

University of Groningen

## Global Strategy Choices (GSC)

Zwitter, Andrej; Kettle, Lawrence

*DOI:*  
[10.13140/RG.2.1.2544.7528](https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.1.2544.7528)

**IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from it. Please check the document version below.**

*Document Version*  
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

*Publication date:*  
2015

[Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database](#)

*Citation for published version (APA):*

Zwitter, A., & Kettle, L. (2015). Global Strategy Choices (GSC): Prognosis and Strategic Planning for European Foreign and Security Policy . (oiip Working Paper ; No. 82). Vienna: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (oiip). <https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.1.2544.7528>

**Copyright**

Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).

**Take-down policy**

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

*Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): <http://www.rug.nl/research/portal>. For technical reasons the number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.*

**Global Strategy Choices (GSC):**

**Prognosis and Strategic Planning for European Foreign and  
Security Policy**

**Andrej Zwitter and Lawrence Kettle**

Working Paper 82 / July 2015



## **Abstract**

The European Security Strategy (ESS) is currently being reformulated. This working paper puts forward a new methodological approach in the construction of global strategies for stakeholders in the international system. It makes the case that contemporary strategy formulation (including the ESS) insufficiently assesses contemporary global security challenges. One reason is the sectoral specific analysis that restricts the ability of the analyst to perceive the problem in other areas, and of the interconnected nature of modern security threats to various referent objects. This working paper takes the European Union (EU) as a case in point when regarding strategies with a specific sectoral/level dimension. The EU has advanced toward more comprehensive strategies; however, these still remain confined to specific sectors and levels of analysis (mostly the national level) thereby inhibiting comprehensive analysis.

This working paper proposes a new method of global strategy formulation by adopting the Copenhagen School's constructivist approach as a basis. The working paper focuses on a particular aspect of EU foreign and security policy. The investigation takes the European Security Strategy (ESS) into focus and analyses its structure and its ability to meet contemporary security challenges. The paper also questions whether the ESS is able to meet the security challenges facing the EU. Adopting a new methodology for the construction of global strategies will be a prerequisite if the EU intends to remain capable of meeting the security challenges it faces. Only by systematically understanding security threats in a multilevel and multi-sectoral manner, will the EU be able to construct comprehensive strategies in order to adequately reform the ESS. The subject of this paper has recently become highly relevant. The European Council of the 25-26 June 2015 concluded that the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was to continue to conduct a strategic review and prepare an EU global strategy on foreign and security policy to be submitted by June 2016.

## **Zusammenfassung**

Die Europäische Sicherheitsstrategie (ESS) wird derzeit überarbeitet. Kontemporäre Strategien auf nationaler und internationaler Ebene (wie auch die gegenwärtige ESS) versäumen es oft, globale Sicherheitsprobleme umfassend und multidimensional zu analysieren. Um solchen Mängeln entgegenzuwirken, formuliert dieses Arbeitspapier einen neuen, methodologischen Ansatz zur Analyse und Entwicklung von globalen Strategien für international wirkende Akteure. Ein Grund dieses Mangels besteht darin, dass Sicherheitsanalysten oft dazu tendieren Probleme nicht sektorübergreifend, sondern für sich abgegrenzt zu betrachten. Dieses Arbeitspapier zieht die EU

Sicherheitsstrategie als ein Beispiel für abgegrenzte Analysen dieser Art heran. Obwohl die ESS einen großen Fortschritt im Sinne einer multisektoralen Auffassung von Sicherheitsproblemen darstellt, ist sie in ihrer Implementierung stark sektoral begrenzt und beschränkt sich auf enge Analyseebenen vor allem auf nationalstaatlicher Ebene.

Dieses Arbeitspapier beschreibt eine neue Methodologie der Entwicklung globaler (multisektoraler/multilevel) Strategien auf Grundlage der sozialkonstruktivistischen Kopenhagener Schule. Es analysiert einen spezifischen Aspekt der Europäischen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, nämlich die Struktur und das Vermögen der ESS gegenwärtige Sicherheitsbedrohungen umfassend zu analysieren und ihnen entgegenzusteuern. Das Papier führt weiter aus, dass die EU, wenn sie weiterhin eine den gegenwärtigen Bedrohungen adäquate Sicherheitsstrategie verfolgen will, eine neue ESS verfassen muss, welche Sicherheitsbedrohungen auf verschiedenen Analyseebenen und multisektoral zu bekämpfen versteht. Der Gegenstand dieses Arbeitspapiers wurde unlängst besonders relevant. Der Europäische Rat vom 25-26 Juni 2015 hat beschlossen, dass die Hohe Repräsentantin der EU für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik eine Überprüfung der ESS vornehmen und eine globale EU Strategie zur Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik entwickeln möge, die bis Juni 2016 vorzulegen sei.

### **Keywords**

European Union, European Security Strategy, Security Studies, Copenhagen School, Strategy, Global Strategy

## **Authors**

**Univ. – Prof. Dr. Andrej Zwitter** holds the NGIZ Chair in International Relations at the Faculty of Law, the University of Groningen, and is also a senior researcher at the Austrian Institute for International Affairs (oiip) on sabbatical. Furthermore he holds an honorary senior research fellow position at the Liverpool Hope University. In his function as NGIZ-Chair he heads the Political Sciences section at the department of Legal Theory. Prof. Zwitter has expertise in developing humanitarian and security analysis tools and has amongst others trained Dutch diplomats and German peacekeepers on matters of security and political analysis and human rights. His current research foci include ethics in international politics and law, Big Data ethics, state of emergency politics, as well as law and politics of humanitarian action.

**Lawrence Kettle, MA**, currently holds the Bruno Kreisky Fellowship at the Austrian Institute for International Affairs (oiip). His research specializations are in the areas of International Security and Security Concepts as well as an interest in United Nations peace and security operations (peacekeeping to peace-enforcement). His current research areas are Strategy, Global Strategy and European Union foreign and security policy.

**Table of Contents:**

Introduction:.....7  
    European Debate.....8  
    Security Studies .....12  
    The Copenhagen School.....14  
Theoretical Framework .....16  
    The Nature of Global Strategy Problems .....17  
    Sectors.....18  
    Levels of Analysis.....19  
    Tracing Security Problems.....20  
        Diagram 1.1: Security Sector Matrix: Matrix of sectoral and level interaction .....21  
Brief Case Study Examples: Libya and Ukraine .....22  
The European Security Strategy (ESS): .....23  
    Diagram 1.1: Illustration of the EU Maritime Security Strategy within the Security Sector Matrix.....27  
    Diagram 1.2: Illustration of the EU Energy Security Strategy within the Security Sector Matrix.....28  
    Diagram 1.3: Illustration of the European Security Strategy (ESS) within the Security Sector Matrix.....30  
    Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)32  
Conclusion: .....34

## Introduction

The issue of terrorism may start with a terrorist attack such as 9/11, but as we have seen with the case of 9/11 what initially started as security problem that was military and traditional state security orientated has evolved into a problem that requires strategies and actions that focus on combating terrorism in all its forms from cyber-security, socio-cultural security, political security et cetera. What started as an attack on the United States rapidly evolved into global problem present in many states and areas of the globe.

These problems are considered in this paper as strategic security problems. These problems have a trans-border dimension to them and include examples such as the financial crisis, terrorism, global food security, climate change et cetera. They are such in nature that they have an ability to influence all levels of the 'international system'. This can happen both dramatically and simultaneously and means it is impossible and unfeasible for one stakeholder within this system to confront these global strategic problems by itself. The specific nature of these problems as trans-national and multi-sectoral challenges makes them especially problematic when predicting their emergence as a security challenge and developing strategies to combat their effects and tackle their root causes.

Considering the European Union (EU) and its security strategy, the European Security Strategy (ESS), which this paper analyses its comprehensiveness and assesses its ability to tackle contemporary security challenges, this working paper attempts to construct a methodology for global strategy formulation, one that can be applied as an analytical tool for the EU and one that can be used as a foundational basis for an updated, stronger security strategy that is global in its approach. This working paper takes the EU as the main stakeholder for analysis in the 'international system', and assesses its capabilities and constraints with regard to its ability to perform as a credible security actor. This paper also creates a methodology that allows for the provision of forecasting and scenario building for European security challenges.

