13  Factors influencing the quality of the BVD-survey

What factors contribute to a higher or a lower quality of a report? There are limitations in answering this question. In this research, many variables are present, but only a limited number of cases. Therefore, these factors cannot be traced through statistical generalizations. Instead, use will be made analytical generalizations. Subsequently, this part of the study is to a large degree exploratory in nature.

First, factors related to the BVD and the survey are discussed (13.1). Second, the reports of 11.3 are surveyed for differences to trace additional insights on factors that influence the quality of reports (13.2). Finally, factors of a positive and a negative effect are listed.

13.1  Forum, deception, and other factors

The case of the BVD – part of the government’s administration – will differ from that on the SRB – a private non-profit organization. First, the BVD forum was much smaller, because it did not publish its reports. Only a relatively small number of surveys were distributed to a select group who had to keep its contents secret. This hinders investigating direct feedback on this specific survey. However, some comments can be made regarding the different forums that served to control, to correct, and to steer the agency (13.1.1).

As in the case of the Bureau, attention is paid to the factor of deception. In this field, the BVD as a larger and governmental organization could respond in a way that the SRB was not capable of – by running a large network of agents through its agent runners. The effects of this network on the factor of deception are discussed (13.1.2).

Finally, a series of other factors will be discussed, such as motivation, wages, size of a section, education, and selection (13.1.3).

13.1.1 Forum

To control, correct, and steer an agency – and its reports – can stem from different forums. It can come from internal forums, limited to the organization that produced the report, or from external forums, such as consumers of the report or the legislative power that controls the agency. As the effects of the different forums are entwined with the discussion on openness and secrecy, these are included in this debate.

Internal forums

The type and quality of the internal forums at the BVD varied between sections. The analysts at the Foreign Policy Staff, for example, submitted their products to
each other in the expectation that these products were reviewed in a critical way. At other directorates, such as Directorate B, while there was rarely any peer review, control had a hierarchical nature.\(^1\) There were also differences in executive qualities and the emphasis given to the quality of intelligence products by the heads of directorates. Directors closely supervised reports to external consumers, but they only exercised this in general terms rather than by checking its detailed elements of information.\(^2\) With the exception of the Foreign Policy Staff, the internal forum was poorly developed.

At the time the reports were written, there was no quality manager at the BVD. A quality manager was appointed after the report by Andersson, Elffers & Felix.\(^3\)

**External forums**

There are different types of external forums that could have served as a factor concerning the quality of reports. There are the domestic and international networks that the BVD functioned in. There are also the political steering and control undertaken by ministers and parliament. Finally, there is public debate.

**Networks**

The networks that the BVD functioned in may have functioned as external forums. In the 1980’s, the most important Dutch network for the BVD was formed by the so-called PID’s. PID was an abbreviation for the local intelligence units, who had different names. In Dutch, this abbreviation stood for Plaatselijke/Politie/Politieke Inlichtingendiensten; in English: Local/Police/Political Intelligence Agencies.\(^4\)

Former head of the PID-Zaanstad, Sjoerd Bos, wrote that the control that was exercised on the activities of the PID’s – carried out by the then head of operations of the BVD, Luc Leijendekker – was minimal. Although Leijendekker was interested in the information from the PID’s – Bos wrote – he was not interested in how this data was obtained.\(^5\) However, this is important in judging the reliability of intelligence and in estimating possible biases. If Bos is correct, then the procedures initiated by Leijendekker may have had a negative influence on the quality of reports. More problems in this field have been identified.\(^6\)

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\(^1\) Letter by Peter Keller to the author, 26 June 2000.

\(^2\) Ibid.

\(^3\) Interview with BVD-employee Dick Engelen by the author, 14 March 1996.

\(^4\) In the 1990’s after an extensive reorganization of Dutch police from a local into a regional structure, these PID’s were transformed into RID’s: Regionale Inlichtingendiensten (in English Regional Intelligence Agencies).

\(^5\) Nieuwe Revu, 6-13 December 1990, 32.

\(^6\) In 1965 through circular 769150, for example, the BVD let the PID’s know that it did not want to receive any correspondence on individual PSP-membership, only if it concerned a supposed extremist character. On 15 December 1966, through circular 852190, the BVD asked to meet certain standards for both registration and reporting. In general, the agency only wanted registration and reporting of persons with a communist, Trotskyist, or anarchist background (BVD, 15 December 1966, no. 852190. Subject: PSP, signed by head of the BVD J.S. Sinninghe Damsté). On 22 October 1979, the BVD formally closed the file on the PSP through a secret official message. Former head of the PID-Zaanstad – Sjoerd Bos – wrote...
official Hoekstra also complained about the poor situation that he was confronted with, when he succeeded Leijendekker. Because of this, Hoekstra found it completely incomprehensible that Leijendekker was later promoted to deputy head of Directorate B.\(^7\)

The communication problems between the BVD and the PID’s would have hindered the forum function. These communication problems were deepened by the fact that the BVD had to be in contact with over 160 municipal and regional police forces, all of whom had their own approach to carry out their tasks. Furthermore, some of the most important police forces – such as Amsterdam, the Hague, and Rotterdam – were reluctant to pass on intelligence to the BVD. For various reasons – including an incorrect understanding of the war record of the deputy head of the BVD Hassan Neervoort – the BVD was sometimes excluded from receiving this information. The intelligence unit of Rotterdam even had a stamp with the text ‘Not for the agency.’ The Dutch central criminal intelligence agency CRI (Centrale Recherche en Informatiedienst), also had a problematic relationship with the BVD, in particular regarding the issue of the shared use of the local intelligence units of the police.\(^8\)

Concerning the international networks, scarcely anything is known about its possible forum function. One exception concerns the Foreign Policy Staff. Foreign sister agencies were receptive to the qualities of the analysts from the Foreign Policy Staff. They visited the section regularly, among them CIA-official Sherman Kent.\(^9\)

### Political steering and control

The political steering and control in those days was poor, even almost absent. This did not contribute to the forum functioning. The main interest of successive ministers was that they did not want to have any political turmoil. From 1981 onwards, the agency had to present to the minister a list of BVD-targets.\(^10\)

However, noticeable is the absence of ministerial feedback. At the end of the 1970’s, head of the BVD De Haan (1977-1986) doubted whether the agency needed to invest a lot of energy on the CPN. In 1981, minister Van Thijn tended to lean towards the opinion that the BVD had to discontinue. Before a final conclusion could be reached, a governmental crisis interrupted this discussion about CPN. The BVD produced a memo in which it proposed what should and should not be

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\(^7\) Hoekstra, *In dienst van de BVD*, 2004, 16.

