Chapter 10. Force in Hegel’s Logic.

In the Logic, Hegel presents the self-construction of the Idea in its pure and general form, that is, the series of concepts which express the essence of the self-moving Idea (Logic, I,p.7) (28). I will give a succinct exposition on Hegel’s method before turning to the exposition of his logic.

section 1. Method: the motion of the Notion.

The actual object and subject (in the sense of acting agent) of Hegel’s Logic is the Notion of pure universality. Since Hegel conceives universality (29) as, ultimately, the unity of what is differentiated, that is, as a dynamical unity, one could also say that the object and subject of the Logic is the pure essence of motion in general. It would not be enough, however, if the Logic presented a simple definition of the principle of motion in general; it must be an exposition of concepts, for three main reasons.

Firstly, a simple definition does not make clear what motion is, because nothing is moving in it; the definition would remain external instead of explicating the inner essence of motion.

Secondly, the essence of this motion is the self-motion of the Notion. Notion is a relation with itself, because it incites itself; this is also not made clear in a simple definition: a definition is a self-determination and, therefore, self-relation of the Notion, but it would as such remain only internal – in order to make clear this self-relation, the definition would have to have a relation to itself. This would mean that the definition would present its inner essence by standing outside itself, opposite to itself, and related to itself. In other words, self-externalization ("sich äussern") of the Notion is necessary for it to gain understanding of itself. This is not only because something has to be brought out into the open what lies hidden inside it, its inner essence, but also because what has been brought out into the open (i.e. what has been externalized) is something particular which is different ("unterschieden") from the form which is not brought out. This difference is necessary, because self-understanding is different from being implicit, that is, from being-in-itself; it establishes the change in the process of self-understanding. But the real self is the self which knows itself; the real self is, therefore, the entire process – this leads to the third reason.

Thirdly, this motion is self-construction of the Idea and therefore it is more than just Notion. Its expression in forms of Notion (viz. the series of logical concepts) is as such incomplete and the complete expression is the whole of the motion, viz. the entire process of concepts transforming into each other.

The exposition of the Logic is, therefore, the process of its self-externalization which expresses its definition or essence in a series of concepts (30). The method used must be, therefore, the method of externalization of the inner essence: presenting the original form, externalization of its essence,
unification of essence and original form. Since each unification contains a difference (because of the externalization) which the original form did not have, it differs from the original form, and this results in a series of changing forms. In this way, method and exposition are identical (Logic, I,p.35) (31).

Consistently, in the end the understanding of this motion of the Notion the latter is transcended in the category Idea. The Notion is a form in which its motion and determination are understood in general, but as a form it is always determinate and therefore as such not completely identical with the process as such of motion and determination in general. The process as such is, in its totality (including the form as which it has determined itself), Idea. This category is best understood as a form of the classical concept of ‘logos’, that is, that which controls motion and at the same time is motion — the ultimate flowing which, to be precise, therefore does not flow but is flowing (32). The Logic, then, is the conceptual exposition of the Idea in which the Notion successively forms all determinations which are necessary to become the Notion of the Idea; it is the genesis of the Idea, expressed in the self-motion of the Notion. The essence of this motion is "das Negative", that is, that which is negating (viz. negating first the original form, then the externalized form, and so on) (33). The Negative ‘dissolves’ the determinateness, i.e. the form, the limitation of the Notion; this does not mean, however, that determinations are lost; determinateness does not become indeterminateness, but different determinateness, and thus finally expresses determinateness in general. The essence flows from determination to determination, from form to form, always dissolving the old and taking up the new. The essence gains in this motion, its degree of determinateness increases, it becomes ‘richer’ and it has to find new forms to express its richness in; therefore, each new Notion is richer than its predecessor. This means that the Negative, which inheres in the motion of the Notion itself, and which brings about the position of new, different, and more determinate forms, is the essence of Hegel’s dialectics (Logic, I,p.37).

It stands to reason that this is not enough to explain Hegel’s dialectical method completely; the essence of his dialectics must express itself, it must appear in the categories of his Logic.

section 2. The Logic.

The essence of Hegelian dialectics must appear, and the Logic as a whole is this appearing; it is the general motion of the Absolute. It must be expounded to be able to show the essence of its dynamics, viz. self-relatedness, of which I have said in the previous chapter that it explains Hegel’s concept of force. I will, therefore, present in this section a succinct exposition of the Logic as a whole as a necessary introduction to the exposition of its dynamical essence.

The first book of the Logic, "Die Lehre vom Sein" (the doctrine of Being), starts with pure universality as such, viz.
Being. Being is the first and most general determination of its unity; it is, therefore, also its most indeterminate form. Since being indeterminate is being nothing, pure universality has two forms, viz. Being and Nothing, in which it realizes itself. These two forms are the opposite ends (or extremes as I will henceforth call such opposite ends of one relation) of a relation which, as its third and true form, is their essential unity, viz. Becoming. This third and true form establishes the Notion of the two extremes as connected but contradictory essential determinations of the general unity, which thereby has arrived at its most general dynamical form. This form concludes the first chapter of the first book.

In this first chapter, the Notion determined the form of Being in general (which is Becoming); in the second chapter it determines itself further by making this first determining activity to its object of which the true form must be determined and, therefore, also be assumed by the Notion (34), viz. Quality, that is, being determined in general. This form has the same kind of extremes as Being, viz. being and not being, which are now Being determined in general, and Being indetermined in general, that is, finity and infinity respectively. For the most general determination of Being determined, is being limited with respect to something else, which is finity. And this "something else" is, in its general form (that is, all determinate being), infinity (which is Being indetermined). Without this opposite, qualitative determination would not be possible; therefore this opposite is included in it. Quality in general in its true form is, then, the unity, that is, the relation, of the finite and the infinite; this relation is, therefore, literally and generally the unity of one thing and the other from which it is distinguished, that is, it is Change in general. However, since there are not yet determinate determinations (as yet there is only determinateness in general) in which this change could find its forms, it assumes the general form of wanting to and having to change, viz. "das Sollen", or Self-incitation.

In the third chapter the Notion determines itself further by taking this qualitative determination to its object of which the true form must be determined and assumed. The qualitative determination is the general assuming of one form as opposed to other forms; since all forms of the Notion are its own, qualitative determination is being related to only itself, that is, "Für sich sein" or Being-for-itself. In 'one thing' this self-relatedness is related immediately to itself, which is, therefore, immediateness or Being-one. It excludes from itself 'the other thing' (which act of exclusion is called repulsion)(35), but this exclusion is a qualitative determination too, viz. determination of not being one, that is, Being-many. Qualitative determination of Being-one includes, therefore, quantitative determination of Being-many (which act of inclusion is called attraction), which means that Being-one is not only being related to itself but also to its opposite (viz. Being-many). This is obvious because Being-many, when related to itself, is related to the many Being-ones it is; the transition of Being-many into Being-one, and vice versa, is easily made. Their true unity, which is the true form of qualitative determination, therefore assumes the form of Being related to each other, that is, the Being-one
which determines itself while Being-many, and \textit{vice versa}.

