De Secretaris-Generaal. Een onderzoek naar de rol van de Secretaris-Generaal in het overheidsmanagement
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The Secretary-General

Each of the three levels of government in the Netherlands, national, provincial and municipal, has an official who is the first to be addressed: the Secretary-General, the Provincial Registrar and the Municipal Clerk respectively.

The positions of Provincial Registrar and Municipal Clerk in their systems are stipulated by provincial and municipal law.

However, the position of the Secretary-General in the national government is not stipulated by law, but is solely based upon the Royal Decree of 18 October, 1988.

The explication accompanying the Royal Decree specifies that the Secretary-General is an advisor to the Minister and is responsible for the coordination and integration of Ministry policy. The Cabinet had no need for an extensive directive describing the job of Secretary-General, and in order not to pre-empt future developments, confined itself to the stipulation of one principle. In an effort to meet with the wide variety of practical needs on the part of the various Ministries, the Cabinet emphasized that ample leeway should be allowed for differentiation.

Not only is the juridical position of the Secretary-General unspecified, so is the extent of his or her competence in the field of finances and legal status affairs. Powers are emphatically and by law directly granted to the head of the Central Department of Financial and Economic Affairs, and in legal and personnel affairs the Crown or the Minister is often the competent authority, whereas if any mandate at all is granted, authority is generally granted to the head of the Central Department of Personnel Affairs or to the Deputy Secretaries.

The second Lubbers Cabinet viewed the responsibility in the field of management as clearly a part of the job of the Secretary-General, though it was a responsibility that was part and parcel of the duties regarding policy development. The Cabinet did not feel it was right to view management as the main duty of the Secretary-General. Moreover, the Secretary-General is an advisor to the Minister, and is responsible for policy coordination and integration within the Department.

In departmental practice, it has been evident on various occasions that central supervision is required for purposes of:

- a responsible and accountable administration and management;
- large-scale operations such as personnel or budget reductions, deregulation, task transfers, checks on expenses;
- a clear and comprehensive organizational structure of the department;
- the prevention of sectarian divisions;
- the prevention of policy inconsistencies.
The question now arises as regards the extent to which these are the primary duties of the Secretary-General. Can he or she be called upon to fulfill these duties? Or does the answer to this question dissolve in the diffuse intermediate region between the responsibility of the Minister and that of officialdom, so that we are alternately confronted with the imminent departure of either a Minister or a Secretary-General?

It will be clear from the historical outline that the question of what a Secretary-General's job essentially amounts to, and particularly what his or her relation is to the political top and to the Deputy Secretaries, is one that has been posed throughout history.

We nonetheless see a traditional, more or less constrained adherence to the unity of policy and control. On the other hand, in contemporary thinking on the departmental organization which, due to the increasing number of tasks and powers of the central government, exhibits a tendency toward rigidity, the idea has developed of implementing separate recognizable units structured on the basis of an adequate division of labour.

In addition, there is the departmental organization which, structured according to the traditional line / staff model, and despite traverse connections and short circuits, whether formal or informal, still has the hierarchic pyramid as its model. It is an organization in which policy aspects initially prevailed but which, due in part to a number of affairs,' is now increasingly called upon to devote attention to management. In practice, this means a reinforced tendency to allow sub-departments to work independently by not only making them responsible for policy recommendations and policy execution, but increasingly for management as well. This leads to a clear regulation of responsibilities.

Working from the principle of Ministerial responsibility and consequently from the primate of politics in the departmental organization, which means Parliament can call the Minister to account for everything done at his or her department, this principle leads to a central supervision of the official apparatus.

This central supervision has a political as well as an official component, as is personified in the Minister and the Secretary-General alike.

This is why in the field between the world of politics and the official apparatus, the position of the Secretary-General is recurrently a central point in the discussion which, in an era of greatly altering views on the government and its tasks, is bound to continue for quite some time to come.

In this dissertation, the central question is whether and to what extent the office of Secretary-General in its present-day configuration, in accordance with the explanation accompanying the Royal Decree of October 1988, is in keeping with developments in the fields of administration and management on the part of and within the national government, and what role the Secretary-General could and should fulfill for the department. In other words, what contribution can he or she make toward the required central supervision of the official apparatus? What is the added value of the function of Secretary-General to a national department?

