Chapter 3. The structure of Leibniz's system.

The structure of Leibniz's system is of a circular nature, as the analysis in the preceding chapters has revealed. In this chapter I intend to elaborate on this circular nature. First, I will examine the foundation of Leibniz's system. I intend to demonstrate how this foundation demands a specific structure, which determines the entire system. In the second section I will then explicate this system by explicating its parts and their structure. The conclusions follow in the last section.

Section 1. Foundation

The basic concept of Leibniz's system is not the monad, but the concept of the complete substances (plural!).

In PPE&NS, the programme of his system, it is clear that the required amendment of metaphysics is related to the concept of substance: metaphysics is the science of what is truly universal and substance is the very concept which is crucial in understanding the nature of this universality.

Furthermore, substance is linked with force and activity, therefore with active individual material beings (see chapter 1, section 1). In this way, substance appears to be not only a central or basic concept, but also a concept which is plural and dynamic as regards its contents.

In SpDyn, Leibniz makes clear how metaphysics must be distinguished from physics, but also how it is to be united with it; metaphysics appears to be that which must make physics intelligible, explicating its hidden concepts and structure of reasoning. Consequently, substance is distinguished from corporeal matter, but also the two are claimed to be inseparable (see chapter 1, section 2). Evidently, the central part substances play is confirmed and elaborated in this text.

In the New System, the relation between substances and bodies is made even clearer, and again in doing so Leibniz emphasizes both their distinction and relation or union (see chapter 1, section 3).

In all three texts, the concepts concerning substance are accompanied by a more or less elaborate criticism of Cartesianism. The main criticism is that it is impossible to derive activity from extension, and that it is also impossible to derive true unity from matter (or what is merely passive) alone (see chapter 1, sections 1-3). Since substance is conceived by Leibniz as the basis and foundation of activity and unity, it is clear why this criticism appears.

In the texts reviewed in chapter 2 follow the details of how substance has to be conceived, and how it determines other concepts to form a systematic whole. It becomes clear that monads and bodies must form a unity and how this happens; it also becomes clear in what way this active unity, representing and expressing the universe as a totality, as a conceptual structure, amends, or at least is meant to amend, which is lacking in Cartesianism.

This textual state of affairs, which I have tried to establish in detail in the preceding part, must be capable of explanation by the structure of Leibniz's system, if it is (as indeed it appears to be) not coincidental but systematic. This
explanation will be given below.

In the preceding part I have concluded that the structure of Leibniz’s system is of a circular nature. To point out a detail which is essential to this circular nature, I have emphasized the evident reciprocal relation between several concepts. In my opinion, this reciprocality derives from the fact that Leibniz wants his system to be capable of explaining a universe which is essentially self-sufficient - a fact which can easily be inferred from his criticism of Cartesianism and Occasionalism (see chapter 2, section 1; see also Leibniz’s fifth letter to Clarke, sections 84 and 89).

As is shown in the preceding part, Leibniz’s criticism of Descartes consists basically of the observation that activity cannot be derived from extension (see e.g. chapter 1, sections 1, 2). This is not an observation which stands by itself; it is a functional part of Leibniz’s system. Descartes had developed an ontological system in which the ultimate cause of the universe was not included: God, in his role as First Mover, was expelled from the universe, which functioned like a mechanism (49), like a clock. With a clock, this might be satisfactory, because a clock is only a part of the universe. But the universe is not in the same way a part of itself; it must contain its ultimate cause or be incomplete. However, since the universe is per se complete, it cannot be incomplete. Therefore it must contain its ultimate cause. Leibniz’s criticism of Descartes is therefore: If one accepts the fact that the universe is compounded of active parts of itself (as Descartes does), and if one at the same time declares that the universe is fundamentally nothing but res extensa (as Descartes also does), but one cannot explain how the former derives from the latter (as Descartes indeed cannot), then one has left out an essential part of the universe. Descartes indeed left out this essential part; he transferred it to theology, and at the same time separated theology from philosophy and the sciences. In Leibniz’s system this is amended; the universe is complete, therefore it must be feasible to explain it completely - to this end one must have a system which is complete in this sense, and that is why Leibniz introduced his metaphysics, to combine it with the sciences and thus obtain a complete system (50). Metaphysics, then, should furnish the ultimate cause of the universe, since mechanics cannot do this. As Leibniz writes to Clarke:

"Or par ce principe seul, savoir: qu’il faut qu’il y ait une raison suffisante, pourquoi les choses sont plustost ainsi qu’autrement, se demonstre la Divinite, et tout le reste de la Metaphysique ou de la Theologie Naturelle, et même en quelque façon les Principes Physiques independans de la Mathematique, c’est à dire les Principes Dynamiques ou de la Force."

(G.VII, p. 356)
(Now by this single principle, to wit: that there ought to be a sufficient reason why things are rather so than otherwise, one can demonstrate the Divinity, and all the rest of Metaphysics or of Natural Theology, and even in some way the Physical Principles, which are independent from Mathematics, that is to say the Dynamical Principles or [the Principles] of the Force.)

It is quite clear that the principle of sufficient reason is the one principle which is essential to Metaphysics, according to Leibniz. And it is also quite clear that this should take the place of the separate theology in the Cartesian system.

The principle of sufficient reason does not, however, stand by itself. As I have established in the preceding part, in Leibniz’s system the ultimate cause of the universe is itself as one totality; this cause is effectuated by the activity resulting from the representation of the universe in the monads of each of the parts of the universe. And these parts are bodies, moving according to the laws of mechanics. Therefore the metaphysical principle of sufficient reason has its necessary counterpart: the physical principle that the universe is composed of bodies in motion.

