Chapter IV

American and Soviet policy towards the university professoriate, 1945 through the early 1960s

Introduction

It must admitted that up until the present American and Soviet policy towards those Germans who delivered lectures and carried out research, who occupied positions such as professors, associate professors, assistant professors, and lecturers in German universities after the end of the Second World War, has not been analyzed in any depth in the literature due to the lack of documents solely devoted to this question. This is because reconstruction and analysis of the history of the relationship between the Occupation authorities and German university faculty requires a meticulous selection of materials from among a mass of documents which describe all the various reforms but only touch on this question. American policy in regard to German professors, in particular, remained largely beyond the parameters of previous research. We began from a perspective which assumed that all the transformations proposed either by the Americans or by the Soviets seriously touched on the personal life and academic careers of those professors who worked at universities. These professors would therefore have been left with the choice of either reacting positively or negatively to the reforms and this, in turn, would have enormously influenced the final effects of these transformations. Hence, we defined our research task in terms of reconstructing both American and Soviet policy towards the German university corporation of professors. As a result, our analysis suddenly revealed a special and an exceptional role played by professors in the fate of both the American and Soviet transformations of German universities.

This chapter consists of three parts. The first part will analyze American policy towards the German teaching staff from 1945 through the early 1960s, and the second part will investigate Soviet policy in this area and over the same period. The chapter will end with our conclusions.
I. American policy towards the German university professoriate

As we have mentioned previously, the American Zone of Occupation included Bavaria, Württemberg-Baden,\(^{391}\) Hessen, the city of Bremen in the British Zone in Lower Saxony, and the sector of Berlin located in the Soviet Zone in the State of Brandenburg. There were seventeen institutions of higher education in the Zone, seven of which were universities. The history of the universities in Berlin, Heidelberg, Munich, Erlangen, Frankfurt, Marburg, and Würzburg stretched back to the late fourteenth century,\(^{392}\) and their international recognition as centers of science and philosophy had long been established by the community of the professoriate of these universities. This community of the professoriate, being a constituent part of university life, was subjected to revision in order to create a new and pliable corporation of professors whose work would contribute to the implementation of all the reforms proposed by the American government.

American policy towards the German professoriate can be reconstructed in terms of the following constituent parts: i) the program of denazification of the professoriate; ii) the interpretations of the way of thinking of the German professoriate; iii) the making of a New Professor; and iv) opposition from the old conservative professoriate and the American response to this.

1. Denazification and reemployment of the professoriate

The American Occupation authorities, in contrast to the Soviet ones, arrived in Berlin with a preconceived apparatus for managing the German teaching staff, and more importantly, with selected and trained experts in the field of university education. The training of military officers – men who had achieved distinction in American university education or who had studied the German university system – began in the School of Military Government at Charlottesville, Virginia, in May 1942. These initial experts formulated certain basic ideas about how to remove all the active Nazis and Nazi sympathizers from positions of authority in German universities. After arriving in Germany, these experts worked out

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\(^{391}\) This state was called Baden-Württemberg in 1952 after unification of three German states.

\(^{392}\) The oldest universities were Heidelberg and Würzburg, established in 1386 and 1402 respectively. Other universities were created from the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries.
of a central secretariat and had field affiliations in the University Education Branch of the OMGUS located in each German state.\textsuperscript{393} In addition, every German university accommodated an American University Officer and agents who communicated with the professoriate and kept a check on their activities.\textsuperscript{394}

The purge of former Nazis proclaimed by the Potsdam Agreement became the initial main and surprisingly prolonged part of American policy towards the German professoriate. The Americans, in contrast to their colleagues in the Soviet Zone, very thoroughly purged Nazis found among the university personnel. The American version of denazification implied three types of action regarding the German teaching staff. Collaborators with the Nazis were dismissed at once. Later some of them were reemployed, while some of them never returned to the universities. The academic life of those who were allowed to return to the universities was entirely under the control of the American Military Administration.

Immediately after the end of the war, all universities were closed and taken over by the Military Administration. Reopening of the universities was arranged after screening the faculty members and after the approval of petitions for reopening sent by the universities themselves to the Education Division of the American Military Administration. These petitions contained a detailed curriculum and a list stating the names and qualifications of the teaching staff.\textsuperscript{395} An American Education Officer, special agents, and professors who cooperated with the Occupation Administration, were responsible for purging the universities of Nazis. American University Officers organized a special University Committee involved in the process of denazification of the professoriate. These committees were comprised of professors and scientists who had either become antifascists in the period of Adolf Hitler’s power or who had demonstrated an active pro-American position during the period of the

\textsuperscript{393} NARA. Record Group 59. International Information Administration Programs 1949-1952. Box 7, 12, 25

\textsuperscript{394} Documents indicate the main responsibility of an American University Officer was as follows: “a surveillance to prevent a repetition of what happened in the thirties, the infiltration and capture of the universities by undemocratic and military political power.” The position of the University Officer existed until the early 1960s. // NARA. Record Group 260. Records of US Occupation Headquarters. World War II. Office of OMGUS. Württemberg-Baden. Records of Education and Cultural Relations Division, 1945-1949. Box 913-917A.

Occupation. For example, the two leading scientists at the University of Heidelberg, Karl Jaspers and Gustav Radbruch,396 played a significant role in purging the university staff. The American Military Administration supported such people by providing them with certain benefits. For example, the members of the University Committee at the University of Heidelberg were released from the duty to lodge American soldiers in their own homes.397 For submission to the American Education Officer, the committee formulated plans covering the nominations of those lecturers whom they considered academically and politically acceptable, along with a list of the university personnel who had already been excluded or should be excluded for political reasons.398 Hence, those German professors who participated in committees such as these contributed to the American program of denazification. Their activity, however, created a platform for conflict and tense situations among the professors in the universities themselves.

The first purge began in 1945. Initially, the Americans supposed that denazification could be carried out through recommendations made by these committees as well as through investigations based on the Fragebogen, a questionnaire filled out by the university people, along with additional investigations made by secret and anonymous agents of the Counter Intelligence Corps or the CIC, a special intelligence agency for hunting down members of the Nazi Party. Archival records mention that there was no time to conduct personal interviews or to do any thorough investigations. All the initial Fragebogen were quickly examined by these special agents, and those professors who fell into the automatic arrest category, as having been active members of the Nazi Party since 1933, were interned; all other people initially remained in the universities. As a result, after the reopening of the universities, classes began with many professors who had been involved with the Nazis and who believed in National Socialism.

In 1946, a new investigation or purge began, because agents of the CIC had received information that there were still professors who continued to give lectures from the standpoint of nationalism and racism.

396 Gustav Radbruch was a famous professor of law and of Kantian philosophy, and a member of the Social Democratic Party as well. He had held a seat in the Reichstag in the 1920s.
398 Ibid.
In one of the reports, an American agent indicated that “a tremendous mistake was made in opening the University of Heidelberg in 1945 without consideration for the fact that University of Heidelberg, as well as all of the German Universities had been, over a period of twelve years, Nazified to the core. It will require at least another six months of careful, methodical investigation before it can be said that the elements of potential threat to the security of the American Occupation have been removed.”

Another reason for this second purge was determined by resistance on the part of the administration of the universities to dismissing these professors. At the University of Würzburg, the military officers of the OMGUS and CIC learned that many lecturers still remained in the university, contrary to the instructions for denazification previously issued by the Education Branch of the OMGUS. An officer of the University Education Branch pointed out this violation to the Vice Rector Josef Martin and advised him to dismiss those professors without any further delay. The Vice Rector suddenly opposed this order and was therefore himself replaced by the American Military Administration “because of his failure to carry out denazification directives.”

During this extensive second purge, the American authorities and the agents of the CIC first conducted personal interviews pertaining to the subjects taught by the professors and to all the books which the professors had published. In addition, the agents of the CIC tried to persuade professors to provide information about those colleagues who had actively participated in the Nazi Party. Those professors who had voiced nationalist ideas in their previous books or voiced them during the interview were dismissed. A fresh group of professors now was forced out of the universities, resulting in a wave of grievances among the faculty members. Rectors of German universities appealed to the American authorities requesting a stop be made to this denazification “which was inimical to the best interest of the universities.” Professors who personally sent letters to the American authorities complained in

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them about the uncertainty of their futures. This uncertainty produced, as one of the German professors wrote in his letter to the American Military Administration in Berlin, “a reluctance to cooperate on the part of those who had not yet been screened, due to the fact that none of the professors knew how he stood, and all of them had not yet been screened, due to the fact that none of the professors knew how he stood, and all of them had the fear of falling out with a rector in the case that they are too helpful to the CIC [sic].”

Moreover, the professoriate, both senior and junior staff, found themselves between the frying pan and the fire, between the university and the American Administration. Collaboration with the Americans implied betraying those colleagues who had been active members of the Nazi Party and thus created conflicts within a university. However, denial of any such collaboration implied hiding information about former Nazis and thus provoked a dangerous living situation for a professor and his family: He could lose his position at the university and thus the essential daily allowances of food and wood provided by the universities.

The most extreme purge happened in the universities of Bavaria. The Würzburg, Erlangen, and Munich universities were considered the most reactionary universities by the Military Administration. The notion of “reactionary universities” implied their nationalist and anti-American positions. These universities were the last to be reopened, because they were the first to completely give themselves over to the National Socialists during the rise of Hitler. Hence, screening was conducted there several times. The philosophy and law faculties of these universities were the hardest hit by denazification of any other department. The percentage of dismissals was the highest, with half of the standing faculty discharged. The University of Erlangen suffered the most: out of the total teaching staff then employed, seventy percent were dismissed.

On the contrary, other German states such as Baden-Württemberg, and in particular the University of Heidelberg located there, became the first to “have felt the might of the American denazification on its
This oldest of the universities, and the one with a strong international reputation, was opened in September 1945, after a purge of 184 professors out of 376. However, the dismissal of almost half of the teaching staff compelled the rector of University of Heidelberg and the famous European medical doctor Karl H. Bauer to complain to the American authorities about the state of affairs in the university in order to impede denazification. Addressing his letter to the American administration, he wrote: “By denazification the staff has been reduced to about half its size. The remaining half consists, to almost two thirds, of old, partly too old professors [sic]. Some of them were undernourished for a considerable time; many are weakened or even sickly. Many bear the signs and the consequences of the mental suffering of the Nazi time [sic]. The problem is made especially difficult by the fact that precisely the middle generations are affected with particular severity by denazification. In these very generations the means of bait and pressure of the Party were immense, so that the individual could hardly escape them sometimes [sic]. German science has suffered a great number of bleeding [sic] one after the other. Denazification may be compared with a great operation performed on an organism already weakened considerably. One will understand that precisely the German anti-Nazis, who, at the same time the preservation of science is nearest to their hearts, plead that the operation should not be more dangerous than the illness for which is performed. Precisely those who hate the real Nazis ardently ask all the more for grace those who merely lost their way and for those who, in our opinion, taken a false step [sic].” Rector Bauer made an effort to protect scientists and professors from denazification. However, after the second purge in his university in 1946, the rector, as a former member of the Nazi Party and the administrator “who tried in every way to soften and, if possible, to nullify the denazification,” was discharged by the Occupation Administration.