Recently, the EU has acknowledged the need to construct a global strategy. Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, announced that she was pursuing a new security strategy for the Union. Following a report that the High Representative gave at the European Council meeting on 25 and 26 June 2015, the European Council



concluded that 'Europe's security environment had changed dramatically',<sup>1</sup> and that the High Representative was authorized to prepare 'an EU global strategy on foreign and security policy... to be submitted to the European Council by June 2016'.<sup>2</sup> In light of these recent developments, and the contemporary debates in academia, this working paper offers a comprehensive reflection and recommendation on the practical and theoretical developments needed to make the ESS effective in meeting contemporary security challenges faced by the EU.

## European Debate

Efforts to consolidate a European security strategy that focuses on a broad range of issues have been successful, as with the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) document.<sup>3</sup> This specifically highlighted key threats and acknowledged that the nature of security threats had shifted at the end of the Cold War. It also showed a change of understanding in the complexities of these problems by acknowledging that 'none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means'.<sup>4</sup> The cooperative element in tackling these security challenges is specifically highlighted. 'There are few if any problems we can deal with on our own...International cooperation is a necessity'.<sup>5</sup> The EU begins to recognize, as this paper argues, that these '*new threats*' cannot be viewed in a one-dimensional manner. These problems transcend allocations to a particular sphere, and in order for the EU and its member states to further its foreign and security policy objectives, the only way to do so is by close cooperation via comprehensive security strategies.

Further efforts to consolidate EU foreign policy, and therefore EU global strategy, were laid down in the Treaty of Lisbon, which came into force in 2009.<sup>6</sup> The ESS itself underwent a 5 year review in

---

<sup>1</sup> European Council, 'European Council meeting (25 and 26 June 2015) – Conclusions', (EUCO 22/15), (Brussels, 26 June 2015). p5. Available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2015/06/25-26/> (Accessed 26 June 2015).

<sup>2</sup> *ibid*, p5.

<sup>3</sup> European Union (EU), 'A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy' (Brussels, 12 December 2003). Available at <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf> (Accessed 3 June 2014).

<sup>4</sup> EU, 'A Secure Europe in a Better World', p. 7.

<sup>5</sup> EU, 'A Secure Europe in a Better World', p. 13.

<sup>6</sup> European Union (EU), 'Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community', (2007/C 306/01), (13 December 2007). Available at <http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty.html> (Accessed 4 May 2014).

2008 that supposedly reinforced the strategy's validity,<sup>7</sup> and in 2010 the Council of the European Union adopted the EU Internal Security Strategy (ISS) in an effort to formulate comprehensive internal policies and to create a common European Security Model.<sup>8</sup> This ISS made advances in the direction of this paper by understanding that, in terms of a security concept, it requires 'a wide and comprehensive concept which straddles multiple sectors'.<sup>9</sup>

However, since the financial crisis, the waning of American influence and a resurgence of multipolarity the EU has had to face an uncomfortable reality; that 'Europeans seem to be losing power and influence in the world at a startling speed'.<sup>10</sup> As the insistence has been on unified action, and for its member states to act as one homogenized entity, this loss of influence is particularly concerning for EU member states who invest heavily in the EU system. It is this shift in the fortunes of European prominence that has triggered calls for an urgent strategic rethink.

Within the last few years, the need to reevaluate the ESS and the EU's foreign and security policies in general has proceeded on the possibility of creating a new global strategy for the EU. The European Global Strategy project (EGS) initiated at the behest of four EU member states' foreign ministers and Notre Europe's 'Think Global – Act European IV' project reflect the growing perceptions of the importance for the EU to be more global in its strategic approach; both projects in their proposals set forward recommendations to this effect. The EGS,<sup>11</sup> Notre Europe,<sup>12</sup> as well as various policy briefs and other publications from the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR),<sup>13</sup> talk about the

---

<sup>7</sup> European Union (EU), 'Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security for a Changing World', (S407/08), (Brussels, 11 December 2008). Available at [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf) (Accessed 26 June 2014).

<sup>8</sup> Council of the European Union, 'Draft Internal Security Strategy for the European Union: Towards a European Security Model', (5842/2/10), (Brussels, 23 February 2010). Available at <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?!=EN&f=ST%205842%202010%20REV%202> (Accessed 1 July 2014).

<sup>9</sup> Council of the EU, 'Draft Internal Security Strategy', p. 2.

<sup>10</sup> Dennison, S. Gowan, R. Kundnani, H. Leonard, M and Witney, N. 'Why Europe Needs A New Global Strategy' (European Council on Foreign Relations, ECFR, October 2013), p. 2. Available at [http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR90\\_STRATEGY\\_BRIEF\\_AW.pdf](http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR90_STRATEGY_BRIEF_AW.pdf) (Accessed 4 April 2014).

<sup>11</sup> European Global Strategy (EGS), 'Towards a European Global Strategy: Securing European Influence in a Changing World', (28 May 2013). Available at <http://www.euglobalstrategy.eu/> (Accessed 11 April 2014).

<sup>12</sup> Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute, 'Think Global – Act European IV: Thinking Strategically about the EU's External Action' (Paris: Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute, April 2013). Available at <http://www.notre-europe.eu/media/tgae2013.pdf?pdf=ok> (Accessed 15 December 2014).

<sup>13</sup> Dennison, S. Gowan, R. Kundnani, H. Leonard, M and Witney, N. 'Why Europe Needs A New Global Strategy' (European Council on Foreign Relations, ECFR, October 2013). Available at [http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR90\\_STRATEGY\\_BRIEF\\_AW.pdf](http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR90_STRATEGY_BRIEF_AW.pdf) (Accessed 4 April 2014).

ineffectiveness of current strategy. In *'Why Europe Needs a New Global Strategy'* the ECFR accuses the European Security Strategy (ESS) of being out-of-date and ineffectual.<sup>14</sup>

In 2013 it was hoped that more coherence would be created at the European Council meeting when discussing, among other things, the CSDP. Whilst the Council called for new policy frameworks and strategies in specific target areas<sup>15</sup> its focus was on defence infrastructure and 'Military cooperation proposals were conspicuously absent. And it is here that European defence is most damagingly falling short of its potential, and its declared ambition'.<sup>16</sup>

However, thanks in part to contemporary events such as the Ukraine crisis and the threat of Islamic State (IS) the weaknesses of the ESS has finally been acknowledged at the European level. At the informal meeting of EU Defence Ministers on 18<sup>th</sup> February 2015 in Riga it was stated that, 'The Ministers agreed that Heads of States and Government will need to address current security and defence concerns and open a revision of the European Security Strategy.'<sup>17</sup> From this agreement the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy announced she was pursuing a new security strategy and would issue a report to the European Council. Following the meeting of the European Council of 25 and the 26 June 2015 it was concluded that the EU needs a global strategy for its foreign and security policy.<sup>18</sup> This new global strategy is to be developed in cooperation with the member states and will be submitted to the European Council by June 2016.<sup>19</sup> With this announcement has come the opportunity for fresh debate into how the new global strategy will be constructed; whether it will take aspects from the existing ESS and security strategies and incorporate it into the new strategy; what will be the new identified threats to European security; and how will the strategy, and the EU, be able to adapt to future changes and new threats? Fresh debate has recently come to light with new perspectives on reforming the ESS,

---

<sup>14</sup> Dennison, S. Gowan, R. Kundnani, H. Leonard, M and Witney, N. 'Why Europe Needs A New Global Strategy', p.1.

<sup>15</sup> Council of the European Union. 'European Council 19/20 December 2013, Conclusions', (EUCO 217/13, 20), (Brussels, 20 December 2013). Available at [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140245.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140245.pdf) (Accessed 2 July 2014).

<sup>16</sup> Witney, N. 'Despite the Brits, a modest defence summit success', European Council on Foreign Relations, ECFR's blog, (22 December 2013). Available at [http://www.ecfr.eu/blog/entry/despite\\_the\\_brits\\_a\\_modest\\_defence\\_summit\\_success](http://www.ecfr.eu/blog/entry/despite_the_brits_a_modest_defence_summit_success) (Accessed 5 April 2014).

