6 The case of the Shipping Research Bureau

What is the quality of intelligence reports that monitored the physical oil flow to apartheid South Africa in the 1980’s? This question will be answered in this case study based on reports by the Shipping Research Bureau (SRB, the Bureau). It is the first of two case studies. The case description is composed of three chapters.

Chapter 6 has an introductory nature. In chapter 7, reports by the SRB are tested against the criteria of chapter 5 – to discover the extent that the investigated reports meet the demands set. In chapter 8, complementary aspects concerning their quality are investigated.

As noted, chapter 6 has an introductory nature. In 6.1, information about the reports is presented and in chapters 7 and 8 they will be evaluated.

In 6.2, the introduction focuses on the Bureau that produced these reports, and in particular on the way it is organized. Information is given on its history, aims, parent organizations, and the division of tasks.

In 6.3, the societal and political context, in which the SRB operated, is explained.

Finally, in 6.4, an explanation is given as to why the SRB was selected as one of the two cases to be investigated. Insight is also given regarding the sources consulted.

6.1 Reports investigated

Which reports are investigated? The Shipping Research Bureau (for more about the organization itself, see 6.2) produced a series of written products. Within these written products, a selection of reports has been chosen for investigation. This selection is explained. Furthermore, the positioning of the SRB-report is described. Finally, some general working conditions are presented.

Products and selection of reports

The Bureau was familiar with five types of written products: main reports, surveys, conference papers, newsletters, and annual reports. All these products were published or externally disseminated.¹

In the main reports, the Bureau attempted to provide a complete as possible overview of oil shipments during a particular period. The SRB issued a main report every two years. The production of these reports influenced the working schedule of the organization. Moreover, the Bureau saw these reports as show-

¹ On occasions, the SRB produced a confidential report for a specific consumer.
pieces on which its reputation was built: of delivering thorough and reliable information. The main reports were published with the cooperation of various pressure groups. A lot of lobbying accompanied the publications. Companies, governments, and media received the reports. These publications led to media coverage, and, in turn, to many questions from journalists.

Surveys generally presented research results on a single aspect of oil deliveries, such as on one specific country. The SRB published surveys to provoke or take advantage of a political debate and publicity. Surveys served a direct political or publicity goal. Publication often took place in cooperation with other organizations. The publication of the main reports took place at a low pace. In contrast, the problem of a swift produced survey was sometimes that results on a very recent period did not allow the SRB to make concrete allegations. Subsequently, allegations were left to journalists or pressure groups.

Conference papers gave information of a more general character. The Bureau presented such papers to parliamentarians, trade unions, churches, and others active in the field of anti-apartheid. Depending on the audience the SRB had in mind, the content would change. The general aim was to promote or reinforce the politics of implementing oil embargoes.

Newsletters incorporated different aspects. Newsletters could take advantage of actual developments, as in the case of the Shell-campaign (6.2). It informed lobby groups, journalists, and governments. The SRB published the first Newsletter in February 1985 and the last (33rd) in the beginning of 1994.

Finally, the SRB made annual reports. The Bureau wrote reports for organizations that subsidized the Bureau, and for briefing the press.

The main reports are focused on to study the quality of SRB-publications. This choice was made for several reasons. The method that the SRB used for main publications was the most elaborate and systematic one. Subsequently a lot of data can be investigated. A comparison can also be made between the quality of successive reports since the Bureau published these reports every two years. Furthermore, the production of the main reports took place in such a way that concrete conclusions could be drawn. The scope of the findings presented in surveys was more limited. Moreover, the SRB saw the main reports as its showpieces and they influenced, more than any other publication, its working schedule. Newsletters had more the format of a specialist journal, than that of a report. Conference papers were different from the main reports; the contents was often more descriptive than analytical. The annual reports served a totally different goal than making an analysis. Thus, in the next chapters, the focus is the main reports.

Concerning surveys, two exceptions are made. Of the many issues the SRB published surveys on, two had a direct link with Dutch interests. The first survey focused on the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles, the second one on

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Rotterdam. These surveys are included in this research, not only because of their special interest to the Dutch situation, but also for their relevance to publicity and political discussions in this country. All other publications will only be referred to incidentally. The frame of this study is limited to the Dutch context.

Reports: positioning and working conditions

The SRB worked on a tight budget, under great political pressure. The Bureau also had to develop an elaborate method to analyze data that opponents had deliberately manipulated or kept secret. The SRB published its findings in reports. The role of these SRB-reports differed from governmental security agency reports. The Bureau was part of a political lobby that was a mainstream policy within the UN. The goal of the SRB-reports was not so much to inform policy makers as accurately as possible, but to apply political pressure on them. To try to classify the SRB in the dichotomy of the traditionalist or the activist approach is not expedient (2.4.1). The Bureau went beyond this dichotomy. Its intelligence work was political activism.

The main reports of the SRB come closest to encyclopedic data or basic intelligence (2.2.3), with additional descriptive overall analyses. The reports were not oriented towards future developments such as estimates. Nevertheless this did not prevent the Bureau from making recommendations, as for example in the Rotterdam survey. These recommendations must be seen in the context of the SRB being part of a political lobby. At the same time, the reliability of its reports was – as for all public agencies – paramount to gain influence. A single erroneous case could destroy the reputation of the Bureau as a reliable source of information.5

All staff members of the Bureau had an academic background, for example in political science or economics.6 This was useful in making a descriptive overall analyses. It also contributed to the structure of the two yearly main reports. To monitor oil transports was new to everyone. The academic background helped to develop the SRB-method. Being almost pioneers in monitoring oil-shipments, the staff members had to identify and overcome all the problems and pitfalls specific to this type of research. The researchers solved most problems themselves, but also sometimes with the help of their own network (12.1.1).

The costs and means needed to produce a report were minimal since the SRB had only one to four staff members. Until 1988, the most important sources were extracts from databases bought from Lloyd’s in London.7 In the 1980’s, the SRB did not reveal how many people were on the payroll or its budget, and did not provide information about its financial backers. In the two yearly reports,

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5 Hengeveld, Embargo, 1995, 123.
6 Interview with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 14 December 1995. The most important criterion for selection were research skills.
7 Hengeveld, Embargo, 1995, 117. Interview with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 14 December 1995. For more on Lloyd’s, see 7.2.2, ‘Lloyd’s.’
information was only given on the two parent organizations: Holland Committee on Southern Africa (HCSA) and Kairos (6.2).

Although the SRB did not reveal detailed data on its organization, accurate information on these issues was passed among third parties. When the Japanese Permanent Representative to the UN asked its Dutch counterpart for information on the SRB, Dutch Foreign Affairs informed them that the SRB reserved fl. 80,000 (Euro 36,364) for salaries. This information was obtained from an ‘application for a subsidy’ document that the Bureau completed at the UN Council for Namibia. ⁸

6.2 ORGANIZATION

To understand the mission of the SRB, insight is needed in the history of the Bureau, and the reasons why it was founded. Aims, tasks, and the structure of the organization will be discussed. Also attention is paid to the parent organizations of the SRB since they influenced it throughout its existence.

