New Eurosceptics or European Union Lovers? Tendencies of Popular Euroscepticism in United Germany

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Quo Vadis Europa?

Introduction

Since the end of World War II, the international community has been confronted with a significant amount of changes and challenges, but has also reached important achievements. One of these challenges and achievements is the successful preservation of peace through the political and economic integration of Europe. For the last sixty years, nation states have been structurally reformed and are increasingly surrendering their sovereignty to a supranational regime, the European Union (EU). Post-war Europe is characterised by co-operation and integration. However, European integration and the process of Europeanisation, which is a concept that has multiple aspects, are not only perceived positively in the European Union’s member states. In the past years, especially since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and the involvement of the European Union not only in economic, but also in political matters, the EU has faced great difficulties. The political project is said to be lacking legitimacy, an issue that is generally referred to as the “democratic deficit.” These factors are partly responsible for the development of Euroscepticism. This phenomenon has been a relevant and quite problematic issue that the European Union has had to face lately, especially since the rejection of the European Constitution in the Netherlands and France and the recent ratification problems of the Lisbon Treaty. This paper is a contribution to the identification of factors that cause Euroscepticism. It will look at the Federal Republic of Germany, which has to date been regarded as one of the most ‘Europhile’ countries and seeks to analyse to what extent Eurosceptic tendencies have developed among the general public in Germany since

Reunification. In order to do this, two concepts essential for the analysis of German Euroscepticism will be defined: Euroscepticism itself and Europeanisation. On the basis of these findings, the historical relationship between the European Community and West Germany will be critically examined in order to trace possible changes that Reunification may have brought. A third section will then analyse whether Euroscepticism has developed in Germany after 1989, identify the possible causes and compare the attitudes towards these issues to those during the period of 2007-2010.

**Euroscepticism and Europeanisation: Theoretical Premises**

*The Concept of Europeanisation*

Since Euroscepticism is considered as a negative reaction towards Europeanization, it is first of all necessary to define the term Europeanisation for the purposes of this analysis. Europeanisation is a fairly new term, and as is the case with new concepts, it is hotly debated and disagreed upon. Some scholars see Europeanisation as a concept that is largely related to Europe and not to the European Union, for example the sociologists Gerard Delanty and Chris Rumford, who define Europeanisation rather as consisting of many influences: modernity, postmodernism, the changing nature of nation states and so on, phenomena that are all contributing to Europeanisation as a concept that designates a major shift and change in society. This implies the existence of a European public space, which is also envisioned by the philosopher Jürgen Habermas, for example.

However, other scholars, and this has become more common, use the European Union as the major point of reference. George and Bache designate five meanings, which they draw from the political scientist Johan P. Olsen, of what the concept of Europeanisation can refer to. Europeanisation can firstly mean the change of the European Union’s external boundaries, for example in the case of enlargement. Secondly, it can also refer to the development of European Union institutions. Thirdly, it can mean a penetration of and influence on national and sub-national systems of governance, hence, refer to the influence of European Union policy on national political systems. Fourthly, it can also refer to exporting the European

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Union model to the wider world and lastly, developing an “ever closer Union”, i.e. referring to the deepening and widening of European integration.\footnote{George/Bache, Politics in the European Union, 59.}

For the purpose of the analysis of Euroscepticism, one can especially stick to one of these definitions, penetration of national and subnational systems of governance, because Euroscepticism is the negative reaction of a member state (political elites and population) to precisely this penetration. In Johan P. Olsen’s article “The Many Faces of Europeanization”, this becomes also quite clear.\footnote{Johan P. Olsen, “The Many Faces of Europeanization,” Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no.5 (2002): 927.} The “central penetration” involves, according to him, a division of responsibilities and powers between different levels of governance. A balance has to be found between unity and diversity and centralisation and regionalism. According to this definition of Europeanisation, national systems of governance have to adapt to the European Union institutional centre and norms and values this implies, especially regarding the influence of European Union law. The central penetration of national and subnational systems of governance is thus also closely related to the development of institutions at the European Union level. Connecting the European Union’s central penetration of national governance and policy making with the development of institutions at the European Union level thus provides the most suitable approach to Europeanisation in order to trace the Europeanisation of Germany and especially negative reactions to the European Union as a new coordinating element of national governance.