In Leibniz’s system, the relation between these two principles is not only reciprocal but circular reciprocal. Of course, a principle of sufficient reason is purposeless if it does not apply to anything; and in this sense the physical principle is the necessary counterpart of the metaphysical principle. But that is not all and it does not cover the essence of the relation between these principles in Leibniz’s system. According to Leibniz, each part of the universe must represent the totality the universe is – this complete and exact representation is sufficient reason for the particular existence of the part (including its motion, change, etc.). In this way, the universe as a totality is sufficient reason for the universe in its differentiated form, i.e. the multitude of moving parts; thus ultimate cause and sufficient reason are identical, and the universe, containing its own ultimate cause, is completely self-sufficient. The circularity, which is obtained in this way, is evident: the sufficient reason for the differentiated universe is itself, mediated by the totality of the universe (which the differentiated form of the universe composes) which is represented in each of the parts of the differentiated universe. This circularity establishes an identity, viz. of the universe as a totality with the differentiated universe. But this identity is mediated (hence the circularity): the universe is a coin with two sides. These two sides are systematically explained in the two concepts monad and body: the distinction between them is of an analytical kind, that is, it is not complete without their unity. For the basic question underlying Leibniz’s system is this: granted that the universe is compounded of mechanically moving parts, then how is it possible that it is a harmonious whole, a totality? In bodies as such there is no capacity for storing determinations (therefore they blindly follow the mechanical laws; see chapter 2, sections 2,3). But this capacity is necessary in order to form a totality; the relative causation, which collision is, cannot explain the formation of a totali-
ty, on account of the very fact that it only relates one specific situation to another. In order to form totality, however, general determination is required, and therefore also storage of general determination. This is why the monad must complement the body. The monad is the representation of the totality, whereas the body is only a specific appearance of totality (since the monad represents totality, it establishes the general or universal relatedness; therefore it is the expression of the essence of totality; the body does not represent the relatedness, only the result of this: the appearing multitude of moving particles). Monad and body together form the complete substance, in which the self-sufficiency of the universe is established.

The principle of sufficient reason, then, is not the first or most fundamental. It is rather a result of Leibniz’s conception of the universe as self-sufficient, and this conception is expressed in the most general and fundamental way in the concept of the complete substances, which is therefore the basic concept of Leibniz’s system.

As I have pointed out (in chapter 1, section 4) the circular structure makes a First unmoved Mover superfluous, and consequently the universe includes its own ultimate cause or foundation. This also means that it must move itself. Again, this is a consequence which Leibniz already mentions in his programme (PPE&NS): the ultimate reason of motion is the monad, i.e. its (primitive) force; a monad, therefore, incites itself (see chapter 1, section 1). The self-sufficiency of the universe is realized by the monad, which mediates its own activity. As has been explained in great detail in the preceding part, the monad is able to perform this basic activity by virtue of the fact that it represents the universe as a totality, which representation (which is primitive force and matter) is differentiated in the successive activity (see chapter 2, section 2). The same circularity as mentioned above features here, but now seemingly completely on the metaphysical, that is substantial, side of the coin, since the whole circle seems to take place within the monad. If this were so, one would expect a similar circularity on the other, the corporeal side, on account of the reciprocal relation between metaphysics and physics. But one would err in expecting this. The circularity does not take place solely within the monad, since by its nature or force it represents the universe as a totality - this universe is not merely metaphysical, it is the complete universe including the physical bodies. One should not interpret Leibniz’s system as amounting to a two-worlds world-picture: a metaphysical world of monads on the one side, a physical world of bodies on the other - the very circularity and self-sufficiency, as laid down in the concept of the complete substance, are designed to sublate this analytical distinction between the two worlds and let them merge together in one self-sufficient universe. Otherwise there would be no place, let alone a basic one, for the concept of complete substance in Leibniz’s system. The circularity of the representation and self-incitation (i.e. the differentiation of the representation in its successive expression) is in fact the same circularity as the circularity of the complete substance, but now ‘reversed’ (inasfar as it is possible to revert a circle). As concerns the complete substance, the
circle begins with the differentiated universe, and ends with it, via the universe as a totality. The totality is in fact the middle term; the intermediary is the complete substance, viz. the unity of both forms of universe. But to make this circular structure conclusive, one must demonstrate how this intermediary is able to perform its task - and, since the whole structure must explain the self-sufficiency of the universe, preferably without introducing any essentially new elements. This is established by analyzing this middle-term, which analysis reveals that this middle-term is in fact the mirror-image of the structure it has to perform in; in this way it casts back to each of the terms, which it has to link in a circle, the mirror-image of this term, which is the other term (the 'opposite') - the representative activity of the monad.

The analysis goes as follows:

(1) The external structure is circular: the universe (as a whole) is (by the representation and expression which the complete substances bring about) differentiated into complete substances which, in turn, compound the universe as a whole.

Schematically this can be presented as follows:

scheme 3.1.a

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differentiated universe as a totality
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in which >>>>>> and <<<<<< are the external mediating effect of the activity of the complete substances

(2) The internal circular structure is: the represented universe as a whole is expressed as a differentiated universe which is (on account of the external circularity) the object of representation.

Schematically this can be presented as follows:
In which **>>**>> and <<**<<** are the internal mediating effect of the activity of the complete substances.

(3) Put (1) and (2) together, and it is obvious that the internal circular structure is the mediating mirror-image of the external circular structure it mediates. Schematically this can be presented as follows:

The relations between the forms of the universe inside and the forms of the universe outside the complete substances (that is, in fact inside and outside their monads) are relations between differentiated and totality-forms. Perhaps one would have expected a relation between the internal and external differentiated form (as externalization of the represented universe), and a relation between the internal and external form of totality (as internalization of the universe). But this would make no sense. Internalization must bring the actual totality into its differentiated forms (viz. into the monads of the many substances which are as such determined by their specific place in the universe and which, therefore, have a differentiated nature which is to be internally united with totality in this relation); externalization is the reverse, it must bring this internal unification out again.

The 'reverse' circularity of the complete substance is, analytically, explained then in the concept of the substance, i.e. monad, as follows. The monad has a representative nature, which represents the universe as a totality. But a monad is always linked to a body in always a specific state; these specific states (in the differentiated universe, of course) are expressed by differentiating the totality of representation into successive activities. And the totality of activities is represented. In this way a monad links specific states (in the differentiated universe) to the totality of the universe, and vice versa. It should be observed that the unification, which the complete substance established in this way, is dynamic by nature: the representation of the totality is only united with the expression of the differentiated universe by
successive activities. Therefore, the basic concept of Leibniz’s system is not only a multitude, but also a multitude of moving parts.

The metaphor of the mirror derives from Leibniz himself, who speaks of monads as an "exact mirror" (see chapter 2, section 1); but also, and perhaps more enlightening, of monads as "little worlds" (id.), indicating that the totality is represented in each of its parts. In this latter sense it would be correct to refer to 'reverse' circularity as 'turning inside out and vice versa', where the inside is the differentiated universe, and the outside is the totality. This is, I think, more enlightening, because it provides an easy path to the fact that 'to represent' means (ontologically) 'to contain', according to Leibniz, which path leads on to the specific kind of logic this circular structure implies, viz. a logic in which the universal contains the singular and the singular contains the universal. (I will come back to this in the next chapter.)

