INTRODUCTION
The Effects of Temporary Employment Relationships on Solidary Behavior of Employees

1.1 INTRODUCTION
Employers who are managing today’s workplace are believed to demand both solidarity and flexibility from their employees due to pressures from the organizational environment. At the same time as some researchers have argued, solidarity and flexibility may be in conflict with each other (Sanders, 2000; Sanders, Van Emmerik, & Raub, 2002). The studies in this thesis deal with the relationship between temporary employment contracts and solidarity of employees within modern organizations and investigate to what extent there is a tension between the two.

Modern organizations are characterized by organizational structures enabling them to deal with environmental changes (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976). Classical organizations operate efficiently and reliably in stable organizational environments, but have limited capacity to quickly adapt to changing circumstances (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Simon, 1969), mainly because of their inability to efficiently process the necessary information (Galbraith, 1973; Radner, 1992). Modern organizations, in contrast, face changes in their market demand and require a lot of coordination between employees or departments. As a result, the use of lateral relations and mutual adjustment are supposed to be more efficient than direct supervision and standardization of work processes (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967; Mintzberg, 1980; Victor & Blackburn, 1987). Therefore, many modern organizations use teams in which employees are expected to work
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closely together and to align their activities without the presence of a supervisor who directs and monitors their work all the time (Cohen & Bailey, 1997).

Within team structures, tensions can arise between the interest of the individual and the interest of the team (March & Simon, 1958). For instance when team members are interested in the rewards they can receive through the team while they are not willing to contribute to the common task of the team. To secure individual contributions in team structures, solidary types of behavior shown by employees are assumed to be important (Sanders, 2000). In this section, the example of a soccer team is used to illustrate what solidarity within a team means. Soccer teams are similar to teams within organizations with regard to the following features: (1) they consist of individuals who have to work together to attain a certain goal; (2) the team goal may be clearly defined but how to attain it is to a large extent decided by the team members; and (3) the team will try to respond to changing conditions in the organizational environment. In the case of soccer, the team will try to win the match, based on a general strategy developed by the coach, and this strategy changes depending on the opponent’s strategy. Within teams, solidarity between individual members may be important as illustrated by a soccer team playing a match on a rainy day. Because the field is wet and slippery, it will be difficult to play on. Imagine that one of the opponent’s players breaks through the team’s defense because one of the defending players slips on the wet field. The rest of the team can respond by thinking that it is not their job to defend and therefore just observe what is going to happen. Perhaps someone else will start to run and take over the defense task, which may be beneficial for everyone else in the team. Or, at worst, they can start laughing and make fun of their team-mate. However, they can also have the team’s ultimate goal – winning the match – in mind and show solidarity by trying to capture the player who is about to score a goal.

The players who are taking over the task of defending the goal show solidarity by not worrying about getting tired and putting the team goal first. A characteristic of solidary types of behavior is that there is a short-term tension between the individual interest and the common interest (Lindenberg, 1998). This tension leads to the expectation that individuals will be inclined not to show these types of behavior because most people prefer the situation in which someone else puts in an effort for the common good instead. Still, individual group members do show these types of behavior. Assuming that most people will do something when the benefits of acting in a certain way outweigh the costs means that there is something to gain by acting solidary.

Two ways in which the benefits of acting solidary may increase, are illustrated by the soccer team example. Let us call the players Freddy (the forward)
and Simon (the sweeper). When Simon slips, Freddy can decide to keep the opponent from scoring. What may be the reason that Freddy chooses to do so? The most obvious reason is that he wants to win the match and therefore has an incentive to stop the other player. Nevertheless, even if this is so, it is still a better option for Freddy that someone else would do the job. An additional reason for Freddy to start running can be found in his relationship with Simon. If they have been playing together for a while and Simon has helped Freddy out in a similar situation, Freddy now has the opportunity to help Simon. It is also possible that Freddy takes the future with Simon into account. If Freddy helps Simon at this moment, Simon may help Freddy in the future. Therefore, the past and the future that Freddy shares with Simon may be an important reason for him to show solidarity toward him. Another reason why Freddy may help Simon is that besides themselves, there are nine other players in the team, who will also be better off if the ball is kept out of the goal. Therefore, if Freddy manages to do that, he is likely to be rewarded by all the other players. Moreover, if Freddy does not try to get the ball, he runs the risk of being punished by the whole team for not showing solidarity. Therefore, the relationship that Freddy and Simon have with the rest of the team can create strong incentives for them to show solidarity toward team-mates.

It is important to note that there are several additional reasons for players to show solidarity toward their team-mates. First, the coach has the ability to control the players, by keeping them out of the team when they do not play in the team’s interest. Second, individual players may be concerned about their professional career. Both of these reasons have to do with the extent to which individual contributions can be measured. During every match, coaches and others monitor the effort of individuals outside the team, such as recruiters looking for talented players\(^1\). The example of the soccer team serves as an illustration of solidary behavior and how it may be affected by the relationships between individuals. It illustrates that within teams, individual actors depend on each other for the completion of a group task and that within teams there is a tension between contributing to the team task by starting to run or taking over a task versus trying not to become exhausted by showing no effort and letting others do the dirty work.