<sup>17</sup> European Union External Action Service (EEAS), *Security and Defence on the agenda at Riga Informal Meeting*. Available from: [http://eeas.europa.eu/top\\_stories/2015/190215\\_eu\\_defence\\_ministers\\_in\\_riga\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2015/190215_eu_defence_ministers_in_riga_en.htm) (Accessed 19 March 2015).

<sup>18</sup> European Council, 'European Council meeting (25 and 26 June 2015) – Conclusions', (EUCO 22/15), (Brussels, 26 June 2015). p5. Available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2015/06/25-26/> (Accessed 26 June 2015).

<sup>19</sup> *ibid*, p5.

including taking the transatlantic relationship with the United States as a means to guide and drive the reform of the strategy.<sup>20</sup>

A reformulated global ESS would have to entail including a full spectrum of threats that Europe faces, and would have to fully incorporate all other existing EU security policy and strategy into this one reformed ESS and set down the mechanisms needed to review strategic security problems regularly so as to keep the strategy relevant. With regard to this paper the crucial factor that urgently needs addressing is the manner in which these problems are analysed and how to address comprehensively complex security challenges. This must also focus on the apparent current trend in strategy formulation of the compartmentalization of these problems into specific sectors and or levels of analysis.

The problem, as far as this working paper is concerned, is that analysis of European strategic challenges is still being compartmentalized by allocating one or a small number of sectors or levels of analysis to a security challenge (e.g. Climate change being only viewed in an International and environmental context). Current European strategy does acknowledge the nature of global strategic problems to have wider influence. Indeed aside from the ESS, the EU has released a series of different strategies to add to the ESS and they do address more than one sector or level of analysis. These have included, amongst others, the 2014 Energy Security Strategy and the Maritime Security Strategy.<sup>21</sup> These new strategies whilst building on from the ESS, and having a degree of comprehensiveness, still have strategic problems. 'The 2014 Energy Security Strategy and the Maritime Security Strategy,<sup>22</sup> whilst accommodating greater inter-sectoral and multidimensional approaches, are heavily focused on some areas at the expense of others and still lack true

---

<sup>20</sup>Bendiek, A and Kaim M. 'New European Security Strategy – The Transatlantic Factor', SWP Comments 34 (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik/ German Institute for International and Security Affairs, June 2015). Available at [http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/swp-comments-en/swp-aktuelle-details/article/die\\_neue\\_europaeische\\_sicherheitsstrategie.html](http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/swp-comments-en/swp-aktuelle-details/article/die_neue_europaeische_sicherheitsstrategie.html) (Accessed 24 June 2015).

<sup>21</sup> European Union (EU), Council of the European Union, 'European Union Maritime Security Strategy' (Brussels, 24 June 2014). Available at <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2011205%202014%20INIT> (Accessed 12 February 2015); European Union (EU), European Commission, 'Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council', 'European Energy Security Strategy' (Brussels, 28 May 2014). Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0330&from=EN> (Accessed 12 February 2015).

<sup>22</sup> European Union (EU), Council of the European Union, 'European Union Maritime Security Strategy' (Brussels, 24 June 2014). Available at <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2011205%202014%20INIT> (Accessed 12 February 2015); European Union (EU), European Commission, 'Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council', 'European Energy Security Strategy' (Brussels, 28 May 2014). Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0330&from=EN> (Accessed 12 February 2015).

comprehensiveness.<sup>23</sup> It is vital that the new proposed global strategy must break away from the compartmentalization of security issues to a specific area, and instead adopt a comprehensive strategy that embraces a greater number of security threats, and allows all sectors and levels of analysis to be accounted for.

The other problem lies in that the framework to analyze these global strategic challenges thoroughly is chronically absent or underdeveloped. Current strategies do address more than one sector, but still have a tendency to compartmentalize the problem within a specific context, thus limiting the analysis. This, however, can be addressed by using the field of Security Studies, specifically the Copenhagen School, as a means to create the analytical frameworks and methodologies needed.

## Security Studies

In its pursuit of a cogent methodology for analysis Security Studies has regarded the same problems that European global strategy does; and just like the European strategy debate Security Studies has compartmentalized these problems. This has to do with institutional, but also content related expertise. For example, EUROPOL will consider the issue of terrorism a policing problem, a developmental and humanitarian perspective will consider it a question of root causes and deprivation et cetera. Security Studies has likewise compartmentalized these problems in order to construct a narrow analytical focus for detailed analysis. The only successful approach, however, will have to be able to combine these perspectives into one global strategy methodology through an effective strategic choice management system.

The diversification of the theories in Security Studies, and their correlative and contrasting aspects regarding their theoretical and conceptual underpinnings, has been elaborated upon in numerous studies. From this gradual evolution in the field these different theoretical camps have constructed different levels of analysis. These range from the traditionalist perspectives on levels as with *global*<sup>24</sup>

---

<sup>23</sup> Kettle, L. 'Global Strategy and the European Union: Advancing the Debate and Updating the European Security Strategy' (Austrian Institute for International Affairs, OIIP, April 2015). Available at [http://www.oaip.ac.at/fileadmin/Unterlagen/Dateien/Publikationen/Policy\\_Paper/PolicyPaper\\_Global\\_Strategy\\_and\\_the\\_European\\_Union.pdf](http://www.oaip.ac.at/fileadmin/Unterlagen/Dateien/Publikationen/Policy_Paper/PolicyPaper_Global_Strategy_and_the_European_Union.pdf) (Accessed 20 June 2015).

<sup>24</sup> Keohane, R. *International Institution and State Power* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 1-20; Keohane, R. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

and *state security*,<sup>25</sup> to post-Westphalian perspectives of the field and referent objects such as *Third World security studies*,<sup>26</sup> *securitization*,<sup>27</sup> and *human security* and its critics.<sup>28</sup> They have also focused on the diverse range of threats such as *military, economic, environmental or technological security*,<sup>29</sup> and to which referent objects are existentially threatened such as *the state, values, the individual et cetera*.<sup>30</sup>

Deliberations have been made on emancipating the concept of security away from the state-centric approach to a broader agenda of threatened referent objects and their survival.<sup>31</sup> Others have sought to present the issue of security based on the protection of values, and regard security in its broadest sense to allow for a wider use.<sup>32</sup> Whilst others have compiled comprehensive histories and reflections of the field to demonstrate the field's evolution, diversity and continuing debates.<sup>33</sup>

The problem with this approach in specific sectoral and level allocation, however, is that it neglects the problem's influence in other areas. The problem exists simultaneously in other areas and therefore any strategies built on this basis do not take into account the problem's true repercussions

---

<sup>25</sup> Carr, E.H. *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (London, Macmillan, 1939); Waltz, K. N. *Theory of International Politics* (New York, Random House, 1979), pp. 102-28.

<sup>26</sup> Acharya, A. 'The periphery as the core: the Third World and security studies', in *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, edited by Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1997), pp. 299-328.

<sup>27</sup> Wæver, O. 'Securitization and desecuritization', in *On Security*, edited by Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York, Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 46-86.

<sup>28</sup> United Nations Development Programme – (UNDP). 'Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security' (New York/Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994); Paris, R. 'Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?', *International Security*, 26(2) (2001) pp. 87–102.

<sup>29</sup> Baylis, J; Wirtz, J. J and Gray, C. S. (eds.). *Strategy in the Contemporary World* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010); Dam, K. *The Rules of the Global Game*. (Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 2001); Homer-Dixon, T. *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999); Sommer, P. and Sommer, I. 'Reducing Systemic Cybersecurity Risk', OECD/IFP Project on "Future Global Shocks". OECD Research Report, (OECD, 2011). Available at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/42/46894657.pdf> (Accessed 4 July 2014).

<sup>30</sup> Morgenthau, H. J. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Brief Edition, revised by Kenneth W. Thompson (New York, McGraw Hill, 1993), pp. 3-16; Baldwin, D. 'The concept of security', *Review of International Studies*, 23(01) (1997) pp. 5–26; United Nations Development Programme – (UNDP). 'Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security' (New York/Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994).