Developments preceding the foundation of the SRB

The earliest seeds that later led to the foundation of the SRB in 1980 were sown in 1973.⁹ In that year, the Working Group Kairos (Kairos) – one of the two organizations that founded the Bureau in 1980 – responded to the idea of an oil embargo against South Africa, by establishing a Dutch campaign to put pressure on Shell. The campaign did not result in the anticipated outcomes. In 1976, Kairos published a report on Shell in South Africa. It asked the Holland Committee on Southern Africa (HCSA)¹⁰ to join its initiative. This led to a nationwide campaign, which started on 21 March 1979. In this campaign, the organizations had three demands. First, they asked the Dutch government to initiate, at an international level an oil embargo against South Africa. Second, they asked the Dutch government to ban the export of oil products to South Africa. Third, they asked Shell to withdraw from South Africa.

In this campaign, composed of three demands, three phases can be distinguished. In the first phase, the anti-apartheid organizations aimed at public awareness and support. The second phase was aimed at the Dutch parliament, especially at the Christian-democratic (CDA) members of parliament, for example Scholten. The CDA played a key role in the center of Dutch politics,

⁸ From such data, a calculation can be made about how many people were working for the Bureau at the time. Foreign Affairs, Documentary Information Systems Service - Cabinet, 1985-1994, 553.12, File 466, letter Permanent Representative UN to Foreign Affairs, 10 March 1987. Foreign Affairs, UN Political Affairs Department, 1985-1994, File 846, letter no. 1218/370, 17 March 1987.

⁹ At an international level, 1960 and 1963 were turning points. In 1960 at the Second Conference of Independent African States, Arab states were invited to thwart processes that brought about oil from being sold to South Africa. In November 1963, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution, calling for an oil embargo for the first time.

¹⁰ In Dutch: Komitee Zuidelijk Afrika; KZA.
since this party was the deciding factor to obtain a parliamentary majority for a center-right or center-left coalition.\textsuperscript{11} The first success of this campaign was the passing of the Scholten-resolution in November 1979. Scholten asked the government to prepare measures that could lead to the implementation of an oil embargo, to consult formally with the partners of the European Economic Community (EEC) of this intention, and to report to parliament regarding the outcome of these consultations before 1 June 1980.\textsuperscript{12} In the third phase, the campaign gained a more international dimension. In March 1980, anti-apartheid organizations organized, in cooperation with the UN Special Committee against Apartheid, an international seminar on the oil embargo against South Africa.\textsuperscript{13} In July 1980, the HCSA and Kairos founded a new organization to monitor the transports of oil to South Africa: the Shipping Research Bureau.\textsuperscript{14} Thus, the SRB was a result of a Dutch campaign, which had begun one year earlier.

The SRB and its parent organizations Kairos and the HCSA

The SRB had two parent organizations: Kairos and the HCSA. Kairos – which means ‘high time’ – was founded in 1970, and was rooted within the Dutch Protestant-Christian community. It was oriented towards the Christian Institute for Southern Africa, which C. Beyers Naudé led.\textsuperscript{15} Kairos had an informal structure, and many volunteers supported its activities. In the 1980’s, it had between one and four paid staff members. In those days, 40% of the financial support came from government funding, and 40% from the churches. The rest came from donations and selling publications.

The other parent organization was the Holland Committee on Southern Africa (HCSA). In 1962, it started as the Angola Committee. Towards the end of 1976, it transformed itself into the Holland Committee on Southern Africa to raise public awareness and to lobby in parliament. It also gave material support to SWAPO and ANC. During these years, the HCSA had about ten full time employees, 40% was paid through government funding while the rest was

\textsuperscript{11} Van Haalen, \textit{De kwestie van een olieembargo tegen Zuid-Afrika}, 1984, 34-37. Also often quoted is a publication in English: Everts (ed.), \textit{Controversies at Home}, 1985, 215-229. For the following reasons, the Dutch publication by Wicko van Haalen was selected rather than the English publication edited by Everts. First, the publication of Van Haalen is the original on which Everts based the chapter in his book (Everts, 215, footnote 1). Second, Van Haalen’s publication has notes, contrary to Everts. Third, the publication by Van Haalen is longer (58 pages), than the according chapter by Everts (15 pages). Consequently, the publication by Van Haalen provides more information. During the research for his publication, Van Haalen was a temporary research assistant at the institute Everts worked, the Institute for International Studies, University of Leiden (Everts, 363) See also: De Boer, \textit{Van Sharpeville tot Soweto}, 1999, 272.


\textsuperscript{15} In 1977, South Africa banned this institute, which proclaimed the abandonment of apartheid.
financed by donations. The HCSA worked within a structure of local autonomous groups in Southern Africa. Like Kairos, it had an informal structure.\footnote{Van Haalen, *De kwestie van een olie-embargo tegen Zuid-Afrika*, 1984, 23-26.} The HCSA had no ties to any party or political ideology. The majority of the employees had their political preference left of the political center, but were not communists.

Both the HCSA and Kairos nominated half of the members for the SRB Board. The SRB itself was officially founded on 11 July 1980 – and the ‘oil and shipping research desk’ was given its official name: Shipping Research Bureau.\footnote{Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 24.} The activities of the Bureau came to a natural end, after the UN General Assembly lifted its – voluntary – oil embargo, at the end of 1993. The last activity of the SRB was to publish a book on its work, in 1995.\footnote{SRB, *Newsletter*, no. 33, fourth quarter 1993/first quarter 1994, 1.} On 1 January 2000, the Bureau was formally dissolved.\footnote{Interview with Ruud Bosgraaf (HCSA & board SRB) by the author, 29 January 2000.} The Bureau was based in Amsterdam, the Netherlands.

The SRB served the international demand for accurate information on oil shipments to South Africa. In the beginning, it paid a lot of attention to shipments that had a Dutch connection. In those early days, the SRB worked for both parent organizations. During its existence, this changed drastically. The Bureau became an independent phenomenon on the international agenda. While the HCSA and Kairos were users of the Bureau’s research results, other organizations, to a far larger extent, made use of the results.\footnote{Minutes of the meeting of 14 January 1987 by SRB, the HCSA and Kairos, 16 January 1987, 4.} However, its Dutch origins remained and had a role to play in later years. This especially concerned the expectations of the parent organizations in discussing the future of, and methods used by, the SRB\footnote{For more on Dutch parties and politics, see 6.3.3 ‘Dutch parliament.’} (12.1.1).

The international political influence of the Bureau was strong. This influence would have been absent – and the SRB probably would have never been founded – if Dutch politics had have taken a different course in 1977. In 1977, a concept coalition agreement was reached with a center-left oriented government comprising the PvdA, the CDA, and D66.\footnote{Scholten & Diggelen, *Vrijheid*, 1993, 146.} According to this concept agreement, the new policy towards South Africa was for its economic isolation. Nevertheless, the formation of this cabinet failed.\footnote{For more on Dutch parties and politics, see 6.3.3 ‘Dutch parliament.’} If this coalition had been formed, the introduction of an oil embargo would have been more likely. In that case, the parent organizations of the SRB would probably not have felt the need to found the Bureau in 1980, in order to put more pressure on the public debate.

**Aims**

The overall goal of the SRB was to contribute to a wider implementation of oil embargoes (6.3.1) against the apartheid regime of South Africa. According to the SRB, this could be reached through a basic triplet of embargo politics: legislation,
monitoring and enforcement.\textsuperscript{23} The Bureau wrote ‘Publicity and Action are Effective.’\textsuperscript{24} Monitoring and publicity were seen as essential elements to lobby for an embargo.