It should be noted in this connection that the function of Secretary-General can be made toward setting the agenda for government.

In particular, the relationship of the Secretary-General is a cardinal point in the official apparatus in terms of central supervision.

The history of the office of the Secretary-General is well known. The proposition was postulated to that of the central official who could be seen to fulfill to, namely the Secretary-General.

The coordinating role of the official in charge of the departments, to whom both the policy advisor, he also

In our government, the contingent of people at the head of the departments, also known as the policy advisor, he also

In conjunction with the functioning of the Executive, also known as the Cabinet, is dependent on the coordination of the Secretary-General and the same person is the Secretary-General.

From the question of the Secretary-General was stipulated the position of Secretary-General over the individuals. This depends on the Deputy Secretaries for the fact that the Secretary-General...
can be made toward settling whatever friction there might be within a department. In particular, the relations of Secretaries-General to members of the Cabinet and to the official apparatus including the Deputy Secretaries are of importance.

The history of the office of Secretary-General illustrates that again and again, the proposition was postulated that within each department, there ought to be one central official who coordinates affairs and who all the other officials are subordinate to, namely the Secretary-General.

The coordinating role of the Secretary-General can be implemented in various manners. The following capacities might be mentioned in this respect:
- advisor and assistant to the Minister;
- manager and supervisor of the department with a central role in its administration;
- policy coordinator;
- intermediary between the political arena and the department;
- person in charge of stipulating the Ministerial responsibilities;
- deputy who replaces the Minister in his absence.

The historical survey also makes it clear that the Secretary-General was not, however, granted this central position intended for him. First it were the Deputy Secretaries who undermined his central position, later the commissioners and administrators and later still, once again the Deputy Secretaries. The remedy was always the same: put all the officials back under the auspices of the Secretary-General, liquidate independent sub-department branches or make a sub-department branch truly independent under the leadership of its own Secretary-General. In practice, however, nothing ever came of this line of thought.

It is striking that from the various perspectives, policy and management elements are both called for. The Secretary-General not only has to act as a knowledgeable policy advisor, he also has to have marked managerial qualities.

In our governmental system, no political formula has ever been advocated pertaining to cooperation between the Minister and the Secretary-General. No one has, for example, ever recommended the American / Belgian system, whereby the people at the head of the official apparatus come and go with the Minister.

In conjunction with the Committee on the Main Structure of the National Departments, also known as the Vonhoff Committee, it can be concluded that the effective functioning of the entire departmental organization, including the members of the Cabinet, is dependent upon the proper fulfillment of the entire packet of duties of the Secretary-General, and that the proper fulfillment of the entire packet by one and the same person is probably unfeasible and certainly undesirable.

From the questionnaire survey conducted in 1986-1988, and even at the time of the emergence of the 1966 Royal Decree in which the position of the Secretary-General was stipulated for the first time since 1823, it was evident that the function of Secretary-General could be fulfilled in totally different manners by different individuals. This depends in part on their relations to members of the Cabinet and the Deputy Secretaries, and in part on their personal affinities and preferences. The fact that the Secretary-General is the highest official might be stipulated in the
officialdom hierarchy, but this does not necessarily mean that the Secretary-General is indeed the most influential official at the department.

The demands of running a complex and dynamic society have led to the development of a detailed regulatory structure including monitoring systems and sanctions. And yet numerous societal developments and the situations that ensued from them have proved to be unforeseeable, unmonitorable or unsanctionable. By way of simplifying the regulatory structure and improving the quality of the legislative process, steps could be taken to remedy this situation. It would seem, however, that the legislative system has reached the borders of its effectiveness.

The refinement of the regulatory structure has led to an abundance of governmental notices and pronouncements and instructions as products of legal ordinances. This abundance has led in turn to the unacceptable complexity of this system of rules and regulations. The government should become actively engaged in eliminating tasks that are no longer relevant. In addition, the government should adopt a more critical attitude toward accepting new tasks. The government should confine itself to steering society in a more global fashion.