**The Concept of Euroscepticism**

Since the concept of Europeanisation is now clear, one can have a look at Euroscepticism as a negative reaction to Europeanisation tendencies. Like Europeanisation, Euroscepticism has been a concept of great debate among scholars in recent years and there exist several definitions of the concept. The political scientists Robert Harmsen and Menno Spiering point to the roots of the concept, which is a relatively recent development.\footnote{Robert Harmsen and Menno Spiering, Euroscepticism: Party Politics, National Identity and European Integration (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004), 14.} Sceptical attitudes towards the European Community (EC) first appeared in Great Britain in the 1980s, although it was only termed as Euroscepticism by Taggart in 1998.\footnote{Fuchs et al, Euroscepticism: Images of Europe, 9.} Someone who is Eurosceptic is, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, “a person who is not enthusiastic about the
increasing powers of the European Union”. On the continent, Euroscepticism has become prominent only during the 1990s. The reasons for this will be analysed in this paper.

However, if one wants to consider, analyse and measure Euroscepticism in more detail, the above quoted definition is not sufficient. Many scholars have tried to define the concept. Worth mentioning is, for example, the approach of the political scientists Alex Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart. They distinguish between a general rejectionist attitude of political parties towards the European Union as a whole and thus also towards the idea of European integration, and secondly, whether there exists a general ability to accept the European Union and European integration (i.e. not reject the idea as a whole) but that there is reluctance to accept further and deepening integration (the EU’s current/future trajectory). Their classification thus distinguishes between rejecting European integration as a whole (and the norms and values this implies) and generally accepting ideas, norms and values of European integration, but not supporting the current EU regime. This corresponds to the definition of Europeanisation as the interaction between European Union institutions and central penetration of national governance, since national systems of governance have to adapt to the European Union institutional centre (i.e. to the regime) but also to ideals, norms and values this brings about.

The political scientists Fuchs, Magni-Berton and Roger develop this classification further. These scholars do this, however, on the level of the citizens. They do not only distinguish between support of ideals and principles of European integration (which they term principled support) and the institutional structure of the EU regime as the embodiment of these ideals and principles (generalised support), but also between authorities and the outcome of their decisions and actions (reasoned support). The difference between the latter and the two former forms of support are that reasoned support refers to the “the evaluation of the EU on the basis of specific standards of reasons”, i.e. this category measures how effective the EU works. This can be done in terms of instrumental reasons (political and economic stability; personal safety; the country’s voice in the EU at present/in the future/personal voice in the EU) and normative reasons (legitimacy: satisfaction with democracy in the EU and own

12 Harmsen/Spiering, Euroscepticism, 15.
13 Ibid., 16.
16 Fuchs et al, Euroscepticism: Images of Europe, 25.
country, transparency: information about EU institutions). In contrast to that, generalised and principled support refer to the support of the ideals and values embodied by European integration (principled) and the general support of the EU as a whole (“membership a good thing”) and the EU regime (generalised). Fuchs et al. use these distinctions in order to measure Euroscepticism, and it is a quite useful conceptualisation for this paper as well, which will in the next section, on the basis of the above conceptual framework, go on to examining the German case.

**Germany: A European Country?**

*Germany and Europe before 1989: A Historical Background*

Since World War II, Germany’s role and position in Europe has been greatly altered. After the war, Germany was divided into two states, the liberal democratic Federal Republic (FRG) and the communist German Democratic Republic (GDR). The war had brought great destruction, but also forced Germany to confront the Nazi past, which in turn led to a need of Germans to re-establish their position and acceptance of the international community as well as to re-define their “nation-state identity”. Since the GDR fell under the influence sphere of the Soviet Union, taking part in Western integration was out of question for this part of Germany. West German post-war identity construction, however, was a different matter. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer only had two choices, namely integrating with the West or surrendering to the Soviet Union. Since the latter was not an option, Western integration was the inevitable course, a view which became extremely dominant in German policy-making. The political scientist Thomas Risse even argues that post-war Germany’s nation-state identity construction was bound to be European – viewing Europe as an antithesis to Nazi Germany. He further stresses that,

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[...] the German notion of what constitutes the ‘other’, the non-European, is related to European and German nationalist history. [...] ‘Europe’, in this identity construction, stands for a stable peace order overcoming the continents bloody
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17 Ibid., 25.
18 Ibid., 23.
22 Risse, “European Identity”, 207.
past, for democracy and human rights [...], as well as for a social market economy, including the welfare state. This argument is quite strong since it draws attention to values generally viewed as European, values that have been internalised by Germany: "democracy", "human rights" and a "social market economy" and on which the German post-national identity came to be based. In terms of principled support of European integration, West German political elites and the general public seemed both to be agreeing with the value orientations of the European Community in the 1950s. In addition, political elites as well as the general public seemed to have been in consensus in terms of generalised support for European integration. According to Teschner, opinion polls in the 1950s not only revealed that there was generally a high degree of popular support for European integration, but that the Germans were of all member states the most enthusiastic about the European Community.