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\(^1\) Many teams within organizations differ in this respect, because it may be much harder or even impossible to determine individual contributions (Ouchi, 1980; Williamson, 1981). Moreover, one of the benefits of teams is that team members can arrange the work together, without being monitored all the time. Even still, monitoring and career opportunities may affect solidarity within teams. The extent to which this is so is not studied in this thesis.
The example of the soccer team shows that solidarity between two actors may be affected by the possibility to interact with each other over a longer period as well as by their relationship with other actors. However, a second important characteristic of modern organizations, labor flexibility, may decrease these possibilities and thus the level of solidarity within organizations. The aim of different flexibility strategies is to respond more effectively to changing market conditions, to minimize costs, and to provide better services to more demanding customers (Sethi & Sethi, 1990; Cohen & Bailey, 1997; Houseman, 2001; Michie & Sheehan-Quinn, 2001; Allen, 2002). Labor flexibility refers to qualitative and quantitative adjustments of the workforce, labeled functional and numerical flexibility (Atkinson, 1984; Kalleberg, 2003). Functional flexibility usually concerns the organization’s internal organization of labor and is achieved by broadening the range of tasks in jobs (Treu, 1992; Applebaum & Batt, 1994; Cohen & Bailey, 1997; Osterman, 2000). Broadly skilled workers can move to different parts within the organization to work on tasks that are required at that moment. Numerical flexibility often refers to the (external) use of workers who are not the regular fulltime employees (Kalleberg, 2003). When market demand is fluctuating, the demand for labor will fluctuate as well. By using numerical flexibility, organizations can more easily make quantitative adjustments possible. An important means through which organizations can do this is by hiring workers for a fixed period (Tsui, Pearce, Porter, & Hite, 1995; Nollen, 1996; Templeman, Trinephi, & Toy, 1996; Tsui, Pearce, Porter, & Tripoli, 1997).

Temporary employment relationships in particular may affect the social relationships between workers in modern organizations and are the main issue studied in this thesis. The question is what happens if organizations demand solidarity behavior of employees and labor flexibility at the same time. Applying this to the example of the soccer team, the question can be posed how hard the players will run if their relationship with the others in the team will be temporary. And, in organizational teams the question may be asked whether employees who have to work closely together for a short period of time and whose relationship with co-workers ends in the near future are less willing to show solidarity to each other by contributing to the common good. The general questions addressed in this thesis are: Under what conditions will the use of temporary employment relationships undermine solidarity behavior of employees? And, under what conditions will the solidarity behavior of employees not be undermined by the use of temporary employment relationships?

The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 1.2, temporary employment relationships are discussed. It is described what accounts for the
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demand for temporary employment relationships, how it has developed recently, and
how it may affect the internal organization. In section 1.3, the literature addressing
the effects of temporary work on employee behavior is summarized. Sections 1.4
and 1.5 discuss how the studies in this book try to contribute to some of the gaps in
the existing literature by investigating the effects of social context on solitary
behaviors. Section 1.6 provides an overview of the data that are used in the different
chapters. In section 1.7 a short introduction to the chapters is given.

1.2 TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS
Temporary employment relationships include those employment arrangements
where there is no explicit or implicit contract for long-term employment (Polivka &
Nardone, 1989). Such temporary relationships are sometimes put under the heading
of the broader term ‘nonstandard employment relationship’ to distinguish them from
the regular full-time job (see, for a review, Kalleberg, 2000). The studies in this
thesis do not deal with the whole range of nonstandard employment relationships but
focus exclusively on temporary employment relationships. Examples of this kind of
employment relationship are limited-duration direct hires, hires from temporary help
services, and contract workers (Masters & Miles, 2002). Despite some differences
between the kinds of work arrangements, they all concern contracts that will
dissolve in the near future.

1.2.1 TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT: DEMAND AND SUPPLY
The demand for flexible labor has grown steadily during the last decades. Labor
markets have undergone considerable changes mainly due to production market
developments, such as increased competition and global interdependence of
economies, asking for rapidly responding organizations (Benson, 1995; Capelli,
1999; Allen, 2002). It is assumed that the replacement of permanent workers with
temporary, on-demand workers creates a flexible workforce that can respond
quicker and more cost efficient to changing business conditions (Tan & Tan, 2002).
Temporary employment contracts allow employers to respond cost effectively to
fluctuating markets by laying off and rehiring employees (Matusik & Hill, 1998;
Parker, Griffin, Sprigg, & Wall, 2002). Employers gain freedom in hiring and firing
because temporary workers do not have an implicit or explicit contract for on-going
employment (Pfeffer & Baron, 1988; Polivka & Nardone, 1989; Tsui et al., 1995;
Feldman, Doerpinghaus, & Turnley, 1995). Moreover, using temporary employment
contracts is attractive for employers because they have to spend less money on
recruitment, training, fringe benefits, and severance of the contract (Pfeffer &
Baron, 1988; Von Hippel, Mangum, Greenberger, Heneman, & Skoglind, 1997). Because of these benefits, it is attractive for employers to use temporary employment relationships. According to recent surveys between 40 and 50 percent of organizations use temporary workers (Goudswaard & Batenburg, 2000; Houseman, 2001).

