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Non-state actors and individuals

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Introduction

This chapter discusses the role of non-state actors in the international system. Non-state actors is a catch-all term for groups, movements, organisations, and individuals that are not part of state structures. The trend described in the WRR report Attached to the World and underlined in the 2012 Monitor continues: non-state actors are having a growing impact on the policies and position of nation-states, a development that fits into the network scenario.

An example of the growing influence of NGOs is the way in which these organisations are able to manipulate the international agenda and to pave the way for others. Due to their diversity, they are active in different fields and can directly or indirectly affect global stability and security. It is important here to distinguish between non-state actors that act against or ‘abuse’ the established system (e.g. terrorists and criminal organisations) and non-state actors that try to exercise their influence within the rules of the prevailing system (in general, the traditional NGOs). What is characteristic of the current era is the grey area of ‘new citizens’ movements’ that do not accept the existing system but refrain from resorting to violence (e.g. the Occupy movement).

This chapter will focus in particular on four specific types of non-state actors: civil society, terrorists, pirates, and criminal groups. We will highlight phenomena such as new-style citizens’ movements and private military companies in separate boxes. Individuals or groups of individuals fleeing their country will also be addressed separately (see Box 4 on migration). The analysis focuses on the events and trends that can be identified within this very diverse group and looks ahead to the next five to ten years to the probabilities and uncertainties related to this theme.

1 Significant events in the past year

The terms civil society and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are often used interchangeably. However, there is a big difference between the two. Civil society stands for the entire society that exists between the individual and the state which is populated by interest groups, churches, media, trade unions, human rights activists, community organisations, and in more fragile contexts, tribal relations, militias, and security communities. NGOs are a part of this, but civil society is more than just NGOs.

The 2012 Monitor signalled a growing role in this context for new-style citizens’ movements: looser, spontaneous, and non-institutionalised network connections and citizens’ movements such as Occupy and Wikileaks which, although transitory, could have significant political and social influence and thus pose challenges to governments, in particular due to the speed with which they can mobilise people (through the use of social media, for example). The phenomenon of ‘new style citizens’ movements’ is discussed in Box 1.
A striking aspect of this development is the inability of ‘traditional’ NGOs to capitalise on these new developments. The speed with which especially young people organise themselves or mobilise and then disappear from view again is a point of frustration for organisations that seek to involve people in their work. NGOs are thus increasingly on the defensive and are at risk of losing their connection to the wider civil society. This is especially true for NGOs in developed countries; in poor, unstable countries, the embedding of NGOs in society has always been limited, partly because NGOs have only appeared there quite recently in response to the availability of development aid funds. Also, NGOs have in recent decades become increasingly dependent on government subsidies, as a result of which they have lost their independent, critical character according to some (Bebbington et al. 2008). With government subsidies for NGOs declining, they are faced with a major challenge. Some hope to mobilise old or new constituencies for moral and financial support. In the meantime, however, society is changing faster than they can keep up with.

Another trend is the increasing focus on a global public goods approach in the discourse on development or development aid instead of the increasingly obsolete principles of ‘charity’ and ‘help’ (see, for example, Edwards 2012). There are many links between on
the one hand globalisation, neoliberalism, and global mechanisms, and on the other
hand fragile states and conflict (Verkoren & Junne 2012). Developments in fragile states
can also affect Europe, e.g. via transnational crime, terrorism, and migration. Conversely,
the problems in poor and unstable areas cannot be separated from the policies of
governments and the private sector in the developed, rich world. Development aid
often only tackles the symptoms of global problems and injustice; a global public goods
approach, however, stresses that changes in policies and behaviour at home are just as
important as offering aid far away. In addition, cross-border cooperation is needed, for
example in transnational civil society networks. Such transnational coalitions appear to
be on the rise and are also able to achieve successful results. In the last few years, there
has been a growing role for international coalitions and networks around a particular
purpose—for example, an arms treaty—which over time disband, especially if the goal is
achieved. This offers NGOs an opportunity to recreate themselves by working together
with such networks, coalitions, and platforms. This trend, identified in the 2012 Monitor,
is expected to continue.

In the field of international cooperation, new forms of diplomacy are developing (Khanna
2011) in which civil society actors play a greater role. In addition to the above-mentioned
cooperation within civil society networks, partnerships are also being created between NGOs, civil society, and state actors. It is expected, therefore, that such Global Action Networks, in which transnational citizens’ movements link up with government officials, entrepreneurs, politicians, and representatives of international organisations, will play an increasing role in shaping policy in the coming years and will most likely crop up more frequently (Waddell 2011).