<sup>31</sup> Booth, K. 'Security and Emancipation', *Review of International Studies*, 17(4) (1991) pp. 313-326.

<sup>32</sup> Baldwin, D. 'The concept of security', *Review of International Studies*, 23(01) (1997) pp. 5–26.

<sup>33</sup> Buzan, B and Hansen, L. *The Evolution of International Security Studies* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009); Walt, S. M. 'The Renaissance of Security Studies', *International Studies Quarterly*, 35(2) (1991) pp. 211–239; Krause, K and Williams, M.C. 'Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods', *Mershon International Studies Review*, 40(2) (1996) pp. 229–254.

in the other sectors. In other words, these strategies are not truly global strategies. Sectors and levels of analysis are used and defined within the methodological framework of this paper, but they will serve only as a method of tracing the movement of a security problem through these sectors and levels. This shall be elaborated on later within the theoretical framework.

In Security Studies we find theoretical approaches that support the development of tools for global strategy building. These can be used to build comprehensive global strategies, and by de-compartmentalizing Security Studies we can construct a tool of analysis fit for purpose. One such theory that is of great use in the construction of this framework of global strategic choice management is the findings of the Copenhagen School.

### **The Copenhagen School**

For the purpose of the analysis in this working paper the Copenhagen School is the most appropriate for the construction of a global strategy methodology because of its multi-sectoral, approach. Its focus on societal/identity security does much to expand the referent object away from traditionalist notions of security (the state / the international community); in particular the work of Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde elaborates on this in extensive detail.<sup>34</sup> This approach whilst allowing for a greater inclusion of sectors also departed from previous scholarship by incorporating the effect of securitization.<sup>35</sup> There is a tendency within the scholarship in Security Studies to compartmentalize a specific security challenge into a specific context or frame of reference for the sake of detailed analysis.

This was done primarily to facilitate specific analysis of the effect of a security issue within a specific area of human society, thereby enabling its effects to be measured and making it easier for the analyst to propose recommendations to counteract the problem. However, this process of compartmentalization has a tendency to place proverbial blinkers over the analyst, meaning that he/she is unable to appreciate the effect of the problem in other sectors or how one problem can cause another in a chain reaction like effect. By including multiple sectors and levels, and adopting a

---

<sup>34</sup> Buzan, B; Wæver, O and de Wilde, J. *Security: A new Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, Col, Lynne-Rienner Publishers, 1998).

<sup>35</sup> Wæver, O. 'Securitization and desecuritization', in *On Security*, edited by Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York, Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 46-86.



constructivist approach, the Copenhagen School sought to address this dilemma and provide a comprehensive analysis of security issues. This school of thought, therefore, provides a great methodological basis for a global strategy formulation methodology.

Global strategies seek to be distinctive by offering an approach that encompasses the greatest possible inclusion of sectors, levels of analysis and stakeholders. In the scholarship of formulating a European global strategy this can be seen in the project proposals and recommendations of the key projects and their various involved think-tanks.<sup>36</sup> Taking this into consideration, the Copenhagen School is the best approach in the construction of a global strategy methodology. The Copenhagen School must be enshrined in the strategy formulation processes of the EU in order to create a comprehensive global strategy. It must be the foundational theory for the EU in its strategic management and planning. However, it should be noted that the Copenhagen School is not absolutely perfect when applied to global strategy formulation. The reason being is that whilst it represents a significant departure from traditional notions of security and includes a far greater number of sectors it too is guilty of compartmentalization by concentrating on security in societal terms. This focus reduces the ability to explore security problems in other levels of analysis; and whilst analysing the securitization process allows for a much more expansive analysis there are still debates surrounding its applicability, shortcomings and weaknesses within Security Studies.<sup>37</sup>

---

<sup>36</sup> European Global Strategy (EGS), 'Towards a European Global Strategy: Securing European Influence in a Changing World', (28 May 2013). Available at <http://www.euglobalstrategy.eu/> (Accessed 11 December 2014); Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute, 'Think Global – Act European IV: Thinking Strategically about the EU's External Action' (Paris: Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute, April 2013). Available at <http://www.notre-europe.eu/media/tgae2013.pdf?pdf=ok> (Accessed 15 December 2014); Dennison, S. Gowan, R. Kundnani, H. Leonard, M and Witney, N. 'Why Europe Needs A New Global Strategy' (European Council on Foreign Relations, ECFR, October 2013). Available at [http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR90\\_STRATEGY\\_BRIEF\\_AW.pdf](http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR90_STRATEGY_BRIEF_AW.pdf) (Accessed 4 January 2015).

<sup>37</sup> Doty, R. L. 'Immigration and the Politics of Security', *Security Studies*, 8(2-3) (1998/99) pp. 71-93; Floyd, R. 'Towards a Consequentialist Evaluation of Security: Bringing Together the Copenhagen and the Welsh Schools of Security Studies', *Review of International Studies*, 33(2) (2007) pp. 327–350; Floyd, R. *Security and the Environment: Securitisation Theory and US Environmental Security Policy* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010); Hayes, J. 'Identity and Securitization in the Democratic Peace: The United States and the Divergence of Response to India and Iran's Nuclear Programs', *International Studies Quarterly*, 53(4) (2009) pp. 977–999; Hansen, L. 'The Little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School', *Millennium: Journal of international Studies*, 29(2) (2000) pp. 285-306; Mitzen, J. 'Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma', *European Journal of International Relations*, 12(3) (2006) pp. 341–370; Rudolph, C. 'Security and the Political Economy of International Migration', *American Political Science Review*, 97(4) (2003) pp. 603-20; Stritzel, H. 'Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond', *European Journal of International Relations*, 13(3) (2007) pp. 357–383; Taureck, R. 'Securitization theory and securitization studies', *Journal of International Relations & Development*, 9(1) (2006) pp. 53–61; Williams, M. C. 'Identity and the Politics of Security', *European Journal of*



However, by remodeling the Copenhagen School to embrace all levels of analysis, and including methods to trace security problems and their effects, this school of thought can be remodeled for application to global strategy formulation.

## Theoretical Framework

This working paper elaborates and lays out a proposed theoretical framework for analysis to achieve comprehensive global strategy formulation and analysis for the EU. This theoretical framework aims to create a global strategy choice management methodology/ system to global strategy formulation for the EU. It aims to create a method of strategy formulation that allows for the inclusion of a greater number of sectors, levels of analysis and stakeholders within the analysis. It uses the Copenhagen School as a theoretical basis and uses it to create comprehensive global strategies for the EU.

It takes the EU as an exemplary case of a global player with internal and external constraints with regards to key strategic problems, vis-à-vis global strategy making. It is crucial that the EU has the ability to plan and think strategically if it is to be an effective security actor, and the new proposed global strategy must include the ability to analyze these strategic problems comprehensively. This working paper seeks to differentiate itself from previous scholarship on the area pertaining to strategy formulation and the rest of the field of Security Studies in the following respects:

- By developing the concept of global strategy for EU foreign and security policy, -
- By overcoming the compartmentalized analytical focus on single sectors and/or levels of analysis. This is done by adapting the theoretical methodology of the Copenhagen School and applying it to global strategy formulation.
- By developing a global strategy formulation process that both tackles contemporary security challenges to the EU and enables scenario building and forecasting for future strategic problems.

This requires in turn a robust theoretical framework to guide the analysis.

---

*International Relations*, 4(2) (1998) pp. 204–225; Williams, M. C. 'Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics', *International Studies Quarterly*, 47(4) (2003) pp. 511–531.

## The Nature of Global Strategy Problems

Having established the state of the art, its advancements and limitations, clarification is required as to which problems require a global strategy. There are a host of problems that while quite persistent or problematic might not require a global strategy. Traditionally national strategies took a problem for the state as the point of departure. This problem when reaching a certain threshold would require alliances to overcome the problem. Such a need for alliances is quite frequent. Their existence, capabilities, constraints and dilemmas have been expounded upon by different theorists and in different settings from state relations to national political allegiances and economics.<sup>38</sup> In the context of the '*international*' this can be demonstrated with regional and international organizations e.g. the EU, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) et cetera. These regimes have commonly two purposes: **(1)** to overcome the problem for which they have been created, **(2)** eliminate free-rider behavior.

