Theme 2
Positioning the EU: Image and Imago
“Les Affaires des Foulards”. The Hijab Controversy in France: Communitarianism and the French Policy of Minority Assimilation

Nicholas Bishop

The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.
W.B. Yeats

…the attitude of understanding-each-other has to be supplemented by the attitude of getting-out-of-each-other’s-way…
Peter Sloterdijk

Introduction

France is well known around the world for its long tradition of liberal thinking. Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s The Social Contract (1762) is perhaps the most prominent text in this respect. Spreading the ideals of the French Revolution around the world, ‘Liberté, Egalité and Fraternité’, became a rallying cry against the injustices of tyrannical governments. So it may come as some surprise that it is also in France where public outcry has led to government sanctions1 aimed at the six million resident Muslims2 that make up the largest such population in Europe and the imposition of these restrictions beg a number of questions. Among them: how has the French policy of minority assimilation given rise to this situation? What are the

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1 In 2009, when Nicolas Sarkozy first addressed both houses of the French National Assembly in his attempt at an annual State of the Nation style speech, he immediately stated that Islamic veils are not welcome in France: “The problem of the burka is not a religious problem, it's a problem of liberty and women's dignity. It's not a religious symbol, but a sign of subservience and debasement, I want to say solemnly, the burka is not welcome in France. In our country, we can't accept women prisoners behind a screen, cut off from all social life, deprived of all identity. That's not our idea of freedom.” Angelique Chrisafis, “Nicolas Sarkozy says Islamic veils are not Welcome in France,” The Guardian 22 June 2009. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/22/islamic-veils-sarkozy-speech-france (accessed 1 May 2010).

2 An estimated 50,000-100,000 are French converts to Islam; due to the French policy of secularism no such statistics are kept by the state. In the EU, which has a population of roughly 500 million (2010), there are approximately 16 million Muslims. France’s Muslim population is estimated at being anywhere between 4 million on the low end to 6 million on the high end but the country is regarded as having the highest Muslim population on the continent. The majority of French Muslims have a North African heritage, coming from Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia.
existing concepts in French society or the historical context that prevents Muslims in particular from greater integration? And as French Islamic scholar Olivier Roy critically reasons: “Is Islam such a threat, or has French identity reached such a crisis point that a few hundred veiled girls and bearded preachers can overwhelm it?”

The status of Islam in Europe is reaching fever pitch, spurred on by the heinous crimes of extremists such as the commuter train bombing in Madrid and the assassination of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam in 2004, the London underground bombings in the summer of 2005, and not to mention the impact of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the attacks of 9/11 in the United States. This has led to the imposition of stricter laws for Muslim immigrants across Europe, sparking off France-wide civil rioting in 2005, and a Swiss ban on the construction of minarets in November of 2009. Most symbolically these new laws include the controversial ban on headscarves in French public schools, with similar legislation proposed in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Bulgaria, and with a ban already in place in secular Turkey.

During the early 2000s, the government, academics and the media in France all attempted to link headscarves, in French *foulard*, with a varying number of social problems affecting the country, including the rise of fundamental Islam, the denigration of women, especially in the *banlieues*, and the growth of communitarian values, which is a clear break with the Republican emphasis on *laïcité*, of French secularism. As a result Bernard Stasi, the Ombudsman of France from 1998-2004, was singled out by then President Jacques Chirac to head a commission to look into the issue (the Stasi Commission). The subsequent hearings and media frenzy presented Islam and its more radical elements as such a clear and present danger to the sanctity of the *République Française* that on 15 March 2004 a new law was passed that states, “In public elementary, middle and high schools, the wearing of signs or clothing, which conspicuously manifest students’ religious affiliations, is prohibited”.