Compared with the 2012 Monitor, little has changed in terms of the threat of terrorists. Islamic groups are still the biggest threat. As outlined in the chapter on polarisation and radicalisation, there is still a danger of attacks or hostage-taking of people abroad by small independently operating groups or loners, some having been called upon by the current leader of Al-Qaeda, Ayman Al Zawahiri, to take action (AIVD 2012a; video Al Zawahiri, 27 October 2012). The internet is seen as a source of inspiration and a tool for the recruitment and planning of terrorist activities, even more so than a few years ago (AIVD 2012b). Nevertheless, the threat of terrorism, both from an Islamic grouping or another source, is ‘limited’. This means that the risk of a terrorist attack is low but cannot be ruled out (NCTV 2012b).

Within Europe, countries such as Germany, France, and the United Kingdom not only have growing concerns about so-called foreign fighters who flock to the areas of conflict in the Muslim world, but also about individuals who return. Concerns about possible attacks by loners, also known as lone wolves, were significantly heightened by the 2011 attacks by Anders Breivik in Norway. This type of threat is still high on the agenda, especially following the attacks in France by Mohammed Merah, who is an example of a jihadist lone wolf. Several arrests of suspected copycat Breiviks and Merahs also contributed to the continuing concern about this particular form of terrorism (AIVD 2012). Another source of concern within the European Union is the increase in the threat posed by far-right groups. According to the Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) of Europol, this threat comes from small groups and individuals who operate underground. Incidentally, the same report indicates that the number of incidents and arrests declined in 2012, as was the case in previous years (Europol 2012).

Outside Europe, the threat of terrorism—depending, of course, on which definition one uses—has not changed significantly. As for Islamic or jihadist terrorism, the threat is now limited, partly because international groups of this sort appear to be primarily focused on local or regional conflicts and because the core of Al-Qaeda has been weakened considerably in recent years (NCTV 2012b). By contrast, the number of attacks in Turkey by Kurdish separatists seems to be increasing, and concerns are growing among counterterrorists on the situation in Syria. The civil war in that country is increasingly attracting jihadist combatants, also from various Western countries. According to the latest Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands (DTN), the interest of jihadists from the West and from other parts of the world for the struggle in Syria could cause this country to develop into a new jihad area (NCTV 2012b). Another region where terrorist groups have come to play an important role in the past year is the Sahel region, particularly in northern Mali and northern Nigeria. In Somalia and Yemen, however,
these groups—Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda respectively—appear to be losing ground (NCTV 2012b).

The weakening of these terrorist groups can partly be attributed to the more intensive and professional international cooperation in the field of counterterrorism, for example in North Africa and the Horn of Africa. Kenya is cooperating at the international level in the fight against Al-Shabaab. In Syria, the participation in the civil war of domestic and foreign jihadist groups seems to have had no effect on the attitude of the international community, although, as already noted, concerns about the influence of these groups are rapidly growing.

Another group of non-state actors operating within the international system and influencing the actions of states are criminal groups. The area of operations of these groups might be limited to within the borders of a state, but in most cases, criminal organisations operate transnationally. The activities such groups are involved in are diverse, but in the vast majority of cases they involve drug trafficking, arms smuggling, money laundering, or a combination thereof. These activities may be accompanied by violence and corruption and can thus affect the authority of the state and in the worst case undermine it or even take it over. This could mean that the government no longer has any say in some regions.

The presence of criminal organisations and networks is nothing new. What transnational criminal groups have done is to adapt their behaviour to certain international developments and to utilise the newly existing opportunities. These include changes in the world economy (globalisation), the rise in fragility in certain states, and technological advances, particularly in the field of communication.

In general, criminal organisations have become flatter and more network-driven organisations over the last twenty years. Using this new form of organisation of enterprises working together, they have been able to be active on different continents and to exploit the intercountry differences in legislation, law enforcement, and susceptibility to corruption. This is the main reason for the exploitation of fragile states lying on major drug trafficking routes, resulting in the further institutional, political, and social weakening of these states. Moreover, transnational organised crime can be both a cause and a consequence of fragility—the potential ability of criminal activities to threaten the stability of national states and to erode state structures is significant.

