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Modalities of Democratic Transformation

Forms of Public Discourse in Hungary’s Largest Newspaper, 1990–7

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abstract: This article is based on the premise that social systems are justified via the discursive use of modal statements (i.e. sentences in which actors delineate that which is possible, impossible, inevitable or contingent) and their associated rationales. Within authoritarian states such modal discourse usually reflects a relatively coherent ‘modality of permission’. However, when the citizens of such states unite to overthrow their totalitarian leaders, their activities are typically justified in terms of two mutually inconsistent discursive forms: a ‘modality of achievement’ (based on market justice among competitors) vs a ‘modality of necessity’ (based on social justice for the masses). These three discursive modalities have theoretical roots in Simmel’s forms of sociation, and can be differentiated using content analysis. In an analysis of editorials during Hungary’s first seven years of post-Soviet democratization, evidence is found of a steady increase during these years in mentions of Hungarians’ opportunities being based on economic circumstances as well as in mentions of their responsibilities being grounded in political circumstances. This latter finding suggests that as late as 1997, Hungarian political discourse was heading toward a modality of necessity, more like the predominant political modality in Western Europe than the achievement modality that characterizes political discourse in the US.

keywords: democratization ♦ Hungary ♦ modality ♦ Simmel ♦ text analysis
When authoritarian rulers are ousted by their subjects, public demands for democratic reform nearly always emerge from an alliance consisting not only of large numbers of workers and/or peasants, but also of entrepreneurially minded (or bourgeois) members of their own governments. Yet once democratic institutions are developed, newly elected politicians find themselves faced with a mixed mandate because policies ensuring social justice for the masses are typically inconsistent with ones ensuring ‘market justice’ on behalf of the bourgeoisie. The theoretical premise of this article is that each of these types of policy is best justified in accordance with a distinct discursive form – a free-market political discourse (commonly, but not exclusively, used in the US) vs a social-justice political discourse (commonly, but not exclusively, used in the welfare states of Western Europe and Scandinavia). Linking each form to a distinct modality, we show how each of these discursive forms has an internal dynamic not unlike a Simmelian ‘form of sociation’. Illustrations of the two forms are provided in an analysis of domestic political discourse during Hungary’s first years as a democratic nation.

**Democratization and its Justification**

A dynamic repeatedly mentioned in studies of democratic transformations is the simultaneous decline in support for a country’s authoritarian rulers by both a locally emerging entrepreneurial class and a disenfranchised class of workers and/or peasants (Markoff, 1990; Poulantzas, 1976). Sometimes bourgeois elites discover broad-based economic dissatisfaction coinciding with their long-standing efforts toward economic restructuring (Cardoso, 1986; O’Neil, 1996), whereas at other times it is during mass unrest that elites first see reform as an opportunity (Arrighi, 1985; Verdery, 1993) or an inevitability (Seidman, 1994). Either way, the combined power of these two segments of industrializing societies have been instrumental in many a democratic transformation.

Formal alliances between entrepreneurs and masses tend to be rare, however. According to Marxist orthodoxy a deep divide exists between the class interests of the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie and the proletarian workers whom they exploit. And indeed, studies of democratization have repeatedly found bourgeois and worker interests to diverge, despite their common dissatisfaction with autocratic rule (see Rueschemeyer et al., 1992: 271ff.). For example, in his analysis of grievances written by citizens of French rural parishes just prior to the French Revolution, Markoff (1990: 416) notes that ‘the French countryside was animated by considerations of services received, of equity and even of something verging on a sense of potential citizenship’. Yet generalizing from grievances of bourgeois origin,
'the Third Estate is noteworthy for its (critical) emphasis on privilege and on barriers to the development of the market' (Markoff, 1990: 422). Similarly, in late 1988, a Hungarian ‘reform circle’ of party cadres called on their fellow citizens ‘to liquidate the structure of the Stalinist model’ and to require a ‘clear strategy for reintegration into the world economy (above all a functioning market and the revival of rejected bourgeois values)’ (O’Neil, 1996: 292). In contrast, in nationwide polls two years later, ‘Hungarians appear to be reluctant to abandon those state-provided social benefits to which they had grown accustomed under the socialist regime’ (Szelényi et al., 1996: 472). Although the concerns of the masses are with social justice and those of the bourgeoisie are with an unencumbered marketplace, their concrete interests in deposing a common leadership coincide when this leadership neither meets the basic needs of the masses nor allows fair competition among the bourgeoisie. Democracy becomes their common alternative, because it promises that leaders will be held accountable for deviations they make from social and market justice.

Once authoritarian rule ends, the alliance between masses and bourgeoisie is typically replaced by party divisions in accordance with their respective policy concerns. For example, since its first democratic election in 1990, Hungary’s major political parties have developed social agendas falling into either a social-justice camp (consisting of the MSZP, the social-democratic successor to the former Communist Party, and the liberal SZDSZ, which has declined steadily in the polls since 1990) or a market-justice camp (consisting initially of the MDF and more recently of the FIDESZ). Legislative decisions call for choices between the policies advocated by representatives from each of these camps, because implementation of one of the former allies’ interests will commonly prove counter to the other ally’s interests:

- By redistributing wealth to meet constituents’ needs, the government inevitably does so by limiting reinvestment in the marketplace.
- By allowing broad discretion over constituents’ profits, the government will have few resources with which to assist its neediest constituents.

And so, we have our traditional left–right political divide. On the left are those who justify government activities in terms of how well they manage a social system within which constituents’ hardships are minimized; on the right are those who justify such activities in terms of how well they ensure a stable economic field within which constituents can accumulate wealth. Beyond a consensus on the general benefits of a healthy national economy, at issue is whether the state’s role is to minimize its citizens’ risks or to maximize their opportunities.
Modalities as Discursive Forms

The promise of democratic institutions is that elected officials’ power remains contingent on their responsiveness to public opinion – attitudes and beliefs formed, in part, via public discourse in mass media. Although the media–public opinion link is not investigated here, important insights into its dynamics are gained through improved understanding of how social issues are characterized in mediated public discourse. Communications literature provides overwhelming evidence that mediated public discourse influences public opinion. For example, research on agenda setting (Dearing and Rogers, 1996; McCombs and Shaw, 1972) provides evidence that issues raised in the media become issues that voters deem important. Research on priming (Druckman, 2004; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987) yields evidence that voters’ evaluation criteria tend to be ones that appear frequently in the news. Moreover, if a political party has been consistently depicted in the media as having ‘ownership’ of a particular stance on an issue, the party will gain public support when this stance is emphasized in the news (Abbe et al., 2003; Budge and Farlie, 1983; Petrocik, 1996). Yet public discourse involves more than mere mentions of issues and evaluation criteria; it encompasses debates regarding the very possibility or impossibility of social policies, as well as arguments for or against their necessity (Roberts, 2008).

Our theoretical position is that social justice and market justice are justifications for social policy, each of which is grounded in a distinct modality (i.e. a discursive form in which speakers socially construct each other’s activities by referring to their possibility, impossibility, inevitability or contingency). Like Simmel’s ‘forms of sociation’ (Vergesellschaftungsformen), each discursive form is characterized by a tension among interactants as they simultaneously seek to preserve the form while acting in their form-specific interests. Before distinguishing two modalities associated with the right vs left policy justifications described in the previous section, we begin by describing the modality associated with the type of authoritarian society from which most democracies emerge – a modality for which Simmel ([1909] 1984) has already laid theoretical foundations, albeit within the more restricted social context of flirtation.

