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Political versus Instrumental Euro-scepticism

Mapping Scepticism in European Countries and Regions

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ABSTRACT

In this contribution we demonstrate that European citizens distinguish between political and instrumental Euro-scepticism and indicate the extent to which these Euro-sceptic positions are endorsed. Data from 143,367 European citizens in 15 countries and 182 regions show that political Euro-scepticism constitutes a cumulative evaluation in each European country. European citizens who are Euro-sceptic on international policies are also Euro-sceptic on joint decisions on immigration policies and sociocultural policies. Moreover, we notice that political Euro-scepticism is modestly correlated with instrumental Euro-scepticism. We explore the extent to which both forms of Euro-scepticism vary between countries and regions and to what extent the percentages of missing values on these measurements affect the degree of Euro-scepticism at the national and regional level. This contribution shows that research on Euro-scepticism to date is skewed by a focus on instrumental Euro-scepticism.

KEY WORDS

- Euro-scepticism
- geographical variation
- missing value analysis
- multilevel analysis
- policy evaluation
**Introduction**

Since the beginning of the process of European unification, there have been serious arguments on the ways to deal with national versus supranational governmental responsibilities. In fact, many public disputes revolve around this matter of responsibility. Time and again this Euro-scepticism has come to the fore (Scheuer, 1999), also indicated by dissatisfaction with supranational EU institutions and the (lack of) democratic procedures (Norris, 1999). Yet, going through the numerous studies on Euro-scepticism, the reader is confronted with the question: ‘What kind of scepticism towards Europe are we talking about?’ Indeed, it is the first aim of the present study to differentiate conceptually between dimensions of Euro-scepticism. Therefore, we will set out to disentangle whether measurements of ‘scepticism’ towards the European Union (EU) refer to one single or different latent dimensions.

Most previous research has restricted itself to exploring instrumental Euro-scepticism (Anderson, 1998; Dekker et al., 2002; Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Gabel, 1998; Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Mahler et al., 2000; Niedermayer, 1995). The question ‘Did your country benefit from membership of the EU?’ has figured prominently in this research; it is clearly linked to the cost–benefit research tradition or the so-called instrumental approach. Additionally, other research took the questions concerning approval of the euro into account or whether it is a good or bad thing to be a member of the European Union (Anderson, 1998; Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993).

Still others have described and explained to what extent people believe that policies should be decided at the national level or at the European level, thereby paying attention to the allocation of national policies to the Union (Dalton and Eichenberg, 1998; Schmitt and Thomassen, 1999; De Winter and Swyngedouw, 1999; Gabel and Anderson, 2002). Gabel (1998) investigated whether support for European integration (measured by membership evaluation) was associated with evaluation of four policy issues to be decided by the national government or jointly by the EU, i.e. political Euro-scepticism. He concluded that it was, at least to some extent, so he continued his research solely on instrumental Euro-scepticism. De Winter and Swyngedouw (1999) showed to what extent political Euro-scepticism is affected by instrumental Euro-scepticism.

In this contribution we propose to disentangle the instrumental approach to public Euro-scepticism from political Euro-scepticism. We focus on Euro-scepticism among the general European public: public rejection of the EU and public refusals to provide more legitimate power to supranational institutions to deal with policy issues. We will establish whether political Euro-scepticism can be referred to as one dimension. Then we test whether instrumental and
political Euro-scepticism can be distinguished factorially. Finally, we test and map to what extent political and instrumental Euro-scepticism vary across the countries and regions of the Union. We also test to what extent patterns in missing values mingle in national and regional variation of Euro-scepticism. Notice that our aim here is first of all to describe these phenomena before starting to explain the variance of Euro-scepticism with individual or contextual characteristics.