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5 It should be made clear to the reader that in French as in English there are many words used to refer to headscarves. These include veil, hijab, and headscarf, while in French *voile*, *foulard*, and *hijab* are common. However, it should also be made clear that *veil* can also be used to refer not only to headscarves but also to burkas and niqabs, which are forms of full body veils.
6 Poor suburbs, especially those surrounding Paris or other major metropolitan areas in France.
7 Art. 1 of the Law of March 15, 2004 (No. 2004-228) regulating, in application of the principle of laïcité, the wearing of signs or clothing which conspicuously manifest religious affiliations in public elementary, middle, and high schools, JORF (Official Organ of the French Republic) number 65 of March 17, 2004 page 5190. Furthermore, the definition of what is conspicuous follows as: “The clothing and religious signs prohibited are conspicuous signs such as a large cross, a veil, or a
law fails to single out Islam but in the context of the time it was written it is understood to be aimed solely at Muslim girls wearing headscarves. Yet when so few girls actually wear a headscarf and most disputes have never moved outside of the public school system, why has this debate become such a focal point in France? Why does the French government see elimination of headscarves as a cure for various societal ills? And what is the role of laïcité or French secularism in all of this?

Over the past decade many books, as well as journal and newspaper articles have been published detailing the headscarf controversy and the situation of Muslims in France. The following works have been of exceptional value in the writing of this paper: specifically the work of John Bowen and American historian of France, Joan Wallach Scott in regards to headscarves and the historical context of the issue have been indispensable. Additionally, Olivier Roy, scholar of political Islam for information on Islam in France, and Roy and Jean Baubérot, French historian and sociologist, for their studies on laïcité. For references on communitarianism, the work of the political philosopher Charles Taylor has been of immense guidance, as has that of Canadian political philosopher, Will Kymlicka for his research into immigration, multiculturalism and minority rights.

In this paper, by relying on the above-mentioned scholars as well as others, I will delve into the heart of the headscarf debate, offering a detailed account of the issues at stake by beginning with a description of the controversy itself. Then I will provide a glance into the historical background stemming from French colonial policy in North Africa, which has largely engendered the current situation. Next, I will discuss the French Republican ideal of laïcité or secularism and the way it affects the assimilation of minorities in France by examining the relationship between the individual and the state. Laïcité is what the British social theorist W.B. Gallie termed in 1956, “an essentially contested concept,” a term that due to the general lack of agreement on its meaning has come to be a source of conflict. Finally, I will propose a possible solution to the problems of immigrant assimilation in the form of communitarianism.


1989 The very first ‘affair du foulard’ or headscarf incident occurred on 3 October 1989 when three Muslim girls (two sisters of Moroccan extraction and another girl of Tunisian skullcap. Not regarded as signs indicating religious affiliation are discreet signs, which can be, for example, medallions, small crosses, stars of David, hands of Fatima, or small Korans.”

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... were expelled from their school on the outskirts of Paris in the town of Creil for refusing to remove their headscarves. The school is part of a Zone d’Éducation Prioritaire (ZEP) or a Priority Education Zone. Implemented in 1981, this French government programme designates schools in disadvantaged areas with a high degree of class or religious tension to receive additional resources in the spirit of equal opportunity. The principal, Eugène Chenière, upon expelling the girls, said he was merely enforcing the policy of laïcité, a pillar of French republican values. As Joan Wallach Scott says in her 2007 work Politics of the Veil, this action appeared to be a simple case of school discipline but when coupled with the rise of militant Islam in the form of Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa against British novelist Salman Rushdie for his Satanic Verses, the first Palestinian intifada against Israel and domestic terrorism in France committed by Algerian groups, press coverage made headscarves the “symbol of a challenge to the very existence of the republic”.9 The matter was later put to the highest administrative court in France, the Conseil d’État or State Council, which ruled that wearing religious symbols in school was not contrary to the principle of laïcité as long as the liberties of other students were not infringed upon.

1994 As in 1989, in 1994 Eugène Chenière called the wearing of headscarves in public schools into question. Putting his time in the spotlight to good use he was elected as a deputy to the National Assembly and produced a bill that would affect a ban on “ostentatious” symbols of religion. Despite the bill failing to pass, François Bayrou, then minister of education, issued a ministerial pronouncement to the same effect and as a result 69 girls wearing the veil were expelled from schools across the country. However, the pronouncement was later overturned again by the State Council, leaving it to teachers to interpret the actions of their students. This led to some schools adopting new measures regarding headscarves; girls were allowed to cover their heads with bandanas instead of a headscarf which was thought to prohibit students from clearly seeing the teacher and many times requirements were given as to the proper size and color. These actions did not serve as a definitive answer to the problem though and tensions remained high.

