Dutch Intelligence - towards a qualitative framework for analysis
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This Appendix contains the complete text of pages 29-39 of the BVD’s Fourth Quarterly Survey, 1981. The text is treated in full detail in Chapters 9-11 of this thesis. The report was classified as confidential and only released in part. This means that the full original text is – contrary to SRB-reports – not available. It is presented here for reasons of verification.

The text follows the Dutch original as closely as possible. Proper names are printed in capitals or quotation marks are used. An English translation of the names of Dutch groups and organizations is given in brackets following the original. The translator has tried to translate the meaning of the text while maintaining the ambiguity of several expressions and constructions used in the original. The beginning and the end of each page is indicated. Items such as illustrations and confidential classifications – on the top and the bottom of each page – have been deleted. Following a request based on the Freedom of Information Act, the BVD released pages 29-33 of the Quarterly Survey to the author. This text is identical to the text published in issue 267 of Bluf! However, the text in Bluf! is incomplete: page 35 is missing. This page is included in this Appendix. It was reconstructed after research of archives, which are not open to the public.

For the complete Dutch text of this BVD-report the reader is referred to: Giliam de Valk, De BVD en inlichtingenrapportages, Appendix 1, pp 248-255.

III. MINORITIES – ACTIVISM – TERRORISM

ANTI-DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE MOVEMENT AGAINST NUCLEAR ENERGY

Given the strong suspicion that anti-democratic elements attempt to abuse the as such bona fide Movement Against Nuclear Energy for its resistance against the functioning of the parliamentary democracy, meticulous observation and study of these attempts seems desirable.

In May 1980 during an encampment of the Anti-Kernenergie Beweging (AKB) (English: Movement Against Nuclear Energy (MANE)) 35 of the 41 grassroots groups present – representing approx. 5000 persons – had in principle agreed to proceed with a lock-in of the nuclear power plant site at Dodewaard in the fall break. This lock-in would take place if the Dutch government did not heed the ultimatum demanding the closure of the power plant. Until then, lock-ins had only been used as a method abroad and only for construction sites and sites allocated for nuclear power plants (e.g. Seabrook, Gorleben, Brokdorf and Malville). Thus, the Netherlands would be the first to experience the lock-in of a running plant. ‘For many of those who fight nuclear power the proposal comes at a opportune moment’ thus, John HONTELEZ, member of the Landelijk Energie Komitee (LEK) (English: National Energy Committee, NEC) and one of the front men of AKB (English: MANE), summarized the sentiments within the movement at the time. ‘The waiting has lasted long enough; it’s time something happened. At the same time, the organizers are well-aware of the fact that a lock-in alone doesn’t decide the fight against nuclear energy. Therefore, information campaigns and such must continue without fail. But the power of AKB
The fact that this concerned a running plant provoked HONTELEZ’s early prediction that the authorities would take a tough stand: ‘The lock-in will be prevented at all costs by the authorities. A lock-in action will be faced with Special Duty Police, Military Police and maybe even elite army troops.’ Quoting from a pamphlet by the Stroomgroep Stop Kernenergie (SSK-Arnhem) (English: Power Group Stop Nuclear Energy (PGSNE-Arnhem)) HONTELEZ added: ‘The nature of the Seabrook action is one of non-violence. This is in principle also our aim, but is questionable whether we will be able to avoid any form of confrontation in October.’

Adding to this, and speaking for himself: ‘If the fat is in the fire, many will join to combat the Special Duty Police, even if this wasn’t their initial intention. In this were to happen the organizers couldn’t possibly distance themselves from it. WIEGEL has already shown clearly at the preparations of the Coronation festivities that he’s dying to get his hands on us. His election campaign will not be a liberal one, but one of law and order. A battlefield at Dodewaard is just what he needs.’