The European idea as an antithesis to the German Nazi past is a very convincing approach and explanation of the post-war German-European relationship. However, regarding this argument, one is also tempted to believe that Germany was ready to give up its identity as a nation state and thus surrendering its sovereignty as an autonomous country, which is rather unlikely. One has thus also to take into consideration that West Germany’s ability to follow its own policy goals was constrained through the presence of the Western Allies and that integrating with Europe was also a way to reduce these constraints and regain full sovereignty.

Indeed, post-war West Germany has often been described as a ‘semi-sovereign’ state. Despite the identity crisis that this ‘semi-sovereign’ state had to face, and which was successfully solved through Europe, the political elites of the FRG seem to have used Europe integration also for other purposes. The German economy was in great difficulties after the war and integrating into an economic community also helped to re-build German economic success. Support for the European project was thus not only principled and generalised, but also reasoned since the Germans expected an outcome from European integration and this outcome was generally satisfactory. Europe was thus not only a value orientation, but also a means to reduce disadvantages. It would be naïve to believe that the German political elites took the division of the country, and thus its ‘semi-sovereignty’ as a lasting status quo. The Preamble of the Grundgesetz (Basic Law) of 1949 clearly shows, for example, that

23 Ibid., 209.
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Reunification was one of the primary goals of the young German Federal Republic, since it speaks of a “transitory period” and refers to the “whole German people”, which also includes citizens of the GDR. It is also interesting that the Preamble clearly places the nation Germany into a European context – “having the will to keep its national and territorial unity […] in a united Europe.” Integrating with Europe thus not only helped to construct a nation-state identity, but also seems to have been a means to re-gain full sovereignty as a nation state and acceptance within Europe and the world. One has thus to keep in mind that Germany did not seem willing to give up its national identity in favour of a supranational regime. It is undeniable, though, that the Federal Republic’s relationship with the European Community was considerably different and unique compared to its fellow EC states and that Germany was virtually duty-bound to promote European integration because of its past, its identity crisis, its constitution and its division.

Reunification: A Significant Impact?

Since the 1950s, Germany has been one of the countries within the Community which has most actively promoted European integration. One may indeed ask, though, whether the European – German relations changed in the following decades. At least until Reunification in 1989, this seems not to have been the case, since despite other opportunities, Germany stayed in line with supporting European integration. In case of the support of the general public (principled, generalised as well as reasoned support), this may also be due to the fact that European integration did not have direct effects on the population, since the European Community had hitherto remained a merely economic project. There was therefore no general gap between popular support and the support of the political elites. Reunification itself was placed in a distinctly European context.

Former Chancellor Helmut Kohl especially emphasized this. In a speech in Paris in January 1990 he said: “The Federal German Republic of today is inseparably tied to a free and democratic Europe […] The ‘German challenge’, as it has recently been referred to by a big Parisian newspaper, is in truth a European challenge. We should meet this challenge

Risse, “European Identity”, 208.
together as Europeans.”

This speech points to all the different reasons why Germany was so actively supporting European integration. Firstly, it shows the continuity with which Germany promoted European integration, which is partly due to its European-German identity. Secondly, however, one should also not forget that Reunification was not only an issue that was solely restricted to Germany, but also concerned the Four Powers which had controlled the four occupation zones. Apart from the Soviet Union, the three European powers had every reason to fear a reunified Germany, a huge state in the middle of Europe, whose influence would, given its new geographic and political centrality, most certainly grow after Reunification. Kohl’s speech thus not only shows Germany’s place within Europe, but he also uses Europe as an instrument to convince the Europeans that Germany would genuinely follow the European path also after Reunification.