Due to their increasingly decentralised approach, criminal networks also have more opportunities to link their legal and illegal practices, primarily via the practice of money laundering. The scandal involving seven billion US dollars of Mexican drug money being channelled through international branches of HSBC bank is no exception in this regard. It is estimated that almost 50 percent of the income of Somali pirates ends up in the hands of their foreign supporters, many of whom are not necessarily engaged in illegal practices in their daily lives. Also in Latin America, government officials, legitimate businesses, and criminals are becoming increasingly intertwined.
Many of the problems associated with the spread of violence and instability, as in the case of Latin America, are caused by the growing influence of criminal networks. Through extortion practices, criminal networks are able to anchor themselves at the local level. At the same time, different cultures of violence have emerged. The surge of violence in Mexico and Colombia can be explained by violent offshoots of criminal groups or by rivalry between heavily armed organisations fighting over control of criminal enterprises’ existing structures.

Another possible development of which more evidence has emerged in recent years is the crime-terror nexus, cited by the US government in its document Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime from 2011: 29 of the 63 organisations on the list of most wanted criminals kept at the Department of Justice are associated with terrorist groups. The exact dimensions and nature of this covenant between criminal and terrorist groups are unclear. However, within academic circles it is generally believed that cooperation

A demonstration in Tahrir Square in Cairo on 8 February 2011. The revolution and the impact of demonstrations in the country illustrate the growing influence of citizens’ movements.

*Photo: Ramy Raoof*
between these groups is driven only by a shared interest in porous borders and the possibilities that are associated with weak state institutions.

In this chapter, piracy is considered to be part of the theme of ‘criminal groups’. The trends identified for criminal groups also apply to a certain extent to piracy. However, because of the timeliness and relevance of piracy as a phenomenon, we decided to treat this issue separately.

Figure 1 Monthly comparison of incidents in the period from January to September (ICC-IMB 2012).

The number of piracy incidents worldwide decreased in the past year (see Figure 1). This is mainly due to a drop in the number of incidents in the wider area around the Horn of Africa. A number of possible reasons for this can be identified. The further implementation of best management practices by shipowners has made merchant ships more resistant to attacks by pirates. The use of (armed) military and private security also contributed to the resilience of merchant ships. However, armed private security also introduces dilemmas with regard to accountability, regulation, and the monopoly on violence. Attempts by the industry to regulate itself have thus far yielded little. States appear to be the right actors to assume this responsibility of protection. As international navies are increasingly working together and becoming better at monitoring, identifying, and intercepting pirates, this has done much to deter pirates around the Horn of Africa. The use of military operations to hinder Somali pirate groups off the coast and on land is also contributing to the suppression of pirate activities. It is therefore possible that the return on investment (risks versus benefits) has deteriorated for pirates, although it is very difficult to obtain reliable figures on this matter. However, it is also possible that pirates are merely taking a break from their activities due to the increased anti-piracy activities and bad weather, which could explain why the number of incidents was lower in 2012. Because international efforts focus primarily on controlling the symptoms at sea,
the root causes on land remain untreated and therefore the risk of a revival of piracy remains real. The integrated approach of the EU to the Horn of Africa is encouraging, but it is uncertain whether the current level of effort will yield structural solutions to the piracy problem. An exception to the global decline in piracy is the Gulf of Guinea, where the number and ferocity of incidents in the past year has increased.

Scenario framework

The picture we have sketched of the non-state actors dealt with in this chapter is a diffuse one in which the various actors have moved in different directions. What is evident is that it is no longer possible to imagine the international system without non-state actors. Cooperation between states and civil society has become uneasy due to scepticism on the part of states. There are also indications of fragmentation within civil society in the broad sense of the word because ‘traditional’ NGOs are becoming alienated from their base. States are engaging in increasingly successful cooperation in the area of measures against terrorism and the fight against criminal activities, including piracy. However, the question is whether this cooperation will prove to be sustainable, given that current efforts seem to be more focused on symptom management rather than on a structural solution to the problem.

The next five to ten years: Probabilities and uncertainties

Probabilities

- Further increase in the influence of non-state actors.
- Increase in terrorist activities by loners or lone wolves.
- Failing and torn states will increase the potential for terrorism.
- Intensified international cooperation against terrorism.
- ‘Traditional’ NGOs will give way to increasingly dynamic, organised citizens’ movements.
- Citizens’ movements will increasingly engage in international cooperation, as a result of which the global public goods discourse is expected to become more prominent.
- Piracy in the Horn of Africa and in some other regions in the coming years will remain a security problem.