With apologies for his presumption – understandable given the over 100-year-old social context within which it was written – that in flirtation ‘the object of love is a woman and its subject a man’ (Simmel, [1909] 1984: 133), Simmel depicts this social form as one that lasts only until the woman reveals her self (i.e. when she publicly acknowledges her commitment to a particular man). To avoid a common misinterpretation, it is important to recognize that for Simmel ‘what the woman does for the man’ is not what is at stake in flirtation. At issue is what she reveals to him.
Her conquest only takes place once she definitively discloses her genuine support for her suitor’s marital intentions. Yet during flirtation – and thus, for Simmel, prior to such a disclosure of loyalty – her behavior oscillates along a scale ‘between affirmation and the denial of genuineness’:

However, each stage on this scale can be put to the use of flirtation, by men as well as women. This is because the subject stands behind his expression in a semi-veiled fashion and gives us the feeling that he seems to offer himself and to slip through our hands at almost the same moment. (Simmel [1909] 1984: 138)

Thus flirtation involves a target, who guardedly values the flirt’s loyalty, and a flirt, who refrains from divulging to whom her loyalties genuinely belong.

The gap between flirtatious discourse and the dominant discourse within authoritarian states narrows when one recalls that Stalin’s rise to power was built by gradually developing an environment within which it was dangerous to prematurely disclose one’s loyalties.

The way the system operated under Stalin’s long rule tended to eliminate those who were threats as potential rivals to one-man dictatorship and to favor, on the whole, those who were shrewd, cautious plotters who took few unnecessary risks but had good organizational ability (Bauer et al., 1960: 199)

This discursive form remained predominant in the Soviet republics and satellites prior to 1989, and is still much in evidence in contemporary Russia. Like coy suitors, Soviet officials would vie to retain their places of authority within the dominant discourse by withholding support for any activity for which they might be held responsible. For example, after a meeting with Russian intellectuals during which he had repeatedly responded to their suggestions with discouragement, George Soros (1990: 23) reports, ‘they told me they loved it. “A Soviet official will never say no. You said no ten times in ten minutes: it was so refreshing.” ’ Or, consider his description of his dealings in 1987 with Georg Miasnikov, then deputy chairman of the Cultural Foundation of the USSR: ‘Unfailingly polite, he used every opportunity to create obstacles, yet he always yielded in the end because he did not want to take the responsibility for our failure’ (Soros, 1990: 20). Decades earlier Bauer et al. (1960: 189) characterized such demeanor as the result of a social system in which ‘nobody is fully trustworthy, nevertheless numerous individuals must be held responsible for what is demanded by the Center’.

By placing excessive demands on its citizens, the regime creates a situation in which small groups become bound together by ties of mutual interest of the ‘you-scratch-my-back-and-I’ll-scratch-yours’ variety. These small, mutually protective societies grow up on the local level among people bound together by self-interest and ties of responsibility that set them off against ‘the Center.’ (Bauer et al., 1960: 177)
The dynamics of flirtation enter in as people build networks of loyal relationships beyond which promises are withdrawn at will.

Each of Simmel’s sociational forms was characterized by a self-sustaining dynamic, which in the case of flirtation involves suitors’ ongoing attempts to remain ‘in play’ (whether it be as marriage-worthy partner or as loyalty-worthy comrade). Yet these dynamics have a modal character never made explicit in Simmel’s writings. That is, Simmel’s social forms can be understood as discursively maintained by an actor’s and an observer’s use of modal statements (i.e. grammatical clauses, each with a single, inflected, modal auxiliary verb). When consistently used, modal statements afford guidelines for human behaviors, inhibiting activities with realizations depicted as impossible or inevitable, and promoting those with realizations depicted as possible or contingent. This fourfold division among social actions is a byproduct of the fact that every modal statement can be negated in three ways – by negation of the modal, the main verb, or both.7

For example, flirtatious statements will convey one of the following (only the first of which would be stated by the flirt in earnest) modal forms:8

- **Contingency** (main verb negated): I am permitted not to disclose my loyalty. (I may always deny what you say about me.)

- **Possibility** (no negation): You are [at this moment] permitted to disclose my loyalty. (Although desirous of making such a disclosure, the target fears that the flirt would deny that the loyalty is genuine.)

- **Impossibility** (modal negated): You are [still] not permitted to disclose my loyalty. (Desirous of making such a disclosure, the target nonetheless hopes that the flirt might reconsider permitting it.)9

Flirtation terminates when the flirt acknowledges:

- **Inevitability** (negations of both modal and main verb): I am not permitted not to disclose my loyalty. (For example, the flirt may publicly promise loyalty to the target, as in marriage.)

Notice how the first statement sets out the discursive context as one in which disclosure is entirely contingent on the flirt. That is, disclosure remains non-inevitable until it becomes inevitable through an irreversible pronouncement (e.g. of marital or, possibly, political loyalty) as in the last statement. Despite her words the flirt keeps her loyalty ambiguous, leaving the target believing that disclosure of this loyalty remains possible. To keep their options open, flirts will only rarely pronounce their loyalty to be absolutely impossible. Instead, given that any disclosure by the target is contingent on the flirt’s acquiescence, she will likely confine her utterances to ambiguous variants of the second and third statements above as
a means of prolonging the tension, and thereby the form, of flirtatious interaction.

Thus, like most of Simmel’s social forms, flirtation, or permission, is perhaps best understood as a contingent social context. Here all discourse is contingent on the flirt’s unknown intentions. Yet with the contrasting modality of ability, or achievement, all discourse is contingent on an agent’s ongoing intention toward attaining a goal – an intention known to interested observers, or stakeholders.

Achievement begins when the agent declares her or his intentions to observers, who, (s)he hopes, will show an interest (possibly a financial one) in the agent’s success. Contracts are concrete manifestations of such interest, consisting of agreement on both precisely what constitutes the goal to be attained (specifying the conditions to be met prior to proclaiming goal-attainment) and a deadline (after which stakeholders are to disclose whether it is inevitable or impossible for them to proclaim these conditions as having being met). Potential statements of ability are as follows:

- **Contingency**: You are able not to proclaim goal-attainment. (Stakeholders will refrain from calling attention to the widely understood fact that the agent’s goal-attainment is optional.)

- **Possibility**: You are [still] able to proclaim having attained the goal. (Desirous of goal-attainment, stakeholders direct the agent toward internal or external resources that may yield success.)

- **Impossibility**: I am not [at this moment] able to proclaim goal-attainment. (Although hoping to be able to proclaim goal-attainment, stakeholders provide focus by reminding the agent of the conditions for goal-attainment.)

Achievement terminates when a stakeholder acknowledges,

- **Inevitability**: I am not able not to proclaim goal-attainment. (For example, stakeholders may no longer withhold payment for the agent’s contracted work.)