Summarizing, in the first part of the first book of Logic the Notion of general unity subsequently assumes the forms of general being which is Becoming, being determined which is Change, and being differentiated which is Being related to each other.

The second part of the first book of Hegel’s Logic starts, of course, with the preceding form of the Notion, viz. pure relatedness, which now is its object of which the true form must be determined and assumed; this object is Quantity. The Notion has, with Quantity, arrived at a level which differs from the level of the first part of the first book and is, in fact, its opposite. At the first level Being has been determined; and with that, determination itself has been determined (because each determination became the object of the subsequent determination); in this way the determining activity, that is, the Notion of it, has moved away from Being and towards itself until, at this second level, the object of the self-determination of the Notion is purely its (self-) relatedness:

"Die Quantität ist das reine Sein, an dem die Bestimmtheit nicht mehr als eins mit dem Sein selbst, sondern als aufgehoben oder gleichgültig gesetzt ist."

(Logic, I, p.177)

(Quantity is pure Being of which its determinateness is positioned, not as one with Being itself, but as sublated or indifferent.)

Since determination has become indifferent towards what it determines, the determinateness as such has come "außer sich" (external to itself) (Logic, I, p.177). This indifferent or external relatedness to itself is quantitative determination in general.

In the first chapter of the second part the object of determination is, therefore, the general being of relation which is being quantity in general. Being is the first and most general determination, and this general determination is, in this case, being quantitatively determined, that is, it is Discrete Magnitude. Being the most general determination, it is also the most indeterminate; being indeterminate in a quantitative way is Continuous Magnitude, which is therefore the other extreme of the relation which quantity in general is. The third and true form, which is the unity of these extremes, must be, therefore, being quantitatively determined in general; this is a dynamical form, because being discrete is being at a specific point, and being continuous is not being at a specific point, which makes their unity the motion along a line, that is, quantitatively determined motion.

In the second chapter the Notion of quantity determines itself further by taking this general quantitative determinateness to its object of which the true form must be determined and assumed; this object is the Quantum, or number. Quantum can, on the one hand, signify the magnitu-
de which is external to it; this is Extensional Magnitude, which is the general form of numerical extensivity. It can, on the other hand, signify the magnitude which is internal to it; this is Intensional Magnitude, which is the general form of numerical contents. For itself, Extensional Magnitude is quantitative extensivity as such, and this tends to lose the determinateness of the Quantum and to explode into abstract (since it is related to nothing) infinity. For the same reason Intensional Magnitude for itself tends to do the opposite, that is, it tends to implode into abstract singleness because it loses the determinateness of the Quantum. The true form of number is, therefore, the relation of these extremes, which is quantitatively determined infinity.

This quantitative relation, that is, the relation between the quantitative being-one (i.e. intensionality, being absolutely limited) and quantitative being-many (i.e. extensionality, infinity) is the object of the third chapter. Again, there are two extremes. Being quantitatively related to each other can assume the form of multiplication; then it is the Exponential Relation in which being-one is expounded as being-many (because from this self-relation multiplies itself). It can also assume the form of dividing, which is the Inverted Relation in which being-one is divided in being-many, therefore expounded intrinsically, that is, in an inverted way (which is, of course, a negative-exponential relation). The unity of these extremes is the mutual determination of being expounded and being divided; quantitatively, this mutual determination is the general form of the extremes, viz. Involution (which includes both positive and negative powers).

Involution, however, is not merely quantitatively determined anymore; since it is determination in general (i.e. limiting and relating activity of the Notion), the Notion has arrived at relatedness in general again, with which the first part concluded. This means that the quality of quantity has been determined, and, with that, that quantity and quality now are being related to each other (36). This relation is the Measure.

The Measure is the object of the third and last part of the first book of Logic. Measure is the most general unity of quantitative and qualitative determinateness. At the end of the first part it became clear that general determinateness is relatedness. In the second part it became clear that relatedness is general determinateness. But relatedness and determinateness are not simply identical; simple identity would lack the difference the Notion has gained in its moving through these determinations. Their unity must, therefore, not lie in one of them, but in both.

In the first chapter of the third part the activity of the unifying form of Notion (viz. Involution) is the object which must be determined in its true form, which must be assumed. This activity is quantitative determination of quality in general, that is, of being determined in general. On the one hand this is being quantitatively
determined for itself, that is, Specific Quantity; on the other hand it is self-determination by which a being differs from other beings, that is, Specifying Quantity. The former is the simple general quality of quantity, viz. that to have a determinate magnitude means to be a determinate being. The latter is the quantity of this quality, viz. that being a determinate being means being determined as different from other determined beings and that determinate magnitude, therefore, implies a multitude of different magnitudes. These two extremes are sublated in their true form, which is the relation of specific and specifying quantity, that is, the Notion that quality is quantitatively differentiated and quantity is qualitatively differentiated, viz. the Measure-Relation ("Massverhältniss").

This is the object of the second chapter. Being a relation between specific and specifying quantity, the Measure-relation is on the one hand their unity, which means that no determination stands for itself (i.e. there are no single determinations), since every determination can be differentiated both intensionally and extensionally, and that, therefore, every determination is part of a Series of quantity-quality-relations (i.e. 'measures'). On the other hand it is their difference, that is, this Series is actually differentiated in units of quantity-quality; this is expressed in the concept of Ties. The unity of these extremes is the Notion that throughout this Series of Ties quantity and quality determine each other and transform into each other – in this unity the Measure, which is their relation and is based on their difference, is therefore sublated in the Measureless, viz. the general unity of what is being a determined being (i.e. matter), that is, the determined Being of Change in a specific Order (i.e. Series of Ties).

With this, the general motion of the Notion has been determined, its forms have been actually assumed, and therefore its Being has realized itself. This means that the forms have been developed in which the Notion understands the Being of motion in general. But this is not the Being of the Idea, because Being expresses only one aspect of the Idea (viz. its motion) as a Notion – and a Notion is not yet Idea. With Hegel this means that all forms of Being in general have been conceptualized; therefore, his "Lehre vom Sein" (doctrine of Being) is an ontological system.

But only the forms of the motion of the Notion have been presented, not motion for itself, nor the way in which motion and Notion are unified (viz. the ultimate self-determination). The latter is treated in the third book of the Logic, in the "Lehre vom Begriff" (doctrine of the Notion). Since this third part is much less important for the understanding of Hegel's concept of force, I will present a very succinct exposition of its contents.

The doctrine of the Notion deals with the self-determination of the Notion as such, that is, with the Notion of the Notion. It is divided in three parts.
In the first part the object is the relation of the Notion to itself in general, that is, the forms or categories in which the self-determination of the Notion expresses itself; this is the Subjective Notion. Of course, the forms here are not the same as in the doctrine of Being, since the object is now the transition of one assumed form to the other and this object must be determined, that is, it develops forms of itself which it must assume.