**Decisions in Brussels: Political Euro-scepticism**

The European Union has increased its power in policy-making in numerous fields and has expanded its domain widely (Van de Meerssche, 1990). Whereas it started as an Economic Community, today the Union’s Parliament (EP) is concerned with a range of topics as broad as those of parliaments of national states. The European Constitution is one in which various policy domains move further from the nations to the Union. Though few countries have held referenda over which policies should be decided at the European level, it is easy to imagine that legitimating the European Union in the long run stands or falls on the extent to which the European population supports decision-making processes at this supranational level (De Winter and Swyngedouw, 1999). In more and more countries, citizens, political parties and associations protest against the power that the Union is appropriating. These critics of further unification point to the present ignorance of the public, while the process of ‘eurofication’ is still continuing. Others echo that democratization processes should be given priority before the Union actively has a larger say on policy domains. Weber, the founding father of the sociology of bureaucratization, indeed would have expected that institutions with power can exist only with the legitimation of its citizens (Ultee et al., 1996; Weber, 1922).

The hypothesis Weber developed was directed towards the double monopoly of the state over the use of violence and the right of taxation. It is only because people provide this monopoly with the meaning of authority that citizens approve of the existence of the state. Modern democratic states enforce policies and citizens regard this as legitimate because they themselves elect the government; this has been labelled democratic coercion (Ultee et al., 1996). The legitimacy of the European Union can be regarded in the same way, although election turnouts in many countries are extremely low for the EP elections. Moreover, the process of European integration was initially considered to be driven by elite actions, for which Europeans provided ‘permissive consensus’ (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993: 507). Eichenberg and Dalton show, however, that the importance of public support for further European integration has increased significantly. The question, then, is to
what extent European citizens legitimate decision-making about particular policy domains by the EU.

One of the straightforward answers to this is that political Euro-scepticism is ordered by the ‘national difficulty’ criterion (Dalton and Eichenberg, 1998). Political problems that are difficult for single nation-states to solve are more likely to find support for a decision to be made at the supranational level. The extent to which problems are regarded as international is an interplay of ‘attributed, exogenous and endogenous internationalization’ (Sinnott, 1995). Attributed internationalization refers to public opinion and exogenous internationalization to institutionalized international claims over the problem, so endogenous internationalization is the most interesting from our point of view. Here, ‘internationalization arises from the nature of the issue and exists whether or not it is perceived by the public’ (Sinnott, 1995: 248). Examples of such policies are environmental issues and fighting crime. In contrast, policy issues that seem to cross borders to a lesser extent would be withheld from joint European policy-making – for example, sociocultural policies on education, health care and culture. De Winter and Swyngedouw (1999: 51) emphasize however that ‘there is no consensus on the range of problems that . . . belong to the remit of local, regional, national, European, or international governance’. De Winter and Swyngedouw (1999: 61) classify problems (as identified by respondents as the three most important) into four categories, ranging from ‘genuine national matters’ to ‘problems with genuine international dimensions’. This classification is close to Hooghe’s distributional logic on government spending. Hooghe (2003: 292) argues that ‘Europeanization is lowest for policies with the highest financial flow from state to citizen’.

Gabel and Anderson (2002) studied the mapping of the structure of EU policy preferences and the extent to which models of policy space as described by Marks and Steenbergen (2002) apply to public opinion. Therefore, the main focus was respondents’ preference for a more active EU on a number of policies and not so much the question of whether EU citizens believe that policies should be decided at the national or at the European level. Nonetheless, Gabel and Anderson show that the priorities for these issues are best described by one dimension, which they refer to as the ‘international relation’ model. Gabel and Anderson expected such a model of preferences to be dominant if citizens evaluate the various EU policies in terms of giving up national sovereignty.

Although we expect, like Gabel and Anderson (2002), that, if one is sceptical about a larger say for the Union on one issue, the likelihood increases that one is sceptical about the Union’s interference in any other issue, we additionally expect a hierarchy of issues. Following Dalton and Eichenberg
(1998) and De Winter and Swyngedouw (1999), we expect that political Euro-scepticism is lowest for international issues, because people would profit from nations cooperating to solve problems, and it is highest for sociocultural policy issues. Moreover, we expect a cumulative structure to political Euro-scepticism. So, if people are Euro-sceptic on international policies, we also expect them to be Euro-sceptic on joint European decision-making in the sociocultural domain.