The main driving force behind the rising use of temporary workers comes from the demand-side of the labor market; employers requiring flexible staff to meet market demands and changes in business cycles (Remery, Van Doorne-Huiskes, & Schippers, 2002). Notably, the increasing use of workers who are employed through temporary help agencies turns out to be largely the result of employers’ needs (Golden & Appelbaum, 1992). Besides that, some supply-side developments account for the use of flexibility. Some workers, such as married women, older workers, students, newcomers, and highly-educated professionals may be interested in a temporary job because it enables them to balance their work with other activities or because of the autonomy it provides (Pfeffer & Baron, 1988; Remery et al., 2002; Sanders, Nauta, & Koster, 2002). Although some employees may be interested in having a temporary employment relationship, most people do not like to hold a temporary job and prefer a permanent job instead. A recent study among a large sample of employees shows that most of them expect the number of temporary contracts to grow in the near future. Most of them indicated to dislike this development (Ester & Vinken, 2001).

1.2.2 DEVELOPMENTS IN TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS

The number of people working through temporary employment arrangements has grown considerably. This development has been called “one of the most spectacular and important events that has occurred in labor markets” (Nollen, 1996: 567). In this section, the scope of this event is illustrated. Table 1.1 shows the development of temporary work in the period 1985-2000 for the Netherlands, the EU12 (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and UK), and the US1.2.

1.2 Martin and Stancanelli (2002: 42) emphasize that: “There is not a standard international definition of temporary work. The OECD defines temporary work as all salary and wage (dependent) work arrangements that have a pre-determined ending date, including work carried out under fixed-term contracts, provided through temporary work agencies, for a specific piece of work, to replace a worker on leave, seasonal work, and any other short-term employment arrangement.”
The number of temporary workers has increased over the period 1985-2000 in the EU12 and the Netherlands; and, they have become a larger fraction of the total workforce. In the EU, the number of temporary workers rose from 10 percent in 1985 to 15 percent in 2000. In the same period, the number almost doubled in the Netherlands, from 7.4 percent to nearly 14 percent (European Commission, 1999). Recent statistics show that the growth of the number of people working on a temporary employment contract has not come to a stop yet. Currently, more than 14 percent of the Dutch labor force is temporarily employed. Table 1.1 shows that the increase in the number of temporary contracts accelerated more in the Netherlands compared to the rest of the EU, bringing it close to the average in the EU.

Developments in the demand for labor have not been the same for every EU country and there is quite some variation between them. In 2002, the top three countries concerning temporary workers were Spain (31.2 percent), Portugal (21.8 percent), and Finland (17.3 percent). Low incidences of temporary workers are found in Ireland (5.3 percent) and the UK (6.1 percent). Compared to the US, the European numbers are high. In 2000, around 5 percent of the people in the US labor market had a temporary employment contract (Martin & Stancanelli, 2002). Low numbers of temporary contracts can be explained by the lack of employment regulation. When employees are less rigidly protected, there are fewer incentives for employers to offer temporary contracts (Booth, Dolado, & Frank, 2002; Martin & Stancanelli, 2002; Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silane, Shleifer, & Botero, 2003).

The two most common ways of employing temporary workers are (1) hiring directly on a temporary basis and; (2) hiring through intermediaries, usually a temporary help agency that employs workers and sends them to customers (Kalleberg, 2000). In the US, employment through temporary help agencies grew from 165,000 in 1972 to over 3.5 million by 2000 (Golden, 1996; Segal & Sullivan, 1997; Ono & Zelenev, 2003). Between 1983 and 2000, the number of temporary

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**TABLE 1.1**

Percentage temporary workers of the total workforce in the Netherlands, the EU, and US

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU total</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD database on temporary employment (adopted from Martin & Stancanelli, 2002)

n.a. = data not available
help agency workers as a fraction of the total workforce grew from 0.5 percent to 2.6 percent (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2001). Traditionally, the temporary help industry is about 50 percent larger in Europe than in the United States (Overman, 1993). As with the use of temporary contracts, there are considerable differences in the use of temporary help agencies within Europe. At the end of the nineties, temporary help workers accounted for only a small fraction of the total labor force in Denmark (0.3 percent). In the Netherlands, this number was a lot higher (4.5 percent of the labor force). The number of temporary help agencies in the Netherlands increased from 500 in 1995 to 3500 in 2001 (Dunnewijk, 2001). The expectation is that there will be no further growth but that the number of agencies will stabilize around this point (Miedema & Klein Hesselink, 2002).

Besides the quantitative developments, there have been shifts in the use of temporary employment relationships that depart from earlier days (Smith, 1997; Kalleberg, 2000). First, there has been a shift in the type of jobs in which temporary workers are employed. In the past, external labor arrangements – consisting of workers from temporary help services and limited-duration direct hires – were focused on clerical staff and blue-collar workers (Masters & Miles, 2002). Nowadays, a greater number of technical workers, accountants, and other professionals have become part of this segment of the labor market (Smith, 1997; Masters & Miles, 2002). Earlier on, being a flexible worker meant holding a bad quality job and earning a low wage. Because more highly skilled professionals have become part of the flexible workforce, the relationship between temporary jobs and labor quality and wages has changed. Second, flexible employment arrangements are increasingly considered a part of the overall strategy of the organization. Whereas temporary workers used to be hired to fill in empty spots caused by vacation or illness, they now have become an integral part of the company’s strategy (Nollen, 1996). In fact, instead of only being a low cost strategy, it is assumed that the performance of organizations is positively affected by the strategic use of flexibility through external employment arrangements (Wright & Snell, 1998; Lepak & Snell, 1999). Thus, not only the number of temporary workers has grown but they are employed in a greater variety of jobs, across different economic sectors, and are considered as valuable resources for organizations as well.