\(^8\) *Ibid.*, 37, 113-114, 116-120.


covered. In 1982, under minister Rood – Van Thijn’s successor – the BVD adopted a new policy on the CPN.\(^{11}\) Subsequently, the BVD did not focus on the entire CPN as a target group, but rather only a number of aspects. These included the main developments within the CPN: 1) ideological and political developments of the party in theory and practice; 2) international contacts and resulting activities; 3) covert and coordinated activities concerning societal organizations; 4) activities that – by their nature or means used – actually exceeded the limits of the legal order; and 5) party leadership.\(^{12}\) In 1985, the agency still monitored these aspects. On 6 March 1985, however, the Permanent Lower House Committee on Intelligence and Security Agencies wrote: a) the CPN as such is not the object of investigation anymore; and b) the committee noted that ‘the viewpoint of the government, concerning the CPN, is that no other policy will be carried out than on any other party actually functioning within the parliamentary-democratic frame.’\(^{13}\) Shortly afterwards on 15 March 1985, head of the BVD De Haan wrote that the reflection of the committee would lead to wrong conclusions. On 2 April 1985, the BVD complained that minister Rietkerk did not tell the committee that he objected to their reflection.\(^{14}\) In January 1987, Blom, the head of the BVD and successor of De Haan informed Cees van Dijk (CDA), the successor of Rietkerk as minister of Home Affairs, that the policy was still being carried out and the committee knew of it, ‘but has represented it in a garbled way in its report. The Minister did not oppose it.’ The BVD did not opt for a minister who did not act and who hoped that no damage would occur regarding the wrong impression that the public had about BVD-activities concerning the CPN. The agency wanted the committee to communicate correctly, or the agency would need to change its policy on the CPN. Furthermore, the BVD wrote that the Lower House would conclude ‘concerning the CPN that indeed “a different policy is carried out than on any other party.”’ I have the impression, the Minister will have little to say about that.’\(^{15}\) On 19 May 1987, the BVD again warned the minister that the Lower House remained ignorant of the policy.\(^{16}\) In 1987, the BVD reduced drastically its intelligence activities towards the CPN.\(^{17}\) The situation of responsible politicians giving only half of the information however, continued. For instance on 8 February 1991 the Lower House asked questions to the then minister Ien Dales, on 2 February 1995 to her (interim) successor Joris Voorhoeve, on 24 June 1995, and on 26 May 1997 to minister Dijkstal.\(^{18}\) Although the BVD emphasized repeatedly about giving

\(^{11}\) Interview with Dick Engelen by the author, 7 March 2001.


\(^{13}\) This position was repeated in a BVD-memo of 20 January 1987, “Bemoeienis van de BVD met de CPN.” In this document, on page 2 it is referred to the meeting of 6 March 1985.

\(^{14}\) Quotes from BVD-memo of 20 January 1987, “Bemoeienis van de BVD met de CPN,” 2.


\(^{16}\) At the same time, the information position of the BVD within the CPN was reduced to open sources. Letter of Head of the BVD to the minister, 19 May 1987.

\(^{17}\) Vrij Nederland, 4 October 1997, 28.

\(^{18}\) Lower House, session 1990-1991, appendix, 759: questions by Willems (GroenLinks); answers by minister Dales. Questions by Oedayraj Singh Varma (GroenLinks), 30 June 1995, answer 1 August
correct information, the responsible controlling bodies – the permanent committee and four successive ministers – did not correct the garbled statements or the giving of only half the information.

This is not unique. As noted in 11.3, the BVD investigated correctly Stop the Neutron Bomb, a communist front organization. Nevertheless, Van Thijn stated the opposite in public. In those years the steering and control from responsible ministers, is mainly characterized by a lack of interest and political games.

Despite this, there is parliamentary steering and control. In the Netherlands, the most important role is taken by the Permanent Lower House Committee on Intelligence and Security Agencies.\(^{19}\) Besides controlling the agency, the committee is also informed about events and developments. This may concern thematic and periodical reports, oral briefings, and ‘eyes only’ documents.

The committee was limited. The committee was composed of the leaders of the main parties in the House.\(^{20}\) These leaders had overburdened agendas. As a result the committee did not meet often. Moreover, it was not composed of specialists. This also limited their control. For decades, the committee was criticized that it did not control the BVD adequately. This criticism was not only expressed by members of parliament, but also by a former member of the committee itself. In ’t Veld, Social-democratic (PvdA) member of the Upper House, had the impression that members of the committee did not control the BVD adequately. He assumed that members were too busy with other affairs.\(^{21}\) Former Christian-democrat member of the committee, Willem Aantjes, wrote that the work of the committee could not even be more or less identified as adequate parliamentary control. No real issues were on the agenda, but rather only a few minor affairs, which kept on absorbing the meetings.\(^{22}\) According to Aantjes, the quality of reports and analyses was never an issue or a point of discussion of the Permanent Lower House Committee on

\(^{19}\) This committee is mainly meant to control the agencies. The policy and coordination of the BVD is the responsibility of the minister of Home Affairs, of the ministerial committee for the intelligence and security agencies (in Dutch: Ministeriële Commissie voor de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten, MIVIC. Chairperson is the prime minister), and of the committee united intelligence and security agencies (in Dutch: Comité Verenigde Inlichtingendiensten Nederland. Chairperson is the coordinator of the intelligence and security agencies of the ministry of General Affairs). The Auditor General controls the budget of the BVD. Yet, the head auditor of the ministry of Home Affairs controls the secret expenditure of the BVD. Complaints are investigated by an interdepartmental procedure, the Permanent Lower House Committee on Intelligence and Security Agencies, or Ombudsman. Besides, citizens may start a case at an administrative or civil court. Even a criminal investigation may be started. Lower House, session 1991-1992, 22463, no. 3, 9-10, 13. Lower House, session 1994-1995, 22036, no. 8, 4. Lower House, session 1997-1998, 25877, no. 3, 78-79. BVD, Jaarverslag 1998, 81-82. For more on aspects of lawfulness, rightfulness, and efficiency, see Lower House, session 1997-1998, 25877, no. 3, 81. After the period under investigation, a new body was installed, to control the rightfulness of the agency.

\(^{20}\) This is contrary to, for example, the situation in the United Kingdom or Germany in which also other members of parliament take place in the committee. Lower House, session 1997-1998, 24714, no. 5, 6-7, 9.

\(^{21}\) Het Parool, 11 April 1962.

Intelligence and Security Agencies in the period that he was a member of it. BVD-employee Hoekstra confirms that the control function was almost completely lacking. The Committee did not even meet for years to read the annual confidential report by the BVD. In short, almost any forum function related to the quality of security agency reports was absent.

**Other**

A more public forum function was only created after the period of investigation – in the 1990’s. The BVD was a very closed organization up until 1990. In the 1990’s, the BVD began to publish annual reports. The BVD also began to commission research to third parties. These pieces of research were published. Nowadays, the agency – reorganized and renamed as the AIVD – publishes reports on its own web site.

The publication of reports (commissioned) by the BVD is a positive initiative to further the forum function. It also develops the public debate and the quality of the arguments used in this debate, and it shows the agency’s accountability to the public and the value it has in serving the democratic legal order.

In one sense, the agency developed in a contrary way. After 1990, the number of agent runners decreased. It is argued that this is resulting in the AIVD missing information on the micro-level, which is necessary for its work and analyses.

**Openness - secrecy**

As in the case of the SRB, there is no consistent outcome in the relationship between openness and secrecy, and quality. In the case of the BVD, this lack of an outcome is mainly caused by insufficient information available. Still, two indications can be assessed. First, there are indications that the forum function plays a role in achieving quality. The more – and diverse – this forum function is present the better the (average) quality of reports (Foreign Policy Staff).

Second, to be outward oriented does not only involve making reports public. The number of agent runners active at the agency also plays a role. The more agent runners you have, in more cases, means that you are likely to gain access to (additional) information on the micro-level. We will return to this issue in the next section, in the context of agents and deception.