However, during the preparation phase of the October action the AKB (English: MANE) in its entirety proved less radical and resistance-minded than was assumed by MANE circles from their Nijmegen and Amsterdam divisions, who had originally come up with the idea of a lock-in of the precincts. Despite harsh opinions coming from SSK Nijmegen (English: PGSNE Nijmegen), from Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Utrecht grassroots groups and from Onkruit circles, a considerable number of grassroots groups preferred a blockade to lock-in. Above all they wanted to prevent violence of attack and therefore preferred to abandon the idea of a lock-in, although they did want to try and approach the plant as closely as possible. In their aversion to violence the considerable influence of BAN (Breek Atoomketen Nederland) (English: Break Atom chain Netherlands, BAN) may be noticed, based as it is on the American example of ‘affinity groups’ and for a large part trained by Americans. These are groups of twenty to thirty individuals who have come to know each other very well and can capitalize on each individual’s strengths and weaknesses. This is achieved by a long series of meetings, during which everybody talks for hours about what they think and feel, and psycho-therapeutic games are played. The same concept underlying affinity groups underlies the ‘grassroots groups,’ where grassroots or consensus democracy is practiced.

‘Grassroots democracy’ in its most ideal form is ‘a system in which justice is done to the say of all those concerned as much as possible. The antithesis in parliamentary democracy between representative and represented is eliminated by putting the say in many areas directly into the hands of those directly concerned. This say takes shape in councils, such as neighborhood, factory, school, office and village councils. On issues transcending such neighborhood levels, representatives from councils decide together. An important principle of direct democracy is the possibility to revoke the elected. Also, the elective are chosen by mandate and after consultation.’

In combination with the concept of grassroots autonomy, on the basis of which everyone has the right to stick to their own opinions and act accordingly if actions ensue even when an overwhelming majority has come to accept another opinion, grassroots democracy results in united action only with relatively small groups. In a larger context there will always be a number of groups that do not keep in line and carry out their own actions. The aforementioned BAN – until then the most active part of AKB (English: MANE) – still held a strong influence in 1980, not in the last place owing to the goodwill it had acquired due to its absolute non-violent approach at actions. And so the original plan to occupy the precincts became a blockade and the authorities were able to take appropriate measures. They made the precincts inaccessible, surrounding them with large barbed-wire barriers within which large numbers of Special Duty Police were positioned under orders to refrain from any use of violence except in cases of extreme necessity. This turned the blockade into a rather playful affair. Special Duty Police asked for and obtained Anti Nuclear Energy buttons and at times sang lustily along with the AKB (English: MANE) activists’ songs. It was not only due to – brutal – weather conditions that the blockade was broken up relatively fast. The action group responsible for the illegal broadcasting station ‘Radio Aktief’ at some point started broadcasting the suggestion to terminate the action. While this was still under fervent discussion in one blockading group others had already complied, so that the action fizzled out.

Whatever ‘organizers’ still existed now that the grassroots groups method was being applied ever more often and more consistently, were blamed for having fallen short. Among other things, it was argued
that not enough meetings had been held on the matter of the lock-in, while in particular from Amsterdam and Nijmegen the AKB (English: MANE) was criticized for their ‘cute’ behavior towards the Special Duty Police. In short, the action was branded a ‘flop’ and the ‘hard-liners’ among the activists were given the opportunity to have a more substantial say in the matter.

This resulted in grassroots democracy and autonomy living up to its promise and in any case the ‘Dodewaard Shuts Down’ movement agreed to organize itself into grassroots groups, while in addition the concept of a ‘prikactie’ [a ‘prikactie’ is a short-timed, small-scale action (GdV)] to be organized by individual grassroots groups made its entry. In November 1980, the need and necessity for monthly Landelijk Overleg (LO) (English: National Consultation, NC) meetings was questioned: from then on the matter was founded more on a regional basis. In other words: each Consultation was named after its target. And so the regional consultation ‘UC Nee’ (English: UC No) and the regional consultation ‘Geen Afvaldumping in Zee’ (English: No Dumping of Waste in Sea) were called into being. Because groups from the rest of the country, not from the immediate vicinity of the target, were equally interested, these meetings were soon again referred to as ‘national,’ so that we now know a LO-Dodewaard Gaat Dicht (DGD) (English: NC-Dodewaard Shuts Down, DSD) een LO-UC Nee (English: NC-UC No) and a LO-Geen Afvaldumping in Zee (English: NC-No Dumping of Waste in Sea) which are held respectively in Utrecht, Deventer and Haarlem, of which the DGD (English: DSD) meets monthly and the other two only if actions are being prepared. It is strange that until now the nuclear power plant at Borssele has remained the exclusive territory of BAN or groups sympathizing with BAN, although lately the name Borssele is being mentioned more and more often at the LO-DGD (English: NC-DSD) which is thus slowly acquiring the tradition of being the LO of AKB (English: NC of MANE).