Uncertainties

- Will Muslim communities become more resilient to terrorism?
- Will there be alternatives to terrorism as a political tool in parts of the Arab world?
- Will states and companies countenance NGOs and civil society movements and the related development of new forms of diplomacy and the global public goods discourse?
- Will the use of private military guards be regulated?
New-style citizen’s movements such as Occupy, Anonymous, and Wikileaks are a relatively new phenomenon within the category of non-state actors and considered to be part of civil society. They form part of what could be called the ‘gray area’ between traditional NGOs on the one hand, which accept the state system and try to achieve changes in a legal manner, and on the other hand those non-state actors that oppose the system and moreover do not shrink from using violence. The Occupy movement, now on the wane, is an example of a new citizens’ movement in the gray area, as they are against the system but act peacefully and avoid violence.

As an emerging phenomenon, new-style citizens’ movements differ from traditional NGOs because they are not institutionalised. They are transitory, loose, and flexible network ties, often focusing on a specific theme or mobilising in response to an event. They derive their strength from the use of social media in particular (see Box 3). It is therefore inherent to this kind of movement that they appear quickly but are also transient. The power of these movements in terms of the speed and extent of mobilisation, scale, and ability to grab public attention as well as act as ‘spoiler’ has been well demonstrated in recent years. The leaders behind these movements were clearly inspired by examples from other countries (e.g. the spread of the Arab Spring).

The emergence of these movements can be partly explained by the ‘representativeness crisis’ that governments—especially in Western countries—or any kind of authority in general are suffering from, a phenomenon that also extends to traditional NGOs. Groups and individuals do not have sufficient confidence in the government or in authority structures and feel increasingly unrepresented by the traditional NGOs. In response, they opt for self-organisation, protest, and mobilisation, all with the use of modern communication. If an analogy with the past is possible, these movements are somewhat reminiscent of the phenomenon of ‘civil disobedience’ from the 1970s.

From the perspective of the government, responding to these movements has been difficult precisely because of their fleeting nature and the effects they can achieve. The effects of their actions do not directly affect security and stability but can be a source of irritation and frustration and could also further erode confidence in the ability of governments to act. States therefore are still searching for ways to deal with this new grouping. Should they be treated as if they were a form of civil protest or should they be held liable or punished by the government? Internationally, the actions of these ‘organisations’ may have greater consequences, as they could increase the instability of the state and bring about chaos. Besides the fact that new citizens’ movements are able to mobilise and connect great masses of people rapidly, such movements can also be contagious (think of the domino effect of revolutions during the Arab Spring). In addition, from both a national and international view, diplomatic safety could be put in jeopardy, as may have been the case as a result of the so-called Wikileaks affair.
In the coming years, not only is the role of civil society/NGOs, or citizens’ movements, likely to expand, but also more and more international cooperation between citizens’ movements (in networks and coalitions) is likely to emerge, organised around specific themes. What will play into these developments is the expected widening of the debate on global public goods. At the same time, the landscape of organisations that make up civil society is expected to change dramatically. Traditional NGOs will have to make way for more transitory forms of organisation, online connections, and changing coalitions. Those NGOs that do manage to survive will have to link up with such international coalitions and incorporate a global common goods approach into their activities. This may mean that they become more activist and turn their attention to themes like corporate and consumer behaviour and the democratisation of global institutions such as the EU, the UN, and the WTO.

A significant uncertainty is the extent to which these developments will be given leeway by established interests—particularly states and businesses. Will the road be freed up for new forms of diplomacy in which civil society actors play an increasingly important role? And will governments and private actors be convinced of the global public goods approach?

We expect states to respond ambivalently to this growing role of non-state actors, although the reaction may vary per government. While governments increasingly recognise that the current global problems can no longer be solved by states alone and that the involvement of non-state actors is often a prerequisite for effective policy, this loss of territory is likely to be accompanied by resistance. This is evident, for example, in the case of the much-discussed concept of global public goods—a concept that is adhered to by Western governments in particular. At the same time, however, when there appears to be tension between global justice and the national interest—for example in the area of migration but also with trade in raw materials and weapons—self-interest still prevails. The question then arises whether this would damage the national interest in the long run, because a more stable world order is ultimately in the interests of developed countries.

With regard to the threat of terrorists, we see three relevant developments for Europe in the next five to ten years. The first is the growth of the threat posed by loners. Anti-Muslim, Islamic, and extreme right groups all call upon loners to act, given that such actions are difficult to track down. It is unclear what the response to this call has been. In the past year, only a few incidents occurred in Europe with people that may have been inspired by such calls.