The first of these forms are those in which the Notion exists as the unity of self-determination, viz. Universality, Particularity, and Singularity. Universality is, according to Hegel, the pure form of the Notion, that is, the form of its identity with itself; because it is universal, it contains all its determinations and is, therefore, identical with itself. This identity is, however, not simple identity, but negation of the negation; this is obvious, because the Notion is a self-relation, and must, therefore, contain its differentiation (which negates its simple identity) but in such a form that it is a totality (which implies negation of this negation). Universality is, therefore, a form of self-mediation of the Notion. This implies that Universality is also Particularity, that is, the determinate and related forms which it contains. But again in such a way, that Universality in its form of Particularity does not lose its Universality, for it is the sublated form of these different forms. This means that Particularity contains Universality, and vice versa. Particularity presents Universality as its determinate forms, but Universality contains all these forms, which means that:

"Das Allgemeine als der Begriff ist es selbst und sein Gegenteil, was wieder es selbst als seine gesetzte Bestimmtheit ist; es greift über dasselbe über und ist in ihm bei sich. So ist es die Totalität und Prinzip seiner Verschiedenheit, die ganz nur durch es selbst bestimmt ist."

(Logic, II, p. 246)

(The Universal as the Notion is itself and its opposite which is again itself as its posited determinateness; it hyperceives this [opposite] and, in it, it is with itself. In this way, it is the totality and Principle of its differentiation which is completely determined by only itself.)

The Singularity, then, is a third form of Universality (and, of course, also of Particularity); it is the result of the reflection-process of self-determination hyperception is, that is, it is the Actuality of the Universal and Particular.

In the Encyclopaedia, Hegel remarks consistently that Universality, Particularity, and Singularity are (for themselves) the same as Identity, Difference, and Ground respectively, except that Universality is a self-identity which also contains Particularity and Singularity, Particularity is a difference which also contains Universality and Singularity, and Singularity is a ground which also
contains Universality and Particularity (Encyclopaedia, s.164).

Then the forms appear in which the Notion is actually related to itself and in which it actually determines itself (which is the activity of the previous three forms); these are the forms of the Notion in which it proposes something about itself, viz. the forms of Judgement ("Urteil").

Finally the forms appear in which the Notion, determining itself and moving itself forward, is developing itself (which is the activity of the previous forms of Judgement), viz. the forms of the Syllogism, that is, the forms of reasoning (i.e. the actual process of understanding and forming concepts) (37).

In the second part this motion is the object of which forms must be determined and assumed. These forms are, firstly, the simple general Being of motion (i.e. Mechanism; this is why the philosophy of nature starts with Mechanics, which deals with the general being of motion, that is, with matter in general), secondly the process of Change (i.e. Chemism), and thirdly the Development (Teleology). In the first part the object was the self-motion in which the Notion is immediately related to itself and determines itself; in this second part, however, the object is the motion of which the preceding forms were the general expression but which is now object for itself. The Subjective Notion is the general expression of the activity of the Notion, that is, the understanding of its motion; in contrast with this Subjective Notion, the understanding of the motion as the object of understanding leads to a Notion which is Objective. The way in which the Notion realizes itself is the way in which the real motion is conceptualized, viz. as Objective Notion.

Since it is related to the concept of gravity, one form of self-realization should be considered in more detail here. This self-realization is the simple Being of motion, that is, Mechanism. Hegel presents the rotation of the solar system as an example of it (see Encyclopaedia, s.198, s.269; Logic, II, pp.371-374).

He explains that this self-realization is a syllogism which consists of three forms of syllogism.

(i) In its form of object of itself the Notion is, firstly, outside itself. Its relation to itself is external to it. But the Notion is, as has been pointed out above, totality; that is, its universality, singularity and particularity all contain each other. As an object of itself, the Notion is singular; its relatedness remains, therefore, internal. This singularity applies to all objects, which means that the universality of its singularity does present itself, but only as an external relatedness (an aggregate of singulars). Since relatedness implies determination and interaction, this interaction is also external; it is formal mechanism.

In this way, the first syllogism is the connection of the singularity of dependent objects with their universality which is external.

(ii) The object is singular, yet it is acted upon; to
be truly singular it must be independent, therefore posit itself against this action. But since it cannot negate this action, the only way to posit itself, is to negate itself by making this action its own, that is, by including it. For the action is the universal action of the singular objects which are related by that action, and the object is itself singular object. This is real mechanism.

In this way, the second syllogism is the connection of the universality of the objects with their particularity.

(iii) Considering this negative activity, it appears that it is universal, yet immanent in every singular object, thus also including the particularity of relatedness (which is, then, not external anymore). This means that the object is free; it is no longer dependent upon other objects, since it includes them. All objects posit each other insofar as they posit themselves. This is absolute mechanism.

In this way, the third syllogism is the mediation and connection of the other two syllogisms.

Consistently, in his philosophy of nature Hegel points out that rotation (which is the general self-realization of matter) involves three movements; (i) mechanical motion, which is uniform, and which is imposed upon bodies from without (i.e. motion by impact); (ii) the motion of fall, which is partly conditioned (since it is dependent on an attracting body) and partly free (since its motion is also due to its own gravity), and in which the separation of a body from its gravity is still posited as contingent (viz. by the body it falls to), although the motion already belongs to gravity itself; (iii) unconditioned free motion, i.e. the great rotating motion of the heavens, which is a curve in which the particular bodies posit the central body, which simultaneously posits them (Encyclopaedia, s.269 add.).

With its self-realization, the Notion has been developed to its limits. In its two ultimate extremes, viz. Subjective and Objective Notion; it meets its ultimate identity and self-understanding. On the one hand it is, as being self-related (Subjective Notion), forming itself; it is self-constructing self-determination. On the other hand it is, as being related to its object (Objective Notion), realizing itself. Realizing itself is realizing its own determinate forms, and these forms express this realization – these two processes, viz. construction and realization, are therefore identical in the sense that they are two aspects of one and the same process, which is absolute self-construction: the flowing which the Idea is. Only from the point of view of this ultimate identity one can understand that the Subjective Notion agrees with the Objective Notion, and that its proper motion agrees with the real motion. Both Subjective and Objective Notion essentially refer to the motion which the Idea is, that is, to the flowing of the Notion through the forms in which it appears. This essential motion is, therefore, the object of this third book of the Logic, i.e. the object of the Notion of the Notion which is self-understanding. Obviously, this essential motion must be, not the object,
but the subject of the second book; in this second book it must be the self-constructing activity that presents its forms there.

This second book, viz. the "Lehre vom Wesen" (the doctrine of the Essence), is, therefore, the central part of the Logic.

In the first place, because it is the proper object of self-understanding of the Notion (i.e. the third book) and, because of that, in fact of the Logic as a whole. It is, therefore, the structure of its contents.