In the beginning of 1981, within the LO-DGD (English: NC-DSD) the position was taken that AKB (English: MANE) could only retain its credibility if the action at Dodewaard be continued until the plant shut down. Although initially a large-scale action during the Easter holidays was agreed upon to fall within the schedule of the plant’s annual servicing stop, activities were limited to a number of relatively small actions in the Spring and Summer of 1981. In March 1981, another Fall action from 19 until 26 September was agreed upon.

The new action would take the form of a blockade raised of both material and human barricades on the three access roads to the plant while at the same time the possibility of blockading the river Waal was being considered. The original intention was to have the material barricades take the shape of ‘anti-nuclear villages’ on the access roads, which villages would also offer protection against the activities of the Special Duty police. As the authorities at a rather early stage made known that a blockade would not be tolerated as it would limit the freedom of movement of plant personnel, who at previous actions had shown in no uncertain terms that they would not accept any further impediments, it was decided in the end to move the actual ‘residing’ during the action to a nearby field, which would have to be squatted.

During the preparatory phase of the second large action at Dodewaard the first attempt at sabotaging the national grid was made. This had been suggested before, following the line of argument that if you could stop the full discharge of a running plant the operation of the plant itself would have to stop. Unfortunately for ‘Willy Wortel en de Lampjes’ [English: Front of Resistance Gyro Gearloose and the Little Helpers, after the Donald Duck cartoon character (GdV)] – the group in this case responsible for sabotaging a Dodewaard nuclear power plant cable – the plant was not in operation at the time. The perpetrators only managed to cause a ground-short at one of the high-voltage cables for a very short time. A next attempt at Maarheeze caused a phase-short between two parallel high-voltage cables and resulted in a thirty-minute power failure in the province of Limburg. Between these acts of sabotage and the next one at Anna Paulowna – a 90-minute power breakdown in the north of North-Holland – a booklet entitled Short circuit, sabotage in your spare time was issued by the Front of Resistance Gyro Gearloose and the Little Helpers, in which propaganda is made for and information given on how to cause a short circuit at high-voltage cables. Investigations into the perpetrators of the aforementioned acts of sabotage has not yielded any results so far, but the impression is given that these activities are if not carried out at the least inspired by Onkrruit activists.
These acts of sabotage – and it is questionable whether we will have seen the last of them – are typical for a change in attitude within the AKB (English: MANE). As early as 1980, a number of activists opposing the transport of light radio-active waste from ECN at Petten to IJmuiden where it had to be transshipped, had shown rather a taste for violence; in 1981 the route from Petten to IJmuiden was divided into one part for non-violent activists and another for those preferring tougher action. Partly as a result of the mounting frustration that their actions were not yielding any direct results and partly due to the fact that AKB (English: MANE) actions are not only carried out by ‘open sandals and woolly socks idealists’ but also by radical squatters, Onkruit activists and anarchists, increasing talk of violent actions against persons and objects directly or indirectly involved in nuclear energy can be heard within the AKB (English: MANE). Thus, in the Spring of 1981 on the LO-DGD (English: NC-DSD) an old acquaintance suddenly came back into view, in three capacities: Joost van STEENIS who under his own name joined the press group DGD-1981 (English: DSD-1981). As ‘Joost’ he submitted a proposal for the action week program, in which 23 September was scheduled as a ‘high-voltage day,’ explaining this as follows: ‘the sawing down and digging out of power pylons, not forgetting the distribution stations. Take a hike in nature and find your own power pylon.’ In addition, he wanted to act as provisional coordination address for short-timed, small-scale actions at electricity companies, power pylons and suppliers, through PO-box 1005 in Amsterdam.