The aims of the SRB ‘were to do research and related activities on oil transports and supplies, and to furnish the HCSA, Kairos, and others with its research findings.’\textsuperscript{25} Its principal aim was to promote an oil embargo against South Africa using research findings on – in the words of the SRB – ‘sanctions busting.’\textsuperscript{26} The Bureau did the research. It published – often in cooperation with other organizations – data related to oil deliveries to South Africa. The Bureau formulated its objectives as follows:

‘The principal purpose of the Shipping Research Bureau is to conduct in-depth research, and to publish reports, on the means whereby the oil embargo against South Africa is circumvented. Other objectives are to conduct research on legislative and other means whereby countries could more effectively enforce the embargo, and to develop relationships with those countries, and with inter-governmental and non-governmental bodies which would be able and willing to make effective use of the research results.’\textsuperscript{27}

In practice the Bureau described its political goals; to deter companies and countries that delivered oil to South Africa, to keep wavering companies and countries on the ‘right’ track, and to compliment ‘well behaving’ companies and countries. In addition, the SRB tried to influence the UN and the legislation of different states. To reach these goals, the Bureau not only informed the media, but also the countries in which organizations – like oil companies, shipping companies, and insurance companies within the shipping industry – were actively evading voluntary and legal embargoes. Thus, the SRB hoped to enhance the pressure on those, who supplied South Africa with oil.\textsuperscript{28}

The research goal – the data on shipments – was of central importance. If this was neglected, the Bureau would ‘kill the goose that lays the golden eggs.’ At the SRB, this research approach was defended strongly in internal discussions.\textsuperscript{29}

On the issue of cutting off the oil flow to South Africa, SRB-research director Jaap Woldendorp wrote in an internal evaluation:

‘I have never been surprised or disappointed that the Bureau has not been able to cut or reduce the flow of oil to South Africa. To put it simply, that was not our job as I saw it. Our job was to make accurate information on oil deliveries to South Africa available to the media, governments, intergovernmental and international organizations, churches, unions, anti-apartheid movements and coalitions etcetera. Those institutions and organizations would have to make the oil embargo effective.’\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{23} Hengeveld, \textit{Embargo}, 1995, 175.
\textsuperscript{24} SRB, \textit{Fuel for Apartheid}, 1990, 43.
\textsuperscript{25} Hengeveld, \textit{Embargo}, 1995, 374.
\textsuperscript{26} Hengeveld, \textit{Embargo}, 1995, 2.
\textsuperscript{27} SRB, \textit{South Africa’s Lifeline}, 1986, 104.
\textsuperscript{29} De Jong “Toekomst Shipping Research Bureau (2),” 2 October 1984.
In this, the Bureau functioned as any agency that wanted to produce the best intelligence it could, and then leave it to others to decide whether or not to act upon these reports.

**Division of tasks and organization**

Within the Netherlands, the actual campaigning was carried out by Kairos and the HCSA whereas elsewhere the campaigning was undertaken by organizations such as the ANC, SWAPO, and foreign sister organizations, such as the British Anti Apartheid Movement. There is a parallel between statements within the CIA’s ‘Studies in Intelligence’ and internal notes of the Bureau. The CIA literature, advised that analyses and operations should be kept separate. While the SRB wanted to keep the research and campaigning separate, it was for different reasons. The CIA wanted to avoid making self-serving analyses. The Bureau wanted in particular a quiet place to work. Moreover, the SRB was of the opinion that research and campaigning could not, because of the difference in daily attitude, be undertaken by the same person. In 1983, the SRB became more active in the field of the media, and the first staff member for public affairs was appointed. A division was maintained between research and campaigning.

The SRB was a small foundation with only one to four staff members. Various groups financed the Bureau. In the beginning, financing from the Swedish government was substantial. It later obtained financing from Norway and the UN. Trade-unions and churches were also among its financial backers. An evaluation of the activities of the SRB was reported in the book *Embargo; Apartheid’s Oil Secrets Revealed* (1995), edited by its former director Richard Hengeveld and co-edited by the late Jaap Rodenburg. In fourteen years, the total budget of the Bureau was less than $2 million. As a comparison, the additional costs for South Africa – as a result of a wide variety of sanctions, measures, and pressures – to obtain oil in the 1980’s were estimated to be more than $2 billion a year (8.2 ‘Effects of SRB-publications’).

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31 - , “Future of Shipping Research Bureau,” 7 July 1984, 1-2; and Rodenburg “Toekomst SRB: discussiestuk,” 23 July 1984, 1-2. Within the ANC, Frene Ginwala was the principal contact.
32 For example: NiZA-archive, telex HCSA to Ginwala (ANC) and Terry (AAM), 7 January 1981.
33 4.1.1. ‘CIA-literature’: Other aims of the intelligence organization.
35 Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 375. During its existence, the SRB made increasingly more contacts. In the very beginning of the existence of the SRB, on at least one occasion the parent organizations, not the Bureau, asked a government for information. This happened just before the publication of the report on the involvement of the Netherlands and Netherlands Antilles, which preceded the first main report. In a telex, the HCSA and Kairos asked the prime minister of the Netherlands Antilles, Don Martina, for additional information concerning his denial that some tankers that had called at the Antilles were involved in oil deliveries to South Africa (Telex HCSA and Kairos to Don Martina, prime minister Netherlands Antilles, 9 January 1981).
6.3 **Societal and Political Context of the Reports**

What was the societal and political setting in which the Bureau operated? Because this research concerns Dutch intelligence, the focus is on the Dutch setting. First, insight is given to what is meant by ‘the’ oil embargo against the apartheid regime of South Africa. Second, attention is paid to the three Dutch networks that composed the setting in which the SRB operated. Third, the focus is on the SRB-lobby, paying attention to the UN and the Netherlands. Finally, a discussion on (changes in) the oil market is presented.

Describing the societal and political setting is important to gain an understanding of the interaction between the political goals of the SRB and its environment. The political and societal setting may have had an effect on the Bureau and the reports it produced. An analysis of the possible actual effects is part of chapter 12, in which attention is paid to factors that influence the quality of reports.

### 6.3.1 What was meant by ‘the’ oil embargo?

‘The’ oil embargo did not exist. Individual countries and international organizations – like OAPEC (Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries), OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries), and the UN – made statements and took measures. Consequently there was a wide variety of measures taken and resolutions made. One of the better known measures was the decision that was taken at the Algiers Arab Summit of 26-28 November 1973. This decision implied a total oil embargo against South Africa, Rhodesia, and Portugal. In 1977, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) established a committee. The aim of this committee was to gather cooperation from all OPEC-countries. Subsequently, OPEC-members – with a few exceptions like Iran, which joined the embargo after the revolution in 1979 – officially banned supplies to South Africa. OAPEC also adopted a detailed resolution ostensibly aimed at preventing Arab oil from reaching South Africa. These countries banned open supplies of crude oil to South Africa. At the end of the 1970’s, these countries focused the embargo only towards South Africa. Hardly any statutory regulations were taken. The countries generally implemented the embargo through contracts with oil companies, by preventing them from selling this oil to South Africa.