This is, in my opinion, also an argument that one should not neglect. Kohl was indeed the Chancellor who always stayed in line with European integration, even during the 1990s, which was a decade that notably brought a change for the German – European relationship, especially in terms of popular support for the EU. The next section will provide more clues about this.

**Popular Eurosceptic Tendencies: 1990s and the Present**

*Attitudes towards the EU in the Aftermath of Reunification (1990 – 1992)*

**Principled and Generalized Support**

As outlined above, the German political elites, especially Chancellor Kohl and his government, stayed in line with the path of European integration after Reunification, continuing the dream of a ‘United Europe’. However, the years after Reunification brought, in contrast to Kohl’s expectations, a divergence between the European path of the political elites and public support of the integration project. This becomes obvious from the following

29 Helmut Kohl, “Rede von Helmut Kohl über die deutsche Frage und die europäische Verantwortung (17 Januar 1990)”, in Reden und Erklärungen zur Deutschlandpolitik (Bonn: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1990), 168. Translation FR.


31 Teschner, “No longer Europe’s Europhiles”, 60.

figure from the *Eurobarometer*, which shows the importance of EC matters for Germany’s future between spring 1990 and spring 1992:

![Figure 1: Importance of EC matters for Germany’s future between spring 90 and spring 92.](image)

The data here show that although an overwhelming majority of East Germans considered EC matters as vital for Germany and its future in 1990, in spring 1992 this had changed. Both East (80%) and West Germans (76%) considered EC matters not as important as in 1990, attitudes of both parts of the population had thus nearly adapted to each other. The high approval of East Germans in 1990 could have been due to the fact that East Germans had very high expectations of the European Community and thus felt very emotionally attached to it. In 1992, the ‘goal’ of Reunification had been achieved, hence the European Community did not function as Germany’s means of identity construction anymore, neither on the side of West nor of East Germans. Germany’s sovereignty had been re-established. This hints at an overall development that the world had to face in this important time in history, namely, the collapse of communism. Germany, as well as the Europe Community, had to face a new world order and re-define themselves and their positions in the world.

The following figure, which shows the support for European unification and the European community, indicates that support for the European project slightly went down between 1991 and 1992:
While in spring 1991, around 79% of East Germans and 69% of West Germans regarded membership a “good thing”, in spring 1992 this had decreased to 72% and 60% respectively. While support thus still remained high, a negative tendency is evident here. It is, however, unlikely that this change in attitude was only due to the collapse of the bipolar world order.

The support for the EU as a whole (“membership as a good thing”) can be referred to as generalised support. Generalised support thus still was quite high. The same goes for principled support: figure 2 shows that in general, European Unification as an idealistic project (approving of the Union’s values and ideals) was supported by 76% of East Germans and 72% West Germans in spring 1992. This means that the Germans showed, despite negative tendencies, a general sense of belonging to the community, which can partly be due to the German-European identity construction and the long-term socialisation with Europe. If principled and generalised support was still high among both East and West Germans, one may ask why public opinion on the European Union changed so considerably in 1992. The explanation for this change of mood can most likely be found in lack of reasoned support.

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34 Ibid., 4.
35 Fuchs et al, Euroscepticism: Images of Europe, 25.
Reasoned Support

Since Euroscepticism is a negative reaction toward Europeanisation, it is interesting to see whether the 1990s brought a stronger Europeanisation, i.e. a “penetration and influence on national and sub-national systems of governance” and whether the citizens were affected by it. Indeed, the 1990s were not only significant in terms of a new world order, but also in the development of the EC and then the EU. One important impact was brought by the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which established the European Union and introduced significant changes.

Among those were, for example, further empowerment of the European Union institutions (through giving them more competences, especially the European Parliament), the introduction of a European Union citizenship, the accomplishment of the Internal Market and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the introduction of a common European Foreign and Security Policy as well as European Union involvement in Justice and Home affairs. These developments were significant because the European Union was not only an economic project anymore (low politics), but became involved in high politics, which had hitherto been competences of national governments. This means that in terms of a penetration of national systems of governance, Europeanisation was considerably enhanced through the Treaty on the European Union. The project was advancing from an intergovernmental to a supranational one. However, it is worth looking at the developments that directly affected the citizens and could thus cause sceptical attitudes towards the European integration project.