In a recent article of the anarchist monthly ‘De Vrije,’ Van STEENIS states that ‘the struggle for the environment against capitalist exploitation of energy sources and against anti-democratic decisions is becoming increasingly vicious.’ In some respects he compares the activities of AKB (English: MANE) activists to the Vietcong struggle against the USA, likening our present Minister of Home Affairs to Goebbels, while eulogizing in the same breath the ‘Front of Resistance Gyro Gearloose and the Little Helpers.’

In addition, Van STEENIS considers AKB (English: MANE) only one of the many expressions of social disaffection, all of which have in common the essential struggle for another social and political order. In this respect, he sees no distinction between AKB (English: MANE) and the squatters’ movement.

Next, Van STEENIS indicates in his article why in his view the actions at Dodewaard may be considered a failure. For this, Van STEENIS makes a distinction between demonstrating and campaigning. The only thing required for a demonstration is to be present at a site, while for a campaign it matters what you do while you are there. Van STEENIS’ criticism boils down to the fact that although everything that might happen at Dodewaard and other places during the action week was discussed ahead, everyone parted afterwards without having discussed or thought about what they could do by themselves or as part of a grassroots group.

Yet, all of this was necessary, for the program was tough enough: constructing (prohibited) barricades, carrying out short small-scale actions, and organizing a massive final demonstration at Arnhem. The desire to do something was definitely felt, but most people did not translate this desire into practical activities, according to Van STEENIS.

Still, Van STEENIS manages to see some good points. Despite a ban to bring building material, which had been made known extensively, some demonstrators carried with them pieces of wood or other materials. Yet, for most of them, this was an impromptu initiative. Nothing showed they had planned for this in groups.

However, Van STEENIS argues, it indicates a beginning of a change of mentality within AKB (English: MANE) and other protest movements. Van STEENIS calls on action-minded Netherlands to start reflecting right on what one should do at a next action at Dodewaard or anywhere else, so that one can act more powerfully. As a result, such actions would not stay within the limits of certain norms set by the authorities.

If one wants to achieve something one has to cross the boundaries of the rulers’ laws. Van STEENIS suggests that the construction of blockades and the execution of damaging short small-scale actions must be organized more systematically for future actions and replace ‘old style’ demonstrations.
Proof of Van STEENIS considerable influence among hard-line activists despite the failure of the 1981 DGD (English: DSD) action, are the developments on 19 and 20 September 1981, where he acted as background leader and source of inspiration for the first construction and the repeated reconstructions of barricades at the dikes later on.

He knew how to motivate a large number of activists to return time and again with a persistency verging on the fanatic, even when they were being chased away repeatedly with tear gas and lange lat (a long flat truncheon [GdV]). That the action could not be sustained until 26 September 1981 – people left as early as 22 September 1981 under the pressure of the threatening attitude of a large number of locals – could really not be blamed on Joost, but more so on the concepts of grassroots autonomy and democracy, which made the building of an organization sound and ready for the fray, in effect, one that is centrally organized, impossible. Either way, the Dodewaard syndrome caused by the Special Duty Police actions and the ‘public outrage’ did not do much to dampen the AKB (English: MANE)’s willingness to demonstrate: on 26 September 1981 as many as 26,000 persons joined the peaceful final demonstration at Arnhem.

A closer look at Joost van STEENIS

Lately, Joost van STEENIS, age 43, for some 25 years actively involved in groups and movements aimed against the existing social structure, has taken on a special position within AKB (English: MANE). He is a strong character with organizational talents and a good head on his shoulders. He holds a grade in mathematics and physics, which he taught for some time. At the present time he is unemployed.