In the second place, because without it on the one hand the third book cannot be constructed, and on the other hand the first book becomes meaningless (since it would lose its inner relatedness, viz. the motion of the Notion, which is the subject of and therefore appears only in the second book; if it would not appear, it would not exist). It is, therefore, also the essence of the construction of the Logic.

In the third place, because in the second book the proper motion of the Notion finds its Notion - not as Notion of the Notion of its motion, but as Notion of motion for itself, which means that here the true concept of motion as such is presented. According to Hegel, motion is the essence of Being (a point which he emphasizes by stating that the doctrine of the Essence is a part of his ontology; see Logic, I, p.46). It is, therefore, the actual essence as such of the Logic.

These three points can be summarized in the proposition that the doctrine of the Essence is the dynamical core of the Logic (38).

section 3. The structure of the logic of the Essence.

The doctrine of the Essence is the exposition of the essential motion, that is, it presents the forms which the Essence assumes and in which it determines itself.

The doctrine of Being deals with forms and determinations which are immediate, since they are the most general; it deals with Being as it is in general. "Immediate" means "logically immediate", that is, there is no mediating factor which is mediating the construction of these determinations, they are logically direct at hand. It also means "ontologically the first", because what is logically the starting point of construction, refers to the most general determinations and is, therefore, the most general and most fundamental, that is, first, determination of Being as it is.

However, in this very logical and ontological immediateness also lies its externality. That which appears immediately, is not mediated - the ground of its appearance appears to be nothing else than the appearing thing itself. But Being determines itself, it assumes different forms. It is, therefore, not only the appearing forms, but also that which assumes them, that which flows through them. This is the internal Being as contrasted with the external Being of those forms; it is the self-expressing, that is, self-externalizing, internal Being - the Essen-
The opposite of this Essence is the Appearance of Being, that is, the forms it assumes. Being the opposite of the appearing forms, the Essence is "das Bestimmunglosse" (the indeterminate), that which is not yet expressed in a determinate form and therefore not yet limited - that which is "absolute Gleichgültigkeit gegen die Grenze" (absolute indifference towards the limitation) (Logic, II, pp.4-5).

If the sequence of Notions is conceived of as motion, as is the case with Hegel, then it is obvious that the Essence is the return of Being, out of its determination and forms, to its pure self; Hegel speaks of "Erinnerung", which means remembrance and is literally re-internalization (Logic, II, pp.3-4). He explains that the transition from Being to its Essence and its subsequent Appearance must be understood as "Reflexion" (reflection) (39), which is the specific motion of the process of self-determination; the Essence, then, is Reflection, that is, it is appearing itself. This activity of appearing is the subject of the doctrine of Being, and it is the object of the doctrine of Essence as which it must assume a series of forms which will be subsequently presented.

The first part of the doctrine of the Essence deals with Essence as "Reflexion in ihm selbst", that is, Intro-reflection (40) or reflection-in-itself, which is the most general, simple form of reflection.

The first chapter of this first part deals with reflection of Being in its most general form. This form is sublation, that is, returning in itself, therefore sublated determinate Being; this is called the Essential. Its opposite is what is being sublated, which is immediate and therefore inessential; this is called "Schein", Appearance (41). Because Being is included in being Essential, Appearance is only determinateness without Being, that is, it lacks the unity of the flowing; Appearance, therefore, is a form of non-being, of Nothing. That is also why Appearance is immediate: being the inessential, that is, being essenceless, it is not mediated and lacks the unity which is established by mediation. The Being, which has the Appearance, lies in the Essential, because that is where the unity of being determined is found. Appearance and Essential are, therefore, the extremes of one relation which is the relation of reflection. The Essence of Being, therefore, is Reflection. The Essential is the constructive activity which is the true unity of Being. The Appearance is what is constructed or determined (i.e. the forms of Being) and, therefore, it is the being-not-one of Being, that is, its externality and extensivity. The relation of construction and constructed is, however, contained in the construction which, in this way enriched with its opposite, encompasses the whole process without being extended, because the construction as such is indeterminate. The Essence, therefore, is encompassing the process as a logical form or structure; this structure is Reflection (Logic, II, p.13).
Reflection, then, must be the (logical) motion of the Essence, and, since Essence is constructive activity, the true form of Reflection must be "bestimmende Reflexion" (Determining Reflection) which is the logical structure of flowing self-determination. This structure is the unity and relation of two extremes: "setzende Reflexion" (Positing Reflection) and "äussere Reflexion" (External Reflection).

The unification of flowing and self-construction follows from Hegel’s idea that flowing (i.e. Becoming) is relatedness of the self to something different than itself. Being, therefore, is constructing itself by becoming different; this is self-negation. The self of Being is, therefore, immediately this self-negation (i.e. flowing). Therefore, Appearance, which is the being different (for Being always appears to be different, that is, it appears as different forms), is essentially Being itself, because it is the motion which is the Essence of Being; it is also the negation of this essence, but, since the Essence is negation itself, Appearance is also identical with the Essence in this respect. The internal essence of Being is in fact external; or to be more precise: internality and externality ultimately are the same, although they are distinguished.

The essential motion, i.e. Reflection, has two (relative) starting-points, because of this. First: being always different, which is the Appearance. From this point on the Essence moves as follows. It starts with the negative factor; always being different is moving from negation to negation, from nothing to nothing. The Essence itself is the negative factor, therefore it starts with itself — this immediateness is, however, negated at the same moment, because the negative factor is related to itself; its being identical with itself is negating itself, therefore this self-relation is repulsion. The negative factor, then, is the return to itself (i.e. establishing its identity as a form of motion) from something different which it is itself; it is negating itself, but in a form which sublates the negation. In this way the negative factor or Essence posits itself in a relation of forms of (ultimately) itself by negating these forms; this is how the Essence determines itself: it is appearing. What is appearing is never what it is, and that is always what it is — this is its being; it is always transforming and negating, being related to what is different from itself and, therefore, being determined. This first form, viz. the Positing Reflection, is the starting point of the second.

Second: this flowing. The Essence now moves as follows. It has posited itself, and, by that, it is not only its own negation but also itself; it reflects in itself back to itself. To this second or 'own' self (as contrasted with the first or 'other' self), the determinations of 'being posited' (i.e. the first motion of the Essence) are external and they must be taken back in order to overcome this externality. The motion of 'positing itself' is conceived of as a circular form; positing is returning to itself whilst expounding or expressing its self, and, in
this returning, the externality of being expounded or expressed (that is, the external determinations) is negated — what remains is only the circular motion itself. The Essence of what is appearing appears to be, not its determinateness, not, therefore, the negation of universality, but the sublation of determinateness, i.e. the very positioning of universality. This motion is the External Reflection.

Together, these two forms of motion (which are in fact logical structures) form the Determining Reflection which is the total structure of self-determination in flowing, that is, the infinitely self-relatedness of the Essence which is the structure of Totality (Logic, II, pp.13-23).