1.2.3 INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS
The strategic use of temporary employment relations affects organizational structures and is related to the supposed and sometimes evidenced erosion of internal labor markets (Capelli, 1999; Grimshaw, Ward, Rubery, & Beynon, 2001). By using internal labor markets, the core workers are sealed off from the external
labor market and are offered an employment relationship consisting of a permanent job, a progressing career, a transparent pay structure, protection against layoffs, and on the job training (Doeringer & Priore, 1971; Grimshaw et al., 2001). Internal labor markets create employment stability and are a means of providing an incentive for employees to work for the organization and stay there to enjoy the promised future rewards. Some researchers argue that stable employment relationships are becoming less important and may even be replaced by what is termed the ‘boundaryless career’, referring to careers unfolding at different employment settings in which a person does not expect lifelong employment but a contract of limited duration (Arthur & Rousseau, 1996; Van Buren, 2003). Boundaryless careers are expected to lead to declining job tenure and job security (Valletta, 1999), but the empirical evidence with regard to this is mixed. It has been shown that there have not been dramatic changes in job tenure (Schmidt & Vorny, 1998). Conversely, the perception of job security has declined (Hartley, Jacobson, Klandermans, & Van Vuuren, 1991; Doherty, 1996). These somewhat incompatible findings seem to indicate that, although some of the changes in the workplace do not affect the workers directly, they may affect their view on career opportunities within organizations.

1.3 EFFECTS OF TEMPORARY WORK ON EMPLOYEE BEHAVIOR

To what extent does the use of temporary employment relationships affect employee behavior? Studying employee behavior is not only relevant because of the growth in the number of temporary workers that is currently employed, it is also important because managers have to deal with the ‘problem of organization’, that is “the problem of obtaining cooperation among a collection of individuals or units who share only partially congruent objectives” (Ouchi, 1979: 833). Creating cooperation between parts within an organization has always attracted the attention of managers, but has become even more salient as organizations move toward team-based organizational structures (Cohen & Bailey, 1997). Within team structures, employees are expected to coordinate their tasks and monitor the quality of each other’s work. This requires contributions from each individual to the common team goal (Smith, Carroll, & Ashford, 1995; Sanders, 2000). Ensuring everyone’s contribution can be problematic in teams because every individual member will be interested in the benefits that the team can offer, but less in putting a lot of effort into it (Miller, 1992; Murnighan, 1994). How does this kind of behavior relate to the declining time-spans of relationships due to the use of temporary work? Are
organizations that employ many temporary workers able to bring about cooperation between different actors or are they creating an imbalance between the demand for and the supply of cooperative types of behavior (Janssens & Brett, 1994; Raub, 1997; Sanders, 2000; Organ & Paine, 2000; Sanders et al., 2002)? This question points to a somewhat paradoxical situation that may occur in modern organizations (Tsui et al., 1995; Sanders, 2000). On the one hand, firms are encouraged to invest in their personnel because these are unique human resources consisting of capabilities which are regarded as a primary source of competitive advantage (Miles & Snow, 1995). At the same time, there may be fewer opportunities and incentives to invest in these employees because of the increasing use of temporary workers (Master & Miles, 2002). Related to this, organizations put more emphasis on cooperative types of behavior of their employees, while the use of temporary employment relationships may undermine positive types of behavior shown by employees (Pfeffer, 1994; Tsui et al., 1995; Moorman & Harland, 2002).

A general theoretical expectation is that temporary workers will have less positive exchange relationships with organizations than regular employees (Tsui et al., 1995; Tsui et al., 1997; Sherer, 1996), because they receive few if any benefits, are not routinely considered for promotions, and cannot expect a steady work schedule or long-term employment (Mangum, Mayall, & Nelson, 1985; Cappelli, 1999). Therefore, it is expected that temporary employment relationships lead to the situation in which the employer offers a short-term financial inducement in exchange for narrow and well-specified contributions by the employee (Parker et al., 2002). Although there is a strong theoretical rationale to expect less positive outcomes with temporary work status, past research does not support this view (Van Dyne & Ang, 1998). Moreover, the literature concerning the effects of labor flexibility on cooperation shows that relatively little is known about how temporary contracts affect attitudes and behavior at work (Howe, 1986; Pfeffer & Baron, 1988; Beard & Edwards, 1995; Nollen & Axel, 1996; Van Dyne & Ang, 1998). There are very few systematic studies on the effects of temporary contracts and findings from the available studies are inconsistent (Beard & Edwards, 1995; Kochan, Smith, Wells, & Rebitzer, 1994). For example, empirical studies comparing permanent and temporary workers reveal negative effects of temporary work status on work behavior (Moorman & Harland, 2002), while other studies do not find differences between the behavior of permanent and temporary workers (Pearce, 1993; Van Dyne & Ang, 1998). Therefore, it can be stated that the assumed negative effects of temporary status seem to be the result of speculation rather than empirical research (Belous, 1989; Feldman, 1995).
1.4 DEALING WITH THE INCONCLUSIVE RESULTS

Temporary employment relationships are regarded as one of the most important issues in the current labor market and their effect on employee behavior seems obvious. Nevertheless, the existing research yields conflicting findings that do not lead to a clear statement about these effects. This raises questions such as: Why did the research that has been carried out so far lead to these inconclusive findings? In addition, how can we deal with them in research? This thesis tries to answer these questions by focusing on two specific issues: (1) the kind of employee behavior studied; and (2) how this behavior can be explained theoretically. Above that, the possible theoretical explanations are examined empirically.