2003 In 2003, Nicolas Sarkozy, then minister of the interior, again revived the headscarf controversy. He insisted that Muslim women pose for official photographs bareheaded in the wake of 9/11. Schools again became a battleground, leading then President Jacques Chirac to appoint the Stasi Commission to investigate the issue and promulgate a law to act as a permanent solution. The commission came up with a wide variety of policies meant to

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improve the tolerance of religious practices in France, recommending the addition of religious history and philosophy to school curriculums, the recognition of Jewish and Islamic holy days, and alternatives to fish and pork at school cafeteria’s on Friday, all designed to show that the law did not apply solely to Muslims and thus was not discriminatory. Yet the only recommendation accepted by Chirac was the law banning conspicuous signs of religious affiliation. As Scott puts it so brilliantly, the message was clear: “… there would be no compromises or mediation—it was either Islam or the republic”. The next section will provide the basic historical framework surrounding Islam and France.

**Historical Context**

Through the course of French involvement in North Africa, Muslims and Arabs have been depicted as inferior peoples, incapable of self-improvement and thus unable to assimilate French cultural values. Signs of this inferiority have ranged from religious practices, to presumed sexual orientations, to traditional forms of dress such as the veil or headscarf. Expressions of bias against Muslims stem from a deep-seated psychological preoccupation with ‘the other’ and racial intolerance dating back to the French conquest of Algeria in 1830. This section will address the historical context through which the present debate surrounding headscarves has arisen.

**French Colonialism in North Africa**

Beginning with the conquest of Algeria and later the protectorate status given to Tunisia (1881) and Morocco (1912), the French sought to transform Islam through its interactions with enlightenment idealism. This civilizing mission was intended to emancipate the Muslim from their own “savage instincts and ignorant behaviour”. Assimilation of French language and culture, like in so many other colonial empires, was equated with modernization and void of the restraining influences of overzealous religious impulses. In 1848 Algeria was integrated into France and in 1865 citizenship was extended to settlers of European origin but Muslims continued to be classified as a subject people with no voting or representation rights.

**Immigration to France**

During the First World War, labor shortages in France led to increased immigration from Algeria. The jobs migrants found were unskilled and physically demanding with next to no

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11 French methods of colonial assimilation should be noted as distinct from those of other imperial powers like the British or Dutch.
social support, and consequently many migrants turned to crime. Thought of as criminals or sexual deviants, Muslims lived in isolation from the general French population in slums on the outskirts of major cities like Marseille, where living conditions were poor and racism high. Assimilation proved for some the only way out of this environment. By taking a French name or intermarrying with a French girl the potential for economic improvement of migrant men increased. Yet, despite the high levels of prejudice faced on a daily basis many migrants clung to their traditional way of life and dress, forming ethnic communities at the same time.12

War in Algeria 1954-1962

By 1954 years of civil unrest led to outright war between the Algerian nationalist movement (FLN, National Liberation Front) and the French colonial rulers. It was during this time that the headscarf or veil was politicized for the first time. The French in Algeria responded to the war by insisting that theirs was a civilizing mission to improve the plight of the Muslim. Those in opposition to the war back in France proclaimed that Muslims could never assimilate and any further presence in Algeria was in vain. In September of 1959 President Charles de Gaulle, who would concede the war to the FLN in 1962, argued in an openly racist diatribe that Muslims would never be able to integrate into French society:

Arabs are Arabs, French are French. Do you think that French society can absorb 10 million Muslims, who tomorrow will be 20 million and the day after 40 million? If we integrate, if all the Arabs and Berbers of Algeria were to be considered French, how would we stop them from coming to the metropole13, where the standard of living is so much higher? My village would no longer be Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises, but Colombey-les-Deux-Mosquées.14

The legacy of colonialism is apparent in the French treatment of contemporary Muslim populations. No matter how long these so-called “immigrants” live in France they remain outcasts and are stigmatized by society at large. Their presumed inability to assimilate French cultural norms has been attributed to their religion of which the veil, as Scott describes it, “has figured as a potent political emblem”.15

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13 The Metropole refers to mainland or continental France.
15 Scott, The Politics of the Veil, 89.
Conflicting views on Laïcité