I want to make two remarks concerning this logical structure.

First of all it must be pointed out that here (as always with Hegel’s categories) the unification of two extremes should not be thought to be a kind of middle thing which is resting between these two extremes. On the contrary, it should be understood to be the basic activity of both which is not resting at all. Mediation has, in fact, nothing to do with ‘middle’ things, but with bringing two extremes literally together on a higher level which is encompassing more and, therefore, is more fundamental.

The second remark is that one should not make the parallel mistake and think of mediation or sublation as something which makes the two extremes completely interchangeable. Thinking this means making the mistake (again) to conceive of mediation as something which is on the same level as the two extremes. Mediation or sublation bring the extremes together, but not by making their forms flexible, not by making them merge into each other. The extremes are not one as extremes, but as sublated or mediated extremes which, therefore, have lost their extremity as such. The extremes entail their mediation and sublation, but they do not contain them; their mediation and sublation contain the extremes, but not as extremes as such. The extremes are logically of a lower level than their sublation and mediation, because they are secondary with respect to them.

On the other hand, the Determining Reflection is not of a completely different ontological level as compared to its two other forms, viz. Positing and External Reflection. With Hegel, a higher logical level is the discovery of a new aspect (which is always a new relation and unity) of the same Being, not something behind it or above it. The ontologically new quality is not absolutely new, but relatively of a higher level than the old quality which is afflicted with those two extremes. The logical transitions are ontologically the display of the self-constructing nature of always the same Being (which must be always the same, because outside the totality it cannot be anything whatsoever). These transitions are nothing more than a change in point of view with respect to the object, not a change of the object itself, although this change does possess an objective aspect or component; Being is itself
different if it is viewed from a different point — and this must certainly be so if, as is the case with Hegel, Being is viewing itself from different points in itself: every different point of view is a different determinate form of Being. In this way, Hegel can expound all aspects of Being successively, yet not indifferently collaterally but interlinked and tied together (as a Series of Ties) and thus present his system of Logic. His presentation of this system is in fact Determining Reflection, because the succession of forms is Positing Reflection, and the flowing through these forms is External Reflection.

In the second chapter of the first part of the doctrine of the Essence (Logic, II, pp.23-62), the forms are determined which are assumed by the reflective motion (which is the object here); these are the determinations of reflection or Essential Factors ("Wesenheiten"; Logic, II, p.23).

The Essence is the infinite relatedness to itself. On the one hand this self-relatedness is Identity of the Essence with itself. On the other hand this self-relatedness is Difference, because there cannot be a relation without a difference between what is being related. These two extremes have in common (since they are determinations of the reflective motion and, therefore, are forms of reflective motion themselves) the Contradiction which is included in this motion. The Contradiction is that the Essence realizes itself by negating itself (because it is itself negating); the Essence forms its Identity by negating this Identity with itself, that is, by constructing its Difference with itself. In this Contradiction, the independence of the Essence is sublated. Every Identity is essentially relatedness to other things also, therefore every Identity is also Difference; every Difference essentially includes the relatedness to itself, therefore every Difference is also Identity. In this way, the Contradiction forms the unification of the determinations of Reflection; Hegel concludes that all things are as such contradictory ("an sich selbst widersprechend"; Logic, II,p.58), that is, they are posited in a totality and therefore essentially interrelated and in motion. The negation of the independence leads to, and is, the Ground (42) of Existence.

In the third chapter of this first part (Logic, II, pp.63-100), the object is the Essence in its form of Ground which has to determine itself and assume its proper forms. Being Ground, the Essence is the sublation of independence, because self-determining Being (which is Reflection) is being the Ground of other beings. Hegel says:

"Die Reflexion ist die reine Vermittlung überhaupt, der Grund ist die reale Vermittlung des Wesens mit sich."

(Logic, II, p.64)

(Reflection is pure mediation in general, the Ground is real mediation between the Essence and itself.)
Therefore, the Ground is on the one hand Absolute Ground, that is, the Essence is the general Ground as the relatedness of totality for itself. This relatedness is, however, also self-determination; therefore, the Ground is on the other hand Determinate Ground, that is, the Ground of being a determinate being. Absolute Ground refers to the process of assuming a form, Determinate Ground refers to the process of getting a specific contents. The activity which is the unification of these two extremes is the motion of the Ground, viz. the Conditioning Mediation ("Bedingende Vermittlung"), that is, the relation between Ground and what is grounded. The Ground, in this form, is therefore the Essence posited as totality, that is, the total conditionality (therefore negation of independence) in its self-determining activity - the Ground of a thing is the mediation (i.e. reflection) of all its conditions. But if all conditions of a thing are present, the thing itself is present, and must appear; in this way a thing comes to Existence, and its Ground is sublated in its Existence. The Ground is, therefore, the sum and final form of the negative and positing activity of reflection which is the identity of the Essence. The Essence ultimately negates itself and is Appearing.

The second part of the doctrine of Essence deals with the motion of the Appearing Essence.

In the first chapter of this part (Logic, II, p.102-121), the object is Essence as Existence, that is the Appearance (by the negating and positing activity of the Ground) of the Essence as totality of its conditions. Existence, therefore, assumes on the hand the form of Thing, that is, the totality of conditions united in a single being. The conditionality of the Thing, i.e. the relatedness to other things which is determining this thing, is initially expressed in the Properties of the Thing. But the Thing owes its Existence to these Properties, that is, to the unification of its conditions. Therefore, Existence assumes the form, on the other hand, of determinate subsistence, that is of independent Materials ("Materien") which are bearers of the Properties of which and by which the Thing exists. Because these bearers are independent, they do not form a limitation with respect to each other but are indifferent to each other. The Thing is, therefore, no more than an arbitrary yet determinate quantum of these free materials. The unity of these two extremes is the self-determining activity of the Essence they are based on, viz. Appearing.

Appearing is the object of the second chapter (Logic, II, pp.122-135), viz. as the activity of the Essence to form a determinate quantum of determinate Existence.

On the one hand this activity assumes the form of the Law of Appearing, that is, that which establishes the Identity of appearing Things by relating their contents (i.e. expressing their relatedness). On the other hand this law implies a world-in-itself besides the appearing world. In Appearing appears what is according the Law, that is, what endures in change, and this implies the negation of the change which is Appearing. On the one
hand, therefore, Law is positive relatedness, on the other hand negative relatedness; on the one hand it establishes identity in relatedness, on the other hand it establishes difference in relatedness. This results in the occurrence of two worlds for themselves: one appearing world in which things have identities and are separated from each other, and one transcendent ("übersinnliche") world on which everything flows and merges into one whole. But the real world is the unification of these two extremes, which is called Actuality ("Wirklichkeit"). This unification is established by and in the Essential Relation which is the object of the third chapter (see below, section 4).