The definition of global strategic problems as illustrated here is a pragmatic definition derived from practical challenges: a *Global Strategic Problem* is a problem that exceeds the capacity of one or a few state actors because:

- (A) Their cause is of global origin and/or,
- (B) Their solution is only reasonably achievable by global cooperation.

In the case of the EU, the member states individually do not have the necessary resources (financial, personnel or otherwise) to act alone on a global strategic problem such as climate change, because the origin of the problem itself is global. Therefore, the member states cooperate via the EU mechanisms to achieve objectives that tackle global strategic problems. Member states use the EU mechanisms, and act in cooperation with other member states, to create and put forward a global agenda (a global strategy) and encourage the EU to act as one entity in order to pursue this global agenda.

---

<sup>38</sup> Walt, S. M. 'Why alliances endure or collapse', *Survival*, 39(1) (Spring 1997) pp. 156-79; Snyder, G. 'The security dilemma in alliance politics', *World Politics*, 36(4) (July 1984) pp. 461-95; Olson, M. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1965); Olson, M and Zeckhauser, R. 'An Economic Theory of Alliances', *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 48(3) (1966) pp. 266-279; Riker, W. *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1963); Gameson, W. A. 'A Theory of Coalition Formation', *American Sociological Review*, 26(3) (1961) pp. 373-382; Axelrod, R. *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York, Basic Books, 1984).

The term '*global*' (in contrast to international, which relies foremost on state actions) incorporates different kinds of actors including states, but not exclusively and maybe not even predominantly. There is a relative and an absolute side to the concept of the *global* depending on what solution needs to be achieved. An *absolute* global strategy relates to a universal normative goal (e.g. the universal respect for human rights); it will eventually require all natural and corporate actors to comply with or contribute to a global strategy. A *relative* global strategy relates to a practical goal that requires the compliance or cooperation of only a certain set of actors that are concerned by the problem to achieve the desired strategic goal.

As a result of the conventional compartmentalizing approach that can be found in many schools of thought and concepts in Security Studies the analytical focus becomes too narrow for security problems that transcend borders and move through multiple sectors. These theories have made valuable progress in expounding how the concepts of security can be viewed in their respective sectors and levels of analysis. Their insights have been invaluable to elaborate on how security can be viewed in these contexts. But, it is by creating a new methodology to analyze global problems that better global strategies can be formulated to successfully deal with, mitigate or overcome a trans-border problem that requires the input of more than one actor (or stakeholder). Steps have been made in the right direction to build a much greater, more inclusive, understanding of security in the context of global problems.<sup>39</sup>

## Sectors

A scrutiny of certain schools in Security Studies reveals that by creating sectors and levels of analysis cogent and specific analysis can be facilitated. Certain schools, like the Copenhagen School, do create sectors to elaborate security problems, however Zwitter and de Wilde have suggested that there can be a sense of confusion when defining sectors:<sup>40</sup>

*'Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde treat a sector as a lens and a value based logic, rather than a well-defined part of society. (...) They are therefore not talking about the military, the economy, or the*

---

<sup>39</sup> Zwitter, A.; Heyse, L; Wittek, R and Herman, J. 'Humanitarian Crises, Intervention and Security: A Framework for Evidence-Based Programming' (London, Routledge, 2014).

<sup>40</sup> Zwitter, A and De Wilde, J. 'Working Paper, Securitization and the Local Level: A Prismatic Approach to Psycho-Social Mechanisms of Securitization' (Groningen, the Netherlands, 2014).

*environment as empirically identifiable sectors of society, but rather about the discourses and institutions that come into focus when military, economic or environmental values are highlighted by the analyst.*<sup>41</sup>

The Copenhagen School did this to compensate for past failures in other concepts to account for the seemingly fluid nature of how security issues could be defined in multiple sectors – a problem this working paper overcomes by establishing an inclusive multi-school approach with a cross-sectoral and level methodology. In reference to this ‘confusion’, this project uses a division of sectors, but does not hold to the narrow view that each problem has a certain place within this artificial separation into sectors (one and the same problem can be viewed from a military, a societal or an economic sector perspective).

This working paper uses empirically identifiable sectors in the analysis, but realizes that it is analysts themselves who place the problem in different sectors. This creates the impression that the problem cannot be defined as residing in a particular area. In the end the analyst has to select the right sectors to adequately trace the problem’s ‘movement’. The following six sectors serve for the analysis of strategic challenges:

- **MILITARY-TRADITIONAL SECURITY**
- **TECHNOLOGY**
- **SOCIO-CULTURAL**
- **ENVIRONMENTAL**
- **ECONOMIC-ENERGY**
- **POLITICAL**

---

<sup>41</sup>Zwitter, A and De Wilde, J. ‘Working Paper, Securitization and the Local Level: A Prismatic Approach to Psycho-Social Mechanisms of Securitization’, (Groningen, the Netherlands, 2014).

## Levels of Analysis

Following on from sectoral definitions, this paper also states that security problems can be viewed within the following four levels of analysis:

- **INTERNATIONAL**
- **REGIONAL**
- **NATIONAL**
- **DOMESTIC**

**International** refers to the 'international community'; this being international organizations with recognized international norms and rules of conduct. Such organizations include the United Nations (UN), the International Criminal Court (ICC) etc. It does also refer to international companies and international civil society groups such as charitable organizations.

**Regional** is the focus on regional organizations and institutions. Examples include the EU, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the African Union (AU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC/ CCASG) etc.

**National** is in reference to state organizations and institutions. It includes, but is not restricted to, the nation-state e.g. the government, of any political denomination, national courts etc. It also includes national companies and civil society groups.

**Domestic** refers to the 'local level'. This includes local groups, associations and organizations within a state, but not necessarily attached to the state. It also includes the individual as a level of security. The domestic includes 'local' groups within states, but also groups that are cross-border in their activities and nature. Such groups include groups focused on ethnicity such as the Kurds or the Roma.

## Tracing Security Problems

The matrix in diagram 1.1 illustrates how each of the highlighted security sectors and levels of analysis interact with each other. It also facilitates the process tracing of these security problems' movement through these sectors and levels from the critical point in which they emerged as a

security problem, existentially threatening a specific referent object. In the context of the Copenhagen School this can be thought of in terms of the impact of the securitization process on politicized issues in society. It is crucial to establish a critical point in time in which the issue was defined as a security problem in order to trace its evolution through the security sector matrix.

**Diagram 1.1: Security Sector Matrix: Matrix of sectoral and level interaction:**

**Sectors**

<b>Level of Analysis</b>	Military-Traditional Security	Technology	Socio-Cultural	Environmental	Economic-Energy	Political
International						
Regional						
National						
Domestic						

A problem that starts at the domestic level, for example, can travel horizontally from one sector to another. One such problem can be an example of food security at the domestic level. If people (i.e. the work force) are unable to secure appropriate nourishment to survive, then the labor force cannot work. This already evolves the problem from a food security problem to an economic problem. Social tension created by a lack of employment can potentially evolve into a socio-cultural problem, which can then move to a higher level of analysis at the national level and so on into potential armed conflict. Contemporary empirical research in this particular field shows that *‘Sixty-five percent of the world’s food-insecure people live in seven countries: India, China, the Democratic Republic of the*

*Congo (DRC), Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan and Ethiopia (FAO, 2010), of which all but China have experienced civil conflict in the past decade'.<sup>42</sup>*

The same problem can also travel on different levels of analysis: as each sector and level is linked, a number of domestic security issues (the accumulation of food insecurity, economic insecurity and societal tension, e.g. in Somalia or South Sudan) can become one global problem through the proliferation of actors and ideologies. Such is the nature of these problems that they become viewed as a systemic problem thus elevating it from the domestic level to a higher plane of analysis, thus becoming a global problem. What this interconnectedness of the different security sectors and levels of analysis shows is that problems such as these can only be comprehensively tackled and dealt with by a global security strategy.