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406 Ibid.
407 Ibid.
There is no doubt that this program of denazification devastated the universities and contributed to the interruption of normal academic activity. It may well be that the American officers understood the level of severity of their program, although we have no direct record of this in the documents. However, a new policy that followed the program of purges may be evidence that the American authorities decided to shift away from this policy of purges when they began to allow former Nazis to return to the universities in 1947 and 1948.

After the wave of dismissals, a process of reemployment, called reinstatement in the documents, was elaborated and began in 1947 and 1948. This policy was aimed at returning nominal members of the Nazi Party to academic institutions. All the members of the Party that had been dismissed were given the opportunity to submit a petition for reinstatement in the universities. The universities, in turn, were permitted to elaborate on the criteria for the reinstatement of these dismissed professors. The university committees first examined whether a dismissed colleague was capable of usefully serving a university in terms of his work and his personality. If a dismissed colleague turned out to have been a convinced and active adherent of Nazism, he forfeited all suitability for his position. If, however, he could provide evidence that he had joined the Party under the pressure of circumstance or for fear of losing his family’s and his own means of existence and of being forced to renounce his scientific calling or if, being weak-willed, he had succumbed to a lesser pressure and become a member of the Party, these reasons were henceforth not be taken as indications of Nazi-mindedness and so such persons could be reemployed. If a professor had refrained from any National-Socialist activity or if, after a brief adherence to the Party born of misplaced idealism, he at the least now showed some genuine remorse and a reversal of feeling, then such a man would tend not to be rejected by this committee. This was especially the case when a professor had done much for science and for a university, and where his academic and research activities were seen as practically indispensable for scientific instruction there. In other words, professors had to produce evidence that they had been forced to join the Party in order to be reinstated in the universities.

In addition, the Military Administration now elaborated on its policy towards those who wished to be reevaluated in terms of whether they had been active members of the Party and whose previous petitions for reemployment had been rejected for this reason. The sanctions were now given gradations. For lecturers who had contributed to the spread of National Socialism but who had not been National Socialists in their mental attitudes, these lecturers were not permitted to deliver lectures for an appropriate but unspecified length of time and were blocked for future promotion. Those professors who had been active members of the Party and had exploited their Party membership to their own advantage were dismissed with recognition of their claim to a pension. These rules regulated in detail the fate of the senior staff, those professors whose age ranged between 60 and 80 years old, but said nothing about the junior staff. In short, the Americans assumed responsibility for deciding on the extent to which the views and so-called mental attitudes of university staff had been Nazified. Such a policy of evaluation was not dissimilar to that of the Soviet authorities who defined the philosophical credo of every professor.

In order to be newly reinstated, the dismissed members of the faculty had to fill out a detailed questionnaire (Personalfrageboren für Hochschulbeamten), and every department at every university sent a petition, together with a letter from an American University Officer, stating its agreement that the former professor should be reemployed. These documents were passed on to CIC agents who made the final decision. The questionnaire included questions about the dismissed person’s past life, that of his or her family, and about his or her political views. In the petition, it was necessary to give evidence for the “scientific value of a re-employee,” stating certain facts about the person’s academic career and proving that he or she had been forced to join the Nazi Party. The following excerpt from a petition prepared on behalf of the theological department at University of Heidelberg demonstrates the style of the petition used in order to reemploy one member of the professoriate: “We are sorry to see him (Professor Günter Moldaenke – N. T.) rejected by the Military Government. The Faculty ask [sic] to plead for this young scholar, who has attended the chair of Ecclesiastical History. <…> he was forced in 1936 <…> to enter the Nazi party. But, wherever he was, he became feeling the prejudice and neglect [sic] generally shown in

410 Ibid.
the party against theology."\textsuperscript{411} However, despite this petition and a letter sent by an American officer at the University of Heidelberg, who indicated that the subject of ecclesiastical history demanded two instructors and that this professor had a good reputation as a scientist, the CIC agents stated that inasmuch as Günter Moldaenke had been an active member of the Nazi Party and had been sent to Estonia in 1936, where he helped the Party which was outlawed there and confined to underground activities, he could not be re-admitted to the University.\textsuperscript{412}

The program of reemployment lasted during the entire period of Occupation. On the whole about 30-40\% of dismissed faculty members had returned to academic life by 1955. It is possible that some of the rejected persons were later able to be reinstated in the universities during the period of the 1960s through the 1970s; archival records do mention such cases but without providing any detail.

In addition, this program was accompanied by supervision of the academic and teaching activities of every reinstated professor, which implied checking the content of courses, as well as a policy of isolating deviant or disagreeable professors, along with the promotion of pliable members of the faculty. Every reemployed professor was put under the control of the American University Officer, who supervised the content of courses delivered by these professors. The procedure for this supervision of courses was as follows: the rectors of German universities submitted to the American University Officer a list of courses together with a brief description of their content and the names of the instructors; only after the officer gave his approval, were the proposed courses or lectures announced by the lecturers. The research and scholarly activities of the reinstated community of professors were placed under the control of the American officers. At the end of each semester, the universities reported on these activities to the officer.\textsuperscript{413} Finally, right up until the end of 1955, the University Education Branch of the OMGUS kept a complete file on professors and officials, which dealt with their political


\textsuperscript{412} Ibid.

activity under the Nazi regime and under the American Occupation.\textsuperscript{414} This system was highly developed by the Military Administration in the most nationalistic Bavarian universities in Würzburg, Erlangen, and Munich, and was later used by the United States everywhere else.

As was the case in the Soviet Zone of Occupation, the American authorities tried to get rid of unreliable and disloyal professors who articulated anti-American views. Professor W. Wengler, a dean of the law faculty at the Free University, was dismissed “because of his hostile attitude at the time of the founding of the Free University, his derogatory remarks about the Free University to foreigners and press representatives, and his various alleged actions during the Nazi regime.”\textsuperscript{415} In addition, the American authorities pointed out the professor’s association with Humboldt University, located in the Soviet Zone, and denounced it as a threat to the stability of the Free University. However, in the early 1970s, he was allowed to return to the Free University and became the head of the Free University’s Institute of International and Comparative Law.

The program of denazification implemented by the American Military Administration during the entire period of Occupation can be described in terms of the dismissal and reemployment of the university professoriate. The military authorities of the United States dismissed a high percentage of faculty members, which varied from forty to seventy percent of the teaching staff. Hence, the question arises as to how German universities were able to operate during the initial years of Occupation, if half or two-thirds of the teaching staff was discharged. The answer proves to be rather simple: these vacant positions were filled by professors who had been dismissed by the Nazis and by a limited number of academic personnel from the US and European countries invited by the Military Administration.\textsuperscript{416} This replacement, called the reconstruction of the teaching staff, is illustrated by the following figures for University of Erlangen: “there were 112 teachers previous to the second denazification investigation in fall 1946; 29 of those were dismissed; 13 were late reinstated; 55 new people were added, and the total number as of today


\textsuperscript{415} NARA. Record Group 59. International Information Administration. Field Program for Germany 1945-1953. Box 1-7.

[1948] is 151,” that is, the number of the university academic staff was increased after denazification.\textsuperscript{417} The “new people,” mentioned in this document, came from universities in the United States and Europe.

Drawing conclusions at this point, we can state that the American program of denazification proved to be much harsher than the Soviet one in terms of figures and formal procedure: the United States dismissed a higher percentage of the faculty members than the Soviet authorities did. In addition, the American authorities elaborated a more complex system for the reemployment of those dismissed than the Soviets did.

2. American interpretation of the way of thinking of the German professoriate

One of the most serious obstacles that American authorities encountered in the process of purging and in their initial transformation of German higher education was the fact that the philosophy of German university education and the way of thinking of the professoriate differed completely from the philosophy of American university education and the way of thinking of American professors.

American universities primarily regarded themselves as teaching sites where the democratic principles of teaching and cooperative work between a professor and students resulted in the formation of a citizen capable of involvement in public and political life. The situation in Germany was entirely different. In brief, in German universities the principle of the unity of research and teaching, along with a strong philosophical approach, resulted in forming scholarly oriented persons who positioned themselves far from public and political life. For the American experts, German universities, as compared to American universities, seemed to be institutions which were too removed from public life to be able to play, let alone implement, any social role.\textsuperscript{418}

More importantly, American experts perceived this stance on the part of the German professoriate as the primary reason behind the social apathy found in German universities. On the one hand, American experts evaluated the academic excellence of the German professoriate as being on a high level in terms of training of scientific personnel and agreed that German universities obtained outstanding results in terms of the

\textsuperscript{417} Ibid.

production of scholars. On the other hand, when assessing German universities in terms of American educational ideology, the experts indicated that German professors were less successful in preparing students for the responsibilities of informed and intelligent citizenship and in making instruction relevant to current political and social problems. The staff of the University Education Branch disliked the fact that German university people, with their traditional concept of “absolute truth,” considered the social responsibilities of higher education to be secondary. The American military authorities concluded that the professoriate assigned too important a role to philosophy and theoretical scholarship in their concept of university education. As a result, the courses delivered by German professors neglected those problems of significance to the society as a whole.

Evaluating the German professoriate in light of their own educational ideology, the American experts were intent on changing this mode of thinking of the university teaching staff. The program of general reform in universities should be accompanied, in the opinion of the experts, by a modification of worldview that included the teaching and research methods of the aristocratic German professoriate. This implied fostering a so-called new professor who would modify his university according to the American model.

3. The Making of a New Professor

A new type of professor implied that such a professor would esteem the American model of higher education and the American approach to research and teaching and, more importantly, would be ready to deliver lectures for newly introduced courses in the field of political science, American studies, general education, and other subjects. The government believed that professors engaged in giving lectures in these disciplines would have their value system transformed, which would in turn make them more loyal to the United States. But the most important question raised by the OMGUS was how to achieve these goals and how to encourage the German professoriate to deliver lectures in these new disciplines. The recommendations of two American scientists employed as temporary consultants by the University Education Branch, Sigmund Neumann and Franz Neumann, both of whom had fled the Nazis and had become leading specialists in the field of political science in the United States, served as the basis for the governmental policy of the United States vis-à-vis the German professoriate.
Sigmund Neumann was professor of political science at Wesleyan University in Connecticut. His book entitled “Permanent revolution: totalitarianism in the age of international civil war” had attracted the attention of Washington because of its propagandistic value stemming from its analysis of the ideology of totalitarian regimes such as that of the German Nazis and Soviet Communists. Franz Neumann, same surname but no relation, was a political scientist at Columbia University in New York. He was a member of the Frankfurt School, an émigré community in the United States, and he was best known for his analysis of fascism. During the war, Franz Neumann was recruited by the US Army, and he became a prominent political expert in the Office of Strategic Services responsible for elaborating on covert and overt American policies abroad. Both these prominent men were known to the American political establishment. Both were invited by the Department of State to propose reforms for the German universities in the American Zone during the period 1948 through 1950. Their ideas and the plans they proposed were carried out by the Occupation authorities, and today these two men are considered to be the founding fathers of political science in West Germany.