In 1966, he emerged as one of the leaders of the ‘Rode Jeugd’ (English: Red Youth). Before, he had already been active in the ‘Rooie Vlag’ (English: Red Flag) organization. Both groups were orthodox Marxist-Leninist. In the ‘Rode Jeugd’ (English: Red Youth) and later in the ‘Rode Hulp’ (English: Red Help) – after discontinuance of the aforementioned group in 1974 – Van STEENIS set out the ideological course, at first in competition with Henk WUBBEN, later with Lucien van HOESEL. It may be assumed that as one of the top-ranking men of the ‘Rode Jeugd’ (English: Red Youth) he had at least prior knowledge of the bombing attacks by this organization, executed mainly in 1972. In particular multinationals such as PHILIPS were preferred targets. However, there was never sufficient evidence to prosecute Van STEENIS.

Towards the end of 1975 he tried to prove quite explicitly that he owned the ideological leadership of the ‘Rode Hulp’ (English: Red Help). During a meeting he put forward a discussion paper which he had probably drawn up in collaboration with his friend Tom de BOOY. This paper received a very bad reception within the ‘Rode Hulp’ (English: Red Help) and resulted in Van STEENIS no longer playing a major part in this group. A point in case is that Van STEENIS, contrary to a number of other members of ‘Rode Hulp’ (English: Red Help) who were of lesser political standing, was not invited partake in a stay at a PFLP terrorist training camp at Aden (South-Yemen) in 1976.

In the discussion paper, Van STEENIS put down his main political ideas and he postulated his theory of ‘Small Violence.’ His main proposition was: ‘The aim is to create armed struggle here and now.’ In order to prevent antagonizing the population against the guerrilla by bloody and terrifying acts during the erection of the force organization, one would, or so Van STEENIS would have it, at least at the start, only use so-called ‘Small Violence.’ This implied that the ‘powers that be’ – i.e. the society’s elite – had to be dealt with. The analogy with the methodology of the ‘Rode Brigades’ (English: Red Brigades) and the RAF (‘you have to punish one to educate a thousand’) is evident here.

Yet, Van STEENIS realized that in particular the Italian situation – to ‘shoot down’ those in power – had to be translated, at least for the time being, into Dutch terms – to torment those in power. The theory of ‘Small Violence’ was implemented among others by the so-called ‘Capelse Group,’ centering around the notorious Rob GROENHUYZEN.

In 1976 Van STEENIS turned his back on the ‘Rode Hulp’ (English: Red Help). Some time afterwards at several locations attacks and attempts at attacks were carried out using Molotov cocktails and firebombs. The objects of these assaults can be considered representatives of business and state machinery; captains of industry of large enterprises, members of the Public Prosecutor and high-placed civil servants were targets.

Responsible for these actions were groups such as ‘Helder van Geest/ Schoon van Lichaam’ (English: Clear Mind/Clean Body) and the ‘Verbond tegen Ambtelijke Willekeur’ (English: Alliance against Arbitrary Official Rule). Both action groups operated from a central line of thought. It can assumed
without doubt that Joost van STEENIS (with Tom de BOOY) was at least the spiritual father of the activities of both groups.

In the middle of 1978, Joost van STEENIS together with Tom de BOOY and Machteld RIETVELD founded the ‘Stichting Macht en Elite’ (*English: Foundation Power and Elite*). The foundation issued a magazine of the same name in the years of 1978 and 1979.

Van STEENIS – meanwhile unemployed – mainly dedicated himself to studying the formation of the elite in society in general and to tracing the actual rulers in the Netherlands in particular for ‘Power and Elite.’ In particular this last point caused a great deal of controversy, also because it received ample attention in the national press.

[END OF PAGE 38, BEGINNING OF PAGE 39]

It was not assumed the board of the foundation would turn to actions against rulers, but – in the words of Tom de BOOY – acts of hot-heads could not be answered for.

After all, ‘Power and Elite’ magazine indicated exactly who should be dealt with and how. The methodology thought up by Van STEENIS has until now only been used incidentally by small groups. This is possibly the reason why some time ago Van STEENIS adopted the new strategy to try and infiltrate his theories inside the broader frame of a mass movement such as the AKB (*English: MANE*).

[END OF PAGE 39, END OF SECTION]