Since Maastricht, there have been a considerably higher amount of referenda on matters regarding the EU, which indicate that citizens were suddenly directly involved in the decision-making process, which is quite a considerable change compared to the situation earlier. Before 1992, the general public was very little affected by the European Community, a project designed for mostly economic integration. Since 1992 this is different: citizens are much more involved and influenced due to developments such as the free movement of persons, the internal market and European citizenship. The Maastricht Treaty is thus one of the factors that caused a debate on the ‘democratic deficit’ and a lack of legitimacy of the EU.

37 Fuchs, Dieter and Andrea Schlenker, “European Identity and the Legitimacy of the EU” (Paper presented at the II Work package V Conference, Lodz, Poland, March 30-April 1 2006).
A regime is regarded legitimate by the population if its institutional structure (i.e. in this case EU institutions) correspond to personal values and ideals of the latter.\textsuperscript{39} Since citizens were sceptical towards the Treaty, it could have been the case that their democratic value orientations were not congruent with those embodied by the European Union regime, i.e. their expectations were not fulfilled. Fuchs et al. term this “normative reasons” for lack of reasoned support: the norms and values of citizens are not met by the regime.\textsuperscript{40} In the case of Maastricht, this could have been due to frustration about the ratification of the Treaty (which was, apart from France, Denmark and Ireland done by the member states governments and not the citizens themselves), and thus the fact that the general public did not perceive themselves adequately represented to have access to EU decision-making processes.\textsuperscript{41} It could, however, also been the case that citizens did not feel informed enough about the Maastricht Treaty and that a sceptical attitude could also have resulted from this. Consequently, support was significantly affected, as the referenda show, and this may also have influenced the attitude of the German population. To emphasize this, although there was no referendum on the Treaty, only about 10\% of the Germans wanted faster integration after Unification and the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and about 30\% wanted the process to be slowed down.\textsuperscript{42}

Furthermore, “instrumental reasons” seem to be one of the biggest causes for the turn in public opinion. The following figure identifies four key issues that have been introduced or at least become apparent because of the Maastricht Treaty:

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\caption{Key Issues Introduced by Maastricht Treaty}
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\textsuperscript{39} Fuchs/Schlenker, “European Identity and the Legitimacy of the EU.”
\textsuperscript{40} Fuchs et al, Euro scepticism: Images of Europe, 25.
\textsuperscript{42} Teschner, “No Longer Europe’s Europhiles”, 69.
While common defence policy and foreign policy were regarded very positively, the common currency and the internal market both seemed to have caused considerable unrest, with only 39% of West Germans and 47% of East Germans in favour of the introduction of the Euro and only 36% of West Germans and 40% of East Germans regarding the internal market as a good thing. These two key issues show that the lack of German support for the Maastricht Treaty and the lack of reasoned support in general could have been especially, although not entirely, due to economic reasons and a fear of a loss of economic stability.

The German economy suffered considerably from the costs of Reunification, which led to increasing taxation and reductions to the welfare state. If one considers the fact that reasoned support is especially a cost-benefit calculation, the German public may not have been happy that Germany became the biggest net payer to the EU after Reunification.\textsuperscript{44} Although this is also a considerable resource of power for the German government, additional net payments to the European Union may have caused dissatisfaction among the public, especially also in terms of EMU, which would have meant supporting weaker economies in Europe with European Union funds in order to smoothly introduce the currency.\textsuperscript{45} In addition, Germany has always been one of the EU member states with the lowest rates of inflation, thus, the disapproval of the Euro may also have been due to the fear of the latter.\textsuperscript{46} A third strong reason for the rejection of a common European currency could have been the specific

\textsuperscript{44} Teschner, “No Longer Europe’s Europhiles,” 64.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{46} Busch and Knelangen, “German Euroscepticism”, 91.
emotional attachment of the Germans to their currency, since the Deutschmark was one of the very few symbols of national identity that the Germans had – symbolising the hard-working and efficient period after World War II and the economic miracle. Similarly, for East Germans the Deutschmark had been a symbol of the West and freedom, so they could have been equally reluctant to give up their emotional attachment to it. The Euro could thus have been a strong cause for the lack of reasoned support among the German population.