The Actuality is the unity of Essence and Existence. This is the object of the third part of the doctrine of Essence. Except Essence and Existence there is nothing; they are each other’s conditions of subsistence and their unity is the all-encompassing unconditionable: the Absolute, which is the object of the first chapter of the third part (Logic, II, pp.157-168).

The Absolute is on the one hand Absolute Identity, because it is in all its moments itself, that is, totality; therefore it is Exposition ("Auslegung") of itself (i.e. the exposition of its absolute contents). On the other hand it is also the negation of this Exposition, viz. as absolute form or Attribute. The unity of contents and form is the Mode of the Absolute, that is, the way in which it is expressing itself — not, however, expressing itself in something other than itself (for there is nothing else than itself), but as itself: the Absolute is, and, as it is, it expresses itself; it is all Actuality.

Actuality is the object of the second chapter (Logic, II, pp.169-183). Since Actuality is the Absolute, it encompasses all Being, that is, the Possible as well as the Actual. The way in which the Possible and the Actual are conditional to each other is the relation which is Actuality, and therefore Actuality must assume these two extreme forms. On the one hand, the Possible and the Actual are mutually conditional; their difference is, therefore, only formal, that is, they are as much identical as they are different. This identity is the identity of the Contingency of Actuality, which its general and formal identity. On the other hand, with respect to a determinate actual thing, there is a determinate possibility of this actual thing, viz. the sum of conditions of its Existence. This determinate relation is not formal anymore, and it establishes the Relative Necessity of Actuality — relative, because the starting-point (i.e. a determinate actual thing) is for itself contingent (i.e. part of the formal identity of Actuality). In this Necessity lies the Differentiation of Actuality.

The unity of these extremes is that the total Actuality is its own condition, viz. as always determinate possibility; this is Absolute Necessity, because it is the form of motion, i.e. reflection, of the Absolute.

This leads to the Absolute Relation, which is the object of the third and final chapter (Logic, II, pp.184-205). The Absolute relation is, on the one hand, the
Relation of Substance and Accidence. Substance is what is mediated by itself (therefore absolutely necessary); this identity (it is an identity, because it is a self-rela-
ton) finds its difference in the different Accidents which are exchanged in this mediation (which is how substances are determined). On the other hand this relation is the Relation of Causality, that is, the relation between cause and effected activity. The unity of these two extremes of the Absolute Relation is Interaction, since, for the totality, cause and effected activity coincide in the general mediation of the interacting substances.

section 4. The logical place of force.

In this section I will present Hegel’s exposition of the central part of the doctrine of the Essence (Logic, II, pp.136-155). Since this part is of crucial importance to the understanding of his concept of force, I will treat it rather extensively.

Between on the one hand Essence and Existence, and on the other hand Actuality (which is their unity) the Essential Relation is situated, which gives the unity of Essence and Existence a determinate form (Logic, II, p.137).

In the first part of Hegel’s ontology, viz. the doctrine of Being, that which gave form to the unification of the final extremes was a form of relatedness for itself. Here, in the second part of the ontology, viz. the doctrine of the Essence, the last form is a form of relatedness - now, however, not a form of Being of relatedness, but a form of the Essence of relatedness, which the Essential Relation is.

The Essential Relation is a form of motion, since it is Reflection; this applies to all determinations which are expounded in the doctrine of the Essence. The Essential Relation is, furthermore, the Essence of Reflection; it is, therefore, the Essence of the motion of the Essence. And as such, it is the core of the core of the Logic.

In the preceding determination of the motion of the Essence, viz. Appearing, the world ultimately appeared in two forms of totality. On the one hand the world as totality of its contents; as such it is identical with itself, without change, that is, it is Being-in-itself. This form of the world is the essential world which is the Ground of its Appearing. On the other hand the world as totality of its forms, that is, the totality of determinateness. This is the appearing world of change. The appearing world is changing according to its laws, and its contents is the essential world. ‘Law’, as a category, divides the world into change or difference, and identity; but it also connects what it has divided. According to Hegel, Law is Essential Relation, because it relates these two forms of world which otherwise would stand indifferently beside and separate from each other (Logic, II, p.136).

The world as it is must be understood as essentially being relation. On the one hand the world is its Ground of its Appearing, on the other hand it is Appearing which is
disappearing in its Ground because it is change. Essentially, therefore, the world is both and that means that it is the relation of both. This relation is dynamical, it is motion, because it is the self-negation of both sides by which they establish their transition to each other; in this way, they are related to each other. This motion is not merely the Appearing of Change, that is, it is not only the motion in the appearing world; this is only one side, therefore it is one-sided. It is motion of the world, that is, it is that which flows through its forms of change and thus gives itself form; it is motion which is the actual subject of Being, and therefore the essential form of the Logos (43).

The object which must be determined and given form to is, therefore, the self-determining activity of the Essence which forms the totality of the world, that is, the total or overall relatedness.

The most general form of this relation is the form of the relation between Part and Whole. The Essence is, on the one hand, Whole, since it is forming the world and, therefore, must be its Ground and, as such, encompass the world. On the other hand, that which is encompassed and which is formed is also Essence itself – the Essence is, therefore, also Part, viz. as Appearing world, that is Existence.

In the relation between Part and Whole, the relation of Existence and Essence is expressed rather superficial (because it becomes external); Hegel speaks of "gedankenlos" (thoughtless; Logic, II, p.144). Being the Ground of the Existence, Essence encompasses Existence, and as such it is the Whole; but this does not mean that the Essence is the Whole of all Being – the Essence must appear and its Appearing is Existence, and as such Essence is a Part of all Being. Essence, then, is the relation of Part and Whole, which is the first determination of the relation of Essence and Existence. But this first and external determination is imperfect, because it pulls itself apart and thus negates this relation. For, as Hegel puts it, there is nothing present in the Whole which is not present in the Parts, and nothing in the Parts which is not in the Whole (Logic, II, p.141). With this, Hegel points out that the Notion of the relation of Part and Whole presupposes that Part and Whole form a unity, because they are mutually conditional to each other. But this very unity is negated by the difference which it must contain (because it is a relation): both Part and Whole are only identical to each other in their own form, not in the form of the other, and this brings about that the relation falls apart. But apart from their relation, Whole and Part are nothing. Negating their relation, they negate themselves. This self-negation, which is implied in the Notion of this relation (on account of its difference), is contradictory to this Notion (because the Notion contradicts its own form, that is, negates itself) and must, therefore, be sublated; this is how the self-motion of the Notion is continuing. For Part and Whole cannot negate each other and themselves, because they cannot exist apart from their
relation; therefore, they must be united, but in such a form that both their relation and their negation is preserved.

It is obvious that the analysis of the relation (undoubtedly conceived by Hegel as self-analysis of the Notion, therefore as self-negation) leads to a new relation which is the sublation of the analysis, that is, a further determination and further development of the Notion of the relation. This further development consists in understanding the meaning of the first negation, viz. that this negation cannot be the end but must be the introduction of a new unity on a higher level where the negation is negated, and the self-contradiction of the Notion of this relation is both preserved and solved. In this case, the meaning of the first negation is that the independence or being-for-themselves of the extremes, viz. Part and Whole, actually is established by their opposites, viz. Whole and Part respectively; far from being unrelated in their independence, they actually are united, and this unification, which negates the first negation, is the sublation.