### **Brief Case Study Examples: Libya and Ukraine**

There are a number of multidimensional, inter-sectoral problems that can be applied as case studies to illustrate the application of the global strategy methodology. The methodology can be applied to any of the contemporary security challenges that the EU currently faces. These also illustrate how the Copenhagen School is the best approach when illustrating the development of security challenges.

The Libya Crisis in 2011 is a case in point when illustrating how security problems can move through the security sector matrix, affecting other areas and causing further problems. The Arab Spring of 2011 emerged in Libya after the arrest of a prominent human rights campaigner. This action quickly led to protests, clashes between security forces and the formation of rebel movements. This problem escalated into military action sanctioned by the UN Security Council and led to the overthrow of Colonel Gaddafi. What started as a human rights issue evolved into a situation that required military intervention. The Libyan crisis illustrates what the theoretical methodology in this paper argues is the ability of problem to move through the security sector matrix affecting multiple levels of analysis and sectors. It is also a good example that illustrates what the Copenhagen School observes as the securitization process. What started as a politicized issue quickly became securitized thus meaning that actions were taken by the Gaddafi regime to counteract the effects. But their actions, instead of

---

<sup>42</sup> Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). FAOSTAT Database. (Rome, FAO, 2010) <http://faostat.fao.org/>, cited in Brinkman, H and Hendrix, C.S. 'Food Insecurity and Violent Conflict: Causes, Consequences and Addressing the Challenges', Occasional Paper (24) (World Food Programme (WFP), July 2011). Available at <http://ucanr.edu/blogs/food2025/blogfiles/14415.pdf> (Accessed, 12 June 2014).

bringing the issue back into the political realm, worsened the situation further causing other issues to become securitized and resulted in the total collapse of the Libyan state as it had existed.

The Ukraine crisis of 2013 to the present day is another such example that illustrates the Copenhagen School's applicability to global strategy. The abandonment of the EU trade deal by the then pro-Russia President Viktor Yanukovich triggered a series of protests and clashes with security forces that escalated into his being ousted from power. The events that followed including the annexation of the Crimea by Russia and the current conflict between east and west Ukraine are examples of how a security problem escalates, evolves and moves up through the levels of analysis of the security sector matrix. What started as a politicized issue at the domestic level rapidly became securitized by the Yanukovich government and became a national crisis. Like the case with Libya, the decision to take the issue from the politicized realm to the securitized was taken by the regime/government in control. Their actions, rather than mitigating the worst effects of the crisis, further securitized other issues resulting in a problem which started at the domestic level, concerning the issue of trade and identity, being moved up to the international level of analysis and becoming a military-traditional security problem whose impact and ramifications have impacted, and still continue to impact, upon international relations, particularly between the EU/NATO and Russia.

The methodology developed in this working paper allows a security problem such as this to be viewed as it truly is; multidimensional and multi-sectoral, and that is able to start a chain reaction causing other problems and elevating the problem to a higher level of analysis.

The methodology can also be used not just to analyze a specific problem or security situation; it can also be used to examine a specific policy or strategy in order to determine its weaknesses and strategic shortfalls. One such example relating to the EU is the European Security Strategy (ESS). In this paper the ESS is taken as an example that can demonstrate the applicability of the theoretical methodology and the Copenhagen School.

### **The European Security Strategy (ESS)**

The ESS is taken in this working paper as a key case study to demonstrate how the global strategy methodology framework can be used to reveal strategic gaps and shortfalls in the EU's security strategies and policies. The ESS is the foundational text on which the EU's policies and strategies regarding security in both external and internal relations are founded upon.



As a strategic document the ESS represents the cornerstone of EU security strategy and by extension its global strategy. Since the ESS came into force in 2003 it has provided the guiding basis for the EU's security and foreign policy. But since then questions have been raised about its effectiveness, comprehensiveness and applicability in dealing with the contemporary security challenges the EU is currently facing. These concerns have manifested themselves in various forms over the years: 'the European Global Strategy (EGS) project and Notre Europe's 'Think Global – Act European IV' project emerged out of concern for the state of the EU's security strategy and the union's ability to perform as a legitimate security actor.'<sup>43</sup> This same fear has also been expounded upon in publications from groups such as the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) in briefs such as 'Why Europe Needs A New Global Strategy' which articulated the opinion that the strategy is unfit for purpose.<sup>44</sup> The fundamental argument of most of these groups is to throw out the ESS and replace it with a brand new global strategy. However, whilst there is a certain attractiveness to have a fresh start and throw out the old strategy there are problems with this approach. 'It is not that the ESS doesn't need reform; rather it is that any attempt to just throw away what has already been developed is likely to encourage disagreement and entrenched positions rather than serious debate.'<sup>45</sup> Any attempt to scrap the ESS in favour of a new strategy built from scratch is likely to invite a protracted period of debate that potentially will produce nothing fruitful. Given that security is not a universally agreed upon construct, and given the varying degree of importance placed on different referent objects by the member states, security in the EU is entirely subjective to the individual member state. In the case of the EU what we find is a conglomerate of stakeholders each with their own subjective interpretation of which referent objects need securing. Add to this the fact that security and defence is regarded as something that is very much in the purview of the member states and an issue of sovereignty, ferociously defended as such by some member states, and it becomes apparent just how difficult it is/ and would be to get an agreement with all 28 member states on something substantial rather than just a vague 'wish-list' or a series of generalized security threats; which is essentially what the ESS of 2003 is. Considering these implications it would be a much more prudent

---

<sup>43</sup>Kettle, L. 'Global Strategy and the European Union: Advancing the Debate and Updating the European Security Strategy' (Austrian Institute for International Affairs, OIIP, April 2015). Available at [http://www.oaip.ac.at/fileadmin/Unterlagen/Dateien/Publikationen/Policy\\_Paper/PolicyPaper\\_Global\\_Strategy\\_and\\_the\\_European\\_Union.pdf](http://www.oaip.ac.at/fileadmin/Unterlagen/Dateien/Publikationen/Policy_Paper/PolicyPaper_Global_Strategy_and_the_European_Union.pdf) (Accessed 20 June 2015).

<sup>44</sup> Dennison, S. Gowan, R. Kundnani, H. Leonard, M and Witney, N. 'Why Europe Needs A New Global Strategy' (European Council on Foreign Relations, ECFR, October 2013). Available at [http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR90\\_STRATEGY\\_BRIEF\\_AW.pdf](http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR90_STRATEGY_BRIEF_AW.pdf) (Accessed 4 January 2015), p. 2.

<sup>45</sup> Kettle, L. 'Global Strategy and the European Union: Advancing the Debate and Updating the European Security Strategy' (Austrian Institute for International Affairs, OIIP, April 2015). Available at [http://www.oaip.ac.at/fileadmin/Unterlagen/Dateien/Publikationen/Policy\\_Paper/PolicyPaper\\_Global\\_Strategy\\_and\\_the\\_European\\_Union.pdf](http://www.oaip.ac.at/fileadmin/Unterlagen/Dateien/Publikationen/Policy_Paper/PolicyPaper_Global_Strategy_and_the_European_Union.pdf) (Accessed 20 June 2015).

approach to use the current text as the basis for the reformulation of the ESS into a global strategy. The reason being is that this is a document which all the member states currently agree to. It would be much easier in the negotiation process to start from a text which all the member states have agreed upon instead of trying to start from scratch. This is an approach which the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy may wish to adopt in the development of the new EU global strategy proposed at the meeting of the European Council in June.

*'The solution to meeting the contemporary security challenges of the EU is not to scrap the ESS, but to save the existing policy by integrating, updating, and augmenting the existing frameworks; combing, including and amalgamating existing strategies and policies into one upgraded ESS that makes the best of the old approaches but with new frameworks to meet contemporary challenges.'*<sup>46</sup>

Reforming this strategy has been long overdue, and now that the EU has acknowledged the usefulness and necessity for a *global strategy* it is crucial that the strategy be reformulated in a manner in which it is able to analyze strategic security problems comprehensively. Developing a global strategy choice management system and a truly comprehensive global strategy that incorporates a large range of threats and stakeholders will enable the EU to meet its security challenges. To this end, it is argued that the theoretical framework proposed in this working paper should be the foundational basis for the EU's proposed new global strategy and indeed the grounding theory in the EU's strategic mechanisms at every level.