**Instrumental Euro-scepticism**

Previous research has focused mainly on instrumental Euro-scepticism, meaning that people are sceptical about the benefits of the EU for their particular country. Often, this scepticism was interpreted in terms of the actual financial costs and benefits that countries, regions and social categories could expect from the Union’s redistribution policies (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Gabel, 1998). We expect such instrumental Euro-scepticism to be associated with political Euro-scepticism. Moreover, we expect that the two dimensions of Euro-scepticism can be empirically distinguished. The crucial argument for this hypothesis is that Europeans distinguish between, on the one hand, the financial costs and benefits from the European Union and, on the other hand, the extent of the EU’s political power in several policy domains. We set out to find evidence for this in each of the countries of the Union and to investigate whether these dimensions are positively associated in each EU region. Because countries as well as regions vary in their budgetary returns from the EU, we take into account both levels. Moreover, regions vary in their relation to the nation-state, which may be of importance for the variation in Euro-scepticism across regions.

**Data and measurements**

The *Eurobarometer* surveys provide us with the necessary measurements. Since these studies are conducted repeatedly, they provide a large data set, making estimations of regional variation possible too. We used the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File and selected the *Eurobarometers* from 1995 to 1999 (42.0, 43.1, 46.0, 47.1, 48.0, 49.0 and 51.0; Schmitt, 2001). To these we added *Eurobarometer 53.0*, which was collected in 2000 (Hartung, 2000). The data cover only the old member states of the EU and include 143,367 respondents. For data documentation we refer to the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File codebook (Scholz and Schmitt, 2001).
Measurements of Euro-scepticism

With respect to political Euro-scepticism, 13 policy areas were measured in the pooled Eurobarometers: currency; defence; scientific and technological research; foreign policy towards countries outside the European Union; fight against drugs; protection of the environment; immigration; asylum seekers; education; health and social welfare; fighting unemployment; basic rules for broadcasting and the press; and cultural policy. Respondents were presented the introduction that ‘Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the (national) government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly within the European Union’. Thereafter, respondents were asked to judge whether the policies mentioned should be decided by the national government or jointly within the European Union.

The description of the policy items by country (Appendix 1) and the extent to which people prefer their own national government to decide shows that respondents are least Euro-sceptic on the issues of ‘science’ (27.3), ‘fighting drugs’ (28.1) and ‘foreign policy towards countries outside the EU’ (28.4). Respondents are particularly Euro-sceptic regarding the policy issues of ‘culture’ (65.4%), ‘education’ (67.1%) and ‘health and welfare’ (67.7%), which are all typical sociocultural policies. The variation between countries is large though. Italians are most in favour of joint decision-making within the EU in almost all policy areas. The only areas in which they are outplaced are ‘defence’ and ‘environment’ (the Netherlands) and ‘science’ (Luxembourg). The strongest opposition to joint decision-making is found in Finland (‘defence’, ‘environment’, ‘immigration’, ‘asylum seekers’ and ‘health and welfare’), Denmark (‘fighting unemployment’, ‘culture’ and ‘press standards’), Northern Ireland (‘drugs’, ‘science’ and ‘education’), Great Britain (‘currency’) and Sweden (‘foreign policy towards countries outside the EU’).

Two other items of – instrumental – Euro-scepticism are widely reported in previous research. First, we used the question ‘Generally speaking, do you think that (our country’s) membership of the European Union is (1) a good thing (2) a bad thing (3) neither good nor bad?’4 Second, we took into account whether respondents perceive that their country has benefited from membership. Respondents who did not give an answer to either question or provided a ‘don’t know’ answer were given a missing value.

Missing values

The two questions most widely used in comparative research on Euro-scepticism differ strongly in the difficulty respondents experience in answering them. Whereas the question on EU membership evaluation was often
answered (only 7.3% missing), the question of whether or not the country has benefited from being an EU member was often not answered (19.1%). Moreover, respondents found it hard to answer questions referring to the policy areas of ‘asylum seekers’, ‘culture’ and ‘press standards’.