Because the object still is the relation of Essence and Existence, Hegel adds that obviously the two extremes presuppose each other; each extreme for itself is the starting-point of the process of reflection which posits the final relation, which means that "Die Wahrheit des Verhältnisses besteht also in der Vermittlung" (the truth of the relation is therefore the Mediation; Logic, II, p.142). The central point is, therefore, that the Essence, which should be the starting-point of the reflection-process in which Essence and Existence are posited (44), owes its existence to Existence; being a starting-point is, therefore, a relative thing - the reflection-process this relation actually is, has a circular form (although it cannot be a mere circle, because it is part of a development).

Part and Whole are sublated in this relation, they are only extremes; their unity is the relatedness itself. This relatedness is determined and given form as Force.

Force is, says Hegel summarizing in the doctrine of the Essence in the Encyclopaedia:

"[...] als das Ganze, welches an sich selbst die negative Beziehung auf sich ist, dies, sich von sich abzustossen und sich zu äussern."

(Encyclopaedia, s.137)

([...] as the Whole, which is in itself the negative relation to itself, this which is self-repulsion and self-externalization).

In other words, Force has, in contrast with the Whole as such, the faculty of self-negation as its own and proper faculty; the Whole as such needed its opposite Part to realize its negation, which means that it could not as itself come away from itself, that is, it could not exert
itself. This deficiency of Whole and Part made their relation to a non-relation which had to be sublated. Force is this sublation.

This means that Force is the process of reflection; it posits itself, as well as its own opposite, in one and the same determining circular motion. The Force is both the Whole and the Parts, because it is the sublation of their relation; therefore it posits itself as Whole as well as its Parts (viz. by self-repulsion or exertion); it is, therefore, self-differentiation.

Force is the form of the motion of the Essence by which and in which the Essence determines itself and is appearing. Force itself has, therefore, also two extremes, viz. Force of Essence, and Force of Appearing (Hegel uses the terms "Kraft an sich" and "Äusserung der Kraft"; Logic, II, p.144).

The Force of Essence is the activity of the Essence to negate and determine itself; as such it is the "ruhige Bestimmtheit des Dings überhaupt" (fixed determination of the Thing in general; Logic, II, p.144). Hegel says:

"So wird die Kraft auch als Materie bezeichnet und statt magnetischer, elektrischer usf. Kraft eine magnetische, elektrische usf. Materie angenommen oder statt der berühmten anziehenden Kraft ein feiner Äther, der alles zusammenhalte."

(Logic, II, p.144)

(In this way [viz. as immediate subsistence of Force, which is something external], Force is also denominated Matter and instead of magnetic, electrical etc. Force a magnetical, an electrical etc. Matter is assumed, or instead of the famous Force of attraction a subtle Aether which would keep everything together.)

Self-determination and self-negation, however, are relations. The second form of Force must, therefore, be that Force is conditional, that is, it is related to itself and thus is self-conditional. In this way, Force is a relation in which the extremes are identical, viz. they are Force; force has multiplied itself (Logic, II, pp.146-147).

Summarizing: Force is the activity of the self-determination of Being, it is the relation which is Essence, and it is the activity which makes the Essence appear. Force is, therefore, ‘Being in the world’ in its Essence and Appearing.

The Force of Appearing is the exertion of Force ("Äusserung"). The conditionality of the relation which Force is, is determined in what Hegel calls the Sollicitation ("Sollicitation") of the Force (Logic, II, p.147). Sollicitation is the form of exertion of Force. For in the conditionality it is implied that Force must have an active as well as a passive moment; the Force is passive in its form of (its own) object of self-negation, and it is active as the subject of it – in this way, Force is being sollici-
tated and sollicitating respectively. The process of sollicitation is the form in which Force exerts itself, that is, deploys its activity. In this deployment, which gives form to the total contents of the Force, i.e. of the Essence of Being, the world as a totality appears—hence the category Force of Appearance.

But Force is the unity of its extremes:

"Aber die Tätigkeit der Kraft besteht darin, sich zu äussern, d.h. [...] die Äusserlichkeit aufzuheben und sie als das zu bestimmen, worin sie identisch mit sich ist. Was also die Kraft in Wahrheit äussert, ist dies, dass ihre Beziehung auf anderes ihre Beziehung auf sich selbst ist, dass ihre Passivität in ihrer Aktivität selbst besteht. [...] oder die Kraft äussert dies, dass ihre Äusserlichkeit identisch ist mit ihrer Innerlichkeit."

(Logic, II, p.150)

(But the activity of the Force consistst in exerting itself, that is [...] in sublating the self-externality and determining it as that in which it [i.e. the Force] is identical with itself. In truth, what the Force exerts is that its relation to the other is the relation to itself, that its passivity is its activity. [...] that is, the Force exerts this that its [self-]externality is identical with its [self-]internality.)

This, viz. the identity (including the difference) of externality and internality is the ultimate determination of the activity which Force is. Force is that by which the world of the contents and the world of the forms (i.e. Essence and Existence respectively) are one; this being one is Actuality. Force, therefore, is the activity which Actuality as total relatedness essentially is; it is the Ground of Actuality, which is the contradiction of self-determination that is sublating itself. Force is (45), therefore, the logical and ontological structure of total interaction.

section 5. Conclusions.

The first and indeed pre-eminent thing which should be noticed is the fact that in Hegel’s system everything (not just his ontological categories) flows from the first category, viz. Being. This means that, in Hegel’s system, there is only one world. Every category and relation is a self-determination of Being; its ultimate subject, viz. the Spirit, is its own—it is different from Being, but this difference is contained in the ultimate totality Being is or becomes. Hegel’s system is absolutely monistic (46).

In Hegel’s system, Being is Becoming (see section 2). From the very start, therefore, his system is dynamical. And again, this dynamic nature is entirely its own; Being is being a process, its motion is self-motion, as appears
in the concept of "Sollen", which is self-incitation (see section 2). Being differentiates itself, it is self-negation and negation of this negation, that is, self-sublation; this has been made clear in the concepts of Being-one and Being-many (see section 2). And that Being is, therefore, self-relatedness which in its relation to itself determines and multiplies itself, has been made clear in the concept of Involution. Because of this, Being realizes itself as an interrelated multitude, it constructs its own Actuality (see section 2). To do this, its Essence must be Appearing, and, as has been made clear in sections 3 and 4, the essence of this is the activity of Force. There can be no doubt, therefore, that Force is the actually actualizing nature of Being, and that it is part of the world Being is. Hegel has no need for God or a first Unmoved Mover; the world itself suffices to be itself as a dynamical totality of interacting parts.