The idea of laïcité or secularism has been prevalent in France since the introduction of the Ferry laws in the 1880s, which prohibited religious education beginning in 1882. Full-blown separation of state and religion was later cemented with the law of 1905, which withdrew the French state’s official recognition and financial support from religions, effectively destroying Catholicism’s vice grip on education. The Slovenian critical theorist Slavoj Žižek has discussed the headscarf ban in France saying that: “this prohibition is the most oppressive of them all – why? Because it prohibits the very feature, which constitutes the (socio-institutional) identity of the other: it des-institutionalizes this identity, changing it into an irrelevant personal idiosyncrasy.”¹⁶ The French republican ideology of laïcité seems to be facing off against the identity crisis that Islam has unleashed on French society. This section explores the way in which state secularism affects the individual in France and how laïcité acts as an agent of prejudice and discrimination against Muslims.

Bowen tells us that, “According to the Republican way of thinking, living together in a society requires agreement on basic values…. [French Republicans] seek to rigorously and consistently justify policies according to this idea”.¹⁷ Here we are brought back to the founding values of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Social Contract, where institutions and policy is designed by the state in order to integrate people into French society. If these mechanisms function properly and people are made into citizens, accepting the values and behaviors that signify being French, then the state can increase immigration and extend its borders. This can be accomplished most readily by educating citizens according to the preferred mould of the state in public schools. The noteworthy importance of these schools in the formation of Frenchmen is something attested to in Eugen Weber’s seminal 1976 thesis, Peasants into Frenchmen.¹⁸ In pre-Revolutionary France, the nation was viewed as dangerously fractious, with the majority of people outside of Paris speaking regional dialects or totally separate languages like Basque or Breton. As a reaction to this environment new integration projects were implemented to unify the nation, exemplified by the program of national education during the Third Republic (1870-1940). Therefore, it has only been since the late 19th century that a true sense of national solidarity developed in France.

Olivier Roy, the preeminent scholar of Islam in France, remarks that Islamic theology is highly decentralized, opening Islam to debate and interpretation of religious texts and philosophies. This leads to a pluralistic theological culture instead of a static one like papal Catholicism. Roy continues by suggesting that although some Muslims seek to identify themselves by forming communities as a means of protesting the legitimacy of their religion, these identifications are voluntary in nature, as they are no longer tied to the actions of a state. This is clearly seen on a generational context, where youths look to distance themselves from parents who have assimilated French cultural values thus giving up their original way of life. 19 Laïcité and the inconsistent way in which the Stasi Commission recommended it be implemented, 20 seems to be at the root rather than the solution to many disputes. In Alsace-Moselle, which was lost to Germany in 1871 and regained after WWI, the separation of church and state law of 1905 was never invoked and thus religious curriculum is still a part of daily school life.

When applied correctly, secularism is a wonderful tool. Creating a public school system in France free of religious affiliations was intended to end indoctrination by the Catholic Church, which has had a corrupting influence on French society in the past 21 and continues to wield considerable social power. Yet it is clear today that Islam, which is a small minority, is being discriminated against not just because it is different but also because it is seen as a religion of immigrants. Given the preponderant weight of Christianity in France and the state’s support of over two million children enrolled in mainly Catholic private schools, 22 laïcité seems to be as inflexible as the fundamental Islam it is supposed to contest.

20 The Stasi Commission recommended the addition of one Islamic and one Jewish holiday to the school calendar yet was ‘loath’ to recommend the institution of laïcité in Alsace-Moselle on the grounds of respect for the wishes of the local population and the historical variability of laïcité itself; so much for laïcité’s universal application.
21 The Law of Separation of Church and State in 1905 can be seen as a direct result of the Catholic Church’s stranglehold over French society especially in rural areas. The law was also meant to remove monarchist elements from society and move towards republicanism by placing total authority with the central government. Text of Law from French Foreign Ministry: http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070169&dateTexte=20110106, (accessed 6 January 2011); Henry Samuel, France 'no longer a Catholic country'. 10 January 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1539093/France-no-longer-a-Catholic-country.html, (accessed 6 January 2011).
Communitarianism, Communalism, and Multiculturalism

Up until the 1960s it was generally agreed by academics and governments alike that assimilation was the social process by which a common national identity would best be forged amongst those who have been referred to by Woodsworth as the “strangers within our gates”. In Republican France the idea of assimilation still plays a dominant role in the way newcomers are integrated into the state. Assimilation was also the ideological basis for French colonial policy in the 19th and 20th centuries. In theory, by internalizing the French language and culture the subjects of the colonies could eventually become French themselves, something that requires total and overriding allegiance to the state at the loss of regional, ethnic or religious loyalties. This section will discuss a possible solution for some of France’s social ills found in multicultural values.