Northern Ireland, Portugal and Spain have systematically more missing values than the average for all items, whereas Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands have systematically fewer missing values. The difference in missing values is particularly large between Ireland (9.2%) and Northern Ireland (27.5%) on the question of whether or not the country has benefited from EU membership. Regarding the various policy areas, the largest proportion of missing values was in Portugal concerning asylum seekers (18.1%), whereas the fewest missing values were in the Netherlands in relation to the decision on fighting drugs (6.5%). After analysing the clustering of the items, we will pay attention to dealing with missing values.

Dimensions of Euro-scepticism

The main question is whether all the measurements of political Euro-scepticism actually refer to one single dimension. The descriptive analyses point to some correspondence between domains for which people are opposed to European policy intervention, which seem to range from international issues to specific national sociocultural affairs. This idea of a cumulative structure of political Euro-scepticism can be tested with Mokken analyses. Such analyses provide the details that allow us to see whether items referring to political Euro-scepticism have a cumulative dimension. From this we can draw the conclusion that, if one is sceptical about European policy-making in one domain, one is probably sceptical about European policy-making in other domains as well. Taking into account similarities in the distributions of the policy items (popularities), we can group the policies into three different domains. One contains international policies (‘fighting drugs’, ‘protection of the environment’, ‘scientific and technological research’ and ‘foreign policy towards countries outside the EU’). A second contains sociocultural policies (‘education’, ‘health and welfare’, ‘basic rules for broadcasting and the press’ and ‘culture’). The distributions of ‘immigration’ and ‘asylum’ policies fall between the popularities of these two domains, so we will consider them to constitute a separate domain.5

In Appendix 2, the three issue domains are presented with the popularities, together with other relevant statistics for each country (H – for scalability – and Rho – for reliability – provided by the Mokken analyses; Molenaar and Sijtsma, 2000). The results are quite satisfactory. The order of the popularities is similar in all of the countries. Furthermore, the analyses
provide strong and highly consistent scales in most countries, with only few exceptions. That is, in most countries the $H$ parameters of scalability are well over .40, indicating intermediate to strong scales, whereas the parameters for $\rho$ indicate reliable scales. Only for Finland do the statistics suggest a weak scale ($H = .36$). We can conclude that, if European citizens are Euro-sceptic on international issues, they also are Euro-sceptic on immigration and asylum policies, as well as on policies in the sociocultural domain. Such cumulative political Euro-scepticism holds for each country.

The next question to be answered is whether the measurement of political Euro-scepticism is empirically distinct from the traditional measurements of instrumental Euro-scepticism. Confirmatory factor analyses with oblique rotation on the two instrumental measurements and the newly constructed measurements of political Euro-scepticism provide clear results. The two instrumental items form one dimension of instrumental Euro-scepticism with high factor loadings, whereas the subscales referring to Euro-scepticism about joint decision-making come out as a separate factor of political Euro-scepticism with high factor loadings too (see Table 1). The cross-loadings are negligible. In Appendix 3, the solution is reported per country. These results show high comparability between the countries.

Reliability analyses show that the internal consistency of the instrumental Euro-scepticism scale becomes satisfactory when political Euro-scepticism is left out (Cronbach’s alpha increases from .41 to .69). Viewing all of this

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1 Confirmatory factor solution of instrumental and political Euro-scepticism: Principal axis factoring, oblique rotation (missing listwise)</th>
<th>Factor 1 Instrumental Euro-scepticism</th>
<th>Factor 2 Political Euro-scepticism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National government should decide about international policies</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National government should decide about immigration policies</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National government should decide about sociocultural policies</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union membership evaluation</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country benefits from membership of the EU</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File and Eurobarometer 53.0; N = 108,981.
empirical evidence together leads us to conclude that two distinct dimensions of Euro-scepticism exist.