The ESS should be remodeled using the theoretical framework described here by incorporating a multidimensional, inter-sectoral framework into the analysis and using the Copenhagen School as the guiding theory for the formulation of strategy and for situational analysis. The Copenhagen School presents the most efficacious theory in the field of Security Studies to facilitate this type of strategy. The reason for this is twofold: In the first part the emphasis on levels of analysis and sectors is something which this methodology uses in the security sector matrix. Secondly, its emphasis on the process of securitization is one that facilitates a method to trace a problem through the security sector matrix, which in turn enables the creation of effective scenario building mechanisms. By incorporating this school of thought into their strategy formulation instruments the EU can build a more comprehensive security strategy and more effective mechanisms to deal with contemporary security challenges.

---

<sup>46</sup> *ibid*, p1.

The proposed new EU global strategy will be formulated over the next year and then delivered to the European Council by June 2016. This working paper puts forward a suggested approach to reformulate the ESS and construct this new EU global strategy for its foreign and security policies. The first suggested part of the reformulation process would be to take the security sector matrix developed in this paper and transpose the various elements of the security strategies of the EU onto it, to see where there are gaps in strategic thinking in terms of the areas they address. The specific sector/ issue area strategies of the EU reveal they have an inability to appreciate a truly comprehensive picture of security. The EU Maritime Security Strategy is a case in point of how contemporary events have brought the weaknesses and gaps in strategic thinking of the ESS into sharp relief.<sup>47</sup> The Maritime Security Strategy purports to be a comprehensive document that addresses the various aspects of maritime security. However, upon closer examination of the language and areas addressed in the document one finds a tendency to focus more on certain areas at the expense of others. The Maritime Strategy tends to lean toward the traditional military-state security aspects, trade and the economy, and to a lesser extent environmental security. This has resulted in a strategy that far from being comprehensive is guilty of the compartmentalizing tendency that this paper warns against. This can be illustrated in the diagram below.

---

<sup>47</sup>European Union (EU), Council of the European Union, 'European Union Maritime Security Strategy' (Brussels, 24 June 2014). Available at <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2011205%202014%20INIT> (Accessed 12 February 2015)

**Diagram 1.1: Illustration of the EU Maritime Security Strategy within the Security Sector Matrix:**

**Sectors**

<b>Level of Analysis</b>	Military-Traditional Security	Technology	Socio-Cultural	Environmental	Economic-Energy	Political
International						
Regional	●	●		●	●	
National	●	●		●	●	
Domestic						

**Key:**

- Maritime Security Strategy

What is illustrated in diagram 1.1 is that whilst the strategy indeed addresses various sectors and level of analysis, it is not comprehensive. Gaps persist in the domestic and international levels of analysis in particular, and in the socio-cultural and political sectors.

These issue specific strategies are symptoms of the lack of comprehensiveness of the ESS, but in attempting to address a strategic shortfall as the result of a contemporary security challenge threatening a specific referent object the strategy was compartmentalized resulting in a limited scope and focus. The EU Energy Security Strategy was formulated in response to the crisis in the Ukraine and the potential halting of Russian gas into Europe.<sup>48</sup> The Energy Security Strategy like the

<sup>48</sup>European Union (EU), European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council’, ‘European Energy Security Strategy’ (Brussels, 28 May 2014). Available at

Maritime Strategy is detailed in some areas, but lacks in others. The strategic focus centers predominantly on the economic-energy, technology and environmental sectors of the security sector matrix. Once again the environmental aspects lack significant substance in the strategy compared to the other areas. And the sectors that are engaged with are restricted predominantly to the regional and national levels of the security sector matrix. The focus of the strategy is illustrated below in diagram 1.2.

**Diagram 1.2: Illustration of the EU Energy Security Strategy within the Security Sector Matrix:**

*Sectors*

<i>Level of Analysis</i>	Military-Traditional Security	Technology	Socio-Cultural	Environmental	Economic-Energy	Political
International					●	
Regional		●		●	●	
National		●		●	●	
Domestic						

**Key:**

- Energy Security Strategy

What diagram 1.2 illustrates is that like the Maritime strategy sector/ issue specific strategies result in a compartmentalization effect and restricted scope of strategic focus. Once again the domestic

---

<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0330&from=EN> (Accessed 12 February 2015).

level and international level are all but neglected. The military-traditional, socio-cultural and political security sectors lack any focus. Once again this demonstrates the failures with EU sector/ issue strategies that attempt to plug the strategic gaps left in an incomplete ESS.

Both of these strategies are good representations of how the referent object of security has expanded away from its traditional moorings, and how the correct language is being used to demonstrate a multidimensional, inter-sectoral nature. However, these strategies are symptoms of the incomplete standing of the ESS, and these strategies still lack their own detailed and specific comprehensiveness and are therefore flawed themselves. Like the ESS, these strategies have many good aspects about them and should be incorporated into the framework of the newly proposed EU global strategy.

The ESS itself is a much broader document than the issue specific strategies that came after it; however, the ESS itself has serious strategic gaps. The security sector matrix can also be applied to this more generalized strategy. By using the matrix as a template a new ESS can be formulated that addresses problems in all sectors and all levels of analysis. By taking the identified threats of *Terrorism, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Regional Conflicts, State Failure and Organised Crime* and transposing them onto the matrix, gaps and shortfalls are revealed in the strategy. Diagram 1.3 illustrates how the threats identified in the ESS can be viewed within the security sector matrix and which sectors and levels are addressed. This is done so via discourse analysis, analyzing the use of language in a strategic document and its meaning; stated, implied or otherwise. Each of the five identified threats is assigned a number: *Terrorism=1, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction=2, Regional Conflicts=3, State Failure=4 and Organised Crime=5*. Examining the language used within the strategy, the relevant number is placed within the specific level of analysis and sector of security in the security sector matrix based on the context in which the threat is talked about within the ESS. The results are illustrated in diagram 1.3.

**Diagram 1.3: Illustration of the European Security Strategy (ESS) within the Security Sector Matrix:**

		<i>Sectors</i>				
<i>Level of Analysis</i>	Military-Traditional Security	Technology	Socio-Cultural	Environmental	Economic-Energy	Political
	International	<b>5</b>	<b>2</b>			<b>5</b>
Regional	<b>1,2,3,4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1,3,4,5</b>		<b>1,3,4,5</b>	<b>1,3,4,5</b>
National	<b>1,2,3,4,5</b>		<b>1,3,5</b>		<b>1,3,4</b>	<b>1,3,4,5</b>
Domestic						

**Key:**

- Terrorism: **1**
- Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: **2**
- Regional Conflicts: **3**
- State Failure: **4**
- Organised Crime: **5**

Diagram 1.3 reveals the gaps in strategic thinking within the ESS. By transposing the areas that the ESS addresses onto the security sector matrix it becomes evident in which levels of analysis and which sectors are not being addressed. The most significant gap is in the environmental sector where threats to environmental security are not even discussed. The domestic level is also one that is chronically undervalued with emphasis being placed predominantly at the national or regional level. This results in an incomplete strategy.

The problem also lies in the identified threats stated in the ESS. Their vagueness and generalized nature may facilitate broad agreement and allow for other related issues to be included within them, but it is precisely because of their lack of specificity that the strategy is suffering to deliver. The other factor is the lack of identified threats. These threats are still relevant to the EU and must still be included within the context of the new EU global strategy. However, they are symptomatic of the fact that the strategy was written for a different time; the challenges faced in 2003 meant the strategic focus of the ESS adequately accounted for this. However, new threats have developed, the geopolitical situation has altered and referent objects of security that were not previously under threat are now in danger. The certainties the EU had regarding its integration processes have been shattered by contemporary events, testing and undermining its core principles.<sup>49</sup> Defending the EU's fundamental basis and core values and principles were not even accounted for in the ESS back in 2003.