In French political theory, all Frenchmen are treated as individuals with equal rights and freedoms. There is no room for separate or private identities or communities, which are divorced from that of being French. Unlike America, where you might encounter someone who defines him/herself as African-American, there are no hyphenated existences in France. That is to say that an individual’s social, ethnic, and religious origins are irrelevant before the law, it is the subversion of these traits, which creates the abstract nature of French citizens and in theory forge a nation devoid of minorities. The reality though, is a nation full of “invisible” minorities. Communitarianism offers a contrasting perspective emphasizing the need to balance individual rights and interests with that of the community as a whole, and argues that individual citizens are shaped by the cultures and values of their communities. It is for this reason that communitarianism, communalism, and multiculturalism are viewed negatively. From the French perspective they only create (ethnic) tension within society and jeopardize the sanctity of the ideals of the French Revolution, preventing the equality that is an individual’s right. This universalism, this sameness of character, is the foundation for French republican political theory and yet it is also a major source of conflict. This situation is most evident in the case of people with North African heritage.

A recent French/American study conducted by researchers from Stanford University and the Sorbonne entitled “Are French Muslims Discriminated Against in Their Own Country?”

26 These people are known in French as beurs; people born in France of North African parents, their generation reached maturity in the 1980s.
found that Muslims applying for work have 2.5 times fewer chances than Christians do of a positive reply and monthly salaries of Muslims were roughly EUR 400 less than those of Christians. The study, which finds religion, not country of origin the main obstacle to employment, goes on to report that, “the discrimination Muslim candidates endure in the French labor market seems [therefore] to have concrete repercussions on their standard of living”.27 Having demonstrated the problems Muslim face in France, what can be done to correct or at least improve their situation?

Charles Taylor, an eminent political philosopher, argues that as most societies are gradually becoming more multicultural, the only difference between them is whether minorities are recognized or not; this is what most strongly influences identity, as non-recognition can cause exclusion and pain, recognition being seen as a basic human right:

Equal recognition is not just the appropriate mode for a healthy democratic society... its refusal can inflict damage on those who are denied it. The projection of an inferior or demeaning image on another can actually distort and oppress, to the extent that the image is internalized.28

Taylor’s argument is a persuasive one. By the simple act of recognition many of France’s problems with Muslims could come to an end. France is taking steps to correct this situation, as shown in 2003 with the creation of the French Council for the Muslim Religion (Conseil Français du Culte Musulman, CFCM), a body which holds elections29 and is intended to play the role of interlocutor between the French state and the Islamic religion in France. Yet, there still remains a dire need for greater intercultural dialogue.

The aversion in France to the implementation of “American-style” multicultural policies must be overcome and the disassociation of multiculturalism with the American model could be a first step towards implementation. Canada has demonstrated to the world successful integration not assimilation of immigrants is more than just possible but practical and necessary to achieve ethnic harmony and balance.30 Canada welcomes over 200,000 new

29 Representatives are chosen by mosques, not individuals and not all mosques in France take part in the election procedures (of 1316 mosques invited only 995 participated), hence limiting the representative capacity of the CFCM. John Bowe, Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves, 48-57.
30 Multiculturalism has been an official policy of the Canadian Government since 1971, recognizing that Canadians, based on their ethnicity, experience unequal access to resources and opportunities. In 1988, the government adopted the Canadian Multiculturalism Act. The policy objectives of the Act are to encourage the recognition and preservation of culturally diverse communities, ensuring that all individuals enjoy equal treatment and equal protection under the law, and to encourage and assist the social, cultural, economic and political institutions of Canada to be both respectful and inclusive of Canada's multicultural character. “Canadian Multiculturalism Act”, Department of Justice, http://lois.justice.gc.ca/en/C-18.7/.
Canadians through immigration annually, and affirming multiculturalism has become a distinguishing characteristic of Canadian identity. By extending rights to immigrants this “nation-centered” approach portrays a unique type of nationalism, one that is inclusive of ethnic diversity. Thus, it is as Canadian citizens, states Kymlicka, that immigrants exercise their rights and contribute to the nation-building process by learning an official language (English or French), paying taxes, enrolling in school and exercising various other citizenship rights.³¹ Obviously, the Canadian model of multiculturalism would need to be adapted for France but at a minimum it provides a framework and a direction for the future and a possible solution to decades of simmering ethnic tension.