One should observe that the circular structure identifies the two forms of the universe, which are to be, as such (i.e. analytically) distinguished from each other. This identification is necessary to explain the universe as entirely self-sufficient, and thus provides the foundation of the system. Therefore it should not be a simple identification; and it is not (51).

It should not be a simple identification, since such an identification cannot be a foundation at all. It should be possible to derive the entire system from its foundation; therefore the foundation must comprise the system. (As a figure of speech: it must be the system in a nutshell.) To comprise the system means to contain its contents and its structure in an implicit way; the system as a whole is the explication of this which is implicit in its foundation. The explication is the analysis of the concepts of the foundation, which leads to the aspects they comprise, which aspects form the successive concepts of the system by synthesis according to the structure the foundation comprises also. A simple identification would not satisfy the needs of the foundation of a system, for a simple identification does not provide anything which can be analyzed, on account of its simplicity. The most simple form of complexity is the relation between two things, which includes three elements: the two things and their relation. This relation must unite the two things (otherwise there would be no relation) but at the same time they must remain two things (otherwise there would be only one, hence no relation at all: simple identification). This most simple form of complex identification includes, therefore, two logical relations at the same time: identification and distinction. On the logical implications of this identity of identity and distinction in the most simple complex relation, I will expand in the next chapter. Here it is sufficient to note that the two forms of the universe (as a totality and differentiated) are identified in the concept of complete substance, which therefore possesses the structure of identity of identity and distinction; this makes this concept the basic concept of the system and analyzable into the entire series of concepts Leibniz’s system consists of, as will be (in part) demonstrated in the next section.
Section 2. Force in Leibniz's system

In this section I intend to derive from the foundation, which has been established in the preceding section, a number of concepts of Leibniz's system, according to the structure comprised in this foundation, which concepts are necessary to reveal the meaning of the concept of force in Leibniz's system. The order in which the concepts follow each other does not as such originate from Leibniz himself. As I have already pointed out, Leibniz never explicated his system in an explicit systematic way; his expositions are always designed to tackle specific problems. Even the Theodicy, his most expansive work, is a compilation of elaborate answers to questions concerning his system, and nothing more. A possible reason for this I will give in the next chapter.

However, the order of concepts in treatises as the New System, and A specimen of dynamics, and the remarks on the method of metaphysics in PPE&NS (see chapter 1, sections 3, 2, and 1 respectively), as well as the basic idea of his ontological system, the idea of exact representation, suggest that the kind of systematic exposition I endeavour to give here, viz. an exposition based on the principle that, since the basic concept must contain everything, the other concepts can be derived from it by analysis and thus represent the contents of this basic concept expressing it in a different perspective each time, would not be alien to Leibniz's system (52). Since by each subsequent representation-in-perspective the sum of revealed particularities which the basic concept contains in a general or universal form will be augmented, it is obvious that one should try to order the concepts accordingly; thus one must move from the universal to the particular, till at last (if this were carried out in a perfect way) one would come to the form of the basic concept which reveals all its particulars. The total structure would then be circular, as it should be (see the preceding section). But also every constituent part of it would be circular, since the basic concept itself has such a structure and must be represented accordingly (id.). Therefore the total structure would be a circle of circles.

As the structure of the basic concepts has been made clear in the preceding section, it will be sufficient to repeat it here only in its schematical form:

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One should observe that in this structure there is not yet an explicit distinction between monad and body - the universe is taken as a whole, both in its form as a totality and in its differentiated form. This distinction will arise from the
following explication of this basic structure.

The circular series of circular structures, which explica-
tes Leibniz's basic concept, must (according to what is said
above) begin with its most universal aspect. This is: quanti-
ty. Leibniz explicitly acknowledges that quantity is applicable to
anything; e.g.:

"[..] les nombres sont indifferens à tout ce qui peut
estre res numerata."

(G.IV., p. 568)

([..] numbers are indifferent to anything which can be res numerata.)

(see chapter 2, section 1).

He also states that numbers are "ideal things" (id.), that is
abstractions.

It is, therefore, not contrary to Leibniz's system to take
quantity as the first aspect to be considered in the basic
concept; that is, as long as one keeps in mind that this
aspect is indeed only an aspect, therefore not a complete
concept. Each aspect, that is, step or little circular struc-
ture in the total series, involves in essence, however, all
the other aspects; since the total series is also circular,
there is no part of it that actually is apart or stands by
itself. Only the total circular structure is fundamentally
conclusive and complete.

The aspect of quantity amounts to the following. The universe
as a totality is one; in its differentiated form, it is many
or a multitude. This is the quantitative aspect of identity
and differentiation or variety respectively, two concepts
which are established in the basic structure of the complete
substance, as explained above. The unification of being one
and being many is established in the unity, as will be demon-
strated presently. The concept of unity is, with Leibniz,
indeed one of the most fundamental, as can be concluded from
e.g. the New System (see chapter 1, section 3). Of course, for
Leibniz this "unity" is not only quantitative: since it is the
unity of matter, it involves the concept of substance, etc.
But analytically one may distinguish the quantitative aspect
from it, in order to come to understand the complete concept.
The question is, then: how are being one and being many united
in one thing?

On the one hand there is being one: the totality; but as
only being one it does not have existence - to exist it must
be differentiated (as has been explained in the preceding
section), and therefore its being one must be divided into
being many.

On the other hand there is being many: the existing diffe-
rentiations; but this cannot exist, if it is not one; for if
every part were only by itself and non-related, this part
could not exist (as being one cannot as such exist); therefore
the parts must be related, and form one whole. It is clear
that this quantitative aspect refers indeed to the original
question the basic structure is designed to answer: how can
totality be established by a multitude? Yet it is also clear
that the quantitative aspect does not yet distinguish between
monad and body; it applies indiscriminately to both.

The reciprocality of one and many is evident. But it is
also evident that on that account neither being one nor being
many can as such exist; only their union can. This union is:
being divisible (and actually divided) and compossible (and
actually compounding). Considering that it is only quantity
which is discussed here, this will be obvious: to be both one
and many must mean to be both one and divided - but as this
division actually exists, the existence of "one" must be
ensured by the compossibility of any part (53).