There is also the possibility of an increase in terrorism in or from failing and torn states. We have already noted that there have been concerns with regard to the situation in Syria acting as a magnet for jihadist groups, which could be setting up training camps in this war-torn country. The situation in Mali has shown that, under certain circumstances, rebels and terrorist organisations are able to conquer much of the country in a short period of time. Developments in Somalia illustrate, however, that foreign interventions can successfully fight off such groups. One of the probabilities in the next five to ten
Private military companies, or PMCs, are non-state actors that have become an important growth market. The 2012 Monitor identified PMCs as winners because demand from shipping companies for their services has grown substantially in recent years. Since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, mainly Americans and the British have made widespread use of PMCs. The British magazine *The Economist* even went so far as to call the war against Iraq ‘the first privatised war’. There are various explanations for the rise of PMCs. For example, Western militaries greatly reduced their personnel after the end of the Cold War, but the number of international peace operations has increased. In addition, there are sometimes insufficient specialist soldiers to operate and maintain advanced military systems. The wave of privatisation also plays an important role, with the assumption that, through outsourcing, the execution of public tasks can be carried out more efficiently and effectively. A more ‘cynical’ aspect of PMCs is that contractors who lose their lives do not end up on the official casualty lists.

In his book *Corporate Warriors*, Peter W. Singer distinguishes three kinds of PMCs: providers, advisors, and supporters. Providers deliver troops, weapons, and equipment. Advisors are more involved in the reorganisation of a force and the recruitment of soldiers. Supporters offer their services in activities such as the transport of equipment, setting up bases, food, and transport of the wounded. PMCs work not only for governments but also rebel groups and drug cartels; they even count humanitarian NGOs and the United Nations among their clientele. The phenomenon of PMCs was in great disrepute after the US security company Blackwater was involved in a shooting incident in Baghdad on 16 September 2007 which killed 17 Iraqi civilians.

Two frequently heard objections to private security firms are their lack of transparency and accountability. In this area, however, several initiatives have been undertaken. The most important is the International Code for Security Service Providers published in 2010. The code contains norms and standards including those concerning the use of force to defend people and respect for human rights as well as measures against such matters as sexual violence and torture. The code also includes a monitoring and complaints mechanism to promote compliance. More than 260 companies have signed the code, including large companies like G4S (UK) and DynCorp International (US). The idea is that governments only outsource activities to PMCs that have signed the code and adhere to it.

Globally, PMCs have become a fact of life. Countries such as Norway and the United Kingdom have made arrangements to allow private guards on board commercial ships. The market for this service worldwide is growing annually by 7.4%. The total turnover in 2014 is expected to be $218.4 billion. Partly because of the continuing reductions in military personnel in Western countries, the rise of PMCs will become an increasingly important dimension of military and security operations in the coming years.
years is that state actors will continue to cooperate intensively with each other both in
the fight against terrorism and on the problem of failing states.

A key uncertainty for the growth or marginalisation of terrorism, particularly in the
Islamic world, is the extent to which Muslim communities dare to say no to terrorism. In
this respect, the political changes taking place in the Arab world are both an opportunity
and a threat. Possible success in reforms in countries such as Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia,
and Yemen would be an important example of political change without the use of force
and would thus marginalise terrorist groups. The lack of reform, however, may lead to
increasing frustration and radicalisation, with even more terrorist violence as a result.

The unpredictability of criminal groups and transnational organised crime limits what
one can say about the future regarding this topic. We can nonetheless identify a number
of possible trends.

At the same time, the trend of international cooperation in the fight against organised
crime is becoming increasingly apparent. This development is expected to continue in
the next five to ten years, with an emphasis on more intensified regional cooperation
(for example in Latin America and the Sahel). The question is whether states will be able
to take into account the specific characteristics of local organised criminal networks in
their regional policy.

It remains uncertain what the growing potential for terrorist activities out of failed states
will mean for the development of cooperation between terrorists and organised crime.
What is probable is that criminal networks will make increasing use of the growing
fragility in certain parts of the world.

Although this was considered unlikely in the 2012 Monitor, the incidents of piracy
decreased over the past year. The reasons for this, as previously indicated, are the
improved self-protection of merchant ships and the activities of navies in the Horn
of Africa region, although it is also possible that the reduction has a different cause.
The root causes of Somali piracy lie ‘on land’ and not at sea and have not changed
significantly over the past year. Sustainable solutions such as bolstering state capacity
in the security sector and developing economic alternatives will probably not have much
effect in the next five years, despite international support. Progress will be made but is
likely to remain limited. This means that piracy in the Horn of Africa is likely to remain
a security problem in the coming years. In the absence of structural and cohesive
solutions, the number of incidents will depend on the success that navies and merchant
ships book in fighting the symptoms, rather than the causes, of piracy.