An essential element of discontinuity is at the foundation of the structure of our nation’s political system. From time to time, the factual political situation can be a factor that causes discontinuity. However, the principle of continuity is inherent to the functioning of a government. It is from this principle that a government largely derives its legitimacy. It is thus desirable that the field of tension that is implicitly present should be neutralized by assigning public management the task of seeing to the continuity of the public organizational system.

For this purpose, adequate powers are required in order to structure the official apparatus as the management sees fit, particularly on behalf of the policy implementation stipulated by the political arena.

Strategic management enables the safeguarding of the organization’s continuity to take shape. This strategic management gives form and contents to the organization’s activities. Thus a framework can be created whereby, on the basis of common points of departure, political administration and public management work side by side to implement the policies stipulated by the political powers. In this connection, the concern for the execution of these policies should be emphatically claimed by the public management system.

The bureaucratic organization described by Weber is of great significance to the structure of public organizations. The design of the bureaucratic model is, however, of a static and centralistic nature and assumes a large extent of predictability as regards the task of the central government. However, rapidly changing social circumstances require a more flexible organization. The growth and expansion of governmental duties and modern-day dynamics have confronted the Weberian governmental organization with certain problems. In order to cope with present-day dynamics, the government is forced to drastically alter its existing organizational structure, which necessitates new steering principles for the official apparatus. A larger extent of freedom to be bestowed upon the various organizational components and the far-reaching decentralization of the official apparatus can present a solution in this connection. In addition to the classical demands, the modern requirements of efficiency, effectiveness and the transformation of the government should be formed for the duties.

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efficiency, effectiveness and simplicity should be the points of departure in the process of transforming the governmental organization into a far more dynamic one, thus resulting in an organically structured governmental organization. Recognizable units should be formed for the execution of recognizable elements of the governmental duties.

The political primate implies that the Minister can be called to account by Parliament for everything that is done or not done at the department, but that he or she can only be held responsible in so far as he or she was directly or indirectly involved or should have been in the opinion of Parliament. The Minister’s responsibility for everything officials do or fail to do is a judicial reality, although in reality it is fictitious.

It is above all else the responsibility of the Secretary-General to do whatever is possible to effectuate this Ministerial responsibility at and by the department. This is of particular importance as regards the relevant information flow to the members of the Cabinet. It also means an expansion of the democratic insight into the official apparatus, and the simplification of the structure of the departmental organization.

The actual possibilities for the Minister to control departmental actors and processes are limited. By delegating duties in the field of detailed decision-making and policy implementation to public management officials, assuming the loyalty of these officials, one can create for oneself the room required for the main lines of decision-making and policy implementation.

Thus in fact part of the decision-making power shifts from the politically responsible Minister to the administration, and there is consequently, to a certain extent, a reduction of the direct influence of the Minister. Forms of official responsibility develop, certainly internally in the organization, by way of self-administration and contract management. There is an accountability obligation via reporting back, followed by whatever adjustments might be called for.

The classical hierarchy does not necessarily conflict with these contemporary developments as regards self-administration and contract management. The political arena is solely exempted from having to deal with management questions, but without losing sight of the main points. After all, the primate of politics and the official final responsibility of the Secretary-General mean that ‘self-administration’ cannot be autonomy, and that in the case of contract management, a ‘contract’ can still be declared null and void by the political and official ‘powers that be’.

The obligation on the part of public officials to remain politically accountable to Parliament is not in keeping with our constitutional system. The public official is not democratically warranted to be politically accountable. There are nonetheless developments which, with the confirmation of the primate of politics, propagate an accountability of public officials that is clear externally as well. One conceivable option might involve the presentation of factual information to parliamentary committees, but there is also the option of having public officials give the parliamentary committees insight into the departmental execution of duties.

Also in view of the central steering of the departmental organization, this accountability on the part of public officials is not a positive development. It might be more advisable to increase the responsibility of the Secretary-General for the
effective supervision and management of the department by also appointing him or her 'accounting officer' vis-à-vis the Minister and Parliament, as is stipulated in the British system.