The kind of behavior that thesis mainly examines is Organizational Solidarity, referring to the application of a general definition of solidarity – contributing to the common good (Hechter, 1987; Lindenberg, 1998) – to organizations. Organizational Solidarity is shown in the interpersonal relationship between two actors, Ego (the focal actor) and Alter (the other actor), within an organization. In the studies, Ego is the employee whose solidary behavior is studied. The person to whom Ego shows (lack of) solidarity is named Alter and may be the supervisor or a co-worker. If Alter is the supervisor, the term vertical solidarity is used and horizontal solidarity is used when Alter is a co-worker. When Ego and Alter are in a professional work situation with each other, the common good can be the completion of a task on which they are both working. Usually, tasks are grouped into teams because there are gains from cooperation, for instance, when a task requires the simultaneous effort of more than one person. At the same time, when two or more people are interdependently working on a task, the problem of solidarity arises. The problem is that, in many situations, both of them will be better off if their common task is completed. At the same time, their individual return is lower when they contribute their time and effort than when they let others do the work. Solidarity between Ego and Alter can be understood as a dilemma situation. If Alter asks Ego for assistance, there is no guarantee that Alter will also be solidary with Ego. Ego can offer assistance and Alter may take advantage of this situation by accepting Ego’s assistance and not offering help in return. Therefore, solidarity between Ego and Alter requires a certain level of trust between Ego and Alter (Coleman, 1990; Buskens, 2002).

Recent studies argue that the creation and maintenance of solidarity between actors depends on the extent to which the actors are embedded (Granovetter, 1985; Raub, 1997; Buskens, 2002; Buskens & Raub, 2002). The social context in which individual actors are embedded is comprised of their ongoing dyadic relationships.
with others and the broader networks of relationships (Granovetter, 1985). The two mechanisms through which embeddedness may affect solidarity are labeled learning and control\(^1\)\(^3\) (Buskens, 2002; Buskens & Raub, 2002). Table 1.2 summarizes how learning and control are enabled through dyadic and network relations.

### TABLE 1.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MECHANISM</th>
<th>LEVEL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DYAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEARNING</td>
<td>Information about Alter from own past experiences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTROL</td>
<td>Possibilities to sanction or reward Alter oneself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NETWORK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Information from third parties about their experiences with Alter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Possibilities to sanction or reward Alter through third parties</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Buskens & Raub (2002)

Table 1.2 shows that Ego can learn about Alter through past interactions or through mutual acquaintances in their networks and that Ego can control Alter when their relationship continues in the future or when their relationship is embedded in a larger network. Temporal embeddedness refers to the past and the future of Ego and Alter; network embeddedness refers to relationships that Ego and Alter have with third parties\(^1\)\(^4\).

\(^1\) In this thesis, the term ‘control’ is used to refer to ‘control of the behavior of other through the provision of positive and negative sanctions’. This meaning of the term ‘control’ is distinguished from ‘control variables’ in the multivariate analyses of the studies, by referring to them as ‘statistical control’.

\(^4\) Solidarity between actors can also be affected by institutional embeddedness (Raub, 1997). This form of embeddedness is not taken into account in this thesis.
1.5 SOLIDARITY AND EMBEDDEDNESS

1.5.1 TEMPORAL EMBEDDEDNESS

An ongoing dyadic relationship between Ego and Alter enables solidarity in two distinct ways: through prior interactions and behavior between the same two actors (shadow of the past) and through expectations about future interactions (shadow of the future) (Raub, 1997; Buskens, 2002; Batenburg, Raub, & Snijders, 2003).

LEARNING: SHADOW OF THE PAST

Learning refers to the use of information that Ego attains from past interactions with the same Alter. Based on these own experiences, Ego knows more about Alter's behavior. If Alter has shown solidarity in past interactions, Ego may expect that Alter will show solidary behavior again in similar interactions in the future (Granovetter, 1985; Coleman, 1990). Learning in a dyadic relationship takes place when Ego acquires information about Alter. Through past interactions with the same Alter, Ego learns directly about the ability and willingness of the other person. Therefore, if there is a shadow of the past between Ego and Alter, Ego knows whether Alter is a skilful and reliable partner or not. Based on this information about Alter, Ego can choose to be solidary with Alter or not. For example, when Alter requests Ego’s help, Ego can take earlier interactions with Alter into account in the consideration to help Alter. Past solidary behavior of Alter may affect the extent to which Ego will be solidary toward Alter. Besides the information effect of past interactions, there is the possibility that Ego and Alter have made relation-specific investments as the relationship continues. Such investments are valuable to Ego and Alter but lose their value when their relationship ends. In a work relation, this may be the case when Ego and Alter have worked together for some time and know about their peculiarities and how they can best treat each other. This may also make their collaboration easier. Learning and investments through past interactions may affect the level of solidarity between Ego and Alter.