However, by appreciating where the strategy falls short it is possible to build on the strategy to incorporate a greater number of threats. The ESS has lacked substance from the start because of the lack of stated threats to European security. Whilst the stated five threats in the ESS may be generic enough to allow for inclusion of other related issues, the lack of specificity is the very thing that is causing the strategy to be weak in the first instance. A reformed ESS must not only just have a greater variety of threats, because this will risk the strategy becoming vague again, it must have detailed specific threats that the member states can agree upon. One threat that could, and should, be addressed is how the EU intends to defend its core values and principles given contemporary challenges to the rules based international order and the undermining of multilateral institutionalism.

By bringing other existing security strategies under the ESS the result is a more comprehensive security strategy. An example of this would be to bring the EU's Maritime Security Strategy and the Energy Security Strategy as part of the ESS rather than as separate pieces of strategy. The Maritime Security Strategy and the Energy Security Strategy were introduced because they filled a specific strategic short-gap that was prompted by contemporary events; namely the Ukraine Crisis and the migrant crisis in the Mediterranean. Both strategies claimed to be multidimensional and

---

<sup>49</sup> Bendiek, A and Kaim M. 'New European Security Strategy – The Transatlantic Factor', SWP Comments 34 (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik/ German Institute for International and Security Affairs, June 2015). Available at [http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/swp-comments-en/swp-aktuelle-details/article/die\\_neue\\_europaeische\\_sicherheitsstrategie.html](http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/swp-comments-en/swp-aktuelle-details/article/die_neue_europaeische_sicherheitsstrategie.html) (Accessed 24 June 2015). p. 3.



comprehensive in their approach.<sup>50</sup> However, upon closer inspection their approach is still one of compartmentalization of security threats into a given context. These strategies have a tendency of placing specific problems in a sector or several sectors and are particularly heavily focused on trade and infrastructure and/or traditional military-state security issues. However, whilst limited in their scope, if they are brought together with other existing strategy they can help to build a more comprehensive ESS; this should be done to help build the basis for the new EU global strategy.

Once existing strategy has been incorporated into the new ESS new threats can be incorporated into it, along with new mechanisms to meet contemporary security challenges. Adding further threats, and the referent objects they threaten, and new mechanisms will begin to plug the gaps in strategic thinking and allow the EU to be truly comprehensive. This should be guided by changes that have occurred since 2003 concerning the geopolitical situation, as well as the qualitative changes that have led to strategic weaknesses.<sup>51</sup>

### **Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)**

Having a comprehensive security strategy will enable the EU to tackle complex problems in a more robust manner. To help facilitate this, elements should also be incorporated from the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which is an integral part of the CFSP, to bolster the new ESS even further. The CFSP and the CSDP whilst being the legal framework set down in the Lisbon Treaty that guides the Union can provide the basis for further improvements, given that this is a treaty to which all 28 member states have agreed to, including the identified areas to pursue common policies. These include, *inter alia*, support for democracy, the rule of law, conflict prevention, eradicating poverty, sustainable development, global

---

<sup>50</sup> European Union (EU), Council of the European Union, 'European Union Maritime Security Strategy' (Brussels, 24 June 2014). Available at <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2011205%202014%20INIT> (Accessed 12 February 2015); European Union (EU), European Commission, 'Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council', 'European Energy Security Strategy' (Brussels, 28 May 2014). Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0330&from=EN> (Accessed 12 February 2015).

<sup>51</sup> Bendiek, A and Kaim M. 'New European Security Strategy – The Transatlantic Factor', SWP Comments 34 (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik/ German Institute for International and Security Affairs, June 2015). Available at [http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/swp-comments-en/swp-aktuelle-details/article/die\\_neue\\_europaeische\\_sicherheitsstrategie.html](http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/swp-comments-en/swp-aktuelle-details/article/die_neue_europaeische_sicherheitsstrategie.html) (Accessed 24 June 2015). p.2-4.

governance et cetera.<sup>52</sup> All of which should be incorporated into the new EU global strategy with highlighted threats to referent objects and strategic objectives. The provisions concerning the CSDP should also be incorporated within the framework of the new strategy as this would help to reinforce it. This includes emphasis on working toward a common defence policy for Europe and creating and strengthening mechanisms for cooperation.<sup>53</sup>

Once all the elements from the various EU strategies and policies are incorporated into one strategic document the process can then begin of filling in the remaining gaps to create the new global strategy, in particular to sector specific areas. For example, if there is a lack of focus on protecting socio-cultural security, environmental or political security, both internally and externally, then the strategy can be revised with new measures to address these areas, and create new mechanisms in order to use the resources necessary. Much of the policy and strategy that underpins the EU has a tendency to be heavily focused on traditional state security and economic security; to be truly effective the new EU global strategy must address all the areas in the security sector matrix equally.

Rather than scrapping the ESS and start from scratch, as some would suggest, it is a far more prudent approach to reform the ESS into a much more comprehensive strategy.<sup>54</sup> This should then act as the foundation for the new global strategy. By using the security sector matrix as a template and by transposing the various elements of these strategies onto it, the gaps can be revealed aiding in the reform of the strategy. By using the Copenhagen School as methodological basis for the construction and review of the strategy the EU will be able to create a more comprehensive form of situational analysis. The school's focus on securitization can be worked into the analysis processes of the EU.

---

<sup>52</sup>European Union (EU), 'Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community', (2007/C 306/01), (13 December 2007). Available at <http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-european-union-and-comments/title-5-general-provisions-on-the-unions-external-action-and-specific-provisions/chapter-1-general-provisions-on-the-unions-external-action/101-article-21.html> (Accessed 20 June 2015).

<sup>53</sup>European Union (EU), 'Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community', (2007/C 306/01), (13 December 2007). Available at <http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-european-union-and-comments/title-5-general-provisions-on-the-unions-external-action-and-specific-provisions/chapter-2-specific-provisions-on-the-common-foreign-and-security-policy/section-2-provisions-on-the-common-security-and-defence-policy.html> (Accessed 20 June 2015).

<sup>54</sup> Kettle, L. 'Global Strategy and the European Union: Advancing the Debate and Updating the European Security Strategy' (Austrian Institute for International Affairs, OIIP, April 2015). Available at [http://www.oaip.ac.at/fileadmin/Unterlagen/Dateien/Publikationen/Policy\\_Paper/PolicyPaper\\_Global\\_Strategy\\_and\\_the\\_European\\_Union.pdf](http://www.oaip.ac.at/fileadmin/Unterlagen/Dateien/Publikationen/Policy_Paper/PolicyPaper_Global_Strategy_and_the_European_Union.pdf) (Accessed 20 June 2015).

This will enable the EU to build an effective global strategy that appreciates both the complexity of global security challenges and that can develop effective mechanisms for scenario building.

## **Conclusion**

It becomes apparent that contemporary approaches to strategy formulation in the EU lack the capacity to be truly comprehensive. As a result of limiting approaches that take only one or a few sectors into account and only one or a few levels of analysis the EU finds itself with foreign and security strategies that have serious strategic shortfalls: a fact that has now been recognized by the EU. By adopting a global strategic approach to its foreign and security policies it will be able to create an EU global strategy that addresses the shortfalls in current strategic thinking, and that address the fullest range of foreign and security objectives, challenges, and the referent objects that need securing. This will allow the EU to become a truly global actor within its strategic neighbourhood and the rest of the world.

By using an adapted more inclusive variation of the Copenhagen School as the foundational and guiding theoretical basis for the EU's assessment and strategic planning capabilities, the EU will be able to formulate strategy more effectively. By incorporating a methodological approach that uses the security sector matrix laid down in this paper, and via the securitization process in the Copenhagen School to trace a problem's emergence into the security sector via a critical incident, the EU will be able to use this methodology to plan strategically in the long term. Analysing current and past challenges, and using them for scenario building purposes, will enable the EU to adapt quickly to new and emerging threats and challenges without being reactive, or having to create *ad hoc* strategies that plug a strategic shortfall. By adopting the global strategy choice management system proposed in this working paper the EU will be able to act as a truly global player and pursue its local, regional, international and global strategic objectives. This proposed theoretical methodology will enable the EU to develop the new global strategy for its foreign and security policy that it has stated it needs.