It will be clear that, mathematically, this leads to the
infinitesimal calculus. Ontologically, however (for according
to Leibniz, mathematics is "ideal" and has no direct ontologi-
cal significance; see e.g. chapter 1, section 2) one has
derived here the principles of divisibility and of compossibi-
licity. The totality must be divided in order to exist, but
also, what is divided must compound totality - but since the
division must exist, there is only the unity which can be the
bearer or subject of both dividing and compounding. Thus,
totality does not exist but in the mode of a multitude of
unities. This is the synthesis of the analytically distinguis-
hed elements.

It is crucial to observe, first, that these unities are not
the 'parts' of 'the whole'; they are not what is divided or
what is compounded; they are that which unites what is divided
and what is compounded - indeed the purely quantitative aspect
of the complete substance. This can be demonstrated by point-
ing out that what is divided is the same thing as what is
compounded, although division is not the same as composition,
but the opposite of it. This opposition cannot be solved by
simply stating that the opposites are one and the same thing,
since they imply each other; this would be a flat contradic-
tion. They are not the same, but of the same, viz. of the third
thing (besides these two) which unites them, which is the
unity.

The second thing crucial to observe is then that this unity
cannot be static, but must be dynamic by nature. This can be
demonstrated as follows. The totality as being one is, as
such, an abstraction. The same applies to being many. Being
one is brought about through being many: totality differentia-
tes. Being many is brought about through being one: variety
totalizes. But the thing that actually differentiates and
totalizes is the unity. It cannot be a unity without its
striving towards the next differentiation and the next, etc.,
thus establishing the total relatedness which forms the tota-
ality.

That Leibniz conceives of this unity in this way, has been
pointed out repeatedly in the preceding part; all his concepts
referring to monads and complete substances are dynamical:
entelechy, force, conatus, etc. - they all signify motion,
change and striving.

That this dynamical unity has a purely quantitative aspect,
may be, on account of its being so abstract, hard to imagine;
yet the above demonstrates it. The easiest way to imagine it
may still be Leibniz's metaphor of the living mirror: the
unity reflects (i.e. represents) the totality and expresses
this part by part through its activities.

The circular structure is then:

scheme 3.2.a

|--------------------------------------|        |
|>>>>>|**>>**>> >>**>>**>>**|>>>>>  |
|being one| variety ←→ being one | variety|
|<<<<<<|**<<**<< <<**<<**<<**|<<<<<< |
|____________________________________|        |
|active unities                        |

The next step in this explication concerns quality as a general aspect.

It might seem to be feasible to pass on from one/variety/unity towards another abstract expression of variety, viz. time and space; its counterpart (another abstract expression of being one) would then probably be the universe as a single event. But this would in fact be contrary to Leibniz's own concept of time and space; in his view time and space are derived from that which is actually extending (see chapter 2) - therefore one must have the concept of force before time and space. The same argument applies to the subsequent introduction of any other abstract quantitative conceptual structure: before more specific aspects (which are in themselves abstract) can be derived and considered, the general aspect of quantity must be related to the general aspect of quality, thus making both aspects in this relation complete (albeit in a general way).

The qualitative counterpart to the preceding quantitative conceptual structure must refer to that which is being one, which is varied, and which is active unity - that which, in general, subsists. With Leibniz, that which subsists, or substance, is active ("actiones esse suppositorum," G.IV, p. 509; see chapter 2, section 2). In this way, the substances mediate between the differentiated universe, which is compounded of actual activities, and the universe as a totality, which is the harmony, the being-one of the former form (see chapter 2, section 2).

The structure, in which this is conceptualized, is:

scheme 3.2.b

|--------------------------------------|        |
|>>>>>>>>>>|**>>>>***> >>**>>**>>**|>>>>>>  |
|universal | actual ←→ universal | actual|
|harmony    | activity harmony      | activity|
|<<<<<<<<<<<|**<<<<***<< **<<<<***<<<<|<<<<<< |
|substances                                        |

Again it should be observed, that also this qualitative aspect does not yet distinguish between monad and body. The activity of the substances consequently includes both the motion of bodies and the expressing activity of the monads (therefore, the distinction between primitive force and deri-
The two structures, which now have been established, are obviously complementary to each other. They must be united, since quantity cannot be without quality, and vice versa. In Leibniz’s system, this is also clear; for instance the universal harmony must be a single event, therefore united with ‘being-one’, as the actual activity must be united with variety, not to speak of the complementary cross-relations (e.g. universal harmony united with variety, of which it is in fact the harmony). It is obvious that this unification will be accomplished by the unification of active unity and substances, since these are in fact the intermediaries in the respective structures and, as has been made clear, unify the ‘opposites’ of these structures. This means that the unification will be accomplished if the circular relation between variety and being one is circularly related with the circular relation between universal harmony and actual activity.

The resulting structure must again be circular. The one ‘opposite’ must be universal harmony plus being-one, but related to actual activity and variety; it is, therefore, the harmonious totality, as a single event, and potentially (to be distinguished from the actually existing differentiated universe) differentiated in a multitude of active parts of itself. The other ‘opposite’ is then the actually differentiated universe, which is part by part establishing a harmonious totality. The intermediary must be a single thing (since it has to establish parts), which is distinguished from all other things (since a totality has to be compounded); therefore it will be better to speak of a multitude of singular things, which have the ability to be active (since the parts they establish are active in order to establish a totality) and perform according to the ultimate harmony which they are compounding. The single things of this multitude, then, are each the actualizer of the potential harmony, which they ultimately establish. Harmony is as such only potential, its actual existence is in these actualizers. Therefore they must be self-inciting.

The circular structure is then:

scheme 3.2.c

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The fact that the agents or substances must be individual derives from the circular relation between quantity and quality. The quantity ‘being-one’ combined with its qualitative complement ‘universal harmony’ must be established in the variety, which is actually active, and which is compounded,
i.e. divisible and divided (as well as compossible and compound). The substance performs this feat, therefore it must be both universal and singular; that is, it must be able to preserve the totality even as it is differentiated - it remains what it is even as it is changing. As Leibniz wrote to De Volder:

"Omne modificatio aliquid durabile supponit."