The special relation between the Minister and the Secretary-General has also been examined in detail. It was observed that this relation is one that is based - or at any rate should be based - upon mutual trust. In his or her relation to the Minister, the Secretary-General is:

- head advisor in a position to express a second opinion in the various sub-fields covered by the department;
- responsible for the essential flow of information provided by the official apparatus;
- in charge of policy coordination and integration within the department;
- the person who safeguards the interests of the official apparatus.

It is the task of the Secretary-General to oversee the various consequences of the aims strived for within the department, and to safeguard the policy consistency as regards their various facets. This automatically puts him or her in a coordinating and integrating role, whereby it has been noted that this role can best be played in consultation with the Deputy Secretaries. This team element develops in the official staffs already in existence at most of the departments, in which policy and management questions are addressed and strategic and coordination problems are solved. Thus the potential is guaranteed for the central steering of a large-scale, widely varied and complex organization. The top of the organization is then no longer solely of a hierarchic and pyramidal design, but is organized more as a management team after the model of a board of directors in the private sectors. The Secretary-General then functions as the chairman of this management team.

By way of a shift in the role of the Secretary-General from superintendent of finances and personnel or legal matters in the classical model of checks and balances to coordinator and chairman of the management team, the role and attitude of the central staff members should be altered as well and become more focused upon the control function and upon macro-steering.

Differences will emerge and continue to exist in the ways each of the above-mentioned functions are executed in actual practice. One of the features of the top functions discussed here is the amount of leeway that exists or can apparently be either given or taken by each organization, and even by each person, to attribute specific contents to the functions. The various facets do not remain confined to the function as such, but have a far greater radiation to the management of the organization in its totality and to relations within the organization, including those pertaining to contact between the official apparatus and the political arena.

A comparison of the functions of Provincial Registrar and Municipal Clerk with that of Secretary-General demonstrates that in the task descriptions of the first two functions, leadership over the official apparatus is not of central importance. In the execution of the function of Secretary-General, historical conditions and personal factors and circumstances have caused differences between the various departments to come into being:

- one Secretary-General is clearly at the top and leaves his mark on the official leadership framework, whereas another Secretary sees the creation of conditions...
and circumstances under which tasks can be implemented far more as his or her role and takes responsibility for coordination;

one Secretary-General clearly focuses attention on policy matters and is thus sometimes a kind of ‘Super Deputy Secretary,’ whereas another Secretary-General concentrates almost totally on the management and day-to-day supervision of the department.

It is important to consider that within the realm of the Provincial Registrar and the Municipal Clerk, integral management occurs, whereas the realm of the Secretary-General remains ‘confined’ to one and only one sector of national government. At the municipal and provincial levels, a coordination and integration facility is consequently available for all the various facets of the official apparatus, but there is no comparable facility at the national level.

In view of the importance rightly attributed to promoting the efficacious attunement of the various sectors of national policy, one might wonder whether and to what extent the Secretaries-General, either individually or collectively on the Board of Secretaries-General, can fulfill a role in this connection.

Until recently, the Board of Secretaries-General hardly played any role of significance in the national government. In the period prior to the Second World War, attention was devoted to routine matters of local importance. In the reconstruction period following the Second World War, the social component came to the fore at the sessions where the Secretaries-General gathered to meet. The absence of a component of wider import at meetings held during this period can be explained as a reaction to the course of affairs in the 1940-1945 period.

Taking into consideration the consequential alterations that have occurred in the duties of the national government and the increasingly important aspects of management and control, it is only logical that the coordinating consultations among the Secretaries-General, on behalf of their coordination with each other and the implementation of their respective duties, should have acquired a more structural character. In this manner, the preparation of policies to be discussed at the session of the Council of Ministers can take place in a more efficient manner. Developments pertaining to the functioning of the national government, as they are now foreseen, also make the further institutionalization of the consultations of the Secretaries-General a matter of necessity.

Before standpoints are stipulated as regards management affairs within the national government, the Council of Ministers might also request prior recommendations or enter into consultations with the joint Secretaries-General. The initiative taken by the Secretaries-General, as has been noted above, would tend to indicate a development in this direction. It should be noted here that in contrast to the municipality and the province, where the Municipal Clerk and the Provincial Registrar attend the sessions of the Mayor and Aldermen Board and the Provincial Executive respectively, the Secretary-General is not in a position to propose the discussion of management aspects at meetings of the Council of Ministers.