Although the social form of achievement is based on a social context in which agency is contingent on agents’ willing participation, mention of this contingency is taboo. Stakeholders hold such discourse at bay by providing agents with a balance of reminders that goal-attainment is possible for them, yet impossible if the conditions of goal-attainment are unmet at deadline. As stakeholders they prefer that the goal is attained – an occasion when their proclamation to that effect becomes inevitable. Whereas during flirtation the woman maintains a tension in the mind of her target regarding her subjective intentions, during achievement stakeholders maintain a tension in the mind of an agent regarding an ‘objective’ goal – one that will
‘prove’ either within or beyond the agent’s reach. The more abstract the goal (e.g. original scholarship), the more discretion stakeholders have in their maintenance of this tension.

In his writings on what has come to be called ‘The Web of Group-Affiliations’ (Simmel, [1922] 1955), Simmel noted that competition between agents is characteristically offset by their cooperative efforts to ensure that they, as stakeholders, mutually recognize each other’s achievements. For example, a merchant ‘pursues his interests by means of the most bitter competition with those with whom he must often unite closely for the sake of common interests’ (Simmel, [1922] 1955: 155). Thus, as stakeholders, merchants may choose prescriptive or proscriptive socialization strategies conducive to a healthy marketplace – ones likely to optimize proclamations of goal-attainment. Accordingly, Simmel ([1922] 1955: 156) continued, group affiliations provide ‘opportunities for socialization’ as well as ones for competition. Moreover, if we extend Simmel’s position by presuming the contingency of all goal-related behaviors on agents’ willing participation, group membership too is added to the potential objects of agents’ rational choices (see Hechter, 1990).

Whereas during flirtation the woman actively refrains from establishing group membership with the target and whereas during achievement the agent readily abandons the group to expedite goal-attainment, collaborators (i.e. participants who choose group membership over expediency) opt for a modality of necessity over one of either ability or permission. More specifically, when necessity is the modality, sociable discourse is contingent on it being unnecessary for any collaborator to remind others of their responsibilities (i.e. of the group-maintenance activities they are duty-bound to fulfill). Most parents are intimately familiar with this modality, as becomes evident in such everyday references to the meal that one ‘must’ prepare, the kids one ‘has to’ pick up, etc. Necessity confers a sense of duty and responsibility on one’s activities. Here one’s actions are not strategies toward proclamations of goals attained, but are tactics for preventing others from recognizing responsibilities one may have neglected (e.g. the well-being of one’s family). Statements of this modality are as follows:11

- **Contingency**: I am not required to recognize your responsibilities. (Observers will refrain from mentioning others’ responsibilities when they do not appear to be neglected.)

- **Possibility**: You are [still] not required not to recognize your responsibilities. (Desirous of group maintenance, observers may convey disapproval to collaborators who do not [i.e. who presumably believe they need not] act conscientiously.)

- **Impossibility**: You are [at this moment] required not to recognize your responsibilities. (A conscientious collaborator’s efforts may nonetheless...
be so poor [e.g. due to illness] that group maintenance would be better served were such responsibilities left to others.)

Sociability ends (and responsibility is reinitiated) when the observer notes:

- **Inevitability**: I am required to recognize your responsibilities. (For example, after noticing a neighbor’s obese children an observer might exclaim, ‘You must feed your kids healthier foods.’)

Note that when the modality is one of permission, loyalty between flirt and target is contingent; when it is one of necessity, what is contingent is each collaborator’s responsibility to ensure that others recognize their own responsibilities for their common well-being. In the sociational form (Vergesellschaftungsform) he referred to as sociability (Geselligkeit), Simmel described this latter modality as one in which ‘the pleasure of the individual is always contingent upon the joy of others’ as well as the only one ‘in which a democracy of equals is possible without friction’ (Simmel, [1911] 1949: 257). While being sociable, responsible collaborators of society join in carefree conversation that is played out between ‘an upper and a lower sociability threshold for the individual’ (Simmel, [1911] 1949: 256). Sociability is maintained through subtle allusions to either the possibility that someone’s subjective intentions might be more responsible or the impossibility that someone’s objective accomplishments will benefit others. For example, comments about a colleague’s seemingly unconscientious demeanor will likely involve irony (e.g. ‘Nice of you to come to the office today, stranger’), thereby providing potential slackers ‘space’ in which to defend their integrity (e.g. ‘I had to go to a meeting for company business’). The sociability threshold is passed when, despite such playful mutual policing, one collaborator finds it necessary, or inevitable, to remind another collaborator of her or his responsibilities.

And so one is left to speculate about the type of modality most likely to become predominant in a country, like Hungary, that has shed its totalitarian past and has set up democratic institutions. Under such circumstances, citizens learn quickly that it is no longer dangerous to disclose their ideas, and thus no longer necessary to probe others’ loyalties in accordance with a modality of permission. In the Hungarian case, this learning process was relatively gradual, since considerable economic reforms had begun as early as the 1960s (particularly in agriculture) whereby small-scale entrepreneurs were given some freedom to innovate (Róna-Tas, 1997; Seleny, 1999). Nonetheless, political changes in 1989 did leave unclear whether within Hungary’s newly democratic society disclosure of such innovations would retain some loyalty aspects, no longer within antagonistic factions vying for power, but among fellow countrymen and women whom one
may occasionally need to remind of their responsibilities to the welfare of all. Or would disclosures be of goals attained, that is, of individual abilities made manifest? More specifically put, would goals be abandoned when socially irresponsible, or would the general welfare be jettisoned when no longer expedient? Finally, recast in Simmel’s terminology, would socialization or competition prevail? To answer these questions we suggest that one must examine the rationales that the country’s people use to discursively justify their modal statements.

Modal Statements and their Rationales

Not all modal statements are equally likely to gain expression. For example, contingency is unlikely to be used in public discourse (i.e. in discourse among participants, who are well versed in the modality at hand). This is because such statements comprise ‘keyings’ for tuning participants into ‘what it is we think is really going on’ (Goffman, 1974: 45). With a contingency statement, the source (i.e. the speaker or author) reminds her or his audience of the ‘discursive rules’ currently in play. Thus, if faced with an overly aggressive target, the flirt may choose to state the self-evident: ‘Don’t forget. I am permitted not to marry you, if I so choose.’ The agent’s willingness and the collaborator’s restraint are also usually self-evident to those socialized in the discourse at hand. Only to an overly demanding stakeholder will the agent feel moved to say, ‘Keep in mind that I can quit (i.e. I am able not to finish this job) at any time.’ And only to someone puzzled at a lack of close supervision would a fellow collaborator be likely to comment, ‘Since you are doing your job, I do not need to remind you to act responsibly.’ Contingency statements are thus for the benefit of participants who appear insufficiently schooled in the appropriate rules of discourse. One would expect such socializing statements to be rare among (presumably socialized) citizens engaged in public national discourse.