Sigmund Neumann, who came to Germany in 1948, proposed an entirely new way to have an affect on the German university teaching staff. He stated that, in as much as the German professoriate could not learn American methods of cognition by themselves, a designated number of American and European visiting professors should teach these methods within the framework of the new universities and institutes established by the US government in Germany. Moreover, in these new universities and institutes, American and European scientists should regulate the training process and foster a new generation of young German scientists. Neumann ironically noted that, since German university teachers held reactionary attitudes, they would not be able to follow the new influences coming from sociological interpretation which were prevalent among American political scientists. Close observation of the work of and personal contacts with German professors convinced this former German scientist that a change in basic attitudes could not realistically be expected in the near future. He claimed that “for this reason, a much needed reform of the teaching and training in political science will not derive from this traditional center of exclusively statistic
Professor Neumann emphasized that German universities placed an emphasis on a nationalistic and parochial view of the world at large.

Accordingly, the only thing to do was to establish new higher education institutions in the area of political science in cities such as Heidelberg, Munich, and West Berlin, and provide them with a group of American specialists and educators who would establish a new curriculum and develop new topics for further research activities in order to prepare new generations of German scholars.

Neumann positively evaluated only one university that, in his opinion, could become the center of the development of political science in Germany. This was the University of Heidelberg, which actually was an exception among the others because of its interest in the development of this area of study. Hence, Neumann suggested developing a department of political science within this university, with permanent staffing by American visiting professors as heads of such a department. Later, as Neumann recommended, a systematic exchange program for “progressive” German professors would assure the development of these new institutes.

After two years, Franz Neumann, Sigmund Neumann’s colleague, went to Germany to evaluate how political science was developing. He proposed the development of this field of study within all existing German universities, emphasizing the Free University created in 1948 as a model institution for such an introduction: “Political science must be introduced as an overt subject in German universities and taught by reliable university professors. The best place is the Free University of Berlin. Once political science is established there, other universities will unquestionably follow. Until political science is a recognized subject in German universities, the teaching of political science by American visiting professors will be of little use.”

Although the evaluations and recommendations of American experts differed to some extent, they converged in one thought that was to become a unique motto for American policy towards the German university professorate: “New Subjects, New Methods, and New

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420 Ibid.
Blood." This slogan implied filling the universities with new scholars and lecturers who could bring new disciplines, new methods of teaching and research, and thereby would change the so-called old conservative professoriate who opposed American modifications.

Washington carefully considered the opinion of these American experts. Having analyzed their recommendations, the officials of the Department of State authorized the following plan to address the German professoriate: i) send brilliant American and European specialists on an assignment to establish and give an impetus to developing a partnership with German teaching staff, and ii) train in the United States those young German university instructors who had completed their PhD theses or demonstrated definite interest in a lifetime career as lecturers and professors of political science.

However, as far as these recommendations and plans were concerned, no judgments and opinions stemming from German professors themselves which might be taken into consideration by American politicians were included. Reasoning from the documents we have analyzed, we are inclined to believe that the American experts and the Occupation authorities did not consult with the teaching staff before compiling this and other programs of transformation for German universities. There are no notes of conversations or any documents about any such dialogue between German university people and the American Occupation authorities. American experts and military officers, in contrast to the Soviet ones, did not arrange private conversations with members of the teaching staff to discuss future transformations. On the contrary, American experts believed that the old professoriate would follow the new ideology, methods, theories, and knowledge, if they were “surrounded” by new professors from the United States and Europe, who would bring about new ways of study and scholarship. The Soviet experts, as we will see later, would act differently: They urged German university professors to revise the content of their lectures by means of private conversations and through persuasion accompanied by serious material support and indoctrination, but without introducing Soviet specialists into German institutions.

American and European visiting professors in German universities

One of the most underestimated and untouched questions in the literature is the question of those American professors who came to occupied Germany in order to implement reforms and establish mutual understanding between two academic worlds – the American and the German professoriate. Documents found in the manuscript collection at the University of Arkansas give us an opportunity to shed light on this question and to show the role these visiting professors, often called the “consultants” in American documents, played. These professors transformed German universities on a day-by-day basis, and it was they who are depicted in these documents as constituting the primary mechanism for the implementation of reforms and for the establishment of grass-roots contacts with German colleagues. Yet, information on their activities, problems, and achievements, as well as information on their biographies, is quite scarce in the archives.

In contrast to the Soviet administration in Germany which raised a generation of “new professors” through short-term training as part of post-graduate studies, American experts acted differently: They flooded German universities with European and American lecturers and scientists. American experts supposed that direct contact between German university instructors and highly qualified American personnel would bring about all the necessary reforms.

In 1948, after the purge, a first contingent of ninety visiting professors from the United States, Switzerland, and the Netherlands filled these vacant positions. Later, 100-175 specialists from American and European universities were sent annually to German higher education establishments by Washington. The official purpose of this program was the implementation of the foreign policy objectives of the Department of State and of the American Military Administration in Germany by bringing highly ranked American professors into direct contact with the German people. The more detailed intentions of this program are fairly well described in the following: “Visiting professors, as it has long been demonstrated by the large number that the United States has sent to Latin America, can be very helpful. The best contribution of such persons is by their example, and they can be helpful by bringing fresh point of view

[sic], new subject-matter, new methods, and expert advice. Visiting professors should be brought to facilitate the development of new fields and new methods. Their effectiveness will in large part depend upon how long they stay over here; one-semester assignments may not accomplish much. A few examples of fields in which American visiting professors might be valuable are: social science, general science, education and educational research, political science, American history, international relations, and cultural history." 425

The Department of State was responsible for finding an appropriate professor from an American or European university. 426 American professors with specialized knowledge in various fields of activity such as law, labor, religious affairs, education, community activities, governmental institutions, public welfare, and information services had a priority in the selection procedure. 427 They had to know German, and hence most of them were selected from the immigrant community. 428 All the American professors came to Washington for ten days for consultation and briefing prior to their departure for Germany and immediately upon their return from Germany. They had an orientation course called “Introduction to Germany” which interpreted American foreign policy objectives in Germany. After recruitment, these specialists obtained the status of a visiting specialist, a consultant, and a temporary employee of the military government. They were also provided with a special mission at a German university and a salary. After completion of a project, they submitted a final report about their activities in Germany to the Department of State and spent one to two days in Washington being debriefed. 429

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426 Ibid.
428 Ibid.
429 NARA. Record Group 260. OMGUS. Records of the Educational and Cultural Relations Division. Visiting Consultants Program. Box 211.
If we look through the available biographies and academic achievements of those specialists who arrived in Germany from the United States as visiting specialists or professors, it is notable that the majority of them belonged to the community of German scientists who had moved to the United States during the 1930s. Almost all of them were specialists in the fields of political science, pedagogy, and social studies. At the desire of the Department of State, they remained in Germany for several months. However, many of them remained there for longer periods of time, for instance, one political scientist, Dietrich Gerhard, who was sent by the US Government to the Münster and Köln Universities to set up a department of political science, and who then remained in Germany to assume the position of president of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Amerika Studien established by the United States. He later became the director of the Modern History Department at the Max-Planck-Institut für Geschichte in Göttingen, which was also established by the American government. To provide an impetus among German professors for the development of new branches of science such as political science or American studies, the American government found outstanding political scientists in the United States whose efforts brought about a birth of political science throughout Germany. Arnold Brecht, a political scientist of the highest standard of scholarly inquiry who taught at the famous New School for Social Research in New York, Quincy Wright, a professor of International Law at the University of Chicago, Charles Aikin, dean of the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, and at one point an assistant to Dean Acheson, the former Secretary of State, along with many other famous scientists, were invited by the Department of State to implant new ideas into the German professoriate. They were responsible for the

431 Ibid.
432 The list of prominent American professors who contributed to American policy in Germany is extremely long. However, we cannot fail to mention such persons as Dr. Gunnar Dybwad, a lecturer in the Sociology Department at the University of Michigan who was sent to develop studies on children in newly established research institutes at the universities; Dr. Elizabeth Fackt from the University of Denver who developed women’s studies; Dr. Dorr, the chairman of the Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, who consulted with American authorities concerning the field of administration; Dr. Dietrich Gerhard, a German émigré and a professor in the Department of History at Washington University in Missouri, who developed American Studies in
preparation of outlines for courses of study, for compiling subject book lists, and for demonstrating to German professors American methods of teaching in small groups. Moreover, they were responsible for reorganizing academic programs; imposing social studies, political science, general education, and American studies in the curriculum; and establishing new structures in the universities such as departments, department chairs, and institutes. They also wrote new textbooks, shaped the holdings of libraries, transformed German methods of teaching in universities, and communicated with professors on a day-by-day basis over several years.\footnote{In contrast to the Soviet Union whose initial reforms were implemented at the hands of military officers alone without sending professors from the universities, the reforms carried out by the United States were in the hands of academic circles. In implementing the reforms, these visiting professors were likely to be far from the higher realms of politics, but they turned out to have successfully implemented the political tasks assigned by politicians. Moreover, to help the American specialists, representatives of European academic circles were sent to Germany through the channels of the Department of State. The American government considered that the use of European specialists would be an advantage in deeply transforming the German university education, because these Europeans were well acquainted with Germany's history and traditions, and they had a practical knowledge of German political, economic, social, and cultural life. In addition, their employment was more economical because of savings in travel and time.} 

European specialists such as these were also selected by the Department of State. The Europeans, just as their American colleagues, became temporary employees of the American Occupation authorities and received their orders as well as their salaries several German universities; Dr. James O. Murdock, professor of International and Comparative Law at George Washington Law School, Washington, DC, who was responsible for a revision of the curriculum in the area of law studies; Dr. Charles Robson, head of the Department of Political Science at the University of North Carolina, who was sent to participate in projects concerning university administration and so on. See: University of Arkansas Libraries. Special Collections. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection. Manuscript Collection 468. Box 141. Folder 7. EDX 22-2. US Specialists in Germany, 1950.\footnote{NARA. Record Group 59. Decimal Files. Box 2436-2449.} \footnote{NARA. Record Group 260. OMGUS. Records of the Educational and Cultural Relations Division. Visiting Consultants Program. Box 211.}
($35 per day\textsuperscript{435}) from the American authorities in Berlin.\textsuperscript{436} About fifty European visiting professors were sent every six months to six German universities located in Württemberg-Baden, Hessen, and Bavaria.\textsuperscript{437}

Among the European specialists, professors from Switzerland, England, France, and Sweden were welcomed by the American government.\textsuperscript{438} The Department of State and the Military Administration in Berlin primarily selected the candidates for work in Germany. However, many European scholars volunteered to work in German universities, to give lectures, and to revise curricula by sending their requests directly to the Department of State. Dutch university professors especially stood out against the background of other European specialists. In 1948, nine professors from various Dutch universities asked the American government to include them among the teaching staff in German universities for six months. G. Van der Leeuw was the first Dutch lecturer to cross the border. He was a professor at Groningen University, a specialist in church history, and a former Minister of Education. His activity in Germany was reported to have influenced the development of phenomenology at the University of Heidelberg.\textsuperscript{439}

According to the documents, Switzerland also proved to contribute greatly to American reforms in German universities. This country was the main participant in the European consultant program, and its emphasis was on the development of governmental studies and teacher education at

\textsuperscript{435} This sum of money was less than that paid to American specialists. American visiting specialists received $50 per day. However, the final amount for daily allowances depended on the service to be performed, the qualification of a consultant, and the salary scale for this type of service in the consultant’s country. As usual, the average monthly salary was $600-700. See: Special Collections. University of Arkansas Libraries. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection. Manuscript Collection 468. Box 240. Folder 25. EDX 19-2 Review of US Professors Program in Germany, 1953-1954; NARA. Record Group 260. Records of US Occupation Headquarters. World War II. Office of OMGUS. Württemberg-Baden. Records of Education and Cultural Relations Division, 1945-1949. Box 913-917A.