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37 A major focus of attention of the Bureau was also on the United Nations, on the ANC, and on other countries, like Denmark and Norway.
38 In political analyses, this decision is linked with the war between some Arab countries and Israel in October 1973, and the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, at Addis Ababa on 19-22 November 1973. During this meeting, Arab countries sought African support against Israel. In turn, African countries asked for support against Rhodesia, South Africa, and Portugal. The decision at Algiers is seen as a trade-off, linking African support for the Arab cause against Israel with the struggle against minority rule in southern Africa. De Quaasteniet & Aarts, “Money over Mouth,” *Embargo*, 1995, 270.
For more on the oil embargo against, among others, the Netherlands (1973-1974), see: Hellema, Wiebes & Witte, *Doelwit Rotterdam*, 1998.
39 One of the exceptions was Kuwait.
Nigeria even forced this implementation through the nationalization of British Petroleum Nigeria. No mandatory international oil embargo by the UN Security Council was ever effectuated. On 13 December 1977, the UN General Assembly recommended to the Security Council a mandatory oil embargo against South Africa. The UN General Assembly passed a separate non-binding oil embargo resolution almost every year from 1977 onwards.\(^{40}\) At the end of 1993, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution to lift its – voluntary – oil embargo.\(^{41}\)

### 6.3.2 The Dutch context: three networks

There were three important networks, within the Dutch context, for the SRB to take into account concerning lobbying and for the discussion on the quality of its reports:

- the anti-apartheid movement (pressure groups and individual politicians);
- the government (ministries and diplomats);
- Dutch business (business and consultants).

The SRB was located in the first network. This network used the SRB-reports to promote oil sanctions. More information on these activities is presented in 6.3.3. The other two networks were central in both criticizing SRB-reports and being the target of the anti-apartheid lobby. All three networks used their contacts to be informed and, if possible, to be pre-informed.

The Dutch government had a strong network with many contacts through its ministries and embassies. Normally, it gathered information through these contacts. On some occasions a ministry obtained or protected information in a more covert way. Foreign Affairs, for example, ‘found’ in a ‘garbage can’ questions that Member of Parliament Brinkhorst (D66) wanted to ask in parliament.\(^{42}\) Foreign Affairs also tried to cover up information regarding annual reports that had been written by embassies. A complete reform of annual reports was instigated after Kairos inquired whether it could obtain a copy of one section of a report. Dutch parliamentarians were among the target group of outsiders, to be shielded from this

\(^{40}\) In 1978, 1984, and 1985, there were no separate resolutions. In those years, the issue of a non-binding oil embargo was part of more general resolutions by the UN General Assembly. This also was the case in 1975 and 1976.

\(^{41}\) The UN Security Council is the only institution to pass mandatory resolutions (see also quote on this issue in 6.3.3 ‘Through the United Nations’). Lifting the voluntary embargo began in several steps, starting in October and ending in December 1993. SRB, *Newsletter*, no. 29, fourth quarter 1992, 3; no. 33, fourth quarter 1993/first quarter 1994, 1-2.

\(^{42}\) Foreign Affairs, UN Political Affairs Department, 1983-1990, File 64, memo directed at ‘Xxxxxxx,’ 8 August 1978. First name of the official is deleted for reasons of privacy.
information.\textsuperscript{43} Within this network, conflicting activities can be traced, illustrating that some activities were even close to being a rogue operation against their own government.\textsuperscript{44}

Within the network of Dutch business, a wide range of means was used. Pagan International\textsuperscript{45} worked out an elaborate plan for Shell – that Pagan advised to keep secret from most of Shell’s own personnel\textsuperscript{46} – on how to influence the public debate. This strategy was leaked and subsequently the ensuing exposure limited Shell’s possibilities to influence the public. Dutch churches interpreted further actions and public approaches from Shell in the light of this strategy.\textsuperscript{47} Another organization, Algemene Beveiligings Consultancy (ABC), made use of infiltration-techniques. ABC made use of a man who worked as a volunteer, as a collector of wastepaper, at organizations such as the SRB (12.1.2).

Unorthodox methods were used, in particular within the network of business. A possible explanation may be that business was not used to being confronted with its societal responsibilities. An additional factor might be that this network was – as far as it can be traced from public sources – the weakest of the three.

**Dutch policy on South Africa**

Within the Dutch context, the aim of the lobby by the HCSA and Kairos was to use the SRB-reports to influence Dutch politics implement an effective oil embargo. During the 1980’s, the Dutch government evolved a three track policy for South Africa.

The first track concerned sanctions against South Africa. These measures were not aimed at disrupting the South African economy, or at the total isolation of South Africa. Generally, the Dutch followed decisions taken by the European Political Cooperation (EPC) of the European Community.\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{43} Foreign Affairs, Code 9, 1985-1994, 901, File 2943, memo Asia and Oceania Department, 6 December 1984, no. 86/84.

\textsuperscript{44} The former Dutch foreign intelligence agency IDB (Inlichtingendienst Buitenland), for example, had handed over to their South African counterparts reports of meetings between successive Dutch prime ministers (Den Uyl and Van Agt) and employees of the ANC and resistance groups from southern Africa. The IDB was very critical about the then minister for Development Cooperation, Pronk. There is no doubt the policy of the IDB was not in line with the politics of the Dutch government (De Graaff & Wiebes, *Villa Maarheeze*, 1998, 305, 313, 320, 340, 341, 344).

\textsuperscript{45} Pagan International was seated in Washington DC, and internationally known for its role in breaking the consumer boycott against Nestlé in the affair of the instant formula for milk powder (sometimes referred to as the baby killer-affair). The organization also advised Union Carbide after the 1986 Bophal-disaster (*NRC*, 17 December 1986; SRB, *Newsletter*, no. 7, April 1987, 9-10).

\textsuperscript{46} ‘Articles in employee and management newsletters used internally should not discuss the strategy [...]’ Pagan International, “Shell U.S. South Africa Strategy,” 1986, Grassroots Strategy, 1.

\textsuperscript{47} Letter of the Generale Diakonale Raad van de Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk to Dutch participants of the meeting between Shell and the World Council of Churches, 15 November 1990.

One of the sanctions could have been an effective oil embargo. In the Netherlands, such an oil embargo was never implemented. Nevertheless, the issue of an oil embargo was one of the touchiest political issues of this period. From 1981 to 1983, the Dutch position was akin to a voluntary, but effective, oil embargo. However, a comprehensive embargo never became an official political stance. Generally, the Netherlands only wanted to support a mandatory oil embargo by the UN Security Council.\(^{49}\)

The second track was to provide support for social development and forces working to bring about equality and genuine reform by peaceful means.\(^{50}\) The third track was aimed at promoting dialogue regarding the constitutional order in post-apartheid, and at a solution to the conflict in South Africa.\(^{51}\)

6.3.3 The Shipping Research Bureau and its lobby

The Bureau put pressure, through various channels, but especially through the UN. In the Netherlands, the parent organizations HCSA and Kairos played an important role in lobbying for oil sanctions. They used the SRB-reports for this lobby. Also the Bureau had its contacts in parliament and with Foreign Affairs. Though the SRB also influenced many other countries, the focus of this section is on the Dutch context.