However, when the discursive modality is one of achievement, modal statements will likely convey possibility. This is because possibility is typically conveyed at three moments within this discourse. First, a modality of achievement is initiated when agents publicly state that their goal-attainment is possible (‘I can create jobs’). Second, during achievement stakeholders will reinforce the agent’s belief in this possibility by providing verbal and material support (‘You can get that American dream’). Third, when stakeholders affirm goal-attainment, this is likely to be done with an acknowledgment of the agent’s abilities (i.e. the possibility of future goal-attainment of the same kind) (‘He is able to provide party leadership’). In contrast, stakeholders will likely restrict their statements of impossibility for fear of discouraging the agent, and they will only mention inevitability once (i.e. at the moment of goal-attainment).
In contrast, when the discursive modality is one of necessity, modal statements will likely convey inevitability. There are three key occasions for these statements as well. First, such discourse is initiated when sociability breaks down and an observer reminds a collaborator of that person’s responsibility (i.e. of something the collaborator must, inevitability, do) (‘You must alleviate unemployment’). Second, when such a reminder is to a highly responsible person, the observer will likely apologize by explaining that the reminder was given of necessity (i.e. as an inevitable, responsible act from a fellow collaborator) (‘Please forgive me for having to ask you this, but . . .’). Third, when others’ unflattering implications become too blatant, collaborators will justify their ‘seeming improprieties’ as having been required (‘We had to impose austere measures to keep the economy from stagnating’). In contrast, sociable talk may suffer if numerous modal statements are made regarding colleagues’ possible lack of conscientiousness or their impossible potential for helping others. And – like goal-attainment within the modality of achievement – ‘in sociability talking is an end in itself’ (Simmel, [1911] 1949: 259).

All such modal statements require a rationale for their completion. That is to say, it is always reasonable to ask the source of a modal statement for a rationale regarding the possibility, impossibility, inevitability or contingency of the statement’s predicate (e.g. disclosure of the flirt’s loyalty, of proclamation of the agent’s goal-attainment or of recognition of a collaborator’s responsibilities). Thus, for example, within a modality of permission, possibility and impossibility are accounted for in terms of someone’s (e.g. a comrade’s) discretion, and the contingency of such discretions is justified as entirely a matter of discretionary license (see Simmel, [1909] 1984: 140).

So what rationale might be appropriate for calling someone to duty, or for asserting the possibility of someone’s goal-attainment? Given that within a modality of necessity modal statements tend to convey a collaborator’s requirements, rationales for these requirements will likely reference responsibilities unmet by the collaborator. In contrast, given that within a modality of achievement modal statements tend to convey an agent’s possibility of success, rationales for such success will likely reference promising opportunities available to the agent. For example, the following text states that Hungarian government representatives’ responsibility to overwhelmingly elect judges is because judge appointments are not to be the product of political interests:

Another, although it is not written in regulations anywhere, requirement that belongs to the democratic state-of-law is that one-sided political interests should not be enforced when Constitutional judges are selected. That is why the law says that Constitutional judges must be elected by the votes of two-thirds of the Parliamentary Representatives. (Népszabadság, 18 November 1996: 11; emphasis added here and below)
On the other hand, political power can afford opportunities such as the ability for a politician to express his views:

István Csurka . . . was elected as a member of the fraction leadership in the fraction meeting on Sunday. From now on, from this position he can explain his highly coherent views about internal enemies who are supported from abroad, about the tasks of the Hungarian-Christian middle-class, and about defenseless Hungarian minorities. (Népszabadság, 19 March 1991: 3)

Moreover, in economic discourse (i.e. discourse in which economic rationales are given for modal statements) fiscal regulations may be used as rationales for legislators’ responsibilities:

This time the government had to reduce the budget deficit drastically in accordance with the agreement with the International Monetary Fund. (Népszabadság, 10 August 1990: 7)

And economic strategies may be given as rationales for Hungarian opportunities:

. . . in several countries like the US, Japan, or even in Croatia, the utilization of solar energy seems to accelerate, they spend more and more on research and development. . . . This looks like a train that we can still catch. (Népszabadság, 2 August 1996: 3)

As these illustrations show, there may be political, economic and other reasons why something is depicted as possible, inevitable, etc. within a nation’s public discourse. Moreover, there is ample empirical basis for developing hypotheses. Despite the free-market, IMF-promoted fiscal challenges of (and occasional revocations of welfare programs during) the 1990s and their concomitant marketplace experiences, several opinion polls show that ‘the majority of Central and Eastern European citizens are indeed very much in favor of the fully-fledged “European Model” ’ (Ferge, 2001: 151; see also Ferge et al., 1996; Tomka, 2006). Accordingly, we venture two hypotheses regarding political discourse within Hungary’s largest daily newspaper between 1990 and 1997:

H1: The modality of Hungary’s political discourse transformed during these years from one of achievement to one of necessity.

H2: The modality of Hungary’s economic discourse transformed in precisely the opposite direction during this time.

Data

Four quotations in the previous section are excerpts from a sample of editorials that appeared in the Hungarian newspaper Népszabadság between August 1990 (the month when Árpád Göncz became Hungary’s first post-Communism elected president) and June 1997. Starting in 1956 Népszabadság (People’s Freedom) was the official national newspaper of
the Hungarian Communist Party (MSZMP), with a pre-1989 circulation of about 695,000 copies daily (about a third of Hungary’s adult population) (Gulyás, 2000). In 1990, the MSZP (as successor to the MSZMP) handed over the newspaper’s ownership to a social-democratic-leaning foundation (The Free Press Foundation), which sold controlling interest (namely, 68 percent) to Gruner & Jahr – a subsidiary of the German media giant, Bertelsmann, AG. As part of the collective bargaining agreement with Bertelsmann, writers were allowed virtually unrestricted journalistic freedoms, including the prerogative to elect their own editor-in-chief (Jakab et al., 1991). *Népszabadság* remains Hungary’s largest daily newspaper with a current circulation of about 220,000.

*Népszabadság* is the least biased, yet consistent public forum for political and social discourse available on Hungary during the period of this study. Although left-leaning and intellectual, the newspaper is generally considered to provide balanced coverage of national politics. For example, Lange (1994) reports that in *Népszabadság* during the 1994 election the conservative MDF had 27 percent of the unpaid coverage (30 percent of the newspaper’s free informational coverage and 25 percent of its editorial content), MSZP had 24 percent (16 percent informational and 33 percent editorial) and SZDSZ had 16 percent (20 percent informational and 15 percent editorial). Compared to the broadcast media, *Népszabadság* had a relatively easier time maintaining control of its content during the ‘media war’ of 1993–4 when leaders within the Antall–Boross government struggled to monopolize political coverage (Hankiss, 1994; Popescu and Tóka, 2000; Tamas, 1999). Moreover, given the Hungarian people’s awareness of these struggles and their strong support for press freedom (Bajomi-Lázár, 2003: 185–9), plus their general affinity for social-democratic (i.e. social-justice) values (Szelényi et al., 1996), the newspaper managed to sustain a reasonably credible image despite national surveys of journalists indicating a decrease in their autonomy (Bajomi-Lázár, 2003: 117–18) and online reports by the Freedom House that press freedom in Hungary was hovering between ‘free’ and ‘partly free’ between 1990 and 1997. Thus in comparison to other archival sources, editorials published in *Népszabadság* likely comprise the most consistent population of Hungarian political and social discourse during the period of study.