Similarly, the introduction of the internal market could also have been an economic as well as emotional issue. Shortly before its introduction at the end of 1992, many Germans expressed fears about the internal market. The following figure shows that East as well as West Germans were most afraid of a higher crime rate and drug-dealing, more unemployment through increasing competition and too much immigration:

![Figure 4: Why the Germans have fears about the Single Market.](image)

The reasons for these fears are mostly connected to economic stability, but also to political stability and personal safety. In addition, many Germans could also have seen the European Union as an accelerator of globalisation and the negative issues this involves.

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Present Attitudes towards the EU (2007 – 2010)

Principled and Generalized Support

The year 2009 marked the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall and thus German Reunification. It is very interesting to see whether support for the European Union has decreased even more in the last twenty years or if the German population (in this case now East and West Germany) is still generally convinced of European integration. Eurobarometer 72 of autumn 2009 shows the most recent opinions of the German citizens on European integration.49

The following figure includes a few indicators for generalised support: (a) membership as a good thing (60%), (b) whether the Germans have a positive image of the EU (47%) and (c) trust in the European Commission (43%):

![Figure 5: Generalised support of the European Union.](image)

Surprisingly, the amount of Germans regarding membership as a good thing has remained stable and almost half of the German population has a positive image of the EU. This indicates that the Germans still remain emotionally attached to the EU.

In terms of principled support, the following figure is quite interesting:

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50 Ibid., 19, 22, 24.
According to the Eurobarometer 72, the most important values for Germans in Autumn 2009 were (a) peace (61%), (b) human rights (39%) and (c) respect for human life (38%). It is interesting that two of these most important values are embodied by the European Union: 54% of all the Germans think that the EU represents peace, and 37% think that it represents human rights. For 49% of Germans, the EU is also the embodiment of democracy, which is an interesting finding regarding the debate on the ‘democratic deficit.’

However, in terms of further integration, it is also interesting to note that a high majority (70%)\textsuperscript{52} of Germans thinks that integration has gone too fast, thus, although they seem emotionally tied to the project, they also appear to be afraid of the consequences of fast integration. Regardless of this fact, the last twenty years do not seem to have brought a significant change among the German population in terms of principled and generalised support. This is not surprising since diffuse/emotional support is assumed to be relatively stable over time.\textsuperscript{53}

**Reasoned Support**

Since the introduction of the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union has changed its role considerably. However, at the same time, the world has also undergone a transformation in the last twenty years. While in 1992 the Germans had to deal with a new world order, their different role within Europe and the challenges of Reunification, present Germany is confronted with new problems to solve: an economic crisis, unemployment, international terrorism and climate change, only to mention a few. Globalisation has thus brought problems

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 49.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 55.
and issues that can only be solved globally, not nationally. It is therefore not surprising that 83% of Germans see the EU as the only adequate actor to tackle environmental issues as well as to fight international terrorism. It is evident here that the EU has a fixed role in policy-making and is not to miss in a globalised world for most Germans.

Nevertheless, Maastricht still caused significant worries about the Union’s ‘democratic deficit’. However, in 2009, 49% of Germans associate the European Union with democracy as one of the three main values the Union stands for, as stated above. Is this an indicator that the Germans are satisfied with the level of democracy in the Union? At least in terms of meeting the values of the citizens, it seems that a majority of Germans appear to be generally satisfied. This could be due to the fact, for example, that the Lisbon Treaty, which is in force since 1 December 2009, aims to make the EU more democratic. Measures to do so include, for example, the introduction of a Citizens’ Initiative, which gives citizens the possibility of submitting a proposal to the European Commission to actively have a say in EU decision-making, and the fact that the European Parliament has gained more competences regarding EU legislation, the EU budget and international agreements. However, it is rather questionable whether the German general public is informed about these developments to such an extent that they are influenced by them. Nevertheless, in terms of normative reasons, the German attitude towards the EU regime seems to be supportive, which is a general improvement compared to 1992.

Considering instrumental reasons, several EU projects are important to look at in terms of German reasoned support. The following table shows the development of support for the Euro since its introduction in 2002 until 2007:

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<th>Year</th>
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*Figure 7: Support for the Euro between 2002-2007.*

From the information in the above figure, it becomes evident that there has been no notable shift in public opinion regarding the Euro. Although the percentage of people regarding the

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56 European Commission, *Flash EB* 139, 153, 165, 175, 193, 216.
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Euro advantageous for their country has slightly risen between 2002 and 2007, the percentage was again down to 39% in 2007. This is the same amount of West Germans who perceived the EMU sceptically in 1992. However, with regards to Europe, the Germans are more positive: in 2007 (73%)\(^{57}\) and 2008 (74%)\(^{58}\) considered the Euro as a good thing for Europe. It thus appears to be becoming a European symbol. Nevertheless, since this paper is examining negative attitudes towards the “penetration and influence on national and sub-national systems of governance”, the Euro seems to be a possible source for German Euroscepticism and a lack of reasoned support up to the present day.