\textsuperscript{436} NARA. Record Group 260. OMGUS. Records of the Educational and Cultural Relations Division. Visiting Consultants Program. Box 211.


higher educational institutions. The Swiss specialists preferred to give lectures concerning governmental decentralization and to participate in instilling new ideas and techniques of research in German professors. A new German pedagogy developed by Americans was also introduced under the aegis of Swiss scholars. The Swiss professor Heinrich Jakobi assisted German experts in teacher education in liberalizing teacher training and in-service training. The Swiss professor Karl Guenther brought information concerning the most modern practices in teacher education in Switzerland to the pedagogical departments of universities in Hessen and Bavaria, and evaluated teacher training programs in German universities on assignment from the American authorities. The history professor Karl Schib, who had extensive experience in working with teacher education groups, introduced university summer courses for Germans in order to discuss certain trends in European teacher education.

The most urgent and at the same time the most difficult task for the US government was to convince the university authorities and German professors to modify their topics of research and the philosophical basis of their lectures, along with revising curriculum. For three to nine months, the visiting specialists mainly worked with the university authorities and committees who managed the curriculum and staff. Through everyday contacts with rectors, with members of the Senate and university committees, these visiting professors proposed their recommendations for improvement of the curriculum in the fields of social studies and political science. The documents cover several cases of how American visiting professors convinced the Germans to introduce something new at their universities. To convince the Germans to introduce, for example, general education courses, visiting professors during the period of the 1950s through the early 1960s arranged a number of conferences relevant to this problem. The American authorities and visiting professors insisted that every German university professor should deliver at least one course in which “the social pertinence of its field was taught during the whole semester.”

440 NARA Record Group 260. OMGUS. Records of the Educational and Cultural Relations Division. Visiting Consultants Program. Box 211.
to deliver a course applicable to the building of a new Germany. The courses in the field of general education were the most appropriate ones.

To help German professors understand what general education was, the American experts established Education Service Centers at all the universities; these offered training courses, books, and other materials necessary for the faculty members.\textsuperscript{443} Franz Neumann, mentioned above, left some notes about the introduction of general education at the Free University: “Quite surprisingly we succeeded in convincing the Curriculum Committee that a general education course is indispensable in order to raise the intellectual level of students. The course will be given as a cooperative course of all faculties. It will be prepared after the American model, its teaching material will mimeographed and the members of the various faculties will jointly give the course. The major American universities (Columbia, Harvard, Yale, Chicago) sent to the Free University the text and source books on such courses as contemporary civilization, humanities, etc.”\textsuperscript{444} From these quoted notes, we can state that the American reforms were carried out through grass-roots contacts between American and German universities, and not between the military and professors as was the Soviet case. This day-by-day and year-in-year-out communication allowed the United States to counter the strong sense of indignation on the part of the German university professoriate who had been so provoked by denazification and by the policy of reemployment.

The American government believed that the introduction of American teaching methods and the imposition of American textbooks in the universities would convert a segment of the German professoriate to the American model of university education along with American methods of research. American visiting professors were therefore asked to present new methods of teaching and to fill the libraries with new monographs, textbooks, and other literature. The documents mention that visiting professors disseminated the idea of the introduction of smaller classes instead of lectures as a new method for teaching in German universities, but that this approach only took root in the Free University during this period.


\textsuperscript{443} NARA. Record Group 59. International Information Administration. Field Program for Germany 1945-1953. Box 1-7.

\textsuperscript{444} NARA. Record Group 59. Decimal Files. Box 2436-2449.
The holdings of German university libraries were also under the special control of visiting professors. The German professoriate had no right to order books, journals, and other literature for themselves and for the libraries until the early 1950s. The visiting professors were assigned the task of assembling new holdings in every university library by compiling lists of books in the fields of political science, social science, and American studies, to be ordered in the United States. In addition, they had to withdraw books from circulation that positively treated such opposing ideologies as Marxism and communism. Moreover, all new textbooks in the area of political science, considered inherent to American values, were prepared by American scholars.

The establishment of new chairs and institutes at German universities also involved the work of American visiting specialists. The Department of State invited American specialists to take up positions as heads of chairs at universities or independent research institutes for a period of from three to five years. The main responsibility of these specialists was to develop new chairs and institutes, introduce new fields of research, and establish a new community of German scholars. They tried to root the new areas of research and study such as American politics, government, history, and civilization as a whole by attracting younger German teaching staff and former students to become involved in these new fields of academic work. The life of these research establishments was maintained for an extended period of time by the Americans themselves and, where the number of American scholars was sizeable and higher than that of German professors, these institutes and chairs succeeded in being developed according to American governmental expectations. For example, at the Free University, only 30 professors out of 350 were German due to the employment of American and European specialists in the mid-1950s. These American professors were free to develop and maintain academic life in the new research institutions such as the East European Institute, the Otto Suhr Institute, and other new institutes at the University, according to American expectations.

In a report by the American military authorities for 1948, there is a list of the projects accomplished by American visiting professors. The

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445 Ibid.
446 Franz Neumann wrote a four-volume work on civil liberties and published these books at the Free University. // NARA. Record Group 59. International Information Administration. Field Program for Germany 1945-1953. Box 1-7.
The junior university teaching staff in the United States

The policy aimed at training the German faculty in American universities and political establishments became an alternative way to foster more loyal professors who would go on to teach and conduct research in the fields of political science and American studies. As with the projects of visiting specialists, the training of these German university professors 1) established the Institute of American Studies at the University of Munich; 2) developed and improved the training of school teachers at the Pedagogical Institutes in Hessen and Bavaria through the introduction of social science, educational psychology, and the system of workshops; 3) delivered lectures in the field of philosophy at University of Marburg and delivered lectures in the field of sociology at University of Frankfurt and at universities located in Bremen and Württemberg-Baden, and delivered lectures on social ethics at the Free University; and 4) conducted seminars in intergroup relations in several German universities, etc.\(^{448}\) So the work accomplished by American and European visiting professors would appear to have been quite comprehensive.

However, these reports provide no information as to how the German professoriate reacted to this activity on the part of the Occupation authorities nor information about any contacts between American and German professors. The one question which cannot be answered therefore is the question of how American and European visiting specialists arranged and maintained contacts with the German professoriate who survived the Hitler purges, wartime bombings, and American denazification. The governmental reports only mention that the American and European visiting professors prepared their own independent reports about such contacts and sent them directly to Washington. Undoubtedly such reports would reveal a reaction and a response by the German professoriate and could therefore contribute to a more balanced evaluation of the final results of American policy. In as much as we have not located these reports, we have to operate on the basis of the statements about the success of the Visiting Professors Program prepared by the American authorities for Washington consumption.

personnel was mainly aimed at reforming the university academic programs. While visiting specialists removed traditional courses in philosophy, theology, classics, etc., from university academic programs and replaced them with the new disciplines of American studies, political science, and general education, the program of training German teaching staff fostered new lecturers capable of teaching these new disciplines and enriching the universities with new knowledge obtained in the United States.

The transformation of the curriculum and the introduction of new disciplines were undertaken by the American authorities in an original American manner: The United States did not coerce the teaching staff to deliver new courses as the Soviets did, but created a new intellectual leadership that consisted of pliable lecturers who demonstrated their desire to develop new branches of the sciences, to set up new courses, to guide other academicians and, generally speaking, to give impetus to their careers in this new political situation. This is a very important difference from the policy of Soviet politicians, who assumed that what was needed was to oblige every German professor to deliver courses in the field of, for example, “Scientific Communism.”

In so far as a segment of the older professors demonstrated their apathy in this regard, the main target of this policy became the younger generation of German teaching staff. The emphasis on the younger generation was also determined by the theory that “there is a difference between the attitudes of the older and young university teachers, the latter being much more ready to recognize the need for changes. The latter need to be assisted by outside resources, or it will inevitably imitate their elders. The prestige, seniority, and fellowship of the older men is bound in time to influence the younger to the same points of view. The most hopeful solution is for as many as possible of the younger teachers to be sent abroad in the environments of universities such as ours. This is furthermore the best hope for providing successful programs of Social Sciences and of General Education in the German university curricula.”


450 Ibid.
In 1949, “The General Project for the Interchange [sic] of University Instructors”451 was officially initiated by the Department of State. This program provided for short-term visits by the junior faculty staff of German universities to American universities and to institutions of the American government. The program was clearly designed to achieve tasks such as conveying to German university instructors information concerning the results of recent developments in the social sciences, political sciences, and American studies, as well as in American teaching methods in higher educational establishments, along with encouraging German university instructors to investigate and teach a range of disciplines in these three areas back in Germany.

During their visits to American universities, young German lecturers observed the teaching methods and became generally familiar with course work, with a special emphasis placed on political science. Each German participant spent the first six to eight weeks at a leading American university. The participants then traveled to various points in the United States where they could observe American life first-hand and meet their professional colleagues, both within and outside the university.452 Furthermore, they were able to observe certain practical ways in which the disciplines of political science and public administration affected local, state, and federal government policy.453

Hundreds of young assistant professors, lecturers, associate professors, and PhD students passed through this program annually. The scope and intensity of the program positioned West Germany in first place among other European states as to the number of young university teaching staff who had participated in similar American programs. The effectiveness of the program was high. As a rule, upon their return, most participants introduced new courses in political science, with the number of these new courses varying from one to seven.454 The young German lecturers’ stay at American universities influenced their methods of

teaching. According to the documents, most of the participants introduced the system of small group discussions instead of lectures, developed closer student-professor relationships, and a tutorial system. In addition, the US government contributed to the promotion of the careers of these former participants. Some of the former grantees became deans of new departments and presidents of new institutes during the period of the 1960s through the 1970s.

4. Opposition from conservative professors and the American response

In their analysis of the situation in German universities, American military officers and visiting professors often informed Washington that a segment of the professoriate would never agree to the imposed reforms. This segment was not made up of former Nazis or communists; they were simply traditional German professors who believed that the coming reforms would undermine the elite status of German university education.