**Treatment of missing values**

Listwise deletion of missing values leads to large losses of information. Therefore, when constructing the scales as the means of the items, the criterion was that at least half the items that related to a scale needed to be answered by a respondent before a score could be calculated on the scale. For example, the subscale referring to Euro-scepticism on international policies consists of four items. If respondents answered only two of the items, the means of these two items were calculated rather than of all four items. If respondents had three missing answers, they were assigned a missing value on the scale. This procedure reduced the number of missing values to acceptable levels (below 5%). Nevertheless, the percentages remained higher for Northern Ireland, Portugal and Spain. The fact that in these countries a larger proportion of respondents dropped from the analyses could imply that this in itself may explain variation between countries in Euro-scepticism (and likewise between regions). We therefore constructed two aggregate measures of missing values on the scales and included these in the variance analyses.

The percentages of missing values on political Euro-scepticism range from 1.4% in the Netherlands to 11.4% in Portugal. Missing values on instrumental Euro-scepticism range from 1.6% in Denmark to 12.7% in Northern Ireland. At the regional level, missing values on political Euro-scepticism vary from 0.6% in Dutch Flevoland \( (n = 164) \) to 19.1% in Portuguese Madeira \( (n = 220) \). Missing values on instrumental Euro-scepticism range from 0.4% in the French Alsace \( (n = 232) \) to 13.6% in Greater Manchester \( (n = 447) \). Although it holds that the majority of respondents do have an opinion on these topics, as emphasized by De Winter and Swyngedouw (1999: 53), variation between countries and regions is quite large. We also constructed measurements in which the missing data were imputed, using regression analysis and the EM procedure (King et al., 2001).

**Regional and national variation in Euro-scepticism**

Previous research has provided empirical and theoretical explanations of why and to what extent countries and regions would vary in their support for European integration. Most of them are categorized into ‘economic’ or ‘political’ explanations (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993). For our two dimensions, we compare the extent of the variation between countries and regions.

We first describe the extent to which countries differ. Figure 1 shows the
cumulative political Euro-scepticism dimension for each country. It demonstrates that Euro-scepticism in all three domains is lowest in the Netherlands (NL – 17%) whereas half of the Swedes (SE) and Finns (FI) are Euro-sceptic in all policy domains. Moreover, 82% of Finns are Euro-sceptic on immigration policies and on sociocultural policies, whereas this two-domain scepticism is lowest in Italy (IT – 30%). Finally, Euro-scepticism in the sociopolitical domain is highest in Denmark (DK – 91%) and lowest in Italy (56%).

Figure 2 shows that instrumental Euro-scepticism is most widespread in Sweden (SE), Austria (AT) and Great Britain (GB). It is particularly low in Ireland (IE), followed by Luxembourg (LU), the Netherlands (NL) and Italy (IT).

Mapping Euro-scepticism: Differences across Europe

To compare the pattern of both dimensions of Euro-scepticism across Europe, maps are presented that show mean support within European regions. Comparing both maps makes visible to what extent differences exist across the Union in political and instrumental Euro-scepticism.

Political Euro-scepticism is particularly low in Italy, on Crete, in the Flemish province of Antwerp and in the provinces of Flemish and Dutch Limburg. Remarkably, the region of Strasbourg (Alsace) scores at the low end of political Euro-scepticism.
too, whereas political Euro-scepticism in Brussels is at the European average. Political Euro-scepticism is widespread in the whole of Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Great Britain. Various regions in Spain, Portugal, France, Austria, Ireland and Greece score high too.

This contrasts with the pattern of instrumental scepticism, which is almost absent in Ireland and Greece, as well as in Italy and the Netherlands. Instrumental Euro-scepticism is strong in Finland, Great Britain and Sweden, and is also more widespread in eastern Austria, central France, central Belgium and central and eastern Germany.

After computing the differences between the two dimensions of Euro-scepticism, it turns out that political Euro-scepticism is more widespread than instrumental Euro-scepticism. What is interesting is the variation between the European regions. In 20 regions, political Euro-scepticism is equally or less widespread than instrumental Euro-scepticism. This holds for some of the German and French regions as well as for the Italian regions of Piemonte and Liguria. On the other hand, political Euro-scepticism is much stronger than instrumental Euro-scepticism in Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Greece, Portugal, southern Italy and some British and Swedish regions.