Through the United Nations

The Bureau tried to put pressure on governments through the UN, including the Netherlands. The UN played a crucial role in the existence of the SRB. From beginning to end, the SRB and the UN were in touch which each other, especially through the UN Special Committee against Apartheid. In the SRB-publication *Embargo*, Amer Salih Araim, the former secretary of the UN Intergovernmental Group to monitor the supply and shipping of oil and petroleum products to South Africa (UN IGG), wrote:

> In 1980 the Committee convened the International Seminar on an Oil Embargo against South Africa in Amsterdam in the Netherlands, in cooperation with the Holland Committee on Southern Africa and the Working Group Kairos, two non-governmental organisations active in the struggle against apartheid. As a result of the work achieved during the Seminar, the Shipping Research Bureau was established with the active support of the Special Committee. Besides actively encouraging activities by non-governmental organizations, the Special Committee established contacts with oil-exporting and oil-shipping states. The Special Committee transmitted the results of the research done by non-governmental organisations concerning violations [GdV: there was no mandatory resolution by the UN Security Council, but only non-mandatory resolutions by the General Assembly] of the oil embargo against South Africa to those states.\(^{52}\)

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\(^{49}\) For more on the oil issue and the impact of the SRB, see § 8.2 ‘Diplomatic activities.’


\(^{51}\) Ibid. (17895, no. 73).

The HCSA and Kairos had invited the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs to this oil embargo seminar. A representative attended.\footnote{Foreign Affairs, Code 6, 1975-1984, 613.211.45, File 5928, correspondence February and March 1980. The Minister felt the need to be present by representation because of the issue in question and the place (Amsterdam). A year later, at the London weapons embargo seminar of 1981, Foreign Affairs did not send a delegation (Foreign Affairs, UN Political Affairs Department, 1983-1990, File 852, memo (‘urgent’) International Organizations Department, no. 67/81, 23 March 1981).} Being an oil-shipping state and because of Shell, the Netherlands was one of the countries contacted by the Special Committee. Especially regarding the first main SRB-report, Foreign Affairs had to do some diplomatic overtime. In the first year of the SRB’s existence, it was the UN Special Committee that sent confidential advance copies of the SRB-report to the Dutch government. The Special Committee asked the Dutch government to ‘study and investigate the information in the attached report,’ and to advise the Committee ‘urgently of the results of the investigation.’\footnote{Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 988, letter B. Akporode Clark, Chairman Special Committee against Apartheid, to Dutch Permanent Representative UN, Reference PO 230-SOAF (2-2-1), 15 December 1980.} For a detailed insight of the reaction at Foreign Affairs, see 8.2 ‘Diplomatic activities.’

**Dutch parliament**

The issue of the oil embargo was an extremely touchy subject, especially in the beginning of the 1980’s. From 1980 to 1983, the pressure from parliament on the government was enormous. Van der Klaauw – minister of Foreign Affairs from 1977-1981 – wrote that the pressure was so enormous that the issue of an oil embargo sometimes seemed to be the central point of Dutch foreign policy.\footnote{Van der Klaauw, *Een diplomatenleven*, 1995, 302.} In July 1980, the Dutch parliament almost accepted a vote of no-confidence when the government did not want to carry out a resolution to install a unilateral oil embargo against South Africa. Six members of the christen-democratic CDA, one of the parties in government, had voted in favor of the resolution. Nevertheless, no oil embargo was established as hoped for by anti-apartheid groups.

HCSA and Kairos mobilized parliamentarians to promote one of the first SRB-reports, which concerned data on the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles. The members of parliament represented parties that were crucial in enhancing pressure to obtain a majority in parliament for an oil embargo – the social democrat Ter Beek (PvdA), the liberal Brinkhorst (D66), and the Christian democrat Scholten (CDA).\footnote{Telex HCSA and Kairos, announcing a press conference at Nieuwspoort (The Hague) on 13 January 1981, of the survey *Oil Supplies to South Africa: the Role of Tankers Connected with the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles*, 9 January 1981. At that time, the Bureau called this survey a ‘report.’ It was a kind of prepublication to the first main report. See also reminder telex HCSA and Kairos, announcing the press conference at Nieuwspoort on 13 January 1981, on 12 January 1981.} The anti apartheid organizations had a strong foothold in Dutch parliament. Anti apartheid organizations were not only helpful in giving information, but they also
assisted in asking parliamentary questions and political debates. On several occasions, the HCSA and Kairos provided spokespersons on South Africa with suggested questions. In the beginning of the eighties, Scholten (CDA), Ter Beek (PvdA), Brinkhorst (D66), Waltmans (PPR), Van der Spek (PSP), and Bakker (CPN) were provided with such information. These parliamentarians were well organized. Already in 1973, Ter Beek founded, together with some other members of parliament and anti-apartheid committees, a parliamentary information group on Southern Africa. Its aim was to consult each other on how the Lower House could contribute to the abolition of apartheid. Sometimes, Kairos and the HCSA first informed a member of parliament of the questions to be asked. After a minister had answered such questions, they would then respond publicly. When necessary these organizations responded in between and on the ‘inside line’ to members of parliament. Erik van den Bergh of Kairos prepared every year ten to twenty questions for the parliamentary sessions on the Foreign Affairs Budget. Van den Bergh spread those questions among members of parliament of different parties. One time, he was too late. As a result, fewer questions were asked during the sessions on the Foreign Affairs Budget. When Van den Bergh later met a civil servant of Foreign Affairs, this official said to him that the interest in South Africa was declining. To compose these questions, Van den Bergh always asked the Bureau if it had specific questions.

The information position of organizations such as the HCSA was strong. As noted, they prepared parliamentary questions for members of parliament to ask. On some occasions – especially when they dealt with more specialist issues – it even happened that the responsible official at Foreign Affairs asked the HCSA how he could possibly best answer the parliamentary question. On such occasions, the HCSA played not only a major role in having a question asked, but also in answering it.

Rotterdam survey

There was a special relationship between the municipality of Rotterdam and the SRB. First, the harbor of Rotterdam was by far the biggest in the Netherlands, and therefore of central importance of possible oil deliveries to South Africa. Second,
Foreign Affairs saw Rotterdam as an important spot market for oil.\(^{62}\) Third, the municipality of Rotterdam asked the SRB – simultaneously with the Erasmus University of Rotterdam – to investigate trade links between Rotterdam and South Africa.\(^{63}\) The SRB focused on oil deliveries. The municipality asked the Department of International Economic Relations of the Erasmus University to investigate the effects on Dutch employment if it stopped oil shipments to South Africa.\(^{64}\) Both documents were presented to the municipality during the summer of 1985. In October 1985, these documents were made public. A public discussion of both documents followed. A central finding of the SRB was the sharp decline of oil shipments to South Africa. In 1979-1980, Rotterdam harbor covered 9-10% of all oil imports to South Africa. During the following years this import declined sharply: 4 shipments in 1982 (3, 6% of the total import); 1 in 1983 (0, 5%); and none in 1984.\(^{65}\)