The areas at high risk of an increase in piracy in the coming years are: the Horn of
Africa region (including the Indian Ocean), the Gulf of Guinea, Indonesia, the Strait
of Malacca, the South China Sea, and the waters around Central and South America.
Piracy is likely to remain a security problem in some of these regions in the coming
two to ten years. The size of the piracy problem is uncertain and depends on factors
such as the state’s capability in the security sector, the lack of economic alternatives in the coastal regions, and the degree of effort and cooperation of states and non-state actors in fighting piracy. Due to the proliferation of coordination mechanisms such as the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) and Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) and the further development and implementation of protective measures, progress can be made in tackling the symptoms in the coming years. Shipowners will probably continue to use armed private security guards. It is uncertain whether regulation in this field is sufficiently developed to avoid ‘black areas’ in oversight and accountability (see Box 2 on private military companies).

Scenario framework
For the coming five to ten years, we can expect the diffuse picture within the broad category of non-state actors to persist. NGOs and civil society will increasingly make use of networks and are likely to become more activist. What this means for their relations with states is uncertain. Regarding terrorism, we see on the one hand a movement in the direction of stronger states and more international cooperation in the fight against terrorism. On the other hand, the degree of fragmentation has increased as a result of failing states. In order to combat the activities of criminal groups, far-reaching international cooperation will continue to be needed, though it is likely that measures against the spread of organised crime will languish as a result of the financial crisis and that criminals will know how to exploit the fragile nature of state institutions for their personal gain. Piracy is likely to remain a security problem in the next five to ten years, although the extent of the problem and the regions where piracy will be concentrated are uncertain. The development of partnerships between navies and ship owners and the use of private security guards show that both non-state and state actors will remain active in the fight against piracy and will continue to work together.

3 Strategic shocks

- Tensions between governments and citizens’ movements due to greater state control over society.
- Terrorists carry out a catastrophic attack on Western targets.
- Islamic terrorists seize power in a country in the Middle East or South Asia.
- Explosive growth of drugs consumption in China or Russia.

Tensions between governments and citizens’ movements due to greater state control over society. If a major terrorist attack takes place in the EU or the US, states might respond by taking measures aimed at strengthening their grip on society. Citizens’ movements can be the victims of this, which could lead to growing friction between
governments and citizens’ movements on civil liberties and the right to protest. If cyber warfare increases, which is likely, then freedom on the internet may come under further pressure through comparable measures taken by the government, with possible implications for new citizens’ movements that are dependent on the internet. The probability of this strategic shock is currently uncertain.

**Terrorists carry out a catastrophic attack on Western targets,** possibly with CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) weapons or through new *modus operandi*. Such an attack would potentially be a strategic shock. This is especially true if such an attack is followed by an overreaction by governments and societies, for example in relation to certain countries (e.g. interventions) or groups (e.g. riots or extreme forms of discrimination).

**Islamic terrorists seize power** in a country in the Middle East or South Asia, possibly as a result of disappointment and frustration regarding the ‘Arab Spring’ or ineffective Western reconstruction aid. The opposite is also possible: democratisation and the strengthening of the rule of law could make the use of violence by terrorist groups obsolete. Positive changes in Egypt or Iran in particular could have a considerable impact on the region, as would a widely accepted solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

**Explosive growth of drugs consumption in China or Russia.** Because of a growing demand for narcotics in one or more of the BRICS, the war on drugs and the international counter-narcotics system would likely collapse.

### 4 Winners and losers

The 2012 Monitor identified the winners among the new citizens’ movements. Although the groups listed in the Monitor lost some momentum in the past year (e.g. Occupy, Arab Spring), the winners in the future are likely to be found among similar citizens’ movements. That such movements are transitory appears to be precisely the nature of this new phenomenon. Facilitated by the internet and other media, it has become possible to mobilise many people (often virtually) in a short period of time for a particular purpose (see Box 3). This will undoubtedly continue to be the case in the coming years. The losers are the traditional NGOs that have difficulty keeping up with these new developments and that are moreover losing much of their subsidies. If they are still to be considered among the winners, this would probably be because they have allied themselves with transnational civil society networks and managed to broaden their mission to a global public goods perspective. Western states are gradually losing ground to non-state actors and can therefore also be considered losers in a sense. Cooperation with civil society in addressing cross-border challenges—despite the opportunities arising from it—is not self-evident and can be hampered by differences in approach between the different actors.
Digital media has become an integral part of our society today, leaving its traces in all layers of society. The advent of the internet, mobile telephony, and social media such as Twitter, Facebook, and LinkedIn have brought people around the world in contact with each other and increasingly affect the daily lives of anyone. The size of social media’s target groups was in the hundreds of millions in 2013. It is a factor that will gain in strength in the coming decades and will have the effect of increasing the power of communication in the entertainment and consumer industries in particular. The sheer size of social media target groups will also be a concern for those who see the phenomenon as the catalyst for activism and ‘progressive’ transnational initiatives in the 21st century. Representatives of this view, also known as cyber liberals, attach great importance to e-media and believe it will have far-reaching influence on diplomacy, statecraft, and bottom-up populist movements. Cyber liberals also have confidence in the ability of states to adequately react to e-media.