This segment of the professoriate was called the Old Professors and was viewed by the Military Administration as a reactionary or conservative force. The experts at the University Education Branch, when describing university professors, noted the following conservative characteristics: “They are generally quite old and quite tradition-minded. The professoriate is overweighed with persons devoted to humanistic studies and not very sensitive to modern problems. They realize little how far back the German higher institutions [sic] have slipped and know little about higher education in America. The older professors are in general those most resistant to change, most wedded to the old curricula, most attached to traditional methods of teaching, least cognizant of training students for effective citizenship, least aware of the social responsibilities of higher education, and least democratic in general.”

Another document states: “German universities are now composed largely of men and women of advanced age who [sic] by the very nature of things lack the initiative and energy to rebuild the universities and adapt them more

closely to the needs of present day life [sic] in Germany." Their close work and personal contacts with German professors convinced American visiting professors that a change in basic attitudes could not realistically be expected in the near future. While formally proclaiming their acquiescence to the American reforms to the curriculum, the professoriate in actuality neglected to offer lectures in political science and American studies. The American experts were therefore compelled to develop these new disciplines outside of the traditional German faculties by establishing independent institutes. The setting up of independent institutes at the universities, where new disciplines were imposed by the visiting professors and delivered by the junior staff, was a more or less effective means of countering the opposition. The old professoriate remained in its position within the traditional departments of the universities but was surrounded by numerous visiting professors.

The available documents, however, do bear witness to the fact that the work accomplished by American and European specialists was certainly positive, albeit controversial. On the one hand, they were more or less able to implement the reforms planned by the American government, even while, on the other hand, some difficulties in communication between the visiting professors and the German old professoriate concerning the proposed reforms, such as the revision of curriculum and the introduction of new disciplines, were noted in the documents. First of all, most of the American visiting professors were German émigrés and they therefore encountered a certain disregard on the part of those Germans who had lived and survived first under the Nazi regime and then under American denazification. This situation created an obstacle to the introduction of the reforms. The old professoriate rejected the proposals made by these former Germans; for example, the project concerning the introduction of political science that was elaborated and proposed by Professor Neumann, a former German scholar, was disliked and thus was only developed slowly. A visible reluctance on the part of the conservative German professoriate to modify the traditional German university system and to change their topics of research and lectures contributed to mixed results for the reforms instigated by the US

Government, even after five years of the Visiting Professor Program had ensued. Second, the documents mention the fact that not all the visiting professors selected by the government turned out to be ready to implement political tasks and military orders. Some visiting professors seemed more interested in doing their own research and gathering materials about Germany than in carrying out the reforms in the universities.

Hence, in so far as the reforms were actually carried out, the modification of the universities according to the American model proceeded slowly. This was a major problem in the eyes of Washington. The opposition of the German old professoriate persuaded Washington to pay more intention instead to the junior teaching staff and to develop an effective program to create a new professor out of this younger generation.

II. Soviet policy towards the German university professoriate

As we mentioned earlier, the military authorities of the Soviet Zone took control of eighteen higher educational establishments, six of which were universities. These six universities numbered in 1945 more than 2,000 full professors, along with associate professors called Dozenten, and lecturers. The documentary sources for Soviet policy towards these German members of the faculty are more extensive than those for American policy in this area. To the extent that Soviet experts, educationalists, military officers, and diplomats who stayed on in Germany sent numerous and detailed reports to Moscow concerning the behavior of German professors, and their interrelations with the Soviet authorities and German communists, these archives hold a generous number of documents dealing with the relationship between the Soviet Military Administration and German professors and are quite sufficient for our purposes. These archival documents will allow us to represent and discuss the following components of Soviet policy towards the German university faculty: i) Soviet interpretations of the philosophical views, methods of teaching, and political positions articulated by the German professoriate; ii) the purge of the university teaching staff; iii) the making of a New Professor, and iv) opposition from the professoriate and the Soviet response to it.
1. Soviet evaluations of the philosophical views, methods of teaching, and political positions of the German professoriate

While the American authorities purged the German professoriate at once, right at the beginning of the Occupation, the Soviet Military Administration was in no hurry to dismiss and reemploy professors from the universities. Once they had occupied the German universities, the Soviet authorities began instead to establish initial contacts with the professoriate by focusing attention on the personality of every professor who remained, on his or her political and even philosophical views, and on these professors’ attitudes towards the new political regime as well.

The Education Division of the SMAD believed that understanding the three pillars of the life and academic activity of the professoriate, that is, their methods of teaching, philosophical views, and political position, was the key to their policy of creating new and pliable professors and thus to the final success of Soviet reforms. Establishing contacts with the professoriate and winning over their minds were considered the primary ways of carrying out reforms without bloodshed. In their initial communication with this academic corporation, the Soviets embarked on their policy by learning about the German professoriate per se. Monitoring the positions, views, and mood of the German university professoriate was the means the Soviets would use to understand them and to establish friendly and cooperative relations with them. The Soviet interpretation of the professors’ philosophical positions, values, and thoughts about the communist regime therefore constituted a very important part of Soviet policy. In contrast to the Americans, who considered the opinions, views, and mood of the professoriate as not that paramount, the Soviet reformers based their initial reforms upon private conversations with the German intelligentsia aimed at persuasion.

In as much as the Soviet military officers who conducted these initial evaluations had been members of faculty in Soviet universities before the Second World War, they were primarily interested in the academic activities of the German professoriate rather in German methods of teaching and the philosophy of the German academic system. When they did take stock of the methods of teaching, the Soviets were astonished by the absence of syllabi and by the rules of free attendance which existed in German universities. In one of the Education Division’s documents the following observation was made: “A specific feature of German higher education was the absence of a list of disciplines essential for students to obtain knowledge within a specialty; there was no indication of the number of lecture hours devoted to a definite course, and there was no
system of a sequence of disciplines [in a curriculum – N. T.]. Students were free as to their attendance at the universities, and the first examination was arranged only after two years of studies. Students did not possess sufficient knowledge for practical activity. Hence, Soviet experts, just as American ones, also emphasized the lack of professional and practical knowledge. However, in contrast to the Americans, the Soviets were more surprised by the absence of a formal academic plan, which meant a university curriculum, and by the absence of a formal plan of lecture courses, which meant a syllabus: “As to our traditional [Soviet] understanding, there have never been curricula and syllabi in German institutions of higher education. Professors and lecturers frequently announced the courses that would attract the greatest number of students in order to earn higher honoraria. Curricula were compiled exclusively at the professors’ discretion.” Such an approach to teaching – the German teaching methods entailing the absence of a curriculum and syllabus, and the lack of professional knowledge – was considered in need of revision.

However, it was the views of the professoriate which bothered the propagandists of the Soviet military administration far more. The Soviets were interested in understanding the philosophical and political basis of the disciplines taught by the professoriate. To clarify what their philosophical and political views were, the Soviets disseminated a special questionnaire among the professors. All professors who delivered lectures in the departments of philosophy, theology, classics, and other departments of the arts received the order from the Soviet authorities to complete and return this detailed questionnaire and, moreover, to write a report entitled “My worldview.” The questionnaire was elaborated by those Soviet military officers who had specialized in philosophy before the Second World War. By encouraging the professoriate to prepare this report, the Soviet officers were trying to clarify what the philosophical credo and political thinking of every professor in the Zone was. However, most of the professors were opposed to this, and the results of the “poll” of those professors who did agree to fill in the questionnaire demonstrated to the Soviets that almost all the professors stood for the position known as idealism. This was the term used to designate any philosophical currents considered as un-Marxist thought by Soviet

460 Ibid., 112.
officers. The Soviets were dissatisfied with the results, because to shift professors away from the stance of idealism and to the stance of Marxism was considered be more difficult than shifting them from National Socialism to communism.

Along with this came the monitoring of attitudes towards the new political regime and the Soviet Occupation itself among university professors. The results of this assessment were also deplorable as far as the Soviets were concerned. Strongly suspicious attitudes on the part of the German intelligentsia towards the Soviet regime became a sad fact of life for the Soviets: “The typical mood of a substantial part of the German intelligentsia appears to be aloof, suspicious, expectant and skeptical with respect to everything new as well as negative in relation to the Occupation authority. For professors, it is difficult to free themselves from the well-known prejudices with respect to the cultural and political values of Russia. Even leftists share visceral prejudices against Russians, particularly Russian soldiers.”

Elsewhere one reads: “The collapse of Nazism, the actual division of Germany, and obviously the prolonged period of Occupation are causes for a state of deep depression among substantial segments of the intelligentsia.” This suspicious and negative attitude towards the Soviet regime would remain the main feature of the political position of German university faculty, as noted by Soviet diplomats and educators who lived and worked in East Germany, during the entire period of the Cold War.

Once they had equipped themselves with a certain knowledge of the political and philosophical views of German professors, along with their teaching methods and their attitudes towards the new regime, the Education Division began a policy of denazification of the university teaching staff, called “the purge” in Soviet documents.

2. Purge of the professoriate

With the monitoring phase behind them, the next step to be undertaken by Soviet officers in dealing with German professors was denazification as the Potsdam Agreement demanded. The purge in the universities had specific Soviet features in keeping with the different

name used. Screening of the university teaching staff was begun in May 1945, and ended in September 1946. Soviet denazification was of a superficial nature in comparison to the American policy of cleansing that lasted several years. We assume that this unique Soviet approach to denazification was determined by the fact that far too many professors had left the Soviet Zone during the first year of the Occupation: out of more than 2,000 members of the university faculty that comprised the universities in 1945, only about 800 members remained in 1946 (Table 1). In order to preserve the remaining part of the professoriate, the Soviets softened the terms of denazification.

Table 1
Number of Teaching Staff in the Universities of the Soviet Zone, 1945/1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Professors fled the Zone</th>
<th>1945</th>
<th>1946</th>
<th>Associate Professors and Lecturers fled the Zone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nazi</td>
<td>non-Nazi</td>
<td>Nazi</td>
<td>non-Nazi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leipzig</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jena</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halle</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greifswald</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rostock</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,260</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the table 324 professors out of 1,260 remained in six universities by the winter of 1946, and 159 members out of the junior staff of 781 remained in the Soviet Zone. As follows from this table, the Soviet Occupation authorities accredited the remainder of the German professoriate.

The Soviets, in contrast to the Americans, did not elaborate a complex and detailed system for denazification and selection of non-

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464 Nikitin, Deyatel’nost’ Sovetskoy Voenny Administratsii (The Activity of the Soviet Military Administration), 214.
Nazis. Individual interviews were the means used for cleansing. As a result, the Soviet authorities preserved the number of staff necessary for renewal of an interrupted academic life. Nominal members of the Nazi Party continued working in universities. A rigid policy was adopted only in respect to German professors and lecturers of history. Almost all of them were discharged. On the whole, however, the percentage of former members of the Nazi Party, who were allowed to remain in the universities by the Soviets, varied from 36% to 47.9%. Pjotr Nikitin, the Chief of the Higher Education Division, mentions in his memoirs that all the professors purged earlier were reinstated in their previous positions during the period of 1946 through 1949.