**Correlations between Euro-sceptic dimensions**

Political Euro-scepticism is modestly correlated to instrumental Euro-scepticism (.21). When we test the comparability of the correlations across countries, we find that the positive significant relation ranges from .12 in Ireland to .31 in Denmark (Table 2). Thus, the extent to which political Euro-scepticism goes hand in hand with instrumental Euro-scepticism is greatest in Denmark, followed by Great Britain (.29) and Sweden (.25). After Ireland, this

relation is particularly small in Luxembourg (.13), Italy (.13), the Netherlands (.14) and Greece (.15).

However, regional variation within countries regarding this relation is large (Table 2). In a few Italian regions, in Dutch Flevoland and on Portuguese Madeira the relation is even negative. Given that the number of respondents in each region exceeds 150, this does not seem to be a problem of too few cases. But, as both Flevoland and Madeira were also mentioned in the section on missing values, the question comes to the fore about the extent to which the correlations are dependent on the percentages of missing values in a region. Additional aggregated regional-level analysis shows – surprisingly – that the strength of the correlation between political and instrumental Euro-scepticism is associated differently with the percentages of missing values in political Euro-scepticism compared with instrumental Euro-scepticism. Although we should not place too much emphasis on the findings, because the correlations are (just) not significant at the \( p < .05 \) level, the parameters point to a positive association between the percentages of missing values on the instrumental dimension of Euro-scepticism and the strength of the correlation between the two forms of Euro-scepticism. In contrast, we found a negative association between the percentages of missing values on the political Euro-scepticism scale and the strength of the correlation.

**Levels of variance**

Our next question is whether there are significant differences in the regional and national contexts on both dimensions of Euro-scepticism. Table 3 presents basic multi-level models for political and instrumental Euro-scepticism, respectively. Multi-level analyses estimate the variance according to a nesting principle, and hence account for within- and between-level variation (e.g. Snijders and Bosker, 1999). In these models we consequently add the country and region level to find out (1) to what extent the fit of the model improves by including the different contexts, (2) to what extent a context is of relevance and (3) whether there are differences between the variances of the two Euro-sceptic attitudes we have distinguished. All models are controlled for variation over time.

The results show that Euro-sceptic attitudes vary across individuals, over time and across nations as well as across regions. The importance of the regional level is smallest, but including regional differences improves the model fit significantly (compare model III with model II in Table 3). Regional variation in both Euro-sceptic attitudes contributes around 1% to the variance. The country level accounts for a larger share of variation: 8.2% for political
Table 2  Correlations between political Euro-scepticism and instrumental Euro-scepticism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Euro-scepticism</th>
<th>Region within country with lowest correlation</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>Region within country with highest correlation</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>.23*</td>
<td>Niederösterreich</td>
<td>.18*</td>
<td>1421</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flanders</td>
<td>.16*</td>
<td>West-Vlaanderen</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>1081</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallonia</td>
<td>.19*</td>
<td>Liège</td>
<td>.08*</td>
<td>833</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>.31*</td>
<td>Bornholm et al.</td>
<td>.26*</td>
<td>1043</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>.19*</td>
<td>Itä-Suomi</td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td>1285</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>.23*</td>
<td>Bourgogne</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>238</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>.21*</td>
<td>Kassel</td>
<td>−.02</td>
<td>152</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>.29*</td>
<td>East Midlands</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>635</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>.15*</td>
<td>Thraki</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>299</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>.12*</td>
<td>North West</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>178</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td>Liguria</td>
<td>−.22*</td>
<td>282</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td>Luxembourg district</td>
<td>.09*</td>
<td>1917</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>.14*</td>
<td>Flevoland</td>
<td>−.03</td>
<td>161</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-Ireland</td>
<td>.19*</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>.19*</td>
<td>Madeira</td>
<td>−.09</td>
<td>178</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>.19*</td>
<td>Navarra and Rioja</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>149</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>.25*</td>
<td>Norrland</td>
<td>.20*</td>
<td>923</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File and Eurobarometer 53.0.
* p < .01.
Table 3  Basic multi-level models, presenting variation in political and instrumental Euro-scepticism across countries, regions, years and individuals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political Euro-scepticism</th>
<th>Instrumental Euro-scepticism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model Ia</td>
<td>Model Ila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1.655</td>
<td>1.657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Missing values at national level</td>
<td>–.020</td>
<td>.0041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Missing values at regional level</td>
<td>–.007</td>
<td>.0047</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[\Omega_f\] – country: 0.087 (.031) 0.090 (.032) 0.085 (.030) 0.0149 (.0053) 0.0158 (.0056) 0.0153 (.0054)