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23 Interview with Willem Aantjes by the author, 26 January 2000.
27 Former BVD-official Hoekstra argues that the Red Youth/Red Help could be controlled well by employing so many agents. This was contrary to RARA, in which the BVD had a poor information position. The knowledge on RARA was mainly based on technical means as observation and taps. Therefore, Hoekstra pleas for infiltration as a vital means (Hoekstra, “Infiltratie in de praktijk,” *Justitiële Verkenningen*, year 30, no. 3, 2004, 106).
Hypotheses

In 2.4.3, hypotheses were developed to assess some of the relationships regarding the issue of openness and secrecy.

**HYPOTHESIS 1**: If the dominant forum function is performed by political or diplomatic feedback, this will influence the quality of the intelligence and security agency report in a negative way.

In the case of the BVD, the feedback by its ministers about the CPN and its front organizations resulted in the BVD advancing without clear steering. Minister Van Thijn even contradicted – apparently for political reasons, because the issue of nuclear weapons and the peace movement was very sensitive within his party, the contents of the BVD-report on Stop the Neutron-bomb. As far as it can be traced, the political feedback did not influence the contents of reports directly.\(^{28}\)

The outcomes of the BVD-case does not support or deny hypothesis 1 concerning the issue of the quality of the report itself. Nevertheless, the political feedback did leave the agency floundering about its preliminary question – concerning which issues to focus on and how to report on them.

A lack of (access to) relevant information, for the period under investigation, about the BVD-case has not yielded any results for the other hypotheses.

In the SRB-case, the many forums contributed to the quality of the reports. In the BVD-case, the indications identified (Foreign Policy Staff compared to Directorate B) show that they are in line with the results of the SRB-case.

### 13.1.2 Deception

In 3.3, Angleton’s model of an opponent’s potential to utilize deception was presented. On one hand, an opponent can feed an agency with manipulating information – or information can be blocked. On the other hand, an opponent can try to gain access to inside information from an organization.

In this section, first elements of deception that were present are investigated. In the quarterly survey of the BVD, two groups received the most attention, MANE (43%), and Red Youth/Red Help (24%).

Second, how the BVD reacted is discussed. In the survey, there were large differences in quality regarding how these groups were described (10.2.3 & 10.2.4).

The question of whether eventual differences within the policy of deception that both groups utilized had effects on quality is addressed. Attention is given to the use of agents. While their use is a means to combat a policy of deception by an opponent, it may, nevertheless, yield additional elements of deception itself. Finally, the hypotheses on deception are discussed.

\(^{28}\) It is not likely the political feedback has strongly influenced the security agency reports. First, the company philosophy was just to present the information. If no conclusions are presented, no steering can take place on conclusions (10.2.5). Second, Ad de Jonge of the Foreign Policy Staff – the section that did draw conclusions – commented that he never experienced – neither internally nor externally – any pressure not to write something (13.2).
MANE

MANE had no specific policy of deception towards authorities – and especially not in the case of the mass actions at Dodewaard. Openness was the starting point of the MANE. This even applied to internal discussions.\(^{29}\) It was easy to gain access to this movement. People could join MANE without any barrier, and they could also easily obtain coordinating activities.\(^{30}\)

Goals were made public, and they maintained these. For example, MANE took, during the 1980 Whitsun-camp, the twin-track decision of a lock-in and blockading the plant. The activists agreed to base their final decision on the reaction of the authorities. Since the authorities would not tolerate a lock-in, MANE decided finally to opt for a blockade. The actual development was in accordance with the original decision – the twin-track decision – during the Whitsun-camp. There was no secret or hidden agenda.

Red Youth & Red Help

In Red Youth and Red Help, elements can be traced of an active policy of deception. Hard-core members of these groups who carried out this policy of deception were – for instance Willem Oskam, Joost van Steenis, Henk Wubben, and Aat van Wijk. They had a high level of security awareness and a policy to double agents. The policy of doubling agents received media attention, as in the affair of the man with the frog’s eyes – the BVD-agent runner who ran Danny Mulders (10.2.1) – and the doubling of BVD-agent Geert Paulussen.\(^ {31}\)

Red Youth/Red Help also tried actively to obtain information about the Dutch security who were investigating them. Red Youth/Red Help did not have a mole, but they had first and second hand sources. For example, they obtained information concerning the BVD and the police through friendly journalists. They also tried to obtain information through a friend of Wubben’s girl friend, who was the daughter of an officer in a special police unit at Eindhoven,\(^ {32}\) in addition to more regular sources, such as lawyers, information by the Ministry of Justice or the CRI. They also managed to obtain some BVD monthly and quarterly surveys that focused on them. The affair that received the largest media attention was the so-called Capelse Group – a group whose ideas were in line with the Red Youth/Red Help approach. During November 1975 - March 1976, the Capelse Group took pictures of about 170 BVD-officials. In 1977, this group was arrested and, amongst other objects such as weapons and chemicals, these pictures were found.\(^ {33}\) Previously, Red Youth in the Hague had observed

\(^{29}\) For example, *Met je hoofd in de wolken en je voeten in de modder* (1981); *Onderstroom*, June 1980, no. 30, 18 ff.

\(^{30}\) BAN prepared some action in secret, but carried them out in the open. Together with its open structure, and to take its responsibility in public, this can hardly be called policy of deception.

\(^{31}\) Dekkers & Dijksman, *’n Hollandse stadsguerilla*, 1988, 53-54.

\(^{32}\) Leena Malkki, draft of her upcoming dissertation (planned for 2006), the Department of Political Science of the University of Helsinki (Finland).

\(^{33}\) *Vrij Nederland*, 7 April 1979; Dekker & Dijksman, *’n Hollandse stadsguerilla*, 1988, 74.
the main BVD building and had compiled a list of number plates belonging to assumed BVD-related cars.\footnote{Hoekstra, \textit{In dienst van de BVD}, 2004, 76.}

The nature of their activities also indicated that they had a possible policy of deception, such as having contacts with foreign terrorist groups like RAF, dealing with weapons and explosives, and taking part in a terrorist training camp. There are enough elements traceable of a policy of deception on behalf of Red Youth/Red Help. In this, there is a significant difference compared to the attitude of MANE.

\section*{The BVD}

The observations by Red Youth in the Hague of the BVD, led to new measures by the agency. For example, every agent runner received a company car with a screened number plate. Lamps were installed at the entrances of the BVD that were switched on when the security detected that the agency was being observed. This warned BVD-staff not to enter or to leave the building.\footnote{Ibid., 76.}

It may have been difficult for the BVD to gain accurate insight, because Red Youth/Red Help doubled BVD-agents and tried to feed the agency with false information. However, the BVD managed to run many agents within Red Youth. A main entry point into Red Youth was through session organized by Oskam and Van Steenis in 1972 and 1973. Because it took some time before someone was trusted sufficiently to join a revolutionary cell, those who were recruited were those who had attended these evening sessions over a long period of time. This led to the BVD in Amsterdam gaining an excellent information position. In Utrecht, the agency had a secret informant who, for example, made it possible to arrest Van Hoessel. The number of BVD-agents in the Red Youth was characterized as ample – but sometimes three out of four members in one revolutionary cell were BVD-agents.\footnote{Ibid., 69-71, 75, 175.} Such an incidental overkill was the result of the overall policy at the BVD to maintain a good overview of violent groups by having at least one agent in each cell.\footnote{Hoekstra, “Infiltratie in de praktijk,” \textit{Justitiële Verkenningen}, 2004, no. 3, 105.}

