measures taken to reintroduce and implement a truly active ‘white’ immigration policy intended to expand and strengthen the position of the white population. This became all the more urgent since the expulsion of the black population to the so-called homelands.

On the part of the Dutch government outward migration was seen as a solution to unemployment and the perceived threat of overpopulation after the Second World War. When in the 1950s the Netherlands for the first time developed an active and well-coordinated emigration policy the Union of South Africa was recommended because of its sunny climate, but even more because of a common colonial history that connected the Dutch and white Afrikaner population. The nineteenth-century notion of *stamverwantschap* again became an appropriate vehicle for stressing the inextricable link between the Dutch and their ‘distant Afrikaner cousins’ in South Africa. This discursive practice, filled with family metaphors, was directed at aspiring emigrants in the Netherlands as well as the South-African government. In this way, the significance of nationality, race (whiteness), religion (Protestant) and culture (language) became amalgamated into a mutually reinforcing process of ethnic identification. South Africa was presented as a kind of dependence of the Netherlands on the African continent, and the associated image of South Africa as a ‘white men’s land’ was self-evident. By reaffirming the *stamverwantschap* between the Dutch and the Afrikaners, the Dutch government and the semi-governmental organisations promoting emigration hoped to overcome the restrictions the Nationalists had placed on emigration from Europe. The mutual rapprochement in the 1950s shows that they were successful.
Nevertheless, emigration from the Netherlands was to steadily decline after its peak in 1952. Emigration stalled after 1960, the year in which ‘Sharpeville’ established the worldwide image of South Africa’s apartheid regime as a highly repressive. At this point, not even the Dutch government could ignore the fact that emigration to South Africa supported the construction of a racist nationalism that denied a place to South Africans of colour. This development was reflected in a change in the framing of the notion of stamverwantschap. First the ‘historical ties’ were mentioned as an argument to engage in a ‘critical dialogue’ with the South African authorities. Dutch political and church leaders expressed their concern for both the black and white populations, and also for the ‘difficult position’ of Dutch emigrants living among them. However, the ethnic identification with the ‘white brethren’ soon gave way to a politically motivated identification with the ‘black brothers and sisters’ or comrades. ‘Those who care about developments in South Africa experience a novel connection to its inhabitants’, wrote anti-apartheid activist Sietse Bosgra in the 1980s. He pointed to ‘a feeling of solidarity with the repressed, fighting for freedom in that country of apartheid’. The Dutch historian G.J. Schutte interprets this process of cultural and political reorientation as a form of renewed ‘cultural imperialism’. The notion of ‘cultural imperialism’ is not new in his work: Schutte has mentioned it before as a characterisation of the Dutch engagement with the former Boer Republics. The ‘Boer sympathy’ was, in his words, ‘a sublimated outlet for different feelings of fear and inferiority’. It ‘enlarged Dutch self-esteem and provided a moral justification for interference in that area’. When Schutte projects this very notion of ‘cultural imperialism’ onto the prominent involvement of the Dutch with the anti-apartheid struggle, he seems to disqualify the undeniably moral engagement of the Dutch in the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa, and in doing so he overlooks the fact that the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the Netherlands was part of a global process of democratisation, secularisation, decolonisation, and a growing interest in human rights and respect for Black Power in the second half of the twentieth century. In this process South Africa, as the country of apartheid, lost much of its appeal, also to politically ignorant Dutch men and women who wished to realise their future elsewhere – despite the financial and political support offered by South Africa’s new immigration policy.

However, a reference to the emerging global civil rights movement is not enough if we want to compare the asynchronous developments in the migration policies of the Netherlands and Great Britain regarding South Africa. The history of the changing positions of the Dutch government towards apartheid and the implications this had for the Dutch emigration to South Africa seems in contrast with that of the British government and British emigration. It was not until the mid-1980s that relations between the United Kingdom and South Africa began to sour and British emigration to South Africa declined. Therefore, the similarities and differences in post-war emigration and transnational identity policies of

125. De Boer, Van Sharpeville, 368–376; Meijers, ‘Het zelf en de ander’.
128. Schutte, Nederland en de Afrikaners, 205; also Schutte, Stamverwantschap onder druk, 31.
129. Conway and Leonard, Migration, 30–49.
the two imperial powers that left their colonial footprints in South Africa deserve further consideration.

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