Often, the circumstances and effects of the above-mentioned activism and such national and international initiatives are more complex and are dependent on more than just digital media. It is therefore too easy to say, as many have, that the Arab Spring—which was coined the Facebook or Twitter Revolution by some—was the result of the use of digital media.

The assumption that digital media has brought only advantages also ignores another side of reality. Digital media not only connects individuals, communities, and societies with each other, it can also drive them apart and thereby contribute to polarisation.

Digital media can put the stability and unity of weaker states under pressure. It can also be a method of control, in particular by governments. When states with dysfunctional crisis and communication strategies and an eroded security infrastructure face social unrest, they run the risk of fragmentation. The threat of unrest and instability can persuade governments to impose new control methods—ranging from the spread of misinformation to outright censorship—in order to ensure stability.

The extent to which the international community is divided on this issue became apparent late in 2012 during negotiations between the US, other Western countries, and a bloc led by Russia on regulating the telecommunications sector. The inability of the parties to agree on the use of internet facilities and limits to freedom of expression led to a schism between the two blocks, which resulted in the failure of negotiations on the development of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and on concluding a telecoms treaty.

This other side of the story is often referred to as the paradox of digital media, which will be amplified in the coming years with the growing influence of digital media. This affects not only individuals or groups but also increasingly states.

In contrast to the cyber liberals, the cyber realists point to the adverse effects of the presence and influence of digital media. Their views—which to date have often been overshadowed by the dominant and more optimistic cyber-liberal perspective—will gain strength in the coming years. States will be more inclined to put restrictions on the telecommunications industry in order to set limits on the ways in which individuals try to exercise their influence using digital media. Once again, we see here the tension between privacy and freedom of expression on the one hand, and the rule of law and security on the other.

**Box 3 The paradox of digital media**

Digital media has become an integral part of our society today, leaving its traces in all layers of society. The advent of the internet, mobile telephony, and social media such as Twitter, Facebook, and LinkedIn have brought people around the world in contact with each other and increasingly affect the daily lives of anyone. The size of social media’s target groups was in the hundreds of millions in 2013. It is a factor that will gain in strength in the coming decades and will have the effect of increasing the power of communication in the entertainment and consumer industries in particular. The sheer size of social media target groups will also be a concern for those who see the phenomenon as the catalyst for activism and ‘progressive’ transnational initiatives in the 21st century. Representatives of this view, also known as cyber liberals, attach great importance to e-media and believe it will have far-reaching influence on diplomacy, statecraft, and bottom-up populist movements. Cyber liberals also have confidence in the ability of states to adequately react to e-media.

Often, the circumstances and effects of the above-mentioned activism and such national and international initiatives are more complex and are dependent on more than just digital media. It is therefore too easy to say, as many have, that the Arab Spring—which was coined the Facebook or Twitter Revolution by some—was the result of the use of digital media.

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With respect to the 2012 monitor, **terrorists** are the losers in Europe. The number of terrorist attacks has shown a downward trend in the last few years (Europol 2012). Al-Qaeda is also among the losers as a result of the elimination of various leaders and a decline in its communication and planning capabilities. Despite the civil war in Syria, the outbreaks of violence in Libya, and the repression in Bahrain, in many Arab countries there is talk of reform. In particular, the relatively peaceful elections in Egypt give reason for considering the moderate forces and peaceful Muslims in the Arab world as winners, although it should be noted that the final outcome of the developments there still remains very uncertain.

Through the pursuit of their activities, transnational **criminal groups** appear to be able to threaten security and stability at both the global and state levels. In the long run, these organisations undermine state authority by compromising the legitimacy of state institutions and by undermining the administrative capacities of governments. Since they have this asset, criminal groups can be seen as winners. Using the turmoil in the world economy and the growing fragility in certain parts of the world, criminal groups continue their sometimes carefree activities while states (especially Western states) are forced to focus their attention elsewhere.

Private security companies, navies and commercial shipping can be considered winners on the basis of the past year. **Pirates** on balance appear to be losers on the basis of the last year.