An inquiry into the role of the Permanent Secretary in the United Kingdom reveals that the situation there differs to an important extent from the Dutch one. In the
Netherlands it is not the Secretary-General, but the head of the central division of financial affairs at a department, who bears responsibility for the financial management in accordance with Section 18 of the Government Accounts Act. The desirability of appointing the Secretary-General of a department as Accounting Officer is clearly formulated in the description of the system adhered to in the United Kingdom. The idea is advanced that it would be wise to alter Section 18 of the Government Accounts Act in such a way as to make the Secretary-General the functionary holding the prime responsibility for the execution of this Act.

The status of officials employed by the national government can also be derived from the research focused upon the United Kingdom. One specific facet of the British Civil Service is that officials are appointed by this Civil Service and not by a department. Officials are in the service of the Crown or the Cabinet, rather than in the service of a specific Minister. This kind of configuration leads to a considerable increase in the mobility of the official within the national government system. It is desirable that a step like the one taken by the Dutch Minister of Home Affairs — to employ national officials in the general service of the national government — be elaborated upon and not remain confined to higher personnel levels.

In November 1991, the Secretaries-General once again sent a letter to the Prime Minister, the Minister of Finances and the Minister of Home Affairs drawing attention to the progress of the Great Efficiency Operation. The developments set in motion by the Dutch Minister of Home Affairs as regards a policy focused upon appointments in general national service for higher ranks of officials, in conjunction with the formation by the Ministry of Home Affairs of a data bank on top managers employed by the national government, would seem to have marked a first step toward changes in the position of national officials in the years to come. In this sense, the concern on the part of the Secretaries-General in this connection is quite warranted nowadays. It should consequently be recommended that a structured platform for the initiation and guidance of the outlined developments be created in the spirit of the Civil Service Committee in the United Kingdom and the Board of Secretaries-General in Belgium. The further elaboration of a structure that, in the course of time, could lead to a Board of Secretaries-General in whatever form would also be desirable.

It is clear from the description of the organizational structure, particularly regarding the interface between the political leadership and the bureaucracy top as is specified for a number of nations, that there is a relation between the political contents attributed to official functions and the relatively short term during which they are occupied by one and the same official on the one hand, and the functionary with no political affiliation and the continuity of the fulfillment of the function on the other.

A central position is occupied by a description of the structure of the 'constructive friction' that ought to exist in the collaboration between the politician bearing the prime responsibility, the Minister, and his top official.

The description of the situation in this respect in the United Kingdom illustrates a striving 'to safeguard the political neutrality of the higher Civil Service.'

In France, there are two arguments to justify the Cabinet Ministériel: firstly the
necessity for a political institute to counterbalance the official apparatus, and secondly
the unstable nature of French politics, obligating Ministers in office to counterbalance
the bureaucracy based upon continuity.

In Belgium, the following has been said about the functioning of the head of the
Cabinet Ministériel: 'L'Esprit qui anime le Chef du Cabinet est nécessairement fausse
par la nature de la mission qui est dévolue.' As regards the Secretary-General, it has
been commented that 'one can not ask him not to belong to any party at all. His
opinions should nonetheless solely influence his private life, in the execution of his
duties he should be non-political.'

The description of the course of affairs in the United States once again emphasizes
that the mode in which top functions in the bureaucracy are fulfilled is largely
determined by the political affiliation and personal preferences of the elected
President and the Secretaries appointed by him.

The differences depicted above, whereby in the United Kingdom the principle
of continuity is apparently preferred and in France, the United States and Belgium
the political tints of the top functions are attributed with great significance, do not
seem to play a role of any import in the Netherlands. There is a striking similarity
to the course of affairs in the United Kingdom. If, in the relation between the world
of politics and the bureaucracy, top officials bear responsibility for the necessary
continuity in the public administration, a likeness strived for upon the basis of this
notion is undesirable, and no further steps should be taken toward incorporating
political preferences into the process of appointing top officials. Consequently, on
a long-term basis as well, a politically value-free discussion will remain feasible about
the quality of the 'constructive friction' between the world of politics and the
bureaucracy, and will be aimed toward attaining a qualitatively high and professional
bureaucracy.