Foreign Affairs took notice of SRB’s-activities for the municipality of Rotterdam. On 14 October 1985, the conservative liberal Weisglas (VVD) asked parliamentary questions concerning these.\(^{66}\) A couple of days earlier, the social democratic mayor of Rotterdam, Bram Peper, and the Christian democratic Minister of Foreign Affairs Van den Broek, were in touch with each other. The mayor wanted to consult the minister.\(^{67}\) Foreign Affairs knew Peper was not a supporter of unilateral sanctions and quoted him: ‘later, nobody will remember why, but that Rotterdam has taken measures based on political reasons.’ Foreign Affairs only wanted measures if they were supported with sufficient international backing. The ministry also wondered whether the decline in oil shipments was a result of the monitoring activities of the SRB. In an internal memo, Foreign Affairs suggested Rotterdam could express its solidarity with the black population by, for example, giving ‘black artists the opportunity to demonstrate in Rotterdam their abilities of expression.’\(^{68}\) Foreign Affairs did not feel at ease with the activities of Rotterdam. As de Volkskrant published an article titled ‘Rotterdam wants to slow down trans shipments of oil to South Africa,’ an official reacted in a handwritten memo:

‘I am wondering how the municipality of Rotterdam conceives all this. In the reply to the letter of the minister, it has to be made clear there is no role at all for the municipality of Rotterdam in

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\(^{62}\) Foreign Affairs, Code 6, 1975-1984, 613.211.45, File 5927, telex Foreign Affairs/Press Service, no. 372687/662626, 1 November 1979. ‘Many observers associate the spot market with the large Rotterdam entrepôt, but the market is not physically located in any one place’ (Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 7 March 1983, supplement page 2).

\(^{63}\) Rotterdam commissioned this research after a successful lobby of local and national anti-apartheid groups.

\(^{64}\) SRB, Olieleveranties aan Zuid-Afrika, 1985, 9.

\(^{65}\) Ibid., 32, 33.

\(^{66}\) Parliamentary questions by Weisglas, Lower House, 14 October 1985.


this, and where the Netherlands has concluded a unilateral oil-boycott is legally not possible, all
the more so Rotterdam can only make a fool of itself.'

Mayor Peper informed the minister regarding the contacts Rotterdam had with
Hamburg and Bremen, and also about how impossible it was to organize a
conference with Antwerp, Le Havre, and Dunkirk. Peper acted this way to be ahead
of upcoming publicity, and he promised the minister to act in the same way if there
were any new developments. Meanwhile, Peper’s salutation of the minister
changed from ‘Dear Mr. Van den Broek’ into ‘Dear Hans.’

There was international attention for the Rotterdam initiative, in particular
from Norway, Algeria, and Nigeria. In Norway, the attention was caused by the
legal measures that could be taken in this country. In Algeria, the daily El
Moudjahid took up the news. The line ‘La municipalité a réservé 50.000 florins
(135.000 FF) pour cette enquête qui risque d’établir la complicité néerlandaise
aux infractions au boycott du pétrole pour l’Afrique du Sud fixé dans une
résolution de l’ONU que les Pays-Bas ont signée il y a quelques années,’ raised
doubt at the Dutch embassy in Algeria. The ambassador wondered if he should
respond to the supposed ‘complicity’ of Rotterdam. Foreign Affairs advised the
ambassador to consider raising the Dutch position to the authorities, and that he
should not make a public statement via, for example, a letter to a newspaper.

In Nigeria, the Nigerian authorities sent – through their embassy in The Hague –
a telex to the Rotterdam municipality in November 1985. In turn, the Rotterdam
Head External Affairs got in touch with Foreign Affairs. He sent his draft
answer to Foreign Affairs for approval, which he obtained. Finally, Foreign
Affairs gained control over the activities of Rotterdam.

The SRB-survey of 1985 was not the first publication that focused on
Rotterdam. In November 1982, the SRB presented the survey Het olie-embargo
tegen Zuid-Afrika en de rol van Rotterdam as a syllabus for a lecture at the
Erasmus University. In this survey, the Bureau unveiled detailed information on
oil deliveries from Rotterdam to South Africa during 1980 and 1981.

Afterwards, a series of talks took place between the SRB and the City Council
of Rotterdam. In September 1983, after a meeting with representatives of the

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69 Foreign Affairs, UN Political Affairs Department, 1983-1990, File 849, undated memo attached to
article of de Volkskrant 9 October 1985 by ‘Xxxxxx’ to ‘Xxx’ (first names deleted for reasons of
privacy).
70 Foreign Affairs, Code 6, 1985-1994, 613.211.45, File 1562, letter mayor Peper of Rotterdam to
minister of Foreign Affairs, 27 November 1986.
71 Interview with Hengeveld by the author, 4 July 2000.
message embassy Algeria to Foreign Affairs, and Economic Affairs, 19 November 1984; and letter
Foreign Affairs/African and Middle Eastern Affairs Department to embassy Algeria, no. DAM/XX-
73 Foreign Affairs, Code 6, 1985-1990, 613.211.45, File 1560, open message Rotterdam External
Affairs to Foreign Affairs, 6 November 1985.
74 In English: The Oil Embargo Against South Africa and the Role of Rotterdam.
75 SRB, Olieleveranties aan Zuid-Afrika, 1985, 9.
Port Authority, the SRB prepared a paper for the Rotterdam City Council. This paper was on end-user certificates and discussed the possibility of how to investigate the role of Rotterdam. The Bureau expected, after a first selection, that fewer than 100 ships had to be investigated. The SRB even presented a quick method to identify tankers that might have transported oil from Rotterdam to South Africa. In April 1984, the Bureau produced a brief paper on the role of Rotterdam, ‘Politiek Café Rotterdam.’ One month later, the town council of Rotterdam invited the SRB to investigate the role of Rotterdam concerning oil deliveries to South Africa. On 13 December 1984, the City of Rotterdam and the SRB signed an agreement for this research.

6.3.4 Oil market

The oil market changed throughout the years. Such changes can be attributed to the number of oil supplies that the Bureau uncovered (7.2.3).

On 11 January 1979, Iran stopped selling oil to South Africa. This development could have given the embargoes more effect. In those years, the oil trade also changed from a sellers to a buyers’ market. Still the Bureau held the opinion that South Africa remained vulnerable for oil sanctions. The South African government was well aware of the threat of an international oil embargo. Nevertheless, in a buyers’ market, it is easier to obtain oil.

The patterns of oil supplies to South Africa changed during the 1980’s. In an internal evaluation, the SRB identified four major changes. The first change concerned the increase in secrecy. In 1979, about one third of the tankers kept their calls at South African ports secret. In 1982, when the Bureau had existed for two years, this percentage was more than 90%. A similar development took place in regard to the owners of oil cargoes. In 1979, in three quarters of the cases, the identity of the owner of the cargo could be established. From 1982, in more than 90% of the cases the charterers demanded confidentiality.

A second change concerned the countries from which South Africa obtained its oil. Until 1979, about half of the identified shipments were from Iran. Before 1979, Iran occasionally supplied even up to 95% of the oil. After the Iranian revolution in 1979, the Netherlands and Netherlands Antilles played for a short period – until
early 1981 – an important role, with an estimated involvement of 20-30% of the assessed import volume. From 1982 - 1987 between 80% and 90% of the oil originated from the Gulf area. From 1987 onwards, this percentage rose to more than 90%. The two main suppliers were the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, followed by Oman, Qatar, Iran, and, since 1988, Egypt.

A third change concerned the oil companies that delivered oil. In 1979, Shell, BP, Exxon, and Mobil owned more than 40% of the oil cargo delivered. Since 1981, major oil companies withdrew, or made use of smaller middlemen who were harder to trace. Among these oil traders were Marc Rich (owner of a network of companies), Transworld Oil (owned by the Dutchman John Deuss), and Marimpex (a German company).