The following illustrates the possible impact an agent can have. In the so-called Operation Black (in Dutch: Operatie Zwart), an agent was deeply actively inside Red Youth. This agent had a past in the CPN, where he had led strikes in the Amsterdam harbor. Afterwards, he was active in various Maoist groups, and finally in Red Youth. Because of his past, Oskam trusted him. Since his house was strategically located, Red Youth used it for meetings with RAF-members. These meetings were taped by the BVD. Simultaneously, the agency observed such meetings from outside the building. In these years, five RAF-members were caught in Amsterdam – on the Prinsengracht – with the help of this agent. These RAF-members were deported without any formality, across the border, where the German authorities were already waiting. On another occasion, the
agent handed a revolver to a female RAF-member – an action which was also observed by the BVD.\textsuperscript{38}

It is without doubt that this agent supplied the BVD with a lot of information. Combined with the number of other active agents that the BVD had, a state of affairs was created in which the agency did not have to fear uncontrolled violence.\textsuperscript{39}

The BVD was not only dependent on its network of agents to obtain information. The agency could read Red Youth/Red Help publications, carry out observations, tap phones, and make use of other technical means.\textsuperscript{40} Besides the BVD, the Dutch police and the CRI also targeted Red Youth/Red Help. This could lead, however, to problems in terms of agents who were run by the BVD and/or the police.\textsuperscript{41}

Besides this triangulation of Dutch sources, the BVD had its international contacts, assuming that the liaisons with these countries worked well. Some of these countries include the following. (for each country, information is given to indicate the different aspects that the BVD could benefit from).

The Federal Republic of Germany played an important role as a source for the BVD. Concerning the RAF, the Dutch and German agencies cooperated intensively – especially between the Dutch BVD and the German Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) and the German Bundes Kriminalamt (BKA).\textsuperscript{42} Publicly known is the so-called Celler-Loch affair, in which the German authorities tried to infiltrate the RAF. In this attempt, the Dutch and German agencies attempted, in vain, to ensure that Wubben played a role in it.\textsuperscript{43} There are leads that the agencies cooperated from an early period onwards. In the beginning of the 1970’s, but maybe years earlier, Red Youth-members helped American soldiers, in Germany, to desert via the Netherlands, to Scandinavia.\textsuperscript{44} From other BVD-documents, the impression is given that helping deserters was observed by Dutch security.\textsuperscript{45} In the 1970’s, there were contacts between Red

\textsuperscript{38} In 1974, the agent drove a RAF-member and explosives to Germany. He put this RAF-member on the train in Arnhem, and the agent continued alone with the explosives in his car to Germany. Through a technical failure at the BVD, his telephone call to the agency on this activity was not responded to. It cannot be excluded that the explosives were used some weeks later in the attack on the US-military base at Heidelberg – one of the best known RAF-attacks (Hoekstra, \textit{In dienst van de BVD}, 2004, 170-173).

\textsuperscript{39} It also led to ethical thoughts at the BVD. Many weapons were paid by agents – which was more or less obligatory if you were active for a longer period at the Red Youth – and it was questioned if this group would have been able to keep functioning that way without these agents (Hoekstra, \textit{In dienst van de BVD}, 2004, 174-175).

\textsuperscript{40} Hoekstra, \textit{In dienst van de BVD}, 2004, 75.

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 117.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 143.

\textsuperscript{43} Dekkers & Dijksman, \textit{'n Hollandse stadsguerrilla}, 1988, 41-47.

\textsuperscript{44} Such contacts may already have taken place from the end of the 1960’s (Verbij, \textit{Tien Rode Jaren}, 2005, 154). Dekkers & Dijksman, \textit{'n Hollandse stadsguerrilla}, 1988, 59.

\textsuperscript{45} From reports on the Angola Committe and the HCSA, it is evident the BVD had special attention for – in this case Portugese – refugees that went into hiding in Sweden. Especially, if this happened with the help of false papers and clandestine routes (BVD, FOIA-file no. 248633-2001, on South-African Communities in the Netherlands 1948-1998. File 1 of 6, “De solidariteitscomité’s m.b.t. Zuidelijk
Youth/Red Help and the RAF, among others, to help RAF-members to go into hiding or, more incidentally, to supply the RAF with weapons and explosives.\footnote{Already in 1976, Dutch media wrote about such contacts: \textit{De Telegraaf}, 2 October 1976 or \textit{Het Parool}, 5 October 1976. See also: \textit{Het Parool}, 19 January 1977; \textit{Accent}, 16 October 1976, 29-30. Dekkers & Dijksman, \textit{’n Hollandse stadsguerrilla}, 1988, 144-145. Hoekstra, \textit{In dienst van de BVD}, 2004, 70-71, 74.} The agency also could simply read Red Youth-publications in which some relationships were almost directly traceable, such as between Red Youth-member Van Wijk, and RAF-member Werner Hoppe. Another known contact was between Henk Wubben and the German Sigurd Debus, who carried out RAF-like actions in Hamburg, but who was not actually a RAF-member. The agent who proposed to Wubben to free the detained Debus was part of the Celler Loch affair.\footnote{Oral source.} When Van Hoessel was detained, he had corresponded with (people around) the RAF.\footnote{Hoekstra, \textit{In dienst van de BVD}, 2004, 126-135.} The BVD was aware of other contacts, such as between the Dutch Paula Meijer and RAF-member Knut Folkerts,\footnote{Dekkers & Dijksman, \textit{’n Hollandse stadsguerrilla}, 1988, 40-41.} and – as mentioned in the previous section – meetings in Amsterdam as part of Operation Black.

The BVD cooperated very likely with US sister agencies concerning the issue of Vietnam deserters. Another example is a Dutchman, who was arrested in the USA for arms smuggling on behalf of the IRA. As he was relatively mildly punished – and because he still lives with his partner in the USA – this was likely to have been a result of an information exchange between the Dutch and US counterparts.\footnote{Ibid., 69.} In general, there was a close cooperation between Dutch and US-agencies.\footnote{Hoekstra, \textit{In dienst van de BVD}, 2004, 78-80, 135, 169.}

Sharing intelligence also took place with the British counterparts and clearly in regards to the mentioned Dutchman in the USA and arms smuggling. At the PFLP terrorist training camp in Yemen, that Red Help-members visited, an IRA-member was also present.\footnote{This becomes clear from law suit files on Lidwien Janssen. For other contacts with the IRA, see Dekkers & Dijksman, \textit{’n Hollandse stadsguerrilla}, 1988, 86-87.} Generally, the BVD worked close together with MI5 and MI6 concerning anything related to the IRA, and the British were very well informed regarding all kinds of Dutch Maoist groups.\footnote{Hoekstra, \textit{In dienst van de BVD}, 2004, 78-80, 135, 169.}

There is traditionally intelligence cooperation between the Netherlands and Israel. This cooperation is also a sensitive one, because the Israeli occupation of Palestine territories is a politically sensitive issue in the Netherlands.\footnote{Ibid., 144.} In September 1976, Israel arrested Red Help-member Lidwien Janssen, who was involved in a reconnaissance, for the PFLP, at Ben Goerion airport in Tel Aviv. Israel was interested in the PFLP camp at South-Yemen, of which it had aerial pictures. During the interrogations, Janssen was hardly asked to give extra
information about the Red Help, because the Israeli authorities were already well informed.\(^{55}\)