It would be wise to draw a distinction in the personnel scaling of the Deputy
Secretary and the Secretary-General at the same department. In this way, the position
of the Secretary-General as the highest official at a department would be substantively
and formally confirmed.

In addition, to promote the mobility of the top management, it would be desirable
to introduce differentiation into the personnel scaling of Secretaries-General within
the salary scales that apply to politicians and top official functionaries. The differenti-
ation can be executed on the basis of a number of aspects, such as the number of
employees in each department, the number of politically sensitive topics being
addressed within each department, and the size of the budget of each department.

In order to create viable opportunities for the recruitment of candidates from the
world of trade and industry for top functions in the national apparatus, it is necessary
to develop a remuneration system incorporating greater flexibility.

In view of the increasing significance of the obligation for public officials to be
accountable to the politically responsible Minister or to Parliament, it is desirable
to design a more structured form for the dismissal policy regarding Secretaries-
General. The introduction of a temporary appointment for a period of six years
would seem to be a good way to formally terminate the employment situation if and
when there is reason to do so on the grounds of policy-related considerations.

Proposals have been made for the further development of the decentralization
process that has been put in motion as regards the role of employer within the national apparatus. A situation can thus come into being in which formal and substantive aspects can differ from one employer or department to the next. This can mean the Secretary-General will come to fulfill a far more comprehensive role than is the case today in determining the labour conditions at a department. This means he or she is simultaneously a party with a direct interest in the packet of labour conditions and the party who bears the prime responsibility for the implementation of this policy within the department. The conflict of interests implicitly created by this situation can be prevented by instituting at the political level, in other words on the basis of consultations between the Minister of Home Affairs and the individual Ministers, a regime designed to reinforce the legal position of the Secretaries-General. The effectuation of a regime of this kind would have to be carried out for each separate department by the Minister in charge there.

Within the departmentally organized public administration at the level of the national government, there has always been one central official whose task it has been to coordinate the various governmental duties to be executed by a department. This official has solely been able to function on the basis of a relation of trust with the political superior. If a Minister is not capable of having the required faith and trust in the official who bears the prime responsibility at the department, then there is no way the departmental organization can function properly. In the Netherlands, it is not the Secretary-General in office who takes the political consequences for the arrival or departure of a Minister. In his or her conduct, the Secretary-General should be able to act in accordance with the political primate that serves as point of departure in the Dutch governmental system.

The execution of the will of the political administration occupies a central position. This execution can, however, solely be efectuated by the official apparatus if and when, on the grounds of natural considerations, the political administration is willing to delegate it to the official apparatus.

Ever since the mid-eighties, there has been renewed interest in the collaboration between the public and the private sector in order to implement societal changes. In essence, collaboration of this kind is not new. It constitutes a reaction to the societal polarization that emerged at the end of the sixties and was characteristic of the seventies, when governmental agencies and the world of trade and industry made every effort to avoid any contact with each other. The cultural climate of the eighties, the spirit in which governmental agencies go about performing their tasks, was fundamentally different from the circumstances the government had to operate under until about 1985. Far more than before, Dutch society was now focused on service aspects. Government policy was now aimed at providing facilities to supplement the initiatives taken by the private sector. In order to be able to fulfill this new governmental duty in an adequate manner, the government has had no choice but to institute comprehensive alterations in its existing organizational structure. This process has also necessitated new guidelines for control. Possible solutions have involved allowing for a larger extent of differentiation in governmental organizations and a larger extent of freedom in the various organizational units within the governmental apparatus. Recognizable units for the execution of recognizable duties have been called for. It has been necessary in this connection to introduce

considerable budget cuts, which is necessary for the government to achieve optimal organizational structures in the increasing dynamic of the external environment ever before when addressing such matters. Thus it is necessary to consider eliminating departments.

The changes described in the context of the Dutch government have had a far-reaching impact. A dynamic society requires a role for the government that is more comprehensive than is the case today. The Minister of Home Affairs has been implicated in the extent of detail to which the government is willing to withdraw. In conjunction with the Minister, this also necessitates legislative changes. Thus the government is now working with a limited number of expensive organizations and offices.