\[\Omega_v\] – region: 0.007 (.002) 0.007 (.002) 0.0018 (.003) 0.0017 (.003)

\[\Omega_u\] – year: 0.014 (.007) 0.023 (.003) 0.042 (.002) 0.042 (.002) 0.0010 (.0006) 0.0035 (.0005) 0.0053 (.0003) 0.0053 (.0003)

\[\Omega_e\] – individual: 1.077 (.004) 0.983 (.004) 0.960 (.004) 0.960 (.004) 0.1698 (.0006) 0.1514 (.0006) 0.1482 (.0006) 0.1482 (.0006)

–2log likelihood: 396,238 384,166 382,668 382,665 145,521 130,199 128,873 128,867

Source: Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File and Eurobarometer 53.0.

N = 136,050 in models a; N = 136,636 in models b. Standard errors in parentheses.
Euro-scepticism and 9.2% for instrumental Euro-scepticism. Even though the Euro-sceptic dimensions are only modestly correlated, the breakdown of the variation between individuals, regions and countries shows similarities.

Because we found that countries and regions vary quite strongly in the percentages of missing values that are reported, we included the aggregated measurements of missing values percentages to find out whether these have significant effects and explain part of the variance between countries or regions (model IV in Table 3). With respect to political Euro-scepticism we can be brief: the percentages of missing values at both the national and the regional level do not reach significance. Both parameters are, however, negative, implying that, in countries or regions where more missing values are reported, the level of political Euro-scepticism is lower. The opposite relation appears when we take instrumental Euro-scepticism into account, and this time the parameter of the missing values percentages at the regional level is significant. This means that the level of instrumental Euro-scepticism is significantly higher in regions where more missing values are reported.10

Conclusion and discussion

In this article, we have looked at the existence of political Euro-scepticism alongside the previously much-studied instrumental dimension of Euro-scepticism. We found evidence that political Euro-scepticism is a cumulative evaluation of national versus supranational governance in policy domains. Most European citizens are Euro-sceptic on joint decisions on sociocultural policies. More than half of European citizens are also Euro-sceptic on immigration and asylum policies, and approximately one-third are Euro-sceptic on international policies as well. Factor analyses provided evidence that, in all the ‘old member states’ of the Union, political and instrumental Euro-scepticism can be distinguished and that in all countries the dimensions are positively but modestly correlated.

Future research on political and instrumental Euro-scepticism should consider the finding that both the national and the regional contexts are of importance, although the national context accounts for a larger share of the variation in Euro-scepticism than does the regional context. Mapping political and instrumental Euro-scepticism revealed the different geographical locations of the dimensions. Political Euro-scepticism in the late 1990s and 2000 is low in Italy, whereas instrumental Euro-scepticism is particularly low in Ireland. At the other extreme, political as well as instrumental Euro-scepticism are strong in Finland, Great Britain and Sweden. Political Euro-scepticism is furthermore strong in Denmark, and instrumental
Euro-scepticism is widespread in eastern Austria, central France and central–eastern Germany.

The findings suggest that, in addition to empirical attention to instrumental scepticism, more research is needed to explain political Euro-scepticism and the differences between the two. The legitimacy of the Union may even be more strongly dependent on the reduction of political Euro-scepticism than of instrumental Euro-scepticism. Moreover, it turned out that greater attention needs to be paid to patterns in missing values and that indicators should be taken into account to control for variance in missing values across regions and countries because they could confound the effects of contextual characteristics.