It is likely that there had been some intelligence contact between the Netherlands and Japan. The Japanese Red Army – who was in contact with the PFLP – carried out an action, in September 1974, against the French embassy. In May 1986, the Japanese Kikumura – of whom convincing proof that showed he was a member of the Japanese Red Army was lacking – was arrested. He had explosives with him, which were likely meant for the summit of world leaders at Bremen. His Dutch contact was said to be Paul Moussault, who had been active in circles close to Red Youth/Red Help.\(^{56}\)

The BVD possibly shared intelligence concerning Red Youth/Red Help with agencies of a number of other countries, including Greece and Portugal. With hindsight, former Red Youth-member Wubb en believes that a Greek resistance organization, for which the Red Youth transported explosives, was a false flag operation\(^ {57}\) organized by the Greek government. Red Youth was also in contact with a Portuguese resistance organization, which was likely to have been a Portuguese false flag operation established to trace international contacts.\(^ {58}\) It cannot be simply said that the BVD was in touch with these agencies before the early 1970’s, because the agency had kept some distance because of the nature of these governments.\(^ {59}\)

Although Red Youth/Red Help had a policy to double agents, the BVD was more likely to have been in control. Other Dutch security organizations also targeted Red Youth/Red Help, as did many foreign sister agencies. They covered many aspects of their activities. The wide range of triangulation of sources that the BVD utilized is likely to have helped in overcoming the difficulties caused by Red Youth/Red Help’s policy of deception. This does not mean that every operation ended successfully – as was the case of the Celler-Loch affair – although most did. Some operations by the BVD were so effective, that even nowadays, former Red Youth members still feel frustrated.\(^ {60}\)

The BVD organized extra activities and remained sharp in case of deception. Former head of the Training Section EO at the BVD, Keller, commented that the less experienced analysts at the BVD analyzed open organizations.\(^ {61}\) Better analysts carried out analyses on groups like Red Youth and Red Help, and

\(^ {55}\) Dekkers & Dijksman, ‘n Hollandse stadsguerrilla, 1988, 137, 140.

\(^ {56}\) Hoekstra, In dienst van de BVD, 2004, 60-64.

\(^ {57}\) In a false flag operation, you behave like one of the opposite group, to attack the opponent.

\(^ {58}\) Leena Malkki, draft of her upcoming dissertation (planned for 2006), the Department of Political Science of the University of Helsinki (Finland). Compare: Dekkers & Dijksman, ‘n Hollandse stadsguerrilla, 1988, 58-59.

\(^ {59}\) Hoekstra, In dienst van de BVD, 2004, 148.

\(^ {60}\) Dekkers & Dijksman, ‘n Hollandse stadsguerrilla, 1988, 68, 73-74.

\(^ {61}\) Interview with Peter Keller by the author, 28 November 2003.

Another factor of influence on the level of the author was the consumer a report was written for. A letter for a minister was in general written by the better analysts, a survey more often by a Young Intelligent Employee (YIE) – for more on YIE see 13.2, Foreign Policy Staff (Interview with Frits Hoekstra by the author, 1 December 2004).
subsequently the quality of the reports were better. The whole agency was more or less organized this way. Keller explained that in cases of deception – to shield or manipulate information – the BVD paid close attention, and all the stops were pulled out. An investigation was given to the better analysts, and extra sources and other means of investigation were mobilized. After 1989, when Docters van Leeuwen became head of the BVD, this approach became the official paradigm. What is described by Wilensky, as a more or less an unintentional socio-organizational process – in which the urgency functions as the catalyst to overcome information pathologies – was, at the BVD, an intentional structure to organize work in the case of deception by an opponent. These Wilensky/Keller mechanisms provide an explanation concerning the differences in quality in the 1981-survey between the section on MANE and the section on Red Youth/Red Help. Fewer mistakes were made about groups that followed a strong policy of deception, because more means were allocated and generally, the better analyst worked on it.

Different echelons of analysts at the BVD apparently contributed to the (initial material of the) 1981-survey. In chapter 10 and 11, the different ways of analyzing led to different results. By focusing on the amount of text reserved for different groups, it is possible to conclude that the agency actually wrote about MANE (43%), by far the largest sub-item of the text. By looking at the quality of the information presented, the vast majority of mistakes and inaccuracies were made about MANE. This means that the group that received the most attention was actually represented the least adequately of all the groups described. This seems contradictory. Plurality in research approaches may lead to contradictory conclusions, but should, at the same time, lead to a solution, which explains a better understanding of the exact causal process. In the case of the BVD-survey the contradictory results on MANE (most attention, least adequately described) could most likely be explained by the Wilensky/Keller-mechanisms – MANE was not the object of investigation. Only the less prominent analysts at the agency dealt with MANE, and the stops were not pulled out as they were in the case of Red Youth/Red Help. MANE probably received a lot of attention because a less prominent analyst wrote the survey, someone who did not know how to compose a report. The role of Van Steenis inside MANE was also represented poorly. The whole issue of Van Steenis being active in MANE apparently was not one of the core issues of the BVD at that time.

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62 Interview with Peter Keller by the author, 28 November 2003.
63 Wilensky, Organizational Intelligence, 1967, 77.
64 If an organization becomes crisis-oriented, Wilensky expects the effects of urgency on intelligence may be modified (Wilensky, Organizational Intelligence, 1967, 81).
66 An undisclosed source stated the report was written by a so-called Young Intelligent Employee (YIE) – for more on YIE see 13.2, Foreign Policy Staff.
Agents and deception

To some extent, the issue of agents and deception was discussed in 10.2.1. Here, some additional comments are made. Observation by agents was an important instrument for the BVD in coping with Red Youth/Red Help. Also years afterwards, former members were still being observed by agents.

Embedded in the employment of agents is a risk of deception. Agents can be part of an operation in which it finally becomes unclear as to which activities are authentic to the target under observation, and which have been manipulated by the operation. Such operations often serve other goals:

‘For example, the recruitment of informants is not only aimed at obtaining information, but a subsidiary goal is also to raise suspicion and to make activists reserved, sometimes it is even the only goal. This has a “cooling-off” effect,” for example political commitment in a peace movement is discouraged.’

More in general active measures of feeding disinformation are used to put an opponent on the wrong track, to provoke them, or to carry out a false flag operation. As noted, former Red Youth-members are of the opinion that their Greek and Portuguese contacts were false flag operations, established by agencies of these countries. Agents served this function.

As a result of different possible security goals, or when an agent acted on its own authority, operations may affect the course of the objects of the investigation. These new developments – that would have been absent if there was no operation – can be of such a nature that they in turn could be described as a threat.