Conclusion

In France the vast majority of people have never had any experience with fundamentalist Islam and therefore have little stake in the issue, past what the media frenzy surrounding headscarves has created. This total lack of objectivity on the part of the media, something that is increasingly seen around the world with non-stop 24-hour news channels, is one of the main problems in properly confronting the issue. As Peter Sloterdijk, the German philosopher has put it, “More communication means at first above all more conflict”. This is why he was right to claim that the attitude of “understanding-each-other” has to be supplemented by the attitude of “getting-out-of-each-other’s-way”.³² And up to a point there is no denying the importance of this statement. Intercultural understanding as the result of dialogue must also be tempered with respect and distance for the independent actions and behaviors of others.

The French ban on headscarves in public schools is explained through the concepts brought forth in this paper. In France, for many people the headscarf has become a sign of the rise of Islam, beginning in 1989 and continuing to the present, and the malaise into which French society has fallen. As immigration increases the seemingly homogeneous characteristics of post-war France are vanishing, while some of its most important republican concepts and the methods used to implement them, like the imposition of laïcité in public school education, are coming into conflict. It is clear that due to its essentially contested nature a consensus on what actions laïcité actually warrants cannot be and will never be defined.

The so-called threat of fundamental Islam has come to play on preexisting psychological images of the other, developed through France’s colonial past in North Africa. Yet, the French state, rather than adapting to the rapidly changing world around it, has for the most part chosen to remain insular, something evidenced in 2002 during the French presidential election, when Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader of the far-right National Front party, came in a close second to Jacques Chirac. A “Fortress Europe” mentality is exactly the opposite direction France and other Western European countries need to be headed in.

The President of France, Nicolas Sarkozy, has rushed to find a solution to the questions surrounding French Muslims, capitalizing on the opportunities caused by fears of growing ethnic tension to refocus the debate on the banning of headscarves and burqas instead of creating a forum for real political dialogue and shifting policy towards accommodating and recognizing diversity. Politicians are always driven by looming elections, therefore short-term, popular actions are taken in the place of well-reasoned decisions, something that is clear from the disjunction between the abstract qualities and social complexities of the headscarf ban. Patrick Weil, a member of the Stasi Commission, claims that the virtue of the law is its role in protecting the individual (girls who are genuinely forced into wearing a veil). While this is an important standpoint, it must also be recognized that some Muslims girls in France wear headscarves simply because it is their right and a personal choice to do so and not because they are oppressed. More importantly the larger issue of the status of Muslims in France should not be brushed aside or detracted from by the headscarf question.

In the majority of countries throughout the world permanent, large-scale immigration does not meet with much support from the general public. Opposition to this type of immigration can be found in policies that are meant to “exclude, marginalize or assimilate immigrants” and reflects a public perception of immigration as a burden or threat, ideas that are espoused by Will Kymlicka and Keith Banting, which recognize that the average person is typically torn between psychological concepts of the other, a fact which is well known from the work of Edward Said, and their desire to be tolerant. In France there is a wide scope of political ideas from communism on the left to the National Front party on the far right. Yet, there is general consensus that Islam should not be viewed with the same degree of tolerance shown to so many other philosophies and religions, political or otherwise. This is a situation that calls for immediate and pressing change.

Now more than ever before, there is a growing disconnect between ethnicity and religion. As Olivier Roy has recently stated, “more and more Muslims want to be acknowledged as believers belonging to a faith community, but not necessarily as members of a different cultural community”. Making this distinction is fundamental for fostering a deeper understanding of the diverse and constantly changing world in which we live. Finally, to the question, “Can Islam become a generally accepted part of the French social landscape?”, the answer, whether grudgingly or resoundingly so, must be yes if the ideals of the French Revolution, ‘Liberté, Egalité and Fraternité’, continue to hold true.

Bibliography