Note that our generalizations are entirely restricted to this text population. Inferences regarding the study period are being made neither to the content of Hungarian newspapers (or other news media) in general nor even to the total content of the newspaper *Népszabadság*. Instead, our generalizations are exclusively to a segment of Hungarian discourse that is both as consistent and as representative as possible of all voices regarding the social issues of the time. We test whether this discourse shifted toward a modality of achievement vs one of necessity during the years immediately after 1989.
Editorials were sampled using a systematic area sampling design, whereby one weekday was randomly sampled from within every second week during the study period. A point-location was then randomly sampled from within Népszabadság’s first section – the section containing most news of national importance – and the article containing this location was examined to determine if it was an editorial. If not, another point-location was sampled from within the same newspaper issue, until an editorial was found and then included in the sample. During this process an article was classified as ‘an editorial’ if its author was a Hungarian citizen and if the article’s last three paragraphs contained at least one statement containing an inflected modal auxiliary verb (can, must, ought, etc.) with two characteristics. First, the verb’s subject had to be a Hungarian citizen. (Thus a statement like ‘conflicts can turn into hostilities’ does not qualify because its subject is not a person.) This was to ensure that our study is one of modalities that apply to Hungarians. Second, a rationale for the statement must have been made explicit in the article’s last three paragraphs. This procedure yielded a total of 171 editorials with approximately 26 editorials per year. From descriptors added to many bylines, this sample can be seen to represent discourse from relatively elite sources, including journalists, university professors, authors, politicians, entrepreneurs, representatives of civic and religious organizations and other concerned citizens.

The first and last three paragraphs of each editorial were transposed into extremely literal English translations, preserving the same clause structure throughout to retain the text’s original character as well as its subject–verb relations. Entire editorials were not translated to ensure that the volume of text representing each time point would remain relatively constant. To identify modal statements indicating possibility and inevitability, we searched the translations for all varieties of the modal auxiliary verbs ‘can’ (including variants of ‘being able to’ and ‘having the ability to’) and ‘must’ (including variants of ‘having to’ and ‘needing to’). Eighteen editorials contained no instances of these two types of modal auxiliary verbs (or, if they did, they did not meet either the Hungarian-subject or rationale criteria mentioned earlier) and were eliminated from the sample, producing our final sample size of 470 modality-statements-plus-rationales nested within 153 editorials.

Each modality statement was classified according to its modal form (i.e. as indicating possibility, impossibility, inevitability or contingency), depending on whether (and how) it was negated. Thus, non-negated instances of the aforementioned varieties of ‘can’ were classified as indicating possibility, whereas those of ‘must’ were classified under inevitability. Impossibility was the classification of statements containing expressions like ‘cannot’, ‘unable to’, ‘have no ability to’, ‘mustn’t’, ‘have to not’ and ‘need not to’. Contingency was the classification of modality statements containing ‘can not’, ‘able not to’, ‘have the ability not to’, ‘not at University of Groningen on January 18, 2011iss.sagepub.comDownloaded from iss.sagepub.com at University of Groningen on January 18, 2011
something one must do’, ‘don’t have to’ and ‘don’t need to’. Double negatives (e.g. ‘not able not to’ and ‘don’t need not to’) are exceptionally rare in natural language expressions, and did not surface in our data. Rationales associated with each modal statement were categorized as based on Hungarian politics, culture, economy or security. The idea here is that each modal-statement-plus-rationale can be ‘read’ according to the following template:

Political reasons differ from economic ones in that the former account for the possibility, impossibility, etc. of Hungarians’ actions as the consequence of activities by politicians and political bodies, whereas the latter account for them as due to aspects of the market and segments of the economy (e.g. agriculture or industry). Cultural rationales account for the contingency, inevitability, etc. of Hungarians’ actions as due to Hungary’s heritage, its language, its morality and its plight (e.g. regarding its poor and handicapped). When the potential for Hungarians’ actions was attributed to such things as safety, order and the military, the modal statement’s rationale was classified as security.

Table 1 provides a cross-classification of the 470 modal statements according to the statements’ modal forms and their rationales’ bases in politics, culture, economics or security. As expected, only a few (fewer than 2 percent) modal statements conveyed contingency – a form that, for reasons explained earlier, observers of both agents and collaborators tend to avoid. Of the other modal forms, over half were of possibility, over a quarter were of impossibility and under one-fifth were of inevitability. It is not surprising that over a third of the rationales provided in a national newspaper’s first section would be of a political nature. Cultural and economic rationales were about equally prevalent, with each accounting for just under 28 percent of the modal statements. Security was least likely (under 10 percent) to be used as a reason for a Hungarian’s possibilities, impossibilities, inevitabilities or contingencies. Distributions within the body of the table vary little from these reasonable, yet theoretically unremarkable marginal patterns. As previously argued, our theoretical interest is in post-1989 trends in Hungarians’ discursive linking of specific rationales with specific modal forms. More concretely put, we are interested in three-way interactions between time, rationale and modal form.
Method and Results

Our unit of analysis is the modal-statement-plus-rationale, more than one of which may be nested within a single editorial. Given this nesting and the tendency for journalists to focus on a consistent message within their editorials, it is likely that modal statements within the same editorial are more likely to have identical modal forms and rationales than modal statements in different editorials. In a form-by-rationale table of such statements these clusters of identical modal statements will yield larger variations in cell frequencies than corresponding variations in the population of all such modal statements. Multilevel models were developed to deal with this problem, thereby allowing researchers to test hypotheses on how contextual variables (e.g. time) at one level are associated with relations (e.g. between modal forms and rationales) at another level (Davidian and Giltinan, 1995; Vonesh and Chinchilli, 1997). The multilevel model (Pinheiro and Bates, 1995) used in this analysis is:

\[
\log(m_{ij} + \Delta) = \lambda + \lambda^P_i + \lambda^K_j + \lambda^L + q\lambda^Q_i + \lambda^{MR}_j + \lambda^{ML}_j + q\lambda^{MQ}_i + q\lambda^{RL}_j + q\lambda^{RQ}_j + \lambda^{RLQ}_j + q\lambda^{MRQ}_j
\]

where \( m_{ij} \) is the expected count of \( i^{th} \) modal form and \( j^{th} \) rationale category, \( l \) is linear time in 1-year increments from –3.5 for 1990 until 3.5 for 1997, \( q \) is quadratic time (centered with largest values at the extremes), and the \( \lambda \) are modal form and rationale effects such that \( \Sigma \lambda^P_i = \Sigma \lambda^K_j = \Sigma \lambda^{MR}_j = \Sigma \lambda^{ML}_j = \Sigma \lambda^{MQ}_i = \Sigma \lambda^{RL}_j = q \lambda^{RQ}_j + \lambda^{RLQ}_j + q\lambda^{MRQ}_j = 0. \) As suggested by Agresti (1990: 250) for sparse tables such as ours, sampling zeros are retained in our data by adding \( \Delta = 10^{-8} \) to each cell in our contingency table.