(G.II, p. 251)

(Something which endures underlies every modification.)

This which endures is the very thing which brings about its modification (thus establishing the differentiated universe); since it endures and is a single thing, it does not only possess identity, but individuality.

But although with this structure the general structure of the harmonious universe may be explicated according to Leibniz's views, this refers as yet only to the 'outside' of the universe: i.e. the essence of it has not yet been made clear (hence the absence as yet of the distinction between monad and body, and between primitive and derivative forces). This is obvious, for the remaining mystery in this structure is how the individual substance succeeds in mediating between the pre-established harmony and the actual multitude. Therefore the next step must be the analysis of this mediation, that is of the concept of individual substances.

In order to mediate between pre-established harmony and actual multitude, the individual substance must itself be a relation, viz. the relation between those two forms. As this relation, it has two 'extremes' or related parts, viz. the parts that on the one hand identify the pre-established harmony with the actual multitude, and, on the other hand, do the reverse, as is clear from the scheme. Obviously, these two extremes are distinguished from each other; otherwise the relation would be a simple identity, therefore superfluous (since it would not be mediating; this would not be necessary, since the two 'outside'-opposites, pre-established harmony and actual multitude, would not differ at all; but they do differ, hence the distinction).

The one extreme is then: the identification of the pre-established harmony with the actual multitude. But this actual multitude is not the 'outside'-multitude, but the 'inside', viz. the actual multitude as it is in the complete substance.

The other extreme is the identification of the actual multitude 'outside' with the pre-established harmony 'inside' the complete substance.

Now if what is 'inside' a complete substance is on the one hand pre-established harmony and on the other actual multitude, that is in both instances the 'outside' of the complete substance, what is inside must represent what is outside - this is how in Leibniz's system one of the required aspects of the complete substance is conceptualized. The structure in which this is conceptualized, is the following:
First there is representation. The representation of pre-established harmony must be distinguished from pre-established harmony itself; but apart from pre-established harmony there is only the actual multitude; therefore the representation of pre-established harmony is in each entity of this multitude. But by being there, the pre-established harmony is actually established; therefore pre-established harmony bites its own tail by this representation - but representation only designates one way of this, viz. from pre-established harmony to actual multitude. The way back is denominated expression: by representing pre-established harmony, it is actually established, but in its differentiated form of actual multitude. In fact it would be more elegant to call representation impression, as obvious counterpart to expression; it is then also simpler to imagine the circularity of this structure: a continuum in which impression is followed by expression, which establishes the very thing to be impressed, which therefore is its expression, etc. ad infinitum.

That which actually mediates representation or impression and expression is successive activity, which is the expression of primitive force and in which this force impresses itself. Thus a self-inciting entity is the result. This entity is the ultimate synthesis (which means that ontologically expression and representation are mere analytical moments).

What is left in the complete substance, after the aspect of representation has been distinguished from it, is that which is represented, but without the representation itself. This residue is denominated body or corpuscular matter by Leibniz (see chapter 2, sections 1, 2). It is clear that what is left, but without representation, is the actual multitude of moving particles, that is the ‘outer’ appearance of the universe: its abstract differentiated form (abstract, since it has been severed from its harmony). Leibniz also refers to this by the term derivative forces. Ontologically it is, of course, an analytical part of the synthesis; as such, however, it falls short of this synthesis and remains an abstraction, a mere phenomenon.
The complete substances form the concrete pre-established harmony; therefore Leibniz often refers to substances and their activity or force as the only thing that is real (e.g. G.IV, p. 523; see chapter 2, section 1). The cycle of expression and representation exists as successive activity. This successive activity makes monads and activity on the one hand, and corpuscles and derivative forces on the other hand perfectly coinciding, viz. in the complete substances; as such, i.e. as analytical elements they have no complete ontological meaning. In an abstract form, monads are the representative activity or force; corpuscles are in an abstract form the complementary passivity. Abstract monads are therefore the representation of the totality-as-one-event, that is pre-established harmony, as such. Abstract corpuscles are on the other hand the expression of this, that is, the appearing differentiation or the physical multitude of phenomena.

It is clear that in this structure the only "real" reality (that is: that which is ontologically necessary and complete) is the multitude of self-inciting complete substances. The concepts 'universe as a totality' (the pre-established harmony as such) and 'differentiated form of universe' (the differentiated totality as such) from the initial scheme prove now to be abstractions; they are mediated by and integrated in the complete substances in the forms of, respectively, represented pre-established harmony and expressed pre-established harmony; and as being integrated they are ontologically complete, therefore real.

One will have noted that in all this there is one concept which has been more or less ignored, viz. the perspectivity of the monad. Perspectivity seems to be the result of the coupling of the monad with its body, since the monad owes its perspectivity to its body. Therefore, perspectivity seems only a property of minor importance. But this is not true. Perspectivity is, in fact, the property which is tied with the expression of the universe in its differentiated form, since this expression occurs at (or, rather, establishes) a specific place and time. Expression is vital, for without it the circular structure would be broken. Now the point is that the monad cannot derive its perspectivity from the universe as a totality which it represents, for in the universe as a totality there are no singular positions; this means, that the perspectivity of the expression cannot derive from the representation which, in the circular structure, precedes the expression. Therefore, the perspectivity must derive from the differentiated form of the universe, that is, from that which must be established – in the Leibnizian structure this is possible because the structure is circular. This makes clear, however, that (circularity or no circularity) Leibniz’s system does have a starting-point, viz. the actually differentiated universe which is also the end or result. One should conclude from this that the difference between the two forms of the totality one can distinguish analytically (viz. the totality and the differentiated form) is as vital as is their identity. And furthermore that, since the Leibnizian circle has an actual starting-point, in the final analysis the mediation might well prove to be problematic, notwithstanding the conclusiveness of the system as a whole.
Section 3. Conclusions

Leibniz’s system has been explicated by the formation of an analytical series of circles, which series is itself circular and therefore (as a whole) synthetical.

The whole consists in fact of two subsequent circular structures: first the structures of active unity, substances and individual substances respectively, then the structure which explicates the individual substances and which leads to the basis again, viz. the complete substances.

The first circle concerns the ‘outer’ relation, that is the explication of the two ‘opposites’: totality and differentiated totality. This circle refers to the fact that totality and differentiated totality actually presuppose and include each other.