According to the Soviet final evaluation of the implementation of denazification, “611 representatives of German higher educational institutions were purged under the terms of denazification. However, 650 new teachers for the universities were trained by the Soviet authorities up to and including 1948, so that the average number of lecturers in eighteen institutions varied from 1,303 to 1,380 persons, which was 57% of the number of lecturers in 1940.”

3. The Making of a New Professor

After carrying out the in-depth evaluation of the professoriate and the superficial purge, the next step was the policy of the making of a new professor. This policy was called the molding of a new worldview (perceptions and attitudes) among the “shilly-shally” German university teaching staff implied the fostering and the reproduction of political allegiance on the part of the professoriate. Moreover, this policy was aimed at making the professoriate not only formally acknowledge Soviet ideology, but believe deeply and sincerely in it and, hence, deliver lectures from a Soviet materialist point of view.

This new type of faculty member implied a lecturer, Dozent, or professor who was consistent with the unified syllabi when delivering lectures, who knew the principles of Soviet pedagogy, who esteemed communists, and who would build a new Germany. The Soviet authorities were aware of the significance of the German university teaching staff in legitimizing the Soviet regime and ideology in German

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466 Heinemann, “Interview mit Pjotr I. Nikitin,” 140.
Creating a favorable community among the professoriate was at the center of Soviet educational policy in Germany. In documents of the Education Division, it was repeatedly emphasized that the “German intelligentsia and professors of universities in particular, were the real force whose use would considerably facilitate the implementation of serious objectives relative to reforms in German society.”

The use of this force assumed the creation of a loyal German university professor who would support and disseminate the virtues of socialist ideology, culture, and politics. This policy of creating a loyal German university professor, in contrast to the American policy, centered on the idea that individual contact between the Soviet political authorities and every German professor could alter the academic life and attitudes of the professoriate.

Moreover, the Soviet approach to creating a new professor who would be pro-Soviet contrasted with the American approach of creating a pro-American one. While the American Military Administration used a two-prong approach of sending hundreds of visiting professors to win over the German professoriate by means of grass-root contacts and of fostering new pro-American professors through the training of hundreds of young lecturers in American universities, the Soviets created a new professor through i) involving him or her in special scholarly mass campaigns to discuss the philosophy of Marxism and communism and through ii) the training of young lecturers within the newly established pedagogical departments and within a new system of postgraduate studies. The Soviets did not send Soviet visiting specialists to German universities and did not train German professors in the Soviet Union in the great numbers the Americans were able to do.

**Ideological campaigns**

The fastest way to create this new type of lecturer, it was decided, was to involve the professoriate in public campaigns, conferences, and debates where problems such as the new role of and autonomy for the universities as well as the role of Marxism in German universities were proposed for discussion. In the opinion of the Soviet authorities, these discussion campaigns, aimed at demonstrating the power of the new ideology, would change the worldview of those professors who had formerly been nominal or active members of the Nazi Party or who were

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proponents of idealism; the result of these campaigns would be to attract the university teaching staff to the side of the communists.

These Soviet campaigns actually did attract at least the attention of the professoriate, who saw in them an opportunity to discuss the problems of the university. The renewal of academic life in the universities in the fall of 1945 had contributed to a rash of heated discussions among the German intelligentsia about both the role of universities in German life and the autonomy of universities especially in terms of political influence. The Soviets, on their end, arranged meetings and conversations with German university professors in order to convince them to follow the lead of the communists and to build a new socialist Germany. As a result, these discussions divided the German professoriate into two groups: One group of professors began supporting the activity of the new regime in the universities, while another segment, mainly consisting of the senior university teaching staff, spoke in favor of total autonomy for the universities from the Soviet Occupation authorities.

Discussion of these two points of view was joined by the German philosopher Karl Jaspers who ended up taking the lead in these public debates. This philosopher proclaimed that every German university should be cleansed of the old German aristocrats who had discredited themselves by their connections with the Nazis. He condemned the caste nature of German universities and called for equal access to higher education for all social strata. These ideas coincided with the Soviet perception of democratization of the German university system. The Soviets at once established close contact with this academic in order to encourage him to convince German professors to follow the democratization of the universities proposed by the communists. The Soviet experts recognized that the personality and the oeuvre of Jaspers would be supported and followed by the great majority of university professors. Two articles by Jaspers, *Science in the Hitler State* and *People and University* were purposely disseminated and were skillfully used by the Soviet authorities. He was therefore allowed to express all the views, deemed sympathetic by the Soviet authorities, that he held, and at first this philosopher did nothing to sully the partnership. However, the idea of university autonomy and academic freedom, as also defended by this scholar, clashed with the Soviet intention of promoting Marxism and communists in the universities and, more importantly, of supervising academic life. When Jaspers officially stated to the Education Division that “after the purge, German universities should delegate famous German scientists known for their work and democratic viewpoint to the
establishment of self-government,” the Soviets decided to curtail their campaign of participation with the scholar. Moreover, when Jaspers began discussing his famous existentialist ideas, regarded as non-Marxist philosophy, the Soviets curtailed this particular activity of Jaspers in the Zone. Jaspers quickly came to the conclusion that there was no chance of obtaining academic freedom in the Soviet Zone; as a result, both he and his friend and fellow philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer left the Zone.

The departure of these philosophers was used by the regime as a chance to expose the weakness of the positions of idealistic philosophy. The initial strong offensive against non-Marxist philosophy, and existentialism in particular, began in the universities. This first offensive entailed the expansion of scholarly discussion about the role of Marxism in European philosophy in all periodicals. Soviet officers and German communists began a campaign to discredit any philosophical school other than Marxism. This campaign lasted until 1948 and influenced some professors to redefine their positions regarding the German Communist Party. Soviet documents indicate that many philosophers openly acknowledged the primacy of Marxist theory at this point.

In addition to these public discussion campaigns, special seminars and lecture courses designed to reeducate the university faculty were established in all universities. The lectures, given by Soviet officers, covered such topics as Soviet society, dialectical materialism, Marxist dialectical materialism, materialistic understanding of history, and Soviet democracy and individual freedom. The lectures attracted a significant number of listeners among the professoriate. Initially, the discussion of such topics produced positive feedback that allowed Soviet officers to claim that the “questions of professors demonstrated their actual interest in understanding the essence of the Soviet system.” Success for the seminars was also depicted by the Education Division: “The university faculty showed an interest in lectures on Marxist philosophy delivered by Major Patent, a lecturer of the Information Division. His lectures attract the attention of professors and are accompanied by pointed discussions.

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469 State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group P-7317. Inventory 54. File no # “Results of the Examination of Higher Educational Institutions”: page no #.
between the followers of idealistic trends in philosophy and the followers of Marxism.  

Establishing scientific journals was also considered by Soviet officers to be an effective way of attracting the university teaching staff to discussions about Marxism and of defining views of every scholar. The establishment of the scholarly journal, *Scientific Notes of the University of Jena*, was described in the documents as “a project aimed at defining a philosophical position of each German scientist according to his work, because we [the Soviets – N. T.] scarcely know anything about it [the worldview of German intellectuals – N. T.].”

Finally, another method which was exploited to involve German professors in discussion campaigns concerned the arrangement of various and numerous conferences on the problems of teaching social studies, and history in particular, in the universities. In May 1946, the Soviet authorities held a conference of historians in Berlin in order to ascertain whether the conditions were ripe to teach history from a Marxist point of view in German universities. All the historians who remained in the Soviet Zone participated in the conference hoping to debate scientific questions. However, before the scholarly presentations began, German communists took the floor and delivered a paper that blamed German intellectuals for Hitler’s rise to power. Continuing their presentation, the communists suggested to historians that the way to overcome their “reactionary” heritage and mistakes was to return civil duty, so-called, to the German people through a revision of historical studies. This revision should entail pursuing all the investigations needed to reveal the life led by the lower social groups and to highlight the proletarian movements at all stages of Germany’s historical development. In other words, the communists demanded that the Soviet approach to historical studies that emphasized the history of the revolutionary movement be applied.

After heated discussion, the German historians found themselves divided into two fractions: The more numerous group adhered to non-Marxist positions and spoke in favor of the autonomy of science and academic freedom in historical studies; the other group supported the German communists with some scholars genuinely asserting that “nobody will accuse us of infringement of academic freedom, if we give

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equal rights to scientific socialism and Marxism within the framework of the disciplines so as to enable non-Marxist professors to become acquainted directly with the views of their ideological opponents." Finally, after two weeks of polemics, the opposing fractions arrived at a compromise that historical studies, the teaching of history at the universities, and all the syllabi in this discipline should combine both materialist theory and various theories belonging to the idealistic point of view.

Although the communists consented to this compromise, this pluralism lasted for only two years. As early as 1948, the Education Division had already arrived at a decision about asserting the supremacy of Marxist theory in history. Historians who delivered lectures in the history or philosophy departments were asked not to give "ideologically harmful lectures," which meant lectures employing non-Marxist points of view. They were required to deliver compulsory courses on historical and dialectical materialism and political economy. Moreover, historians as well as other university teaching staff were forced to conform to the formal requirements regarding the inclusion of the tenets of Marxism in their syllabi, requirements established by the Soviet authorities for such disciplines as history, didactics, pedagogy, and literature.

This and other campaigns had a sobering effect on a segment of the professoriate who discussed the position of Marxist and non-Marxist ideas in German universities in terms of scholarship rather than in terms of politics. When the communists proclaimed to German professors that "socialism will come about with the assistance of today’s intelligentsia or without it, and if the German intelligentsia does not enter into an alliance with the working class, then it will be driven into a corner by the new intelligentsia," most professors understood that these campaigns were employed not to provide a forum for a sincere discussion of the future of the German university system but to win over their allegiance and convince them to cooperate with the Soviets. Some professors quickly left the Zone; however, other professors were undoubtedly swayed by these influences and became partners with the regime.

The junior university teaching staff in “Aspirantura” studies and at pedagogical faculties

The successive steps which would lead to the making of a new university professor were codified into a planned and consistent process for producing new personnel for German universities from among the junior staff. To create a new professor who would introduce Marxist philosophy into all corners of academic life, the Soviet experts, first of all, decided to insert post-graduate studies called Aspirantura into the system of German higher education and to reeducate young lecturers at this level. The second project was to foster future university professors from within the framework of the pedagogical departments in the universities. And the third project was to promote the academic careers of the younger teaching staff at the expense of the oldest professors.

In 1947, a program of two-year postgraduate study of the Soviet type was established in all the higher educational institutions and universities of the Zone in order to foster a new favorable faculty. Selection of potential postgraduate students and future lecturers was strict. German citizens originating in the lower social classes and loyal to the Soviet regime were to be admitted. Out of the first sixty-six students accepted in 1947, forty-nine were already members of the German Communist Party. Instruction was established according to a system of complete control: Postgraduate students were compelled to participate in monthly conferences devoted to questions of socialism and Marxism, to prepare plans for their future lectures, and to play a part in the political life of their university.\(^{477}\) However, after the first round of students, subsequent recruitment of fresh postgraduate students went very slowly. By the end of 1948, out of 200 positions available, only 89 were filled. German professors viewed these new methods for preparing new assistant professors for the universities with suspicion and tried to curtail them. For example, the president of the Academy of Sciences in Saxony, and a well-known scholar of German studies, Professor Frings, wrote to the Soviet authorities that the current method [of postgraduate studies – N. T.] hampered progress in the training of new and capable scientists more than it helped and that it damaged the traditional German system for fostering scientists. However, he as well as other professors finally yielded to the Soviets and took positions as supervisors in Aspirantura studies.