How would this become clear in reports? Many examples of provocations are known, in which the original activities were upgraded, or in which activists were provoked to commit actions that they did not have in mind. BVD-officials denied again and again that provocation was a policy of the agency. Although

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67 For example, in 1982 two agents – Ine van den Akker and Fred van Dijk – were asked to observe Evert van den Berg and Theo Engelen, who were then active for the PSP at Eindhoven. In the past, both Van den Berg and Engelen had been Red Help-activists (Lower House, session 1981-1982, appendix 2027-2028. Questions 28 April 1982; answer 17 May 1982. Proceedings Lower House, 3 December 1981, 788. NRC Handelsblad, 28 April 1982; De Groene Amsterdammer, 28 April 1982; Trouw, 29 April 1982; de Volkskrant, 29 April 1982; Vrij Nederland, 1 May 1982; Dekkers & Dijksman, ‘n Hollandse stadsguerrilla, 1988, 13, 19, 28, 64, 87, 90-91, 101, 103).

68 Another example: In 1979 at a School of Social Work in Den Bosch, there was a group studying the theory of encirclement by Lin Piao. This group had been evolved out of the Red Youth and was monitored through agents (De Groene Amsterdammer, 10 October 1979. See also: Welzijnsweekblad, 5 October 1979, 17).

69 Peter Klerks in: de Volkskrant, 10 November 1990.

70 Agent love – the phenomenon that a agent runner experiences criticism on his agent as criticism on himself – also may hinder the view on such new courses.

71 Examples of such activities by the agents and provoqueurs Lex Hester, Cees van Lieshout, and John Wood/Gardiner are presented in: De Valk, De BVD en inlichtingenrapportages, 1996, 72-77, 223-236.

72 Hoekstra, In dienst van de BVD, 2004, 97. The then head of the BVD Arthur Docters van Leeuwen reacted in VPRO, Argos, 21 May 1993:
this position is very likely to be true, its agents did repeatedly carry out provocations. There was a lack (of means) to control such agents. At the BVD, there was an absence of mechanisms to stop excesses.

One example concerns the already mentioned Cees van Lieshout, who was active in groups such as the Red Resistance Front in which former members of Red Youth and Red Help took part (10.2.1). In March 1980, there was a controversial eviction of a squat in Nijmegen which involved four female squatters who had wide political support. Agent Van Lieshout, arrived on the scene and tried to escalate the situation. After the eviction, Mayor Hermsen informed the town council that the squatters wanted to place iron wires on the premises at the height of the neck. However, this was one of Van Lieshout’s ideas for booby traps that was not taken over by the squatters. The briefing by Mayor Hermsen did not describe the authentic developments, but instead the failed manipulations of an agent and a provocateur active for the BVD. In methodological terms, this provocation created an artifact.

In such situations, agencies no longer report on the authentic developments of a movement, but rather on a new reality manipulated by an agent. Policy makers – reading an intelligence and security agency report – are not able to perceive the extent to which reports of one agency is influenced by, or is an effect of the actions of an agency. This can lead to self-serving reports, and even to self-deception. It is possible to maintain that provocation was not the policy of the BVD, but if the agent had not been present, the provocation would have been absent. This conclusion remains principled, even if the agent carried out this provocation on his own authority.

In general, there was criticism on the way operations were carried out. In 1989, the management consultation agency Andersson, Elffers & Felix wrote in its report:

‘[...] it is insufficiently anticipated and steered to reach a particular result. Subsequently, operations receive an irresponsible amount of autonomy (l’art pour l’art). In addition, results tend to too often shape chance hits [...]’

‘To incite to violence is inconceivable. For the rest, we do sometimes have problems that resembles problems that undercover agents have in drugs trade (...). That type of problem ‘it should not be provocation,’ we also know (...). That do is a clear answer. We are not provocateurs.’

This does not exclude the possibility that some BVD-officials, as Leijendekker, might have pushed things too far sometimes.

Hoekstra, In dienst van de BVD, 2004, 40.

In relation with his activities in the Red Resistance Front, Van Lieshout was in touch with the German terrorist scene. It is possible, he played to some extent a role in the arrest of a few of them (OBIV, Operatie Homerus, 82-88, 181).

OBIV, Operatie Homerus, 1998, 105. In the case of agent and (not on behalf of the BVD) provocateur Wood – who was in a few instances paid by the BVD – his activity could be traced back in a report by the former Air Force Intelligence Agency – (in Dutch: Luchtmacht Inlichtingendienst, LUID), in its report ISAM 6/84 – Appendix E, of chapter IV (For more: De Valk, De BVD en inlichtingenrapportages, 1996, 74-77).

Hypotheses

The inner circles of Red Youth/Red Help carried out a policy of deception against the BVD and other security forces. It triggered special attention at the BVD. Such a policy was absent at MANE. In the survey, the section focusing on MANE was of a poorer quality than the section on Red Youth/Red Help because MANE did not trigger additional activities – including the use of a better analyst to write the survey.

In 3.3, two hypotheses were developed in relation to deception and quality

**HYPOTHESIS 4:** If an opponent has a policy of deception – disconnected from the fact if this is or is not discovered by your agency – this will influence the quality of your analysis in a negative way.

**HYPOTHESIS 5:** If an opponent has a policy of deception – and this policy of deception is discovered – this will trigger off such additional or different activities within your agency, that in the end better analyses are produced than if the opponent did not employ a policy of deception.

In the material investigated, there is a strong support for hypothesis 5. In the case of the SRB this was mainly caused by the more unintentional socio-organizational mechanisms as described by Wilensky, which at the BVD this was the result of an intentional policy of how to organize work in the case of deception (Keller). Intentional or unintentional, the Wilensky/Keller mechanisms in both case studies, additional and different activities were generated at the agencies in response to a policy of deception by an opponent.

Some effects of Wilensky’s big policy decision (3.3) can also be traced in the case of deception. Deception led to the mobilization of new resources and to an improved information flow – that in the end led to an analyses of a higher quality. Discovering deception appears to some extent to activate high-quality intelligence. The urgency caused by the discovery of deception appears to shape many decisions and frees the flow of information. In short, the discovery of deception triggered some of the elements Wilensky mentioned – but at the BVD this was an intentional policy.

**13.1.3 Other factors**

In this section, other factors, in which less material was obtained, are discussed that may have influenced the quality of the reports.

The elements identified concerning motivation are not consistent. In a reworked version of the report, for parliament, by Andersson, Elffers & Felix the minister
added that the characteristics of BVD-officials included loyalty to the agency, sense of responsibility, and devotion to the job\textsuperscript{78} - highly motivated personnel.

Some of the conditions, however, were such that it apparently had a negative effect on motivation. In an article from the quarterly survey of 1981, the agency made a comment regarding privacy within the (positive) vetting procedure. The BVD wrote that for the classification of data, it had to be certain it is ‘in accordance with the interest of the document contents and the security of the State. Too much or incorrect classified data often has a disastrous influence on motivation.’\textsuperscript{79} At the same time, in contrast, the agency was on the leading edge, world-wide, with its automated filing system.\textsuperscript{80}

The management could have influenced motivation in a negative way. During the period when Aart Blom was head of the BVD, and Kees de Kloet head of Directorate B, there was a complaint that there was a lack of flair and energy at the level of management. There are serious indications that qualified personnel may have chosen therefore to leave the agency.\textsuperscript{81} Furthermore, instruments were not used sufficiently to reward motivated personnel that distinguished themselves positively.\textsuperscript{82} Insiders characterized the situation, at the BVD at the end of the 1980’s, as ‘rather desolate.’\textsuperscript{83}

Although different elements of influence on motivation can be traced, no information was found concerning its effect on the quality of reports.