Given our 153 clusters plus the four-levels each of our modal form and rationale variables, the table described by this model has 2448 (4 × 4 × 153) cells – too many to yield sufficient power for drawing statistical

---

**Table 1** Percentages of Modality Statements According to Rationale and Modal Form

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rationale</th>
<th>Politics</th>
<th>Culture</th>
<th>Economy</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Possible</td>
<td>19.1 (90)</td>
<td>15.1 (71)</td>
<td>15.1 (71)</td>
<td>4.5 (21)</td>
<td>53.8 (253)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impossible</td>
<td>8.9 (42)</td>
<td>8.6 (40)</td>
<td>5.5 (26)</td>
<td>3.0 (14)</td>
<td>26.0 (122)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inevitable</td>
<td>6.2 (29)</td>
<td>3.7 (17)</td>
<td>6.6 (31)</td>
<td>1.9 (9)</td>
<td>18.3 (86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingent</td>
<td>0.6 (3)</td>
<td>0.6 (3)</td>
<td>0.4 (2)</td>
<td>0.2 (1)</td>
<td>1.9 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34.9 (164)</td>
<td>27.9 (131)</td>
<td>27.6 (130)</td>
<td>9.6 (45)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Frequencies are in parentheses below percentages. \( N = 470. \)
inferences about any but the most enormous of the effects it is intended to estimate. For this reason, we collapse the table in 16 ways allowing each combination of rationale and modal form to be analyzed separately. Thus we are fitting the above multilevel loglinear model to sixteen 612 \((2 \times 2 \times 153)\) cell contingency tables, such that in each model when \(i = 1\) a specific modal form is indexed and when \(i = 2\) all other modal forms are indexed. Likewise, in these models when \(j = 1\) a specific rationale is indexed and when \(j = 2\) all other rationale types are indexed.

When estimating these models we assume that their errors are distributed normally about zero and that the observed cell frequencies have a Poisson distribution, such that \(Y_{ij} \sim \text{Poisson} (m_{ij})\). Moreover, designating all observed counts as \(Y\) and all expected counts as \(M\), the model can be rewritten as

\[
\log(E(Y + \Delta)) = \log(M + \Delta) = X\alpha + Z\beta_E
\]

where \(\alpha\) is the vector of the model’s 12 unknown \(\lambda\)s and \(X\) is the design matrix of known constants for the model’s fixed effects. Editorials, within which modal statements are clustered, are identified within the matrix, \(Z_E\), allowing the marginal effects of each editorial to be estimated as one of the 153 elements, or \(\beta_k\), within the vector, \(\beta_E\). In making these estimates we make the standard assumptions that the expected value of each editorial’s effect is zero (i.e. \(E(\beta_k) = 0\)), that the editorial effects are independent of each other and have the same variance (i.e. that \(Var(\beta_k) = \sigma^2 \beta_E\ k = 1...153\)), and that there are no joint effects between editorials and any combination of modal form, rationale or time. Table 2 lists parameter estimates for the seven interactions specified in our model. (The five marginal effects in each model have been omitted from the table given their lack of theoretical importance.) All are true maximum likelihood estimates obtained using NLMIXED in SAS.

The campaign leading up to Hungary’s June 1994 elections took place at nearly the middle of the time period during which our sampled editorials were published. Our model’s estimates of interactions between quadratic time and modal forms and/or rationales, were introduced to capture discourse specific to this election. Although there is no evidence in Table 2 of any change in modal form associated with the 1994 election campaign, there is (in the rationale with quadratic time column) clear evidence that generally for all modal statements (i.e. irrespective of modal form) there was a shift at election time away from economic rationales and toward rationales based on politics and security. Note how closely this jibes with the following list of 1994 campaign issues given by Popescu and Tóka (2000: 5): ‘the democratic credentials and relative competence of the different parties, various themes related to the religious vs. secular,
Table 2 Estimates from 16 Hierarchical Loglinear Models of Interactions among Modal Form (m), Rationale (r) and Both Linear (l) and Quadratic (q) Time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model (L^2)</th>
<th>Modal form by rationale (m × r)</th>
<th>Modal form with time (m × l)</th>
<th>Quadratic (m × q)</th>
<th>Rationale with time (r × l)</th>
<th>Quadratic (r × q)</th>
<th>Three-way interactions (m × r × l)</th>
<th>Quadratic (m × r × q)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Politics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible (1443.2)</td>
<td>0.060 (0.079)</td>
<td>-0.041 (0.034)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.034)</td>
<td>-0.008 (0.034)</td>
<td>-0.088* (0.034)</td>
<td>-0.070* (0.034)</td>
<td>0.029 (0.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impossible (1377.9)</td>
<td>0.014 (0.084)</td>
<td>0.058 (0.036)</td>
<td>0.011 (0.036)</td>
<td>-0.011 (0.036)</td>
<td>-0.076* (0.036)</td>
<td>0.019 (0.036)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inevitable (1321.0)</td>
<td>-0.097 (0.114)</td>
<td>0.024 (0.047)</td>
<td>-0.044 (0.047)</td>
<td>0.058 (0.047)</td>
<td>-0.114* (0.047)</td>
<td>0.110* (0.047)</td>
<td>-0.055 (0.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingent (1086.7)</td>
<td>-0.674 (0.795)</td>
<td>-0.290 (0.256)</td>
<td>-0.205 (0.251)</td>
<td>-0.205 (0.256)</td>
<td>-0.340 (0.251)</td>
<td>-0.184 (0.256)</td>
<td>-0.272 (0.251)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Culture</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible (1408.9)</td>
<td>0.036 (0.074)</td>
<td>-0.017 (0.032)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.032)</td>
<td>0.089* (0.032)</td>
<td>0.023 (0.032)</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.032)</td>
<td>0.033 (0.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impossible (1344.9)</td>
<td>0.080 (0.078)</td>
<td>0.033 (0.034)</td>
<td>0.010 (0.034)</td>
<td>0.065 (0.034)</td>
<td>0.028 (0.034)</td>
<td>-0.047 (0.034)</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inevitable (1288.9)</td>
<td>-0.212 (0.128)</td>
<td>0.031 (0.055)</td>
<td>-0.051 (0.051)</td>
<td>0.144* (0.055)</td>
<td>-0.026 (0.051)</td>
<td>0.070 (0.055)</td>
<td>-0.069 (0.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingent (1057.2)</td>
<td>0.391 (0.377)</td>
<td>-0.193 (0.158)</td>
<td>-0.053 (0.121)</td>
<td>0.260 (0.158)</td>
<td>0.119 (0.121)</td>
<td>0.173 (0.158)</td>
<td>0.096 (0.121)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible (1386.0)</td>
<td>-0.009 (0.074)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.032)</td>
<td>-0.015 (0.032)</td>
<td>-0.095* (0.032)</td>
<td>0.096* (0.032)</td>
<td>0.082* (0.032)</td>
<td>-0.043 (0.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impossible (1326.0)</td>
<td>-0.094 (0.082)</td>
<td>0.039 (0.035)</td>
<td>0.015 (0.035)</td>
<td>-0.092* (0.035)</td>
<td>0.089* (0.035)</td>
<td>-0.018 (0.035)</td>
<td>-0.007 (0.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inevitable (1266.3)</td>
<td>0.216* (0.107)</td>
<td>-0.012 (0.045)</td>
<td>-0.039 (0.043)</td>
<td>-0.164* (0.045)</td>
<td>0.144* (0.043)</td>
<td>-0.113* (0.045)</td>
<td>0.087* (0.043)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingent (1049.5)</td>
<td>-0.215 (0.443)</td>
<td>-0.182 (0.192)</td>
<td>-0.014 (0.136)</td>
<td>-0.158 (0.192)</td>
<td>0.065 (0.136)</td>
<td>-0.067 (0.192)</td>
<td>-0.025 (0.136)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible (1217.0)</td>
<td>-0.164 (0.157)</td>
<td>-0.074 (0.059)</td>
<td>-0.056 (0.062)</td>
<td>0.067 (0.059)</td>
<td>-0.175* (0.062)</td>
<td>-0.073 (0.059)</td>
<td>-0.045 (0.062)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impossible (1156.8)</td>
<td>0.061 (0.203)</td>
<td>0.175* (0.085)</td>
<td>0.035 (0.071)</td>
<td>0.132 (0.085)</td>
<td>-0.184* (0.071)</td>
<td>0.138 (0.085)</td>
<td>0.033 (0.071)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inevitable (1124.7)</td>
<td>-0.162 (0.257)</td>
<td>-0.029 (0.083)</td>
<td>-0.099 (0.098)</td>
<td>0.081 (0.083)</td>
<td>-0.223* (0.098)</td>
<td>0.006 (0.083)</td>
<td>-0.106 (0.098)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingent (900.8)</td>
<td>-2.223 (4.756)</td>
<td>-1.188 (1.900)</td>
<td>-0.346 (0.822)</td>
<td>-0.992 (1.900)</td>
<td>-0.505 (0.822)</td>
<td>-1.092 (1.900)</td>
<td>-0.335 (0.822)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Units of m × r interactions are log odds. Coefficients associated with two-way interactions with time represent one-year linear or quadratic shifts from the average log frequency calculated among all 612 cells in each contingency table. Standard errors are listed in parentheses below estimates. d.f. = 600 for all models.