The establishment of pedagogical faculties in the six universities in the Zone, which we discussed in a previous chapter, had a profound effect on the production of new loyal university faculty. Each department annually accepted from 150 to 300 students who mainly originated in the lower social groups, thereby demonstrating the egalitarian approach of the Soviets to higher education.\footnote{State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group P-7317. Inventory 55. File 2: 98.} Never before had there been pedagogical education at the university level in Germany; previously all school teachers had been taught in special Higher Schools of Education established outside the university system. Now, the Soviet authorities were seen as undermining this tradition of German teacher education: Universities now had to educate prospective teachers by giving practical professional education. To bring this new kind of pedagogical education even closer to the Soviet model, certain measures were undertaken to implant and popularize the Soviet pedagogical system in German universities. Soviet scholars translated a number of Soviet books into German; among these were *Lenin and Stalin’s ideas of schooling and upbringing, Overcoming formalism in the process of schooling and upbringing,* and *The basic principles of Soviet didactics.* All six pedagogical departments established in German universities were given the Soviet textbook entitled *Pedagogy,* which was the one used at that time in the USSR.\footnote{State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group P-7317. Inventory 55. File 3: 23.}

We should note here that Soviet pedagogy did attract genuine interest on the part of German specialists in the field, and they enthusiastically participated in the numerous conferences devoted to pedagogy arranged by the Soviet officers. There is no doubt that dissemination of all these books contributed to the implantation of the Soviet pedagogical system. This system, built on the principles of Marxism with its ideas about the primacy of collective interests over individual ones, and the primacy of fostering an active citizen during his/her attendance in the public schools, along with exercising control over the leisure time of each student when not in school, when coupled with the establishment of the system of pedagogical departments in the universities, turned into one of the successful projects of Soviet educational policy in Germany. It also succeeded in contributing to the production of new loyal university teachers.
The promotion of a young loyal faculty on the career ladder turned out to be a difficult matter for the Soviet authorities. The old professoriate tried all sorts of ways of keeping young Soviet protégés out of high academic positions in the universities: “The reactionary professoriate undertakes all means to discredit and depreciate the knowledge of young docents in order to not allow them to gain professorial status. For example, the rector of the University of Berlin said to one docent that: ‘If you had not been a member of the German Communist Party, you would have been awarded with the rank of a professor long ago.’”

Similar cases irritated the Soviet authorities sufficiently to result in the issuing of an order for regional military administrations to investigate cases and dismiss from the universities any senior professors found restricting these young docents.

4. Opposition from conservative professors and the Soviet response

The Soviet staff of the Education Division recognized the fact in 1948 that most of the old professors were predisposed against Soviet reforms and the ideology of Marxism. Moreover, in as much as many of these professors were of advanced age, over 70 years old, Soviet experts admitted that it would be difficult to change the minds and views of this segment of the German professoriate. Despite this understanding, the Soviet Military Administration decided to try to influence the old professoriate in terms of their Marxification. In contrast to the American authorities, who decided to avoid direct confrontation with this old and conservative segment of the professoriate by establishing new institutes independent of the influence of the old professoriate, the Soviets decided to take up the struggle against this segment of the university teaching staff and make Marxists of them.

To try to convert this segment of the university community, the Soviet officers set up four-month courses for training and reeducating old German professors. These four-month reeducation courses were aimed at attracting the old professors to Marxist concepts, at convincing them to treat Marxism with respect, and, finally, at winning the professoriate over to the side of the communists. The seminars included “the study of selected works from the classics of Marxism-Leninism and had themes

such as Lenin and the end of bourgeois philosophy, The Marxist doctrine of statecraft, Science and Marxism, Lenin and Stalin’s ideas of German predatory imperialism, Critiques of the philosophical systems of the German philosophers Spengler and Hartmann, among others."

However, as one of the records noted, this policy of reeducation within the framework of four-month courses was not efficient: “Established in a number of universities, Marxist seminars (the four-month courses) still have no serious effect on the ideological substance of the teaching process in higher educational institutions. The German Communist Party organized several theoretical seminars for professors, and some of the members of the university faculty attended the course of lectures devoted to Marxist philosophy at the Central Party School. However, the introduction of Marxism into higher education as a whole is not advancing properly.”

A more important measure taken by the Soviet authorities towards the old German university faculty entailed obliging the professoriate to deliver both traditional and newly introduced disciplines from the standpoint of Marxism. This policy of imposing Marxism was accelerated in 1948 as a result of the division of the University of Berlin. This division, as well as the political problems with the Americans over the control of the city of Berlin, puzzled and frightened the Soviet authorities, and, more importantly, caused Moscow to interfere directly in the policy implemented by the Soviet Occupation authorities. In our opinion, it was Moscow that forced the Soviet officers to accelerate the introduction of Marxism in the universities and to implement the following policy in 1949: “Reinforce control over the teaching process in higher educational institutes by revising the curricula and syllabi so as to ensure proper teaching in institutions of higher education; provide for the preparation and publication of new textbooks in the field of the humanities during the current year; organize the translation and publication in German of a number of staple Soviet textbooks for universities; get the best theorists of Berlin and the Zone to take part in giving lectures in the field of philosophy, and impose more decisively the teaching of dialectical materialism so as to enhance the activity of Marxist professors in the ideological struggle against anti-Marxist theories; expedite the training of

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new teaching staff for the universities; cleanse the university teaching staff of active reactionary elements.\textsuperscript{484}

However, the Soviet experts in Germany clearly understood that this proposed policy could not be applied with regard to the old German professoriate whose intention was to revive and maintain liberal and autonomous processes in the higher schools. In order to implement Moscow’s order and not to undermine the fragile liaison established with the universities, the Soviet Military Administration elaborated a system of formal consultations on the problems of new curricula, disciplines, textbooks, etc., with the German university faculty. Without Moscow’s approval, Soviet officers decided that “the syllabi should not be offered to German universities from above, but that they should be discussed, elaborated and finally approved at meetings held by the university teaching staff.”\textsuperscript{485} This approach, in the opinion of the Soviet officers, would contribute to winning the confidence of German professors that was necessary.

Soon, the Soviet authorities reaped the fruits of their soft policy. During the year 1949, the new system of making up and approving curricula, schedules, and all syllabi, as well as the introduction of new disciplines, was accepted by German rectors and professors. The result was as follows: “1) the dialectical history of materialism course has been introduced in all universities of the Zone; 2) the principles of planning in the Soviet national economy, in the economic departments of Universities of Berlin and Leipzig; 3) the tenets of the state and law, in the departments of law of Universities of Berlin and Leipzig; 4) a brief history of the USSR, in the Slavic departments of Universities of Berlin and Leipzig; 5) a course of general psychology, in the philosophy and pedagogy departments of Universities of Berlin and Jena; 6) the principles of Soviet pedagogy, in all the pedagogy departments of all the universities in the Zone; 7) the principles of Soviet linguistics, in the philosophy departments of all universities in the Zone; 8) a course of lectures on Soviet literature, in the Slavic departments of the Universities of Berlin, Leipzig, and Jena, along with a course of lectures on the theoretical grammar of the Russian Language.”\textsuperscript{486} Hence, the old German

\textsuperscript{484} Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. Record Group 082. Inventory 35. Box 174. File 91: 50.
professoriate, which must have participated in these meetings, had agreed to introduce these new disciplines in their universities. No doubt it was a passive approval on their part but, according to the documents, the Soviets did gain the support of a segment of the professoriate who voiced their intention to cooperate with the communist regime.

However, after this approval of Soviet policy by the professors, the Occupation authorities ran up against an unexpected and significant difficulty involving the actual insertion of these new courses into the university academic programs and curricula. It turned out that the professors did not in fact introduce the new disciplines and did not deliver any of the lectures on the imposed disciplines. The disciplines existed on paper but were never delivered in fact. This situation was similar to the situation the United States faced when introducing the discipline of political science: the professoriate approved the American decision but the disciplines were never actually offered. In the Soviet Zone, the professoriate agreed to the imposed reforms, but only a few of them ever delivered lectures in accordance with the Soviet plans. The staff of the Education Division of the SMAD was shocked by such behavior on the part of the professoriate and indicated that “most disciplines are still being taught from the standpoint of a bourgeois world outlook. The history of philosophy is taught by old professors – followers of various idealistic schools – such as Professor Leisegang\(^{487}\) in Jena and Professor Jakobi\(^{488}\) in Greifswald. Among the faction of reactionary professors, there is a tendency to limit and isolate Marxist disciplines, to not allow the penetration of Marxism into the teaching of any of the scientific disciplines, and into history, biology, the history of law, and philosophy in particular. A number of professors excoriate Marxism. For example, Professor Leisegang sharply opposes dialectical materialism not only in the lectures he delivers, but also in a number of papers published in the Western Zones. Leisegang states that ‘Marx’s dialectics is a step backwards with respect to Hegel’s dialectics’ in his article ‘Hegel, Marx and Kierkegaard’s ideas of dialectical materialism and dialectical theology.’ The views of this professor are typical to some extent of the majority of the professors who give lectures in the field of the history of

\(^{487}\) Leisegang, a philosopher and professor at the University of Jena, fled East Berlin in 1948 and became a professor at the Free University.

\(^{488}\) Jakobi, a philosopher and professor at Greifswald University, remained in the Soviet Zone.
philosophy in German universities." Elsewhere one reads: “The distinctive frame of mind of the reactionary professoriate is demonstrated by the statement quoted below from the dean of the philosophy department at University of Halle. The offer of a curator [a Soviet supervising officer at universities] to distribute two vacant positions of heads of chairs among two rival representatives of idealistic and materialistic philosophies was objected to by the dean as follows: 'I do not understand what you want with your materialism and Marxism. This, in fact, was a concern [in science] until some time in the 60s of the last century. It became a relic long ago. Nowadays, Marxism is a superstition or something like a scarecrow for children.'

These fragments demonstrate that the professoriate opposed the introduction of Marxism by stating that its tenets could not constitute a new theoretical foundation for philosophical, historical, and other studies. This opposition on the part of the old professoriate served to limit the expansion of Marxism in German universities. As we should remember, American visiting scholars who attempted to introduce political science in German universities also mentioned that the old professoriate disregarded the disciplines of political science due to the absence of any scientific and philosophical character about them.