Regarding the Internal Market, this is slightly different. The following figure shows attitudes towards four key issues that had caused fear in 1992: (a) jobs, (b) immigration, (c) price stability and (d) loss of national identity.

![Figure 8: German attitudes towards issues concerning the Internal Market 2010.\(^{59}\)](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_263_en.pdf)

Although in 1992, as was shown above, nearly half of all East Germans and nearly 30% of West Germans were afraid that the internal market would bring a major loss of jobs, in 2010 62% of Germans agree on the fact that the number of jobs within the EU has increased. An equally positive result shows the attitude on price stability: while in 1992, around 25% of both East and West Germans feared higher prices, 58% agree on the fact that the internal market


caused prices to decrease. In terms of fear of loss of national identity, only 28% think that this has been the case through the internal market in 2010, while in 1992, around 30% of West and 25% of East Germans were afraid of this. The fear of too much immigration, however, seems to be confirmed: 50% of Germans agree on the fact that since the introduction of the internal market, their country has been flooded with cheap labour. However, despite this fact, a positive perception of the internal market appears to be dominant in 2010, which is very different compared to 1992 – reasoned support in this regard seems thus to be secured.

While the internal market is perceived more positively, other issues, which were not yet of relevance in 1992, are further causes for a decline of reasoned support. Enlargement, for example, is one of these issues. According to the Eurobarometer 72, only 31% of Germans are in favour of further enlargement of the EU.\(^{60}\) This could be due to a fear of immigration from Eastern European states, for example. In 2002, 53% of Germans expected a considerable number of migrants after Eastern enlargement,\(^ {61}\) however, up to this date, Germany does not yet allowed low qualified Eastern European workers into the labour market, following a regulation that the free movement of labour may be restricted up to seven years after enlargement.\(^ {62}\) This has led to considerable debate, since Germany and Austria remain the only EU countries who still have severe restrictions against Eastern European free movement of labour, which has been excused by the recent financial crisis.\(^ {63}\) Nevertheless, enlargement remains one of the key issues that cause scepticism against EU policies.

**Conclusion**

What do the findings of this analysis tell us about German attitudes toward the EU? One general conclusion can be drawn: German Euroscepticism does indeed exist. However, an analytical distinction has to be made regarding this Euroscepticism, namely between the support of the project as a whole and the support of certain issues of EU policy-making. It is evident that East as well as West Germans were and are still very convinced of European integration and the EU as a whole, both twenty years ago and now, which is due to an emotional attachment to the European idea (principled and generalised support). A reason for this could be Western Germany’s relationship with the European community, which involved

\(^{60}\) European Commission, *Eurobarometer* 72 „Nationaler Bericht Deutschland“, 25.
\(^ {61}\) Busch and Knelangen, “German Euroscepticism”, 93.
\(^ {62}\) Ibid., 94.
a “European nation-state identity” construction. The cause for Eurosceptic tendencies appear to be mostly due to a lack of reasoned support, certain issues and reasons connected to the EU that cause fears and unrest. The introduction and ratification of the Maastricht Treaty has been identified as one of the key causes of new Eurosceptic attitudes, since it involved the European Union in political issues that had hitherto been the competences of the Member States and also directly affected the citizens. It introduced a debate regarding the ‘democratic deficit’ of the Union, a single currency and an internal market, all key issues that involved more European intervention in a country that still had to find its place and role within a new world order. Since then, the EU has more and more become involved in key policy issues, which is however not always perceived negatively by the public. The Union’s role to face international and cross-border problems is greatly valued by the German population. Also, the ‘democratic deficit’ seems not to play a key role anymore. However, it is undeniable that there always seem to be issues that are especially of an economic nature and thus follow a cost-benefit calculation that will influence reasoned support. The EU will have to focus more on these issues, promote them actively and provide more information and transparency. In general, however, the German public and the European Union seem to be able to arrange themselves with each other.
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