At the agency, wages were higher than those of officials, in a comparable position, elsewhere. There was also compensation for irregular times, extra rewards for agent runners, and personnel could retire early.\textsuperscript{84} This so-called ‘BVD-plus’ system hampered that personnel would apply for a job outside the agency,\textsuperscript{85} albeit this was an actual aim of this system in order to keep the number of insiders as limited as possible.\textsuperscript{86} In turn, the lack of circulation may have hindered the recruitment of new higher educated personnel. Nevertheless, information is lacking to make a conclusive statement on the relationship between payment and quality of reports.

Size does not appear to influence the quality of analyses. A small section, such as the Foreign Policy Staff, produced high quality reports. At the small Department E IX, however, the quality of a report could be poor. It depended on the quality of the employee in question. The composition of personnel at this department was characterized as ‘mishmash.’ In one report, an employee from this department claimed to have had ‘a good an informative conversation’ with

\textsuperscript{78} Lower House, session 1990-1991, 21819, no. 2, 8.
\textsuperscript{79} BVD, fourth quarterly survey 1981, 49.
\textsuperscript{80} Hoekstra, In dienst van de BVD, 2004, 29.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., 15, 30-31.
\textsuperscript{83} Abels & Willemsen, “Veiligheidsdienst in verandering,” Justitiële Verkenningen, 2004, no. 3, 89.
\textsuperscript{84} Hoekstra, In dienst van de BVD, 2004, 37-28.
the deaf-and-dumb landlady of a BVD-target.\textsuperscript{87} A large section, such as Directorate B, was very likely to produce both high and low quality reports.

There are indications that up to 1980 personnel were recruited and judged on its reliability, rather than quality.\textsuperscript{88} A network factor can also be traced. For years, those from the Group Albrecht, a resistance group from World War II, dominated management.\textsuperscript{89}

In addition, there were some problems in recruiting high quality personnel. Former head of the BVD – Sinnighe Damsté – once characterized a large number of his personnel, who had earlier worked in the Dutch colonies, as ‘driftwood from overseas.’ Some others, who had been active in the Dutch resistance during World War II, actually did not fit into normal society anymore. Furthermore, those who had not completed their study had to bridge the gap created by a lack of academics. Only after 1989, the policy that officials needed to be academics was established.\textsuperscript{90}

At the BVD, a muddling through policy that was carried out, for too long, towards personnel did not function well. This hampered the possibility to attract good quality personnel\textsuperscript{91}

The BVD had its own six-week basic education program. Although the level was acceptable, the period was too short to typify it as an in-depth knowledge course. Special courses primarily focused on issues such as running agents and practical exercises.\textsuperscript{92} In general, training courses were limited to a certain function. It has been said that management paid too little attention to training courses outside this framework.\textsuperscript{93}

To summarize, there is no consistent outcome, or a lack of information concerning most factors discussed – that is motivation, (high) wages, or size of a section. The relationship of these factors with the quality of reports appears to be weak.

Recruitment and personnel policies, in addition to the reward system, in general, do not appear to have contributed to the well functioning of the agency. Nevertheless, their relationship with the quality of reports could not be established.

One factor did have a clear and direct relation with the quality of a report – the skills of the official in question.

\textsuperscript{87} Hoekstra, \textit{In dienst van de BVD}, 2004, 28.
\textsuperscript{88} \textit{Ibid.}, 28, 33.
\textsuperscript{89} NPS, Dokwerk, De geheime dienst, Nederland 3, 11 October 2004, 21.00-22.00 hours.
\textsuperscript{90} Hoekstra, \textit{In dienst van de BVD}, 2004, 17-20.
\textsuperscript{91} \textit{Ibid.}, 15.
\textsuperscript{92} \textit{Ibid.}, 42-44.
13.2 THE BVD AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

What factors contributed to differences in quality between the survey by Directorate B and reports by others? As noted in 11.3, the reports by others were only evaluated marginally – for their differences with the BVD-survey. This encompassed a cross-case analysis of the BVD-case study.

In 11.3, other reports were discussed – the letter by the ministers of Home Affairs and of Justice on DSD’81, the hidden factor report by BVD’s Directorate B, and reports on China and the Soviet-Union by the Foreign Policy Staff of the BVD.

Letter by the ministers of Home Affairs and of Justice

To begin with, two factors are likely to have contributed to differences in quality between the letter on DSD’81, sent to the Lower House by the ministers of Home Affairs and of Justice, and the BVD-survey\(^94\).

First, there is the issue of empathy and interaction concerning the object of the letter. In Appendix III of this letter, it is clear that there have been contacts between the ministry and MANE in order for the report to have been written. The description of the interaction between activists and authorities provides insights into what you can influence most, the actions of your own authorities. To make this analysis, a sense of empathy was present. As is shown in the Rotterdam-report, relevant insights on such an interaction can be presented, even without having contacts with opposing groups (11.3.1).

Second, it is more likely that more attention was paid to the letter that the ministers wrote than to the BVD-survey, which had possibly been a mandatory ‘rush job.’ Extra attention was paid to this letter because of the public and political turmoil that was caused by the violence at Dodewaard. What may have played a role, in the background, was the tough policy at Dodewaard carried out by the Queen’s Commissioner, Geertsema, and Mayor Goldberg (9.3 10.2.3/4) – who held a right-wing law and order spectrum of politics – contrary to the (inner-party) position of the left and social-democratic minister Van Thijn. Max van den Berg, the chair of the PvdA (Van Thijn’s own party), had together with the PvdA-board, expressed his support for DSD’81.\(^95\) This called for a careful formulation by Van Thijn.

Because there is a lack of access to sources, no conclusive information could be obtained on other factors of influence on the differences in quality. One possible factor may have been that the ministry officials, who wrote the letter, could have been higher educated than those at the BVD.


\(^95\) This support was controversial within the PvdA though. According to the board, the action had to pass off as nonviolent (de Volkskrant, 5 September 1981).
Directorate B – the hidden factor report

Some factors are likely to explain the differences between the hidden factor report by Directorate B – on Dutch communists who cooperated with East European countries to manipulate the Dutch peace movement – and the 1981-survey by the same Directorate. In the case of the hidden factor report, the opponent carried out a policy of deception, contrary to MANE, and which was presented inadequately in the 1981-survey. This policy of deception led to the noted utilization of extra means such as taps, observations, and agents. As this deception was carried out by a superpower (Soviet-block), this would have triggered more extra means than in the case of the quarterly survey, in which the investigation of the possible deception concerned mainly only one person (Van Steenis).

The whole hidden factor report was better than the 1981-survey. The difference is possibly explained by the following. First, an experienced official wrote the hidden factor report. Second, the hidden factor report was also a product that was to be exported, and therefore received extra attention. The 1981-survey, on the contrary, was likely to have been a mandatory ‘rush job,’ meant for the domestic market, and not written by a ‘top gun’.

Foreign Policy Staff

The Foreign Policy Staff was known, even internationally, for producing high quality reports. Directorate B was not. Directorate B very likely produced reports ranging from poor to good quality. Between both sections, the average level of the quality of the reports differed. In the following more general factors are explored that could explain the mean differences between both sections.