The Soviet experts who worked at the Education Division of the SMAD understood that it would be impossible to influence the old professoriate. However, in explaining this situation to Moscow, the Education Division produced reasons for the failure to make the professoriate deliver lectures such as the absence of an outline for every lecture supervised by a Soviet curator at the university and the lack new teaching staff and the opposition of students: “in as much as the syllabi are not regulated, they created a loophole for the reactionary professoriate to build a course of lectures any way they like and to deliver lectures whichever way they prefer.” And elsewhere one reads: “The introduction of Marxist disciplines in higher education schools proceeds extremely slowly and encounters great difficulties. The main difficulty in this regard is the absence of qualified personnel. None of the leading figures of the German Communist Party possesses the theoretical
knowledge necessary to give lectures in universities. The compulsory course for all students, ‘Contemporary political and social problems,’ called upon to play a significant role in the political education of students, was not provided with qualified manuals in sufficient quantity. Moreover, the lectures of professors supporting Marxism are attended by students to a lesser degree than those that state the facts from the position of idealism.”

In contrast to the American approach of creating a new professor from among those who wanted to cooperate, the Soviets tried to coerce every professor into changing his or her philosophical foundation. This pressure was therefore met with stronger and more persistent resistance from these professors than it was in the American Zone.

Another and equally complex thing that the Soviet experts were faced with was a deep unwillingness on the part of the faculty to join the German Communist Party. The Soviets believed that affiliation of professors with communists would revise their views and would pave the way for the expansion of Marxist disciplines. The Education Division tracked this problem very carefully, reporting monthly on the numbers of new communists which appeared among the professoriate: “In 1948, out of 1,595 professors, senior lecturers and others, 265 were members of the German Communist Party, 895 were non-Party members, 292 were former nominal Nazis, and the others were members of bourgeois parties.”

The same state of affairs existed within the administrative staff (rectors and deans) of the universities: “Out of 62 executives, only 20 of them were members of the German Communist Party, 33 were non-Party members, and the others were members of bourgeois parties.”

The loyal members of the faculty, which numbered nearly 300 people by the end of the Occupation, were the oldest members of the German Communist Party, while “the majority of the German professoriate has taken conservative positions in the field of science and has politically adhered, at best, to the positions of bourgeois liberalism.” As a result,

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493 Ibid., 51.
495 Ibid.
496 State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group P-7317. Inventory 54. File no # “Results of the Examination of Higher Educational Institutions”: 53.
the problem of converting these independent professors into loyal members of the Party would remain unsolvable for the Soviet government not only during that period but also during the entire history of the Cold War.

The final challenge for the Soviet Occupation authorities and consequently for the political regime of the German Democratic Republic became the so-called “escape of professors,” the term used in the Soviet political vocabulary, “to the West.” Before the Red Army arrived in Berlin, about 75% of the German teaching staff of higher educational establishments had already left the future Soviet Zone. According to the documents, this “escape of professors” deeply irritated the Occupation regime because of the affect it had in terms of weakening the Zone’s scientific potential. According to the documents, ideological motives were the primary reason for leaving the Zone. These motives were perfectly stated in a letter of resignation from Professor Wanstrat of University of Jena addressed its rector. It was entitled “the letter of resignation for ideological reasons”, and is worth citing:

“His Excellency, the Rector of University of Jena, Prof. Dr. Schwarz,

I must inform you that I have decided to leave the teaching staff effective 1 May of this year. I have received an associate professorship in the field of sociology at the Free Berlin University. The reasons which have forced me to resettled concern the events of last year. The Soviet delegates as well as the German communists emphasized at the pedagogical congress in Leipzig in July 1949 that all lecturers who do not wish or cannot be advocates of the Marxist-Leninist outlook should be “removed” little by little. After the announcement of class struggle – which I essentially reject – it has become clear to me in recent months that it is impossible to remain neutral. My serious and objective work with Marxism and Leninism has shown me that this was a speech not about science,

but about having a class-coherent outlook. According to my specialty – sociology – I cannot become a supporter of this outlook in a German university because I consider this outlook, on the basis of my scientific conscience, to be wrong. Moreover, as to my political conviction, it is necessary to struggle against any dogmatic totalitarianism both on the left and the right in order to maintain peace for mankind; therefore, I cannot remain in the Eastern Zone, as my work appears to be impossible there. I hope that my point of view will be understandable at the University of Jena. I do not wish to be a hypocrite. The idealist cannot be influenced by financial privileges; otherwise he deceives himself and betrays his views…”

Thus, the aversion to the philosophy of Marxism forced the professoriate, historians, and philosophers in particular, to leave the Soviet Zone. Their departure was sometimes done openly to demonstrate their opposition to the implantation of Marxism in the universities.

Up until the end of the 1950s, Soviet experts became accustomed to such turns of events and, moreover, the departure of obstinate professors was welcomed by the new regime, because members of the young teaching staff either educated within the pedagogical departments or in the system of postgraduate studies were there to fill these vacant positions in the universities. In one of the reports it is specified that “the strengthening of the position of progressive forces [Marxists] in institutions of higher education has forced some representatives of the reactionary forces to flee to the Western Zones. Thus, in terms of the offensive on the philosophical front, the professor of philosophy at the university in Jena, Benze, has fled to the West. Similar cases will continue to happen; the necessity for further democratization in institutions of higher education must bring about the elimination or self-

elimination of some representatives of the old reactionary professoriate from all work in institutions of higher education in the Soviet Zone.”

Moreover, each notable case of a crossing of the border by a professor resulted in a new improvement in the financial position of those professors and their families who remained. Resistance from the German university faculty and the shortage of staff forced the Soviet authorities to initiate a new program of financial support and a new pension system for the German professoriate. The improvement of the financial position and welfare standards of the university teaching staff became a key step in implementing Soviet policy in the Zone. From January 1947 onwards, the basic and hourly wages for all categories of teaching staff, along with payments to rectors and deans in particular, increased tenfold, with the income tax being lowered. Special pensions for scientists and national prizes in the field of pedagogy were introduced. All members of the university faculty were provided with extra food and extra firewood during the initial years of the Occupation. In addition, health centers and rest houses were reconstructed or rebuilt just for German professors beginning in 1951. The German professoriate was granted leaves for rest and relaxation in Soviet sanatoriums in the south but with compulsory participation in seminars on Marxism. They were also provided with special credits for building their own homes. All these measures undoubtedly promoted a growth in trust in the Soviet regime among those members of the German university staff who had remained in the Zone. At one time or another, the financial position of university professors improved so much that for a short while those who had previously left the Soviet Zone began to return. However, these newly arrived professors were placed under tight surveillance by the Soviet police, which forced many of them to return to the Western Zone again.

Summing up Soviet policy in regard to German professors, it is possible to state that improvement of the financial positions and welfare standards of the German university teaching staff, and the establishment of pedagogical departments along with the system of postgraduate studies contributed to the fostering of a loyal segment of the professoriate. When evaluating their own policy towards the corporation of professors, Soviet

officers mentioned that they had “created the necessary prerequisites for a transformation of the higher schools into strong features of German democracy.”\textsuperscript{501} This implied that some form of loyalty on the part of the professoriate had been established. However, the allegiance of the professoriate was more formal than real. The persistent resistance on the part of the old German professors created difficulties that hindered any profound transformation of German universities.

\textit{Conclusion}

The policy of the United States towards the German teaching staff differed from that of the Soviet Union. At the same time, their policies had similar features. Although both powers shared the aim of creating a new, pliable professor (either a pro-American or a pro-Soviet one), their methods for bringing this about differed. In particular, a line of difference can be drawn in such areas as their approaches to purging the professoriate, modes of communication with the professors, and methods of promoting reforms by means of the university corporation of the professoriate.

First of all, denazification and reinstatement were carried out in a much more rigorous manner in the American Zone than in the Soviet Zone. The American authorities elaborated a more complex and strict system of denazification and consequent reemployment of the teaching staff: \textit{Fragebogen}, University Committees, and the work of special agents were the main elements in purging former Nazis. In contrast, the Soviets followed less formal criteria for denazification: individual contact, verbal persuasion, and intimidation were the Soviet mechanisms for convincing the professoriate to cooperate with the new regime.

Second, the American military authorities conducted a more formal process of communication vis-à-vis the German university professoriate. They did not establish intimate contacts with the German teaching staff in order to understand their views and to collaborate with them, and in this way to persuade them in the end – as the Soviets did – to modify the content of courses, research interests, etc. The American approach was determined by the American view of the place and role of the German professoriate in the general transformation of the universities. The American Occupation Administration did not define the German university teaching staff as a separate albeit main target for

\textsuperscript{501} State Archive of the Russian Federation. Record Group P-7317. Inventory 54. File no # “Results of the Examination of Higher Educational Institutions”: 53.
transformation. The German university corporation, termed German university instructors by the American officers, served only as only one of a number of tools for imposing American reforms. For the Americans, the German professoriate, and its conservative segment in particular, did not play a great role either in establishing new academic programs in the new independent institutes or in the Americanization of German universities. This was done by means of both the young, pliable university staff and the American professors. Among the documents, there is no one completely given over to discussing the German professoriate. Their attitudes and academic life were only touched on in the documents devoted to other transformations taking place in German universities. Quite to the contrary, for the Soviets, the German professoriate was the force whose behavior would contribute either to the failure or to the success of the Marxification of German universities. The Soviet Union worked individually with every professor, convincing him or her to teach new disciplines and to cooperate with the communists.

Third, both powers applied different methods for promoting their reforms through the university corporation of the professoriate. The United States elaborated the system of visiting professors recruited by the Department of State and the system of training the junior staff in the United States. The American and European experts promoted the model of American education, established new structures in the universities, introduced new themes and methods of research, wrote textbooks, and filled libraries with new books. Their activity contributed to the implantation of American scientific inquiry in German universities. Young and promising members of the faculty, trained in American universities, went on to revise the university curriculum, modify existing disciplines, and they were able to guide the activity of other pliable members of the faculty in German universities in accordance with the general line of the reforms. On the contrary, the Soviet military authorities transformed the work of the German teaching staff without any intensive and massive training in the USSR and without sending specialists to German universities. The Soviets tried to persuade and at the same time to pressure professors through special semi-scholarly campaigns. Seminars and conferences were held in order to encourage them to revise the conceptual foundations of their academic disciplines, along with their own philosophical views and political positions. Moreover, they trained a new loyal and pro-Marxist teaching staff within the framework of newly established postgraduate studies called
Aspirantura as well as in the new pedagogical departments established in the universities.

However, both policies were similar in terms of the goals assigned: Both the Americans and the Soviets intended to create a new professor. Influencing a professor by means of political science or American studies was the American way of creating a new professor in the German university system. Convincing a professor to deliver lectures from the standpoint of Marxist philosophy was the Soviet way of creating a new professor of the German university system.

In creating a new professor, both powers encountered resistance from the old German professoriate. While formally accepting the reforms proposed, these professors stated that these imposed reforms undermined the traditional German university system and they opposed some of the transformations. They refused to deliver lectures and seminars in the fields of political science and general education in the American Zone and in the field of Marxism in the Soviet Zone. This opposition on the part of the professoriate was milder in the American Zone than it was in the Soviet Zone and, anticipating the following chapter, the opposition of the professoriate soon begins to appear much weaker when compared to that of the students, as will be seen when events begin to unfold later in the period under study.