The concept of Force has been made clear in the preceding section. Force is actualization. According to Aristotle, motion is the actualization of a possible being insofar as this being is possible – when it is completely existing, which means that it is not possible anymore, it is complete and, therefore, not moving anymore (47). But according to Hegel, a being is never completed, not if one considers it in the totality it is part of; it is always being determined, by being related to others – if it were completed, then all the other beings (being its conditions) had to be within this completed being, but this would make it relationless, therefore indeterminate: Being as such. And, indeed, Being (as the totality) is the only true self-relatedness and as such indeterminate; it is determining itself by becoming. In order to be becoming, it must differentiate itself quantitatively, and thus it determines itself qualitatively: it falls apart (repulsion) and forms a unity of itself (attraction) (see section 2) – as such it is Force, viz. it is actualization of itself in general. In Hegel’s system, motion cannot disappear, nothing can stop moving, because then it would stop being.

Aristotle remarks that motion is a concept hard to grasp, since it is actualization and non-actualization (that is, it is becoming, being incompletely) (48). And indeed it is; forming a concept of motion is hard, since concepts refer to identities and motion is more than just identity. It is not only a 'higher' identity because it unifies different identities (that is, it unifies difference); it is also non-identity, and this implies that the concept of motion refers to at least two levels at the same time, which is a contradiction. Motion is actualization and non-actualization, says Aristotle; its nature (i.e. Force) is the actualization of the contradiction, says Hegel. As such, Force is the Ground of motion; it is what is actualized in motion, not, however, as a fixed result, but as a process – it is the activity in motion. Hegel points this out by situating Force logically between on the one hand Essence and Existence, and on the other hand their unification, i.e. Actuality – Force is what
establishes the transition, it lacks, therefore, the degree of determinateness which Actuality possesses, it is more general (49). Essence is flowing, it is being attracted to one thing, it is totality without determinateness; Existence is being repulsed from itself, it is expounded totality without unity; Force unifies them, therefore it is both of them, but not yet (being that unification already is being Actuality): it is the motion that forms unity — and in this sense Force expounds (also in the sense of ‘explains’, for it is a logical concept as well as an ontological concept) totality. Force is the actualization of the contradiction; and sublating it, it is the Ground of total relatedness.

Force is the contradiction of totality: on the one hand totality is total relatedness, attraction of all, but on the other hand this is how it is determining itself, which means being different, repulsion. Force must be simultaneously attraction and repulsion, because totality would otherwise be total relatedness at one moment, and indifferent collaterality at the next moment. That is why Force is the actual contradiction (because it actually exists), it is the contradiction of actualization (because it is Ground), with that, it is the acting contradiction (because it sublates itself in the actual activity), and finally, therefore, it is the fundamental contradiction of Actuality as totality. Which, of course, means that in Hegel’s system Actuality and actualization are, fundamentally, contradictions.

This leads to the logical analysis of this concept.

Force is a form of Reflection. This is logical, because in Hegel’s system every form of positing is a form of Reflection, and Force is positing of the Actuality. Reflection has a circular structure, therefore Force must have a circular structure too. Again, this is logical, because it is the monistic world which is positing itself as Actuality; obviously this calls for a circular structure.

This circular structure is the structure of self-mediation. Simply put, this is the following. The Essence posits (by going to its Ground) its Existence; this process is Appearing. Appearing means expressing itself, that is, externalizing itself — it is assuming the form of its opposite, or as Hegel puts it: reflection in the other. But in positing its Existence, Essence posits itself; thus it returns, or as Hegel puts it: reflects, in itself (which is a circular motion) — but not as merely itself, because it takes its opposite form (viz. Existence), which it has posited, with it (which is why this motion is not merely a circle). These two forms of Reflection together (which is the third form of Reflection) posit Actuality. Force is this third form. It is, therefore, reflection in the other which is reflection in itself; as Hegel puts it:

"Die Kraft ist als das Ganze, welches an sich selbst die negative Beziehung auf sich ist, dies, sich von sich abzustossen und sich zu äußern. Aber da diese Reflexion-in-anderes, der Unterschied der Teile, eben-
sosehr Reflexion-in-sich ist, so ist die Äusserung
die Vermittlung, wodurch die Kraft, die in sich
zurückkehrt, als Kraft ist.
(Encyclopaedia, s.137)

(The Force is as the Whole, which is in itself the
negative relation to itself, this which is self-re-
pulsion and self-externalization. But since this
reflection in the other, [i.e.] the difference of the
parts, is as much reflection in itself, the self-
externalization is the mediation by which the Force,
which returns in itself, is Force.)

Since with Force, self-externalization is returning in
itself, there is no separation of the internal and the
external; in fact, internal and external are merely diffe-
rent determinations of one and the same reflective motion
in which, that is, as which, the world actualizes itself.
Force actualizes the Actuality which, as Interaction, is
determined in the three forms of the Notion, viz. Univer-
sality, Particularity, and Singularity. As has been poin-
ted out in section 2, these three determinations are the
same as the three determinations of reflection (viz.
identity, difference, and ground), but they all contain
each other. Universality, therefore, is the self-identity
of the universe, which expresses its self-difference (i.e.
extensivity or collaterality, which in this case is not
indifferent but interrelated) as its differentiated form
of Particularity; but since it is in itself in this diffe-
rentiated form, the differentiation is actualized (which
means that the differentiated forms are as independent as
is the Universal, therefore they are truly Singular) as
well as actually interrelated (because each singular thing
is also universal). The Singular, therefore, is the actual
unit of interaction; it is the subject of interaction, and
therefore its Ground: the Singular (as an infinite multi-
tude because of the differentiation) is the negation as
well as the sublation and, therefore, actual mediation and
position of the universe. In it, the differentiation of
the universe (i.e. the Particularity) is interrelated, and
this means that the difference is actualized; actualizati-
on of difference means actualization of negation, but
since the universe negates itself in positing itself,
nothing vanishes — everything is changing: interaction.
The form of this interaction is negation of negation (i.e.
sublation), because this is the form of the Singular. This
form is circular. Therefore the general form of the actua-
lized universe is circular (more precisely: elliptic)
motion, that is, rotation: it is attraction (self-identi-
ty) and repulsion (self-difference) at the same time,
which (as has been pointed out in the preceding chapter)
is elliptic motion. As has been pointed out in chapter 10,
section 2, rotation is treated by Hegel not only as the
essential property of heavenly bodies (i.e. the general
form of nature), but also as an essential logical form,
viz. the form of self-realization of the objective Notion,
that is, the three forms of Mechanism which have the same
structure as the three forms of reflection and are as a
whole, therefore, circular. His system is, therefore, entirely consistent in this respect.

It is clear that Force logically entails hyperception, because it is an activity which unifies three different levels. But the difference of these three levels is sublated in this unification.

It is also clear, therefore, that this Hegelian form of hyperception differs from the other preceding forms. How they are related, is the subject of the subsequent chapter.