The fourth change was the decrease of the number of shipping companies involved. In the beginning of the eighties, Scandinavian companies played an important role. In 1987, this changed after the introduction of a Norwegian law, banning crude oil shipments to South Africa. From now on only a very limited group of shipping companies were involved. Among these companies were World Wide Shipping (Hong Kong), G.P. Livanos/Carras (Greece/UK), Seearland (Austrian), C.M. Lemos, Hadjipateras, Kulukundis, and Embiricos.

6.4 CASE-SELECTION AND SOURCES

What are the reasons for selecting the SRB-publications on the oil flow as a case study? It is one of two cases – the second one focuses on the BVD. One case focuses on a private Dutch agency while the other on a public Dutch agency. Both focus on the 1980’s.

It is desirable to include a private agency, because private organizations play an increasing dominant role in producing intelligence and security agency reports. As a private organization, the Bureau is an example of a non-profit organization. The SRB can be best located as part of civil society. It is therefore an example of a specific niche of private agencies.

The SRB was chosen for several reasons. First, it received a lot of attention from the media.

Second, it has a special position in the political lobby context. The Bureau is likely to have been the only private agency in Dutch history that had a powerful lobby in parliament to promote its reports and its political aims. It also was a major player in this field at an international level, among others, by its role with the United Nations (UN). At the international level, the SRB was seen as the ‘most active non-governmental organization’ to impose an effective oil embargo against South Africa. As the Bureau had to work with manipulated data and

85 Speech of Anthony Nyakyi, chairman of the UN Intergovernmental Group to Monitor the Supply andShipping of Oil and Petroleum Products to South Africa (UN IGG). In: SRB, Newsletter on the Oil
within a highly politicized environment, this agency is of interest to study whether it is possible to produce high quality reports, and to identify difficulties to be avoided. Such a study on a private agency could lead to additional factors that may contribute to understanding what makes a high or low quality than when more of the same (another public agency) is investigated.

Third, sources were comparatively easily accessible – all its reports were published, a former staff member wrote a book on the organization, and for this study a full and unconditional access was granted to its archives.

Sources

To carry out this case study, information was – among others – retrieved from the SRB itself, its parent organizations Kairos and the HCSA, the Dutch ministry of Foreign Affairs, Shell, employers’ organizations, South Africa, and the UN. From all of these sources, internal and confidential information was obtained. Sometimes this included leaked material and material that was acquired through an intermediary. However, in most cases access was granted by the organizations. Furthermore, a diversity of other sources was used that provided a clue in identifying the quality of the data presented in the SRB-reports. This ranged from, for example, comments by the local authorities such as the municipality of Rotterdam, to letters by foreign ship owners. Use was also made of a range of media and (academic) publications on this issue.

A lot of effort was made in obtaining documents of a diverse nature. It would have been easy to limit critical voices to the information of several easily accessible Dutch ministries. However, the choice to obtain a triangulation of sources of information, as Shell, the UN, or secret sources from within South Africa was explicitly taken.

Although this was difficult – for example, apartheid is still a sensitive issue for Shell, and it has no procedures such as a Freedom of Information Act – nevertheless some crucial documents could be obtained (for example on Pagan, on Shell Nigeria, and on documents related to exports from the Netherlands Antilles).

Another crucial type of source in checking the accuracy of SRB-reports were South African sources. When the author planned a trip to South Africa, it turned out that South African material needed to check the SRB-data had just been sent to the Bureau in the Netherlands. This material arrived in the Netherlands after the final publication of the SRB and was never used in any previous publication. Use could be made of this material with the support of the SRB. In South Africa, additional data was obtained at the archives of the Dutch embassy at Pretoria. Also, inside information was obtained through a SRB-intermediary concerning the digital archive of a former UN-employee. Finally, two informers in the oil and shipping industry were consulted.

*Embargo against South Africa, no. 33, fourth quarter 1993/first quarter 1994, 2. This publication is further referred to as ‘Newsletter.’*
There was also an advantage in studying the quality of SRB-reports. Two former staff members of the SRB edited the book *Embargo*, evaluating their activities. A series of interviews was held with the principal author, Richard Hengeveld. He also assisted in consulting the SRB-archives. As a result, all inside SRB-data – necessary in gaining insights into issues such as analytical difficulties, mistakes, biases, political pressures, and solutions to process a report – could be obtained.

Besides this, the Bureau published reports. These provoked a public reaction by the parties involved and by opponents of the SRB. These reactions were included in checking the quality of the reports.

Furthermore, Dutch ministries are accessible under the Dutch Freedom of Information Act. The main source was the archive of Dutch Foreign Affairs. This ministry played a crucial role for two reasons. First, it was eager to check – for political reasons – the accuracy of the data presented by the SRB. This especially applied to data with a Dutch connection – Dutch harbors (Rotterdam), the Netherlands Antilles, and Shell (60% Dutch). Second, it was a crucial source to describe the setting of the SRB-reports, their impact, diffusion, and knowledge use in 8.2. For the Dutch context, the SRB-reports were meant to put pressure on Dutch politics. Foreign Affairs played a central role, as this ministry is responsible for the policy on South Africa.

For the case study on the SRB, there were no language barriers, because all the material obtained was in Dutch, English, Afrikaans, and French.

In chapter 6, background information was presented, not only to give the SRB-reports a context, but also to obtain a better understanding of the conditions under which the Bureau produced its reports. These conditions were influenced by factors such as the societal and political context of the three networks (anti-apartheid, government, and business), and changes on the oil market. In short, chapter 6 also served to gain understanding of the peculiarities of research in monitoring oil deliveries.