The necessity for greater differentiation in the governmental organizations as well as further diversification in the performance of the duties of the governmental apparatus makes it necessary to withdraw from the political and administrative interdependence, which governmental organisation is characterized by a limited number of departments. It is possible to supervise the governmental apparatus in the sense that a few department managers, such as the Secretary-General, who is chairman of a top management team, can carry out the tasks of the department with its coordination and interdepartmental circle of interests. This circle of interests is often designated as the task packet of the Secretary-General and, for the purposes of coordination, it is necessary to stipulate a positive attunement among the various Secretaries-General. The external functioning of the department is then achieved in the line of the task packet of the Secretaries-General, who is not in the position of the Secretary-General in his specific department, but rather by the national administration in order to reinforce the national governmental mana
considerable budget cuts as regards governmental expenditures. This has made it necessary for the governmental management apparatus to focus in part upon achieving optimal organizational efficiency and a restriction of expenditures. In view of the increasing dynamics of society, the government will have to be more alert than ever before when addressing tasks once again, and wherever necessary will have to consider eliminating duties that are no longer relevant.

The changes described above in the mode of thinking as regards the role of government have had direct consequences affecting the task of the Secretary-General. A dynamic society requires a dynamic government. A society-oriented approach to the role of government provides the building blocks for the structure of the government. As a result of the altered economic conditions and changing views on the extent of detail to which society ought to be steered, the government will continue to withdraw. In conjunction with this, there is similarly a need for less detailed legislation. Thus the government sees it as its duty to continue fulfilling its tasks with a limited number of regulation-oriented measures, with a smaller and less expensive organization, and confronted with a society increasingly subject to change. The necessity for greater austerity in stipulating political ambitions and the required differentiation in the governmental organization have led it to an increasing use of achievement-oriented agreements between the world of politics and the official organizations as well as to the need for continuing decentralization. This leads to a further diversification of the governmental organizations. Their greater independence makes it necessary to develop control systems. The unambiguous structures which governmental functioning was based on up until the eighties have made it possible to supervise large organizational units such as departments by way of standard procedures and techniques. For each of the various departments, the diversification referred to above requires a different attitude on the part of the department management or a different type of manager. The shift in the role of the Secretary-General from being a superintendent of finance and personnel or legal matters in the classical model of checks and balances to being a coordinator and chairman of a top management team supervising the officials employed by a department with its own identity and predilections requires a new attitude on the part of the Secretary-General, an attitude focused on macro-steering and on the coordination and integration of policy and management. In addition, both in the interdepartmental circuit and vis-à-vis the private sector, the importance will increase of the external role of the Secretary-General. In view of the growing significance of positive attunement among the various sectors of national policy, not only will the external functioning of the Secretary-General become more important, it will exceed the task packet of the department under his or her custody. Consultations for purposes of coordination and management, as will increasingly have to take place among the various Secretaries-General, will also have to be structured into what will eventually be formalized as a Board of Secretaries-General. In this manner, the Secretary-General is developing from a manager employed within the framework of one specific department into a manager with a far more general task packet employed by the national administration. In order to further stimulate this development, in order to reinforce their legal position it would be advisable for this category of governmental managers to develop a separate regime.
New strategies will be called for in order to continue managing the public sector in the future. It has been demonstrated above that the existing instruments of the government are no longer adequate and require supplementation. The world of politics is going to have to provide the solutions.

It has also been demonstrated above that governmental organizations as such will be needing new forms of organization and management. The functionary bearing the prime responsibility in this connection is indeed the Secretary-General, but a 'new-style' Secretary-General who, with deference to the individual political responsibility of the Minister for the course of affairs in his or her department, is the central point of address and consequently serves as an indispensable link between the world of politics and the official apparatus. The Secretary-General will no longer be able to play this role as an isolated superintendent of financial, legal and personnel affairs or a glorified advisor to the Minister, but will have to be an integral manager and team chairman, an inspiring figure with integrity and with authority that is not solely based upon Royal Decrees, but has mainly been acquired in the course of years of experience within the government system, if possible in a variety of positions.