CONTROL: SHADOW OF THE FUTURE

Control refers to the fact that Ego realizes that Alter may have short-term incentives for abusing trust but that some long-term incentives for Alter are under control of Ego. Ego can control Alter directly by punishing or rewarding actions of Alter. The mechanisms underlying control are also referred to as reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960; Blau, 1964; Voss, 1982) or conditional cooperation (Taylor, 1987). Ego can control

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1.5 This section is based on Buskens & Raub (2002).
the behavior of Alter in a dyadic relationship if it is likely that they will meet each other in the future. If there is the expectancy of future interactions between Ego and Alter, Ego can control Alter by sanctioning: punishing inappropriate and rewarding appropriate behavior of Alter. These sanctions have credibility for Alter if Ego has the possibility and incentive to effectively use them. A common future between Ego and Alter is a way to make this possible if Ego and Alter are in a situation in which Alter needs Ego’s help; Ego’s decision to provide assistance may be different if there is a common future with Alter than when their relationship will end shortly after that.

1.5.2 NETWORK EMBEDDEDNESS
Learning and control are also possible when the relationship between Ego and Alter is part of a larger network of relationships.

LEARNING THROUGH NETWORKS
When there have not been previous interactions between Ego and Alter, Ego’s willingness to be solidary toward Alter may be low. But, if there is a third party who has experiences with Alter and who belongs to Ego’s network, Ego can gather information about Alter through their indirect link with the third party. This is for example the case in a workgroup to which a new person is added. If this person has been working somewhere else in the organization, then the members of the workgroup can contact those people to acquire information about their new colleague. As a result, information is gathered about the reputation of Alter and experiences that others have had with the same person carry over from one workgroup to the other. The learning mechanism is also at work if Ego has not interacted with Alter before, but others in the team have. Again, the other people can inform Ego about their experiences with Alter. In both examples, it is required that Ego trusts the third party to provide true information about Alter.

CONTROL THROUGH NETWORKS
Ego can control Alter’s behavior more easily, if Ego and Alter are in a relationship that is also part of a larger network of mutual acquaintances. The production of a common good requires contributions of a number of people. When there are more connections between the actors that have an interest in the good, they have more possibilities to provide positive and negative sanctions to each other. For instance, when Alter does something that hurts Ego, Ego can choose to inform the third party

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1.6 The term ‘sanction’ refers to sanctions that are positive (rewards) or negative (punishments).
about Alter’s behavior and give Alter a bad reputation. This may be a bad thing for Alter, because the result can be that other members of the network choose not to be solidary toward Alter. Ultimately, Alter may be excluded from the group and no longer enjoy the benefits of it. Therefore, people prefer to have a good reputation, and as a result Alter will have an incentive not to hurt Ego when they are embedded in a larger network. The more Ego and Alter are embedded in a network with third parties, the higher the control capacity they have. Therefore, the denser the network of which Ego and Alter are part, the higher the trust between them (Weesie, Buskens & Raub, 1997). These dense networks can create strong group pressure on individual members and may affect solidary behavior of the individuals in a team.

1.5.3 TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS AND EMBEDDEDNESS

Theoretical considerations about the link between embeddedness and solidary behavior of employees are used to study temporary employment relationships. This section provides an outline of how this relates to current research and how it may solve some of the inconclusive research findings. The general question formulated in section 1.1 can now be translated into the more specific question: Can temporal and network embeddedness account for the inconclusive findings regarding the effects of temporary employment relationships on solidary behavior of employees?

The first research problem that this thesis focuses on is to what extent and how solidary behavior of temporary employees toward their organization is influenced by their level of temporal and network embeddedness. The question is asked whether solidarity from temporary employees can be understood by taking these two forms of embeddedness into consideration. This is dealt with in Chapter 2. In this chapter, it is studied how their temporal embeddedness affects solidary behavior of temporary workers by examining the effects of the length of the past and the expected future of their employment relationship. Effects of network embeddedness are investigated by examining the formal and informal network of these temporary employees. Therefore, Chapter 2 does not take the employment relationship as a given (employees are either temporary or permanent) but investigates whether the behavior of temporary employees changes over the course of the contract.

The second issue that is dealt with in this thesis concerns the kind of employee behavior studied. Solidary behavior refers to the behavior that actors show in their relationship with others. Therefore, to study this kind of behavior, it is necessary to look at how these types of behavior influence each other. Most kinds of
cooperative employee behavior studied in organizations – such as cooperation (Barnard, 1938; Smith, Carroll & Ashford, 1995), organizational citizenship behavior (Organ, 1988) and loyalty (Hage, 1980) – does not include the behaviors of other actors explicitly and focuses on the individual employee instead. Hence, earlier studies tend to focus on the behavior that Ego shows toward Alter and not on the behavior that Alter shows toward Ego and how this may their mutual solidarity. Chapter 3 focuses on this issue by examining Organizational Solidarity. Organizations consist of horizontal and vertical relationships (Smith et al., 1995): relationships between employees on the same hierarchical level and hierarchical relationships between supervisors and employees. Horizontal and vertical relationships are distinguished from each other since employees are not necessarily solidary in both dimensions at the same time and to the same extent. Chapter 3 aims at investigating whether reciprocity can explain Ego’s solidarity toward others. Since Ego may be involved in horizontal and vertical relationships, it is examined if these two dimensions of Organizational Solidarity do differ from each other empirically.