* p < .05.
anti-communist vs. excommunist, nationalist vs. cosmopolitan divide, or the ongoing “media war”’. Although the MDF tried to make its performance a campaign theme, this ‘may have been unwise given the rather bleak popular assessment of the government’s record and the opposition parties’ enthusiasm to discuss governmental incompetence’ (Popescu and Tóka, 2000: 5). Thus, any attempts by the incumbent parties to mention modest economic gains (e.g. regarding inflation and wages) were met by the opposition with popular charges of incompetence.

This decline in economic rationales appears to have begun much earlier, given their monotonic decline from 1990 to 1997 and a corresponding increase in cultural rationales given for Hungarians in Népszabadság’s editorials (as evidenced in the rationale with linear time column). Economic issues seem not to have had the justificatory purchase that they had after the country’s post-1990 rush into free-market reforms. Appeals to ‘things Hungarian’ seem to have replaced ones to bourgeois prosperity as rationales for the possible, impossible, inevitable and contingent in Hungarian life.

Yet it is from Table 2’s significant three-way interactions that generalizations can be inferred regarding the social domains within which modalities of achievement vs necessity were developing. As illustrated in Figure 1, post-1989 public discourse within Népszabadság is characterized by a linear decrease in the odds that editorialists gave political reasons for ‘that which is possible’ for Hungarians. This decline is superseded by an increase in the odds that they gave political reasons for things that are inevitable for Hungarians. Thus in accordance with our first hypothesis, H1, the evidence here is for a shift away from a modality of achievement (according to which political circumstances yield opportunities, or possibilities, for goal-attainment), toward a modality of necessity (according to which political circumstances provide reasons why one must do things).

Despite the overall decline in appeals to economic rationales, there has been a steady increase in the odds that editorialists provide economic reasons for ‘the possible’. That is, consistent with our second hypothesis (H2), there is evidence of an increasing tendency for editorialists to depict opportunities stemming from Hungary’s emerging market economy. In contrast, references to ‘economic reasons for the inevitable’ declined sharply after starting from a peak in 1990, but then showed a modest rebound shortly after the 1994 election. Here one finds evidence of what one might call IMF (International Monetary Fund) rhetoric, according to which Hungary’s dire economic situation is the reason why one must (i.e. inevitably) implement austere economic policies.
To the pedestrian observer, Hungarians seem to be a fickle bunch. With each election they have turned the incumbent party out of office, replacing the rightist MDF with the leftist MSZP in 1994, then putting in power the rightist FIDESZ plus minority MDF in 1998, then returning the MSZP to power with a leftist minority SZDSZ in 2002. Yet if one follows the polls and the campaigns closely, it is clear that the message from the Hungarian public has been quite consistent. Despite large shifts in party support, the electorate has consistently voted for social justice and against potentially draconian free-market reforms. For instance, during the campaign leading up to the 1998 election, the incumbent MSZP promoted not-so-social-justice-like policies of continued economic austerity and integration with the West – a position evident in Figure 1 with the rise from 1995 to 1997 in economic rationales for inevitability (i.e. for dutiful implementation of austerity measures). In contrast, the ultimately victorious FIDESZ campaign

Figure 1  Trends in Log Odds that Economic or Political Rationales Were Given for Subjects’ Inevitabilities or Possibilities

Conclusion

To the pedestrian observer, Hungarians seem to be a fickle bunch. With each election they have turned the incumbent party out of office, replacing the rightist MDF with the leftist MSZP in 1994, then putting in power the rightist FIDESZ plus minority MDF in 1998, then returning the MSZP to power with a leftist minority SZDSZ in 2002. Yet if one follows the polls and the campaigns closely, it is clear that the message from the Hungarian public has been quite consistent. Despite large shifts in party support, the electorate has consistently voted for social justice and against potentially draconian free-market reforms. For instance, during the campaign leading up to the 1998 election, the incumbent MSZP promoted not-so-social-justice-like policies of continued economic austerity and integration with the West – a position evident in Figure 1 with the rise from 1995 to 1997 in economic rationales for inevitability (i.e. for dutiful implementation of austerity measures). In contrast, the ultimately victorious FIDESZ campaign
focused on attacking ‘regional disparities, growing income inequalities, better chances for big multinational companies than small and medium Hungarian businesses, population decline, cutback in education, healthcare, and family welfare’ (Popescu and Tóka, 2000: 6).18

Yet our Hungarian data illustrate the more general observation that as an alternative to authoritarianism, democracy does not comprise a specific social form. In accordance with Simmel, our argument has been that social systems are maintained by self-sustaining patterns of social interaction and discourse. Whereas authoritarian societies are likely to be organized around loyalty networks and a modality of permission, democracies can be sustained via political modalities of achievement (as in the US) or necessity (as in the welfare states of Western Europe). Upon departing from a modality of permission, citizens of democratizing societies find their political discourse migrating primarily between two modalities with which to rationalize the activities its members believe to be possible, impossible, inevitable and contingent for each other. As for the segment of Hungarian public discourse investigated here, our data suggest that this migration has been toward a modality of necessity.

Notes

This research was sponsored in part by seed money from the Statistics Department at Iowa State University and from the Department of Sociology at the University of Groningen. Special thanks to Zoltán Daroczi for his substantive suggestions, plus his conscientious work in sampling and translation. Thanks too for thoughtful comments from Kate Judge, Péter Róbert, András Vargha and Lilla Vicsek.

1. Although our position in this article is that ‘social justice’ and ‘free market’ correspond to discrete types of political discourse, political discourse is commonly operationalized along a social justice (left) vs free market (right) continuum (Budge et al., 2001; Huber and Inglehart, 1995; Klingemann et al., 2006). Within the 1999 World Values Survey (www.worldvaluessurvey.org/), representative samples of both US citizens and citizens from 10 Western European and Scandinavian countries ranked their political views along a 10-point scale (1 = left, 10 = right). The following mean scores on this scale accord with our depictions of greater free-market political discourse in the US vs more social-justice political justice in these other countries: US (5.80), Denmark (5.51), Austria (5.42), Luxembourg (5.37), Sweden (5.34), Belgium (5.25), Germany (5.21), Netherlands (5.09), Great Britain (5.08), France (4.86) and Spain (4.79). (p < .001 in t-tests between the US mean and means for each of the other countries.)