Notes

We would like to thank the anonymous referees as well as Gerald Schneider for their suggestions for improving our contribution. Moreover, we thank the critics present at the ‘Open Minds Conference’ in Lodz, Poland, in September 2003. The Eurobarometer data are made available by the German Central Archive. The original collectors of the data and the codebook producers (ICPSR, ZA, SSD) bear no responsibility for our interpretation of the data.

1 We refer to the ‘country level’ consisting of 13 countries, as well as the geographical units of Great Britain, Northern Ireland, the Walloon region and Flanders. We decided to divide the United Kingdom into Great Britain and Northern Ireland at the higher level of analysis, as in both parts separate survey samples were drawn. For Belgium, we divided the French speaking Walloon region (including Brussels) from Dutch speaking Flanders as the questionnaires differed by language. The regional level is defined such as used in the Eurobarometer surveys and follows the NUTS2 division. For Great Britain, NUTS2 units are only used when enough cases were present at this level, else they were combined into NUTS1 units. Similarly, for Germany and Greece some of the NUTS2 regions were combined. For the Republic of Ireland (to which we refer as Ireland), the NUTS3 division was used. Northern Ireland is not broken down into other lower level regions. For Luxembourg and Denmark, the Eurobarometer follows its own division into four regions for both countries, as a NUTS2 division does not exist. The lowest number of respondents is 145 in the German region of Wiesbaden and Giesen in Hessen; the highest number is 4404 in Jyllan (Denmark).

2 We have to note, however, that data documentation concerning response rates and sampling procedures is lacking. Information from some of the separate data collections shows large variation in response rates between countries; in some countries, the rate is very low. For these reasons we have compared the results of our analyses with the provided weights (controlling for sex, age and geographical distribution within countries). The weighting did not change the results though. However, these weights do not include the more
important factor of skewed distributions in education. To account for this, we estimated an educational weight, based on statistics provided by Eurostat (2002) and OECD data (1995, 2002). According to these figures, it appears that the higher educated are overrepresented in most countries, particularly in Denmark, Finland, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden. There is, however, a problem comparing the Eurobarometer data with official statistics from the OESO and Eurostat. These offices present the typical ages of graduation. Of course, these do not match the categorization of education in years provided by Eurobarometer and, moreover, are different for various cohorts as educational systems change over time. We therefore compared the official statistics with the available data on education in years, where we followed a country-specific formation structure. Including education in the weights therefore introduced a factor of uncertainty in itself. However, the results of this weight did not deviate from the unweighted results. We therefore present the unweighted results only.

3 The Appendices can be found on the EUP homepage.
4 The item has been recoded such that the score 0 refers to ‘membership is good’ and the score 1 to ‘membership is bad’. People who answered ‘neither good nor bad’ were given the value 0.5.
5 Two items are left out of the analyses. The first is ‘defence’, on which Euroscepticism differs so strongly between the countries that it does not fit into a cumulative dimension. The second is ‘currency’, because its significance varies across countries owing to variation in the introduction of the euro. In addition, ‘fighting unemployment’ is left out of further analyses, because this item intersects the items on immigration and asylum when it is taken into account in the sociocultural domain.
6 The hierarchical scale we derived from the Mokken analysis already implies that the three policy domains are related. As we showed, scepticism towards EU policies in international affairs goes hand in hand with scepticism about EU policy-making on the other domains. Hence, the domains are hierarchically related. The measurements of the policy sub-domains were constructed as means of the items. In the measurements of Euro-scepticism on international issues and cultural issues, two missing values out of four items were allowed; in the measurements of Euro-scepticism on immigration issues one missing value out of two items was allowed.
7 Analyses with the Mokken scale instead of the policy domains items also provided two factors.
8 Computed as the differences between the two scales after transformation to similar scale ranges from 0 to 1.
9 Results with the measurements where the missing data were imputed scarcely differed from the presented data. Interested readers can request the tables from the authors.
10 According to King et al. (2001), people who answer ‘don’t know’ should be treated as a unit of analysis, instead of imputing a missing score or deleting them listwise. Additional analyses show that the likelihood of having a missing value also varies significantly over the levels distinguished.
References


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