Central to Organizational Solidarity is that the behavior of Ego is influenced by the behavior of Alter and vice versa. In the relationship between Ego and Alter, temporal embeddedness refers to the interactions between them in the past and the likelihood that there will be interactions between them in the future. Studies of the effects of temporary employment relationships on employee behavior usually compare the behavior of permanent and temporary employees. Most studies implicitly assume that employees with a temporary employment relationship have a short-term relationship with others in the organization and that they therefore will show certain types of behavior. This assumption may not be valid and needs to be revised. First, relationships that temporary and permanent workers have with others do not necessarily differ in duration for several reasons. Permanent workers that just started to work for a particular organization may have a short past with others. Employees may also be transferred from one place to another from time to time, resulting in relatively short-term relationships with others in the organization. What is more, permanent employees may be considering leaving the organization, thus decreasing the likelihood of future interactions with others. Finally, taking into account that employee behavior may be affected by the behavior of others, it is also possible that a permanent employee has short-term relationships with others, because the others are temporary workers, are transferred to another section within the organization, or are about to leave the organization. To summarize, it is stated that temporal embeddedness differs from the distinction between temporary and permanent employment relationships. A second revision has to do with the behavior
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that others – supervisors or co-workers – show toward the employee. It is assumed that solidary behavior of Ego depends on the behavior of Alter. This assumption has consequences for the expected effects of temporal embeddedness. Temporal embeddedness does not only mean that Ego and Alter are in a relationship of certain duration but also that they can show different types of behavior during the course of the relationship. Being in a solidary relationship for a long time with Alter may therefore increase Ego’s solidary toward Alter. Nevertheless, when Ego and Alter are in an unsolidary relationship for a long time, the effects of relationship length may be negative. Therefore, it is stated that temporal embeddedness refers to the combination of length of the relationship and the Alter’s solidary. Chapter 4 investigates to what extent these ideas about temporal embeddedness hold.

An additional source of solidarity between actors may come from the network in which they are embedded. Networks differ with regard to their structure (the way in which actors are connected to each other) and content (the type of relationships present in a network). The effects of network content on solidarity are studied in this thesis. Many organizations are formalized to a certain degree to manage the workflow. Formalization refers to the organizational blueprint in which tasks are prescribed and grouped into formal jobs and positions. The network of formal relationships between team members is aimed at completing the team task. The contributions of every member are needed but not guaranteed. Therefore, the team members will monitor each other to make sure that everyone is doing their job. Non-contributors are expected to be punished while the ones who contribute can expect to be rewarded. The formal network will thus be formed by relationships in which individual members control each other to reach the team’s goal. Within teams informal relationships may develop that connect employees through activities that do not have to be work-related. For instance, people may drink coffee with each other and chat about mutual interests. Even though the principal aim of these relationships has nothing to do with the tasks of a team, there may be consequences for the level of solidarity that members show toward each other. When there are more informal relationships within a team, there may be more trust among the individual members. This may increase the solidarity that the individuals show toward each other. Chapter 2 and 5 investigate the influence that formal and informal ties have on solidarity of employees.

To summarize, the studies in this thesis aim at investigating how the social context of employees, in terms of their temporal and network embeddedness affects the extent to which they show solidarity toward others. Three main facilitators of solidary types of behavior of employees are studied. First, solidary types of behavior
are directed at specific others, therefore the solidarity that Ego shows toward Alter may be influenced by the solidarity shown by Alter toward Ego (Chapter 3). Second, the effects of the past and the future that employees have with an organization may affect their solidarity. Reciprocation of solidarity types of behavior between Ego and Alter takes place as their relationship develops and may affect considerations about future interactions (Chapter 2 and Chapter 4). Third, solidarity of employees is assumed to be affected by the formal and informal network relationships that connect them with others in the team (Chapter 2 and Chapter 5).

1.6 RESEARCH STRATEGY AND DATA SOURCES

1.6.1 RESEARCH STRATEGY

The relationship between the use of temporary employment relationships and solidary behavior of employees is examined with data from multiple sources. Data sources that have been gathered with different research methods are combined to study one problem, which is a form of triangulation (Denzin, 1978; McGrath, 1982; Scandura & Williams, 2000). By using information from different sources and making use of multiple measures to address similar research problems, the principal goal of triangulation is to generate a more robust and generalizable set of findings (Denzin, 1978; Scandura & Williams, 2000). How robust the findings of a study are, can be investigated by using more than one dataset. If the relationship is found in datasets that differ in method, there may be more certainty about the finding.