2. Of course, transformations to democracy are doubtlessly facilitated or impeded by numerous other factors such as industrialization itself and the associated development of both an educated middle class (Huntington, 1991; Lipset, 1960) and a working class of rural-to-urban migrants (Maravall and
Santamaria, 1986), the diffusion of democracy among countries and access to diffusion-enabling communication technologies (Huntington, 1991; Markoff, 1996; Verdery, 1993; Wejnert, 2005), plus the consolidation of state power and the relative influence of foreign powers (Bollen and Jackman, 1989; Crenshaw, 1995; Rouqué, 1986; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992; Wallerstein, 1991) and the world economy (Castells and Laserna, 1994; Frieden, 1991; Martins, 1986). See Schwartzman (1998) for an excellent review of much of this literature.

3. Beyond its fundamentally pro-market message, the circle’s call also appealed to social justice (i.e. to ‘Political and ideological reform which will rediscover and support every legitimate value of the socialist movement’ [O’Neil, 1996: 292]) and to democracy as an end in itself.

4. The following party abbreviations are used throughout this article: MSZP (Magyar Szocialista Párt) for the Hungarian Socialist Party; SZDSZ (Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége) for the Alliance of Free Democrats; MDF (Magyar Demokrata Fórum) for the Hungarian Democratic Forum, and FIDESZ (Fidesz–Magyar Polgári Párt) for the League of Young Democrats–Hungarian Civic Party. After the 2002 elections, there were no parliamentary representatives remaining from any other (religious, agrarian or nationalist) party that had previously participated in the Hungarian parliament.

5. The degree of this conflict will vary greatly from one democracy to another. For example, Poland’s parliamentary confrontations are legendary, whereas those in Hungary have been the most civil among all recent East European democratizations. Seleny (1999: 503) has argued that this Hungarian tendency for compromise stemmed in part from the MSZP’s eagerness to distance itself from its autocratic (i.e. uncompromising) Communist roots – a tendency to which we return when discussing our results.

6. Both Ost (1993) and Comisso (1997) point to rationales given for preserving (linguistic, religious, etc.) traditions as a third internal justification given for political policies within democratizing East European countries. These culture- and security-related rationales (usually expressing desires that disparate Communist-era repressions not recur) are later shown in our findings to have no significant links to the discursive modalities of interest here.

7. Modal logicians often conceptualize this fourfold character of modal expressions (i.e. no negation, negated modal, negated infinitive and double negation) as the ‘Square of Oppositions’ (Horn, 1989; van der Auwera. 1996).

8. To remain consistent with Simmel’s use of the term ‘form’, we refer in this article to permission (or flirtation), ability (or achievement) and necessity not only as distinct modalities, but also as social forms. However, this usage is likely to become confusing as each of these modalities is itself referred to as being expressed in four modal forms (i.e. contingency, possibility, impossibility and inevitability). Hopefully, these two uses of the word ‘form’ (i.e. modality as a social form vs a modality’s modal form), will not lead to confusion.

9. Simmel referred to these first three modal forms as the ‘polar coordinates of flirtation’, which he respectively labeled flattery, provocation and contempt (Simmel, [1909] 1984: 135).

10. See a parallel discussion by Coleman (1990: 277ff.) on encouragement and reward-amplification within the context of rational choice theory.
11. Modal logicians (e.g. Chellas, 1980: 7) argue that necessity (must) and ability (can) are redundant. For example, when one finds it necessary not to proceed, one is unable to proceed, and vice versa. The concept of modality being developed in this article differentiates ‘can’ and ‘must’ by situating each as the discursive mechanism driving a distinct social form.

12. Although necessity may seem a peculiar modality to most natives of the US, it has a long intellectual history in, for example, Rousseau’s ([1762] 1997) ‘social contract’ and Foucault’s (2000: 73ff.) panoptical modernity. Moreover, it is a modality familiar to the vast majority of citizens in the welfare states of Western Europe.

13. We had considered sampling pre-1989 issues of the newspaper. However, we found nearly all news coverage there to be descriptive, leaving us unable to identify any modal statements among these issues. Consistent with our earlier discussion of the modality of permission within authoritarian states, this Communist-era evidence of journalists’ hesitance to reveal their opinions was most likely due to their having followed a strategy for prolonging the tension between the hoped for possibility and the feared impossibility of continuing in their livelihoods (see Gálik, 2004).

14. The equivalences in this paragraph follow standard rules of modal logic. For example, let ‘p’ be any proposition. ‘☐p’ means ‘p must be true’ and ‘◊p’ means ‘p can be true’. The first of these two logical expressions is true if and only if (↔) it is not (⌐) able to be true that p is false (or, in symbolic form: ☐p ↔ ⌐¬p). See Chellas (1980) or Mints (1992) for relatively accessible introductory texts.

15. This study’s template, or semantic grammar (Roberts, 1997), has at least two advantages over co-occurrence approaches to the analysis of relations among themes in texts. First, by encoding these relations directly, it avoids the ecological fallacy of inferring words’ interrelations based on their mere co-occurrence ‘somewhere’ within the same text-window. Second, by not encoding relations directly, co-occurrence analyses introduce measurement error (i.e. false positives), thereby necessitating vast samples of text. Our approach affords as much power with much smaller samples, since it combines representative sampling with less error-prone encoding at the level of theme-relations (see Roberts et al., 2008).

16. Texts from sampled editorials were encoded using Textual Content Analysis (Metatext, Inc.), or TCA – a general purpose interactive coding aid, written in Visual C++® for Windows XP®. (Beta versions of TCA are available from the first author on request.) In independent encodings of a subsample of 68 modal–statement/rationale pairs, two trained coders’ interrater agreement scores were κ = .79 (t = 56.61) among modal forms and κ = .89 (t = 63.09) among rationales (Popping, 1984; Scott, 1955).

17. Both of these linear trends in rationale usage are replicated in at least half of the four models in which that type of rational was estimated. In contrast, note that only a single marginally significant linear change in modal form was found (namely, ‘impossible with linear time’ when security is the model’s rationale type) but was replicated nowhere else. Wishing to avoid reporting
findings due to sampling error, we only discuss two-way interactions that are replicated in more than one of the models listed in Table 2.

18. Of course, more factors than social vs market justice have been involved in deciding the outcomes of these elections. The MSZP/SZDSZ coalition was hurt in 1998 by charges of corruption within the government’s privatization board (Szilagyi, 1996) and by an outbreak of shootings and bomb explosions in Budapest during the spring of the election (Popescu and Tóka, 2000: 6). The narrow MSZP/SZDSZ victory in 2002 may have turned on such non-issue criteria as youth mobilized by parents and cell phone technology (Sükösd and Dányi, 2003) and the MSZP’s and SZDSZ’s use of joint candidate lists during the runoff election (Nikolenyi, 2004).

References


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