The second circle concerns the ‘inner’ relation, that is the explication of the relation the two opposites are mediated in: complete substance. This circle refers to the fact that the mutual presupposition and inclusion must form a multitude of unities in which they are related. It is in fact the counterpart of the first circle, since it explicates the identification which is implied in the first circle, viz. that totality and differentiated totality are one. In the last scheme this is shown: the interiors of the intermediaries (viz. the complete substances) are of a circular nature, which is the complement of the outer circle of the first scheme, which the complete substances mediate. And throughout the explication the concepts are formed which are suitable to express this.

The final result, which comprises the overall structure, is therefore:

Scheme 3.3.a

```
universe | represented   | expressed   | differenti-  
as a      | pre-est.     | pre-est.    | ated      
totality | harmony      | harmony     | universe  
<<<<<<<<<| <<**<<**<<** | <<**<<**<<**| <<<<<
```

Which can be summarized as: the identity of totality and differentiation is mediated by the identity of representation and expression, which is therefore its logical complement. The logical implications of this will be treated in the next chapter. The ontological implications will be treated below.

The first, most prominent and principal thing to note is the place and function of force. It is clear that force has a central place and function in the whole of the structure, since it is the concept that realizes the ultimate mediation, viz. within the complete substances. It is primitive force that forms the representative nature; it is primitive force that incites the substances (which therefore are self-incisive) to successive activity, thus expressing the representation. Thus, on the one hand, force is that which lets the tota-
lity in into the parts the totality consists of, and on the other hand it lets it out again, differentiated, and so forming the parts totality consists of and is let in to and thereby forming the actual totality. In this way force establishes in fact the actual self-sufficient universe.

The structure of force itself is also circular:

scheme 3.3.b

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representative
nature
|________________________________|
|primitive force|
```

But the particular property of force is that it mediates itself: its 'outer' circle is identical with its 'inner' circle, only they are reversed as compared to each other. Of course, all the other circular structures, belonging to the other concepts, have this same structure - ultimately: by themselves these other circles do not explicate their own mediation, but force does, since its 'inside' is its 'outside'.

This is not only the force, but also the weakness of Leibniz’s system. Its force is that it actually makes the system conclusive. Its weakness is that there is no further explication or foundation for this ultimate structure. This is a weakness since it makes the system totally conclusive; as a consequence there is no way to enter it, unless by accepting its ultimate structure, which explicates itself (but, of course, only completely through the system as a whole: all analytically distinguished elements must be clear before the ultimate synthesis can be understood). In this way one has to swallow Leibniz’s system completely, or reject it completely - its weakness is that it does not sell easily.

Logically, it is no weakness at all, since conclusiveness is generally considered a logical virtue. But as regards aspects of theory of knowledge, this conclusiveness seems again troublesome: knowledge, in Leibniz’s system, seems to be only absolute - and this is somewhat contrary to experience. Of course, as I will point out below, there is a necessary perspectivity in Leibniz’s system, which actually makes the parts of totality discernible. But totality in perspective is still totality; perspectivity does not mean necessarily vagueness or incompleteness, as Leibniz himself acknowledges: a sufficiently penetrating spirit could see in each monad all of the universe (G.IV, p. 557; see chapter 2, section 1). The solution to this problem is, first, that there will not be in the universe more than one sufficiently penetrating spirit - if there were, they would be indiscernible, hence only one. For if a spirit could see all, it also would see all perspectives and, of course, represent them; but all perspectives together compound no perspective at all - the sum negates its parts - and therefore sufficiently penetrating spirits would all be perfectly similar, hence indiscernible, hence only one.
And, second, even the existence of one such a spirit is contrary to the system: if every part of totality must represent and express it in perspective, none of its parts can be sufficiently penetrating to negate its own perspectivity (54).

As it appears, the theory of knowledge and the theory of being concur in Leibniz’s system, and force – since it identifies representation and expression and therefore totality and individuality – is again the fundamental concept or entity which realizes this.

Still, it seems rather strange that a monad is capable of representing the whole of the universe but does not have the whole of the representation at its disposal; it seems dualistic. In fact, it is the result of the dualism in Leibniz’s system, that is, the fact that the universe as a totality and the universe in its differentiated form are both identical and not identical. This will be dealt with further in the next chapter concerning the implicit logic of Leibniz’s system.

The concurrence of gnoseological and ontological aspects also appears in the concept of individuality.

Leibniz writes in his fifth letter to Clarke:

"Il faut avouer que ce grand Principe, quoiqu’il ait été reconnu, n’a pas été assés employé. [...] J’en infere entre autres consequences, qu’il n’y a point dans la nature deux etres reels absolus indiscernables: parce que s’il y en avait, Dieu et la nature agiroient sans raison, en traitant l’un autrement que l’autre; et qu’ainsi Dieu ne produit point deux portions de matiere parfaitement egales et semblables."

(G.VII, p. 393)

(It must be confessed that this great Principle [viz. of sufficient reason; this is mentioned in the preceding section: " [...] ce grand Principe du Besoin d’une Raison suffisante pour tout evenement [...]"], although it has been acknowledged, has not been sufficiently employed. [...] I infer from it, among other consequences, that in nature there are no two real beings absolutely indiscernible: because if there would be, God and nature would act without reason, in treating the one otherwise than the other; and that therefore God does not produce two portions of matter perfectly equal and similar.)

So the principle of sufficient reason leads to the principle which is known as the lex identitatis indiscernibilium. Since the explication of Leibniz’s system has been given, this can be easily explained. The lex identitatis indiscernibilium presupposes a multitude of beings (for if there were only one, it would be superfluous and meaningless). These beings all represent totality, thereby establishing it – this circularity is in fact the contents of the principle of sufficient reason, as has been explained in the first section of this
chapter. Therefore, each aspect of that totality is actually represented; but it can be represented only once — if it were represented more than once, the circularity would no longer exist: for the representation is actually the mediated representation of the multitude itself, therefore each part of it is mediated with itself via the multitude or totality. In this way every part must be discernible from every other part.

This is obviously an ontological aspect concerning individuality. But the fact that representation is included leads to its gnoseological aspect. It has been established that each part of the totality must be related to itself in the totality. The discernibility of each individual representation, which is included in this, is signified by the term perspectivity (see e.g. Monadology, section 57). But it also makes clear that each part necessarily must be both itself and its own representation (this is in fact the essence of the representation: the self-mediation of force). Therefore each individual thing reflects itself. The capacity to reflect is, then, not exclusively tied to human consciousness, but must be inherent to all things. Leibniz actually acknowledges this in stating that a human soul is not substantially different from any other soul or monad, since otherwise there would be a vacuum formarum (G.VI, p. 543; see chapter 2, section 2). In this way the ontological system furnishes also the basis to build a theory of knowledge on.

This remark only serves to show how conclusive Leibniz’s system is. In the following I will confine myself to the ontological aspects.

Force does not enter physics, since it is a metaphysical concept (see chapter 1, section 2). It cannot be experienced by the senses, it can only be understood by reason, as Leibniz writes to De Volder:

"An enim vis imaginari quae non possunt nisi intelligi, videre sonos, audire colores?" (G.II, p. 270)

(For you would not imagine that which can only be understood, would you, to see sounds, to hear colours?) (55).

Leibniz makes this and similar remarks (e.g. G.II, pp. 281-2) to make clear that force is something that necessarily exists, but not directly sensible — it is not a phenomenon, but a complete structure. Physics operates with abstractions as time, space, motion. Apparently, in Leibniz’s system phenomena are abstractions, viz. of the complete substances, as the last scheme in the preceding section makes clear. Time, space, and motion do not appear in the circular structures, which explicate the concept of complete substance. They do not, because each complementary part of these circles is, as such, either a complete representation or a complete expression of the totality — abstractions, however, are not complete representations, since they are abstracted from something. The definitions which Leibniz gives of time and space, make this clear. Time is the order of incompatible or inconsistent possibilities, space is the order of possible coexistences.
(G.IV, p. 568; see chapter 2, section 1). It is obvious that
time as such does not exist as a whole, since this would mean
the coexistence of what is incompatible; time, therefore, has
only a punctual existence and no extension. Space does not
exist as a whole either, since it gives at each point of time
only a limited number of things, viz. those which are compati-
ble. Each on its own does not fill out the universe. But even
taken together they only constitute (in an abstract and formal
way) extension, not that which is extended; however, extension
derives from what is extended and the extended derives from
the complete substance. It is evident, then, that there is
quite a difference between abstract concepts such as time and
space (and motion, and other concepts of mechanics) and con-
cepts as complete substance, from which they are eventually to
be derived.

Therefore, according to Leibniz, there is nothing real in
these abstract concepts. For instance in motion the only real
thing is force (G.IV, p. 523; see chapter 2, section 1), since
force is a complete structure, the nature of the complete sub-
stance; it is real because it is that thing in the present
state "which carries with it a change for the future" (id.) -
that is: it establishes totality by successive activity, by
change, and only because of this, the representation and
expression of totality, it is real. It is obvious, then,
that for Leibniz the only real thing is totality.

How little value abstract concepts have as such, is made clear
by the answer Leibniz gives to Bourguet, who asks whether time
has a beginning:

"Pour ce qui est de la succession, où vous semblés
juger, Monsieur, qu’il faut concevoir un premier
instant fondamental comme l’unité est le fonde-
ment des nombres et comme le point est aussi le
fondement de l’étendue: à cela je pourrois re-
pondre, que l’instant est aussi le fondement du
temps, mais comme il n’y a point de point dans
la nature, qui soit fondamental à l’égard de
tous les autres points, et pour ainsi dire le
siège de Dieu, de même je ne vois point qu’il
soit nécessaire de concevoir un instant prin-
cipal."

(G.III, p. 581)

(As concerns what is succession, of which you
seem to judge, Sir, that it is necessary to
conceive of a first fundamental instant, as the
unit is the fundament of the numbers, and as the
point is also the fundament of the extension: to
that I could respond that the instant is also
the fundament of time, but as there is no point
in nature which would be fundamental as regards
to all the other points, and so to say the seat
of God, similarly I cannot see that it should be
necessary to conceive of a principal instant.)

Leibniz makes clear that one cannot operate with complete
structures in the same way as with abstract concepts. He
continues then to demonstrate that, as there is no principal instant of time, likewise there is no first instant of time (G.III, p. 582). And he concludes with making explicit the distinction between the two modes of operating with concepts:

"Il y a de différence en cela entre l’analyse des nécessaires, et l’analyse des contingens: l’analyse des nécessaires, qui est celle des essences, allant à natura posterioribus ad natura priora, se termine dans les notions primitives, et c’est ainsi que les nombres se résolvent en unités. Mais dans les contingens ou existences cette analyse a natura posterioribus ad natura priora va à l’infini, sans qu’on puisse jamais la réduire à des éléments primitifs."

(G.III, p. 582)

(There is a difference here between the analysis of what is necessary, and the analysis of what is contingent: the analysis of what is necessary, that is of the essence, proceeding a natura posterioribus ad natura priora [from the nature of posteriors to the nature of priors], ends in the primitive notions, and this is how numbers resolve in unities. But in what is contingent or what exists this analysis a natura posterioribus ad natura priora proceeds to the infinite, without one’s being ever able to reduce it to primitive elements.) (56)

Of course in Leibniz’s system the analysis of the existent proceeds to the infinite, without any possible reduction, for each existent being represents the totality and the circularity included in this prevents any kind of reduction or end.

Therefore, pre-established harmony does not mean estabished at the beginning of time or before everything else. There is no first in time, as there is no principal in time - it is all one, as the totality is all one. "Pre" only refers to the logical and ontological necessity to "pre"-suppose this harmony, although the harmony is as much pre-supposed as it is derived, due to the circularity. Only if one renounces this circularity and proceeds to the operating with abstract concepts, one can reduce things to primitive concepts - only then there are ends to be found, only then one may reduce to simplicity, which in circular structures is not to be found.

Force is not a simple or primitive concept, it is complex as its circular structure requires. Only in this way it is able to be the intermediary between pre-established harmony as one and differentiated into the actual harmony the existing things compound. As this intermediary it establishes both forms of harmony: the one as representation, the other as expression. Ontologically, this is the structure which conceptualizes the existence of natural laws, since it is obvious that the concept of law is understood as pre-established harmony in Leibniz’s system.

This leads to a problem, which Leibniz had to face frequently in discussions with critics: is this ontological
system deterministic or is it not? Leibniz tried to explain that it was both; his critics seem never to have understood this. Bayle kept repeating Leibniz had to reject the concept of free will. Clarke too refused to understand Leibniz’s explanation of necessity and freedom (57).

In Leibniz’s system there can be no absolute necessity or fatality, nor absolute chance or indeterminateness. The fact that all that has happened and will happen in the universe has been pre-established does not lead to fatality, since the complete substances determine the universe on account of their expressive activity as well as they are determined by it on account of their representative activity. The circularity of the structure involved prevents that there is an absolute first cause (as has been made clear regarding time; above) (58). The problem of determinism arises as soon as one considers one of the aspects of the complete substances in itself. Then it seems that, on the one hand, the complete substances are absolutely determined by the pre-established harmony, and on the other hand, that they absolutely determine the harmony they establish; on the one hand absolute necessity, on the other absolute freedom, or chance. Indeed, physics must face this problem, since in physics the circular structure is not taken into account, as has been pointed out. But metaphysics amends this, in Leibniz’s system. And therefore Leibniz says:

"[...] que la liberté n’est point exempte de la nécessité. Mais ces expressions sont moins exactes et moins revenantes dans les circonstances où nous nous trouvons aujourd’hui, et, absolument parlant, elles sont plus sujettes aux abus [...]"
(Theodicée II, pp. 60-62)

( [...] that freedom is not void of necessity. But these expressions are less exact and less suitable under present-day circumstances, and, speaking absolutely, they are more subjected to abuse [...]
)

To keep speaking and thinking in terms of the opposition or even contradiction formed by freedom and necessity, is indeed to keep missing the point Leibniz wants to make. Since they form, as abstractions, an opposition or contradiction, they are not suitable to express the circularity of the determination, which is established by representation and expression both. This circularity also relates efficient and final causes. Since the complete substances determine the universe as well as they are determined by it, the final cause (the end to which the activity of the substances is poised) is the efficient cause (since, as it is represented, this end is also that which starts the activity), and vice versa. Therefore, teleology is inherent to Leibniz’s ontological system. But this equivalence of efficient and final causes vanishes as soon as one proceeds to physics; the abstractions used in physics do not include the circularity, as they do not include the representative nature or primitive force. Therefore, physics can only make use of efficient causes, and is in need of a counterpart in which final causes are used to explain
this abstraction of reality (hence the need of theology) (59).

It is obvious that here again the relation between totality and differentiation, mediated by force, is of the greatest importance.

It is also obvious that the two forms of analysis (which have been established concerning time) again feature here. The "analysis of what is necessary," which in the Monadology is said to result in truths of reasoning ("verités de raisonne-ment"; Monadology, section 33) appears again to be only sufficient in treating abstractions, as in Mathematics. The "analysis of what is contingent," leading to truths of fact ("verités de fait," id.), however, is needed to understand reality as it actually is. The former is linear, the latter circular of nature. Truths of reasoning are necessary and their opposite is impossible; truths of fact are contingent and their opposite is possible (Monadology, section 33). Therefore, it seems to be impossible in the former kind of analysis, that necessity and freedom are one, for they are opposed to each other; but in the latter kind of analysis the fact that they are opposed does not mean that their unity is impossible. The logical implications of this will be treated in the next chapter. The ontological implication is that, according to Leibniz, the actual reality must be understood by means of the circular structure in which seemingly opposed concepts are united. Therefore, the fundamental entity is the complete substance; and its dynamical nature, i.e. force, is the very essence of reality. This leads to the concept of substance. Substance is essentially plural - there are only substances. If this were not so, the circularity would be broken. The problem of determinism, for instance, would become acute: if there were really one substance, this would mean the pre-established harmony as such would actually be before its differentiation - it would be possible to reduce reality to one simple concept, by "analysis of what is necessary." But clearly this is not the case in Leibniz’s system. The plurality of substance is necessarily accompanied by its activity: substances have a dynamical nature, viz. force, since they must express the pre-established harmony they represent. Change, then, is inevitable; it is inherent to the concept of complete substances. Moreover, this change is realized by the substances themselves: they are self-inciting. This is also necessary, since the activity of the complete substances - necessitated by their plurality - is immanent. Self-incitation is, in fact, the very expression of the circular structure of the nature of complete substances. As a concept it is the perfect set-off of the concept of an absolute first cause or Unmoved Mover: instead of every thing being moved by one ultimate separate thing, every thing is ultimately moved by itself, mediated by the plurality of things. Circularity instead of linearity. Thus the universe is self-sufficient.

In fact, the concept of substance has been changed into the concept of subject. The complete substances are the subjects that, on account of their active nature or force, by their self-incited activity as much form natural law or harmony as carry it out.

A second consequence of Leibniz’s concept of complete substances is that matter seems to disappear. Indeed it does as a separate concept, that is as an abstraction. Speaking as
though matter could be distinguished as such, one must say that in Leibniz’s system matter has been completely integrated in the dynamical nature of the complete substances in force; in fact it would not be very far off the mark to say that in Leibniz’s system matter is change, since change is the fundament of reality. In Leibniz’s system matter as such (i.e. as an abstraction, an analytical element) features in physics, where it is mass, the passive receiver of motion (see chapter 1, section 2). This is secondary matter, to be distinguished from primary matter, which is an aspect of primitive force, therefore an integrated part of a complete concept instead of an abstraction.

That the multitude of complete substances must be infinite, also derives from the Leibnizian concept of totality and differentiation. In fact, it is explained in the circular structure, which has been referred to as the quantitative aspect in the preceding section.

As has been pointed out, the circularity of Leibniz’s system requires that the totality must be differentiated. However, totality must be one whole; therefore there can be no ultimate elements which form it - it must be differentiated ad infinitum, that is, infinitely divisible and divided. Yet each division must be a whole itself, since it must represent and express totality. Hence the infinite multitude of complete substances. Leibniz, therefore, must reject atoms, that is, as ultimate constitutive elements.

This is expressed in Leibniz’s principle of continuity (see chapter 2, section 1). The universe is continuous, forming one whole, but consists of distinguishable unities, which are, as such, discontinuous (since otherwise they would not be unities). Continuity and discontinuity thus form a circular structure, similar to that of being one and being many, and again it is the unity, the complete substance, that mediates this: the only thing that is real is the infinite multitude of changing complete substances.

Since everything, then, is divisible and divided, or composite, every