1.6.2 DATA SOURCES

The empirical chapters in this book are based on four different data sources. The datasets are: (1) a survey held among university employees (described in: Dekker, 2000), (2) the Solidarity at Work Survey (for an overview of the questionnaire: Lambooij, Sanders, Koster, Emmerik, Raub, Flache, & Wittek, 2003) that was conducted among employees in different organizations, (3) a vignette study (discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis), and (4) a dataset gathered by the Workplace Ethnography Project, containing team-level data (this dataset is discussed in: Hodson, 1998). Table 1.3 provides an overview of the datasets, their level of analysis, and the chapters in which they are used.
TABLE 1.3
Overview of data sources and levels of analysis by chapter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Data source</th>
<th>Level of analysis</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>University Survey (&lt;Dekker, 2000&gt;)</td>
<td>Individual employees</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Solidarity at Work Survey</td>
<td>Individual employees</td>
<td>674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Solidarity at Work Survey</td>
<td>Individual employees</td>
<td>736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vignette Study</td>
<td>Vignettes</td>
<td>1040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Solidarity at Work Survey</td>
<td>Individual employees</td>
<td>736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Workplace Ethnography Project (&lt;Hodson, 1998&gt;)</td>
<td>Teams</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.6.3 KINDS OF ORGANIZATIONS
The datasets are gathered across different organizations. The survey among university personnel is done at a Dutch university. The data from the Solidarity at Work Survey are gathered at 15 different organizations. Table 1.4 provides an overview of the economic sector, type of organization, number of respondents, percentage of temporary workers, relative number of female employees, and mean educational level – measured on a scale from 1 (no education completed) to 9 (Ph.D. level completed) – per organization in the Solidarity at Work Survey.
Table 1.4 shows that the organizations participating in the Solidarity at Work Survey are from different economic sectors. The overall response rate is 52 percent. Response rates vary between the organizations. The university has the lowest number of returned questionnaires (24 percent) and the pressing plant in Belgium has the highest response rate (74 percent). It should be noted that these organizations are not a representative sample of all organizations in the Netherlands. There is a lack of industrial organizations present in the sample; most of the organizations are service organizations, for example university departments. The employees also have a relatively high mean level of education. Therefore, the findings based on these data should not be generalized too quickly to other types of organizations.
Organizational type is not a major issue in this thesis, because the theories that are tested in this book concern individual employees and how their behavior is influenced by their relationships with others. No hypotheses are tested concerning the organizational level. To examine possible effects at the organization level, statistical control variables are added to the models with which the hypotheses are tested. In addition to the Solidarity at Work Survey, data from the Workplace Ethnography Project are used to test hypotheses. These data are gathered across a large sample of organizations, including many manufacturing organizations. The results from the different datasets are compared throughout the studies in this thesis.

1.6.4 SOLIDARITY AT WORK SURVEY

The main source of information this book is the Solidarity at Work Survey. For each of the organizations, data are gathered with an organization-specific questionnaire. The Solidarity at Work Questionnaire consists of so-called modules that contain a set of questions about a certain topic. Examples of these modules are: ‘solidary behavior’, ‘quality of relationships’, and ‘organizational commitment’. A subset of the complete questionnaire is used in each of the organizations because it would be too time-consuming to administer all the modules in every organization (the Solidarity at Work Questionnaire contains 900 items in total). The module containing questions about solidary behavior is part of all questionnaires but some of the independent variables may not be available for all of them. Therefore, some questions cannot be answered with information from the total dataset. Depending on the availability of independent variables studied, the decision is made to include them in the study or not. How the different organizations are used in the different chapters is shown in Table 1.5. Table 1.5 shows that the information gathered three organizations – the pressing plant in Holland, the pressing plant in Belgium, and the project organization – are not examined. The questionnaires prepared for these organizations did not contain the modules required for this study.
### TABLE 1.5

**Overview of the organizations by chapter**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 3 Survey data</th>
<th>Chapter 4 Survey data</th>
<th>Chapter 4 Vignette data</th>
<th>Chapter 5 Survey data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pressing plant (Holland)</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pressing plant (Belgium)</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing foundation</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supportive staff university</td>
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<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering firm</td>
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<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultancy firm</td>
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<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project organization</td>
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<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
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<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
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<tr>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental organization</td>
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<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nursing home</td>
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<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art foundation</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation center</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1.7 OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK

This book contains studies in which the effects of temporary employment relationships on solidary types of behavior of employees are examined by taking the temporal and network embeddedness of employees into account. The chapters are structured as articles that have been submitted to journals and it is possible to read them separately. Chapter 2 examines the effects of temporal and network embeddedness on Organizational Citizenship Behavior (OCB; Organ, 1988) of junior researchers at a university. In this chapter it is studied how this kind of behavior changes over the course of a temporary contract and how it is affected by relationships that these employees have with their co-workers and supervisors. To study the influence of embeddedness on the behavior of Ego more precisely, Chapter 3 develops a measure of Organizational Solidarity by formulating and testing hypotheses about the reciprocal nature of solidarity and comparing it to Organizational Citizenship Behavior. A distinction is made between vertical and horizontal Organizational Solidarity. In the remainder of the book, the focus is on
horizontal employee solidarity. Chapter 4 provides insight into the effects of temporal embeddedness on solidarity toward co-workers. The question is asked whether temporary and permanent employees differ with respect to their horizontal solidarity. In Chapter 5, the effects of network embeddedness on solidarity toward co-workers are examined. It is argued that the use of flexible employment relations lowers the possibilities of learning and controlling through temporal embeddedness. It addresses the question whether networks can make up for this lack of temporal embeddedness and can create solidarity instead. Hypotheses are tested about the effects of formal and informal networks of employees on their solidarity toward co-workers. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes and discusses the findings of the chapters, deals with practical implications, and provides suggestions for future research.
1.8 REFERENCES


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Miedema, E.P., & Klein Hesselink, D.J. (2002). Uitgezonden of uitgezonderd worden [To be send out or shut out]. Hoofddorp: TNO Arbeid.


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