Finally, it may be helpful to have an overview of the main events of importance for the SRB and its environment. Such a chronological overview is presented in the next table 6.1.
### Table 6.1 Facts and dates in relation to SRB and its reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SRB</th>
<th>the Netherlands</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>World (incl. UN)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11/7/’80: SRB is officially founded after the Amsterdam Seminar 14-16/3/’80</td>
<td>30/6/’80: parliament almost passes vote of no-confidence; government promises consultation of Scandinavian countries on oil embargo</td>
<td>'80: SFF/Sasol overpays $200 million for two oil contracts; minister misinformed</td>
<td>14-16/3/’80: UN co-sponsors International Seminar on an Oil Embargo against South Africa in Amsterdam (attended by Dutch Foreign Affairs)</td>
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<td>19/11/’80: weighty Shell delegation visits Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>16/12/’80: UNGA resolution oil embargo</td>
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<td>12/’80: advance copy first SRB report sent to Foreign Affairs through UN: activity at Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>13/1/’81: release sub-report on Netherlands Antilles</td>
<td>'81: Cultural Treaty with South Africa revoked (formal revocation: 5/2/’82)</td>
<td>'81: South Africa stops to cooperate with Dutch authorities on Salem-affair. Reason: it wants to avoid publicity</td>
<td>'81: London weapons embargo seminar (not attended by Dutch Foreign Affairs)</td>
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<td>1/’81: (advanced) publicity on sub-report Netherlands Antilles; consultations Foreign Affairs-Netherlands Antilles</td>
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<td>30-31/1/’81: parliamentarians Brussels conference (attended by Dutch Foreign Affairs)</td>
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<td>2/’81: check of Foreign Affairs at Shell of denial involvement by Netherlands Antilles; denial incorrect according to Shell. Shell informs Foreign Affairs OPEC supplies South Africa with oil</td>
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<td>2/’81: Scandinavian countries do not want to support oil embargo</td>
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<td>11/3/’81: first main report SRB</td>
<td>4/’81: parliamentary debate on oil embargo</td>
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<td>20-27/5/’81: UN/OAU conference on sanctions at Paris (attended by Dutch Foreign Affairs)</td>
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<td>8/9/’81: Foreign Affairs internally labels data SRB as accurate</td>
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<td>11/’81: installation of committee to investigate oil embargo</td>
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<td>17/12/’81: UNGA resolution oil embargo</td>
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<td>’79: several local authorities ask for oil embargo by Dutch government</td>
<td>11/1/’79: Iran stops selling oil to South Africa</td>
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<td>5/3/’79: parliamentary questions on Namibian uranium; problems with resolution 283 UNSC* 22/7/’70</td>
<td>’79: start Salem-affair</td>
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<td>18/10/’79: Dutch parliament bans South Africa at Paralympics</td>
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<td>1/11/’79: Foreign Affairs sends oil analysis of Bailey to diplomats</td>
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<td>13/11/’79: parliament asks government to investigate EEC oil embargo</td>
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<td>’79: BP subsidiary nationalized by Nigeria after oil supplies to South Africa</td>
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<td>24/1/’79: UNGA* resolution oil embargo</td>
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<tr>
<td>28/1/’82</td>
<td>HCSA, Kairos (SRB) visit Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>the Netherlands</td>
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<td>25/5/’82</td>
<td>HCSA, Kairos (SRB) visit Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<td>6/’82</td>
<td>second main report SRB</td>
<td>World (incl. UN)</td>
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<td>7&amp;8/’82</td>
<td>British based ANC-, PAC-, and SWAPO-offices burgled. SRB also on list of caught suspects</td>
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<td>1-2/’82</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs contacts Netherlands Antilles because of preliminary findings second SRB-report; coordination of public action</td>
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<td>2/’82</td>
<td>Pik Botha does not want to put more pressure on Dutch - South African relations</td>
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<td>29/7/82</td>
<td>government to parliament: data SRB generally reliable</td>
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<td>’82:</td>
<td>tension inside SRB because of perceived declining of the publicity, but no brain drain</td>
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<td>’83:</td>
<td>Dutch embassy appoints social attaché in South Africa (Code of Conduct)</td>
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<td>21-22/6/’83</td>
<td>parliamentary debate on unilateral sanctions</td>
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<td>6/’84</td>
<td>third main report SRB</td>
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<td>8/’84:</td>
<td>SRB presents survey to the municipality of Rotterdam. 10/85 publication of this survey by the municipality</td>
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<td>19/11/’84</td>
<td>Algerian daily writes about Rotterdam investigation by SRB</td>
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<td>’84:</td>
<td>South Africa puts pressure on Dutch - South African relations</td>
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<td>25/6/’84</td>
<td>memo second track policy</td>
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<td>8/’85:</td>
<td>Nedlloyd contacts Foreign Affairs, fears sanctions shipping trade</td>
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<td>9/’85:</td>
<td>inaccurate ’81 list of Dutch embassy at South Africa criticized by unjust listed company</td>
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<td>9-10/’85</td>
<td>Dutch diplomatic efforts to stop import Namibian uranium fails because of German and UK resistance</td>
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<td>20/7/’85</td>
<td>state of emergency in 35 areas</td>
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<td>31/7/’85</td>
<td>Chase Manhattan Bank does not renew short-term loans. Start South African debt crisis</td>
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<td>’84:</td>
<td>ANC put on the defense by South Africa</td>
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<td>27/6/’84</td>
<td>report by Advocate-General reveals long term contract with Saudi’s (in 1985 in Dutch media)</td>
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<td>13/12/’84</td>
<td>all states are asked for arms boycott, Dutch initiative is supplement of UNSC arms embargo of 1977</td>
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<td>South Africa</td>
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<td>9/86:</td>
<td>2/7/86: spokesman Shell admits oil shipments to South</td>
<td>86: according to Dutch diplomat, South African measures are obtuse bureaucratic, and so are answers on press briefings. Central policy absent?</td>
<td>6/86: secret Neptune strategy for Shell by Pagan Int.</td>
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<td>fourth main</td>
<td>African police and army on Dutch radio, he later</td>
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<td>6/86: UN co-organizes oil embargo conference in Oslo</td>
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<td>report SRB</td>
<td>denies in written statement</td>
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<td>16-20/6/86: UN conference on sanctions and South Africa at Paris</td>
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<td></td>
<td>end 86: much activity by local authorities against</td>
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<td>10/11/86: UNGA resolution oil embargo; UN Intergovernmental Group to Monitor the Supply and Shipping of Oil and Petroleum Products to South Africa founded</td>
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<td>apartheid (LOTA), protest by Dutch entrepreneurs</td>
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<td>12/3/88:</td>
<td>87: Dutch ban on equipment for personal data and</td>
<td>87: secret Shell strategy unveiled on Dutch national TV</td>
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<td>Economic</td>
<td>nuclear products, according EPS decision 10/9/85:</td>
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<td>27/2/87: Khalifa-list criticized by Dutch company for outdated listing, fear terror attack</td>
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<td>Affairs</td>
<td>Dutch embargo on steel, iron, golden coins according</td>
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<td>20/11/87: UNGA resolution oil embargo</td>
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<td>EPS decision 16/9/86; ban on limited export (not</td>
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<td>transport) EC-oil</td>
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<td>11/88:</td>
<td>14/7/87: UN Council for Namibia starts legal</td>
<td>12/88: peace pact signed for independence of Namibia</td>
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<td>Soviet</td>
<td>proceedings against the Netherlands on uranium</td>
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<td>Academy to</td>
<td>12/3/88: Economic Affairs informs business on Mossel</td>
<td>5/12/88: UNGA resolution oil embargo</td>
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<td>Dutch</td>
<td>Bay project. No more information given afterwards</td>
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<td>diplomat: no</td>
<td>11/88: Soviet Academy to Dutch diplomat: no role USSR</td>
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<td>22/11/89: UNGA resolution oil embargo</td>
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<td>role USSR in</td>
<td>in Southern Africa</td>
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<td>SRB</td>
<td>89: abortive bombing against Kairos, parent</td>
<td>9/90: sixth main report SRB</td>
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<td></td>
<td>organization of SRB</td>
<td>2/2/90: Speech of F.W. de Klerk</td>
<td>19/12/90: UNGA resolution oil embargo (Angola does not attend voting session)</td>
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<td>1990/2: SRB gets direct access in South Africa to data</td>
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<td>on oil shipments; coverage raises from 50-60% to 85%</td>
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<td>13/12/’91: UNGA resolution oil embargo</td>
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<td>1-3/’92: seventh (last) main report SRB</td>
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<td>18/12/’92: UNGA resolution oil embargo</td>
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<td>fourth quarter 1993/first quarter 1994: last (33rd) Newsletter SRB</td>
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<td>7/12/’93: first meeting of the TEC, the government in transition</td>
<td>10-12/’93: UNGA resolution to lift the voluntary oil embargo</td>
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*UNGA: United Nations General Assembly  
*UNSC: United Nations Security Council