### 5 Implications for global security and stability

The developments described above have potential implications for global security and stability. Terrorist attacks; the growing internet activism and the related vulnerability of governments, economies, and societies (including through hacking); and the actions of criminal groups can all lead to political, economic, and social destabilisation. Growing citizens’ activism can have either a positive or a negative impact on global security.

There is a (slight) risk of global destabilisation due to the developments in Syria and Mali, which could lead to an increased threat of terrorist attacks. Growing citizens’ activism, aided by the internet and the increase in transnational connections between citizens, can lead to more Arab Spring-like revolutions. When these revolutions are associated with violence, global/regional security can be jeopardised. But growing citizens’ activism could ultimately be positive for global stability. Instead of NGOs, which increasingly operate as though they are an extension of the state, a trend may be emerging of a civil society that takes a critical approach to the government. This contributes to the ‘checks and balances’ that enhance the functioning of democracy. As a result of global protests against the dominance of neoliberalism and capitalism, for example, changes in the economic system may be achieved. Due to an improved regulation of financial and economic transactions, countries may be better able to absorb economic shocks.
Activities of criminal groups continue to pose a threat when they are accompanied by acts of violence, such as revenge killings within criminal networks and drug wars. In addition, criminal groups have an impact on economic security by transferring more and more activities in the legal economic sphere to the black or gray economies. The economic impact of piracy at the global level will be limited, although it certainly will have an impact on the physical safety of seafarers.

Conclusion

To conclude, we expect the trend whereby non-state actors increasingly influence the position and policies of national states to continue. In different areas and in different ways, they are able to influence global stability and security. In this chapter we have highlighted civil society, terrorists, pirates, and criminal organisations.

The picture we see in the scenario framework remains diffuse. This is mainly due to the multiplicity and diversity of actors discussed in this chapter. We do observe some shifts among the groups of non-state actors. This applies to both NGOs and civil society as well as for the spoilers within the international system. Within the field of civil society, we see on the one hand the emergence of more alliances and coalitions, but on the other hand also a fragmentation as a result of the growing gap not only between ‘traditional’ NGOs and citizens’ movements, but also between civil society and governments. In the fight against spoilers such as terrorists, criminal groups, and pirates, the trend of international and regional cooperation continues. States should, however, be aware of the causes and combinations of criminal activities of the above-mentioned groups if they wish to fight them effectively. More effective approaches would involve searching for structural solutions to the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia and the recognition of the potential exploitation of fragile states by criminal groups and terrorists.
Within the theme of global security, migration is a much discussed topic. An analysis of this topic is therefore indispensable. In this box, we will throw light on the theme of ‘migration’ by highlighting the driving forces that will influence it in the coming years.

Migration has been a fraught topic in recent years. The reason for this is the fear that migration—especially from the Islamic world—would lead to social disruption and deteriorating cohesion within societies. There was also the fear that migration would increase the risk of terrorism. These factors have been given additional charge against the backdrop of alarming reports about the growth of the world population and the risk of large migration flows due to climate change and conflicts in the periphery of Europe. In this box we will identify the driving forces behind migration and address the question of whether an increase in migration is likely.

Migration takes place at different levels: at the rural-urban, regional, and international level. The reasons for migration are often linked to social and economic issues. Regarding international migration, it is striking that the poorest members of society do not emigrate. About three percent of the world population are migrants. This percentage is about the same as a century ago. However, the direction of the migration has changed. The decolonisation wave of the last century brought about a migration stream flowing from the former colonies to the mother country; the North-South migration has as a result changed into a South-North pattern.

The International Migration Institute (IMI) identifies three driving forces of migration: education, technology, and climate change. A direct link exists between the availability of education in the source country and the extent to which migration occurs. Better educated people have more insight into the opportunities offered by migration. In addition, highly educated people are better able to make use of these possibilities thanks to the education they received.

At the global level, the availability and quality of education is rising. The percentage of those registered for basic education in sub-Saharan Africa rose from 59 percent in 1999 to 77 percent in 2009. Second, technological advances tend to lead to an increase in migration. Between 2005 and 2010, the number of internet connections doubled, which expanded the world population’s access to information. Advances in technology are also leading to an increase in the availability of cheaper means of transportation. The third driving force with respect to migration is climate change, which can induce migration flows when the quality of life in certain areas decreases, for example due to a natural disaster. Because climate change is shrouded in uncertainty, the extent to which this influence will be felt is difficult to estimate. We can say that a link exists between these two elements, but it is difficult to determine the concrete effects measured in terms of the scale of migration.