First, former leading officials at the BVD – De Jonge and Keller – both mention the differences of quality between different analysts. This difference in quality was largely explained in terms of differences in the level of education. The analysts at Directorate B had primarily a secondary school education, whereas, at the Foreign Policy Staff, analysts were educated to university level. This resulted in those more academic working at the Foreign Policy Staff. All the six to eight analysts active at the Foreign Policy Staff were academics. At Directorate B, there were dozens of analysts from different levels of education. This difference in the level of education had a deeper societal origin. From the mid-1960’s, the BVD had a problem in recruiting academics. Compared to the CIA or the NSA, the position of the BVD was less advantageous. In order to solve this problem, the BVD

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96 The Dutch HAVO, VWO, or HBO.
98 Besides analysts, agent runners were active at Directorate B. They needed to have at least two qualities. First, they had not to be fooled by the informants they ran. Second, they had to bring back the information the analysts needed. In total – including administrative staff – close to a hundred people were working at Directorate B. The whole unit of the Foreign Policy Staff was only composed of 6 to 8 analysts, plus one administrative employee to support them.
focused on ‘Young Intelligent Employees’. These Young Intelligent Employees had – at least – finished their secondary school education and were open to an academic way of thinking. Nevertheless, they were not academics. An additional problem was that the agency, in those days, was rarely in contact with academic world. Consequently, many analysts were not trained in academic thinking or in making analyses. Their limited capabilities hindered them from dealing with information and in making analyses. At the most elementary level, these employees were able to verify information. At the middle level of analysis, they could draw conclusions by combining information. However, only a very few were capable of making a prognosis.

Second, the different level of education led to a different type of control mechanism. The analysts at the Foreign Policy Staff submitted their products to each other in the expectation that these products would be reviewed critically. While there was rarely any peer control, in other sections of the organization, there was hierarchical control.

Third, there were differences in executive qualities and in terms of the attention paid to the quality of intelligence products, by the heads of directorates and departments. Directors controlled reports to external consumers, but not those concerning general details.

Fourth, the recruitment for the Foreign Policy Staff differed from that of Directorate B. In comparison, the process of recruitment was longer for the staff.

Fifth, there were differences concerning the amount and the quality of information obtained.

Some factors were explicitly declared as not being the reason for intelligence products giving rise to differences in quality. Keller stated that compartmentalization did not play a role in explaining the differences in quality between both sections of the BVD. De Jonge also supports this impression. He said that at Directorate B, when necessary, agent runners and analysts were in contact with each other. Furthermore, analysts were not manipulated to write a particular perspective, and thus does not explain differences in quality. De Jonge never experienced – neither internally or externally – any pressure not to write something. No indications were identified of intelligence-to-please.

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99 In Dutch: Jonge Intelligente Medewerkers: JIM’s.
100 Interview with Ad de Jonge by the author, 28 June 2000. For more on YIE’s, see: Hoekstra, In dienst van de BVD, 18-19
101 Letter by Peter Keller to the author, 26 June 2000. Ibid.
102 Ibid.
103 Interview with Ad de Jonge by the author, 28 June 2000.
104 Letter by Peter Keller to the author, 26 June 2000. Ibid.
105 Ibid.
106 Interview with Ad de Jonge by the author, 28 June 2000.
107 Ibid. During his career, De Jonge was in different ways in touch with Directorate B. He had been head of Department B, the predecessor of Directorate B (11.3.3). At the end of the 1950’s, he wrote – together with Cees van den Heuvel – the so-called ‘future letters’ meant to split the CPN (NPS, Dokwerk, De geheime dienst, Nederland 3, 11 October 2004, 21.00-22.00 hours). He could also be consulted when a special operation was carried out at Department B, as was the case in the affair of the man with the frog’s eyes (10.2.1).
Hypotheses

The cross-case outcomes of the BVD-case highlights the issue of deception – hypotheses 4 and 5.

**HYPOTHESIS 4**: If an opponent has a policy of deception – disconnected from the fact if this is or is not discovered by your agency – this will influence the quality of your analysis in a negative way.

**HYPOTHESIS 5**: If an opponent has a policy of deception – and this policy of deception is discovered – this will trigger off such additional or different activities within your agency, that in the end better analyses are produced than if the opponent did not employ a policy of deception.

The results of the hidden factor report by Directorate B are most consistent. The policy of deception by Dutch communists and the USSR, resulted in a lot of means being made available to cope with the deception.

The outcome of the Foreign Policy Staff is less visible. The top analysts worked there, because they could deal with more complex material than others – including deception. If an indication is to be derived from this, hypothesis 5 rather than 4 appears to be more relevant.

The cross-case outcomes of this case study supports – as in 13.1.2 – hypothesis 5.

### 13.3 Conclusion

Three effects may occur as a result of factors influencing the quality of reports – a positive effect, a negative effect, and no or negligible influence.

**Factors of positive effect**

Different factors have indicated that they had a positive effect on the quality of reports. As in the SRB-case, the discovery of deception at the BVD led to a better quality of the eventual analysis. This discovery of deception led to extra activities and sharpness. One difference occurred in the BVD case, and that the response was informed by an intentional policy (Keller), whereas in the SRB case the response was more a natural – unintentional – process (Wilensky). Despite being either intentional or unintentional, these Wilensky/Keller-mechanisms triggered extra quality and availability of means. These mechanisms can even be found within one report. In the 1981-survey, the section on MANE (where there was no deception) was of a significantly poorer quality than the

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108 Intelligence analyses are then steered toward political wishes. This is also characterized as the issue of his master’s voice (compare: Hoogenboom, “Inlichtingenwerk en ethiek,” *Justitiële verkenningen*, year 30, no. 3, 2004, 125).
section on Red Youth/Red Help (deception was present). Also the cross-case results illustrate the Wilensky/Keller mechanisms (hidden factor report Directorate B, Foreign Policy Staff).

To gather feedback from different forums had a positive effect on quality. At the Foreign Policy Staff, this was established by a process of peer review and the attention that was paid to reports at the management level. This feedback appears to develop more naturally with groups who have an academic background. Empathy was a skill that had a positive influence on the quality of a report (letters by the ministers, report by the Rotterdam intelligence unit).

Two positive effects that cannot be assessed conclusively are filing and the attention paid to a report. Contrary to Directorate B, the Foreign Policy Staff did not suffer from the many problems connected to filing that were common at the BVD. It is plausible that a report meant for foreign use (hidden factor report) received more attention than the mandatory ‘rush job’ that was customary for reports destined for the domestic market (1981-survey).

Factors of negative effect

As such, the employment of agents is a tried and tested method to cope with deception. In addition to being a better control on groups, its positive effect on reports provides a better assessment of developments and intentions of an opponent. However, agents need to be steered and coached well. If this is absent, a negative effect on the quality of reports may be a subsequence, resulting in the creation of an artifact. There is a risk that this might result in self-deception or the production of self-serving reports.

Factors for the larger part of indifferent effect

The lack of political steering and control had a negative effect on the agency as a whole. It allowed the BVD to more or less flounder as to what, and how, to report. Nevertheless a direct negative effect on one single analysis could not be traced.

Factors such as (high) wages, the recruitment policy, and personnel policy, also had some negative effects on the agency as a whole. Again, no direct negative effect on one single report was traced.

No relationships were traced between quality and motivation, or between quality and the size of a section.

Openness

Contrary to the SRB-reports, none of the BVD-documents were intended to be made public. Also from cross-case outcomes (as the letter by the ministers), insufficient information was available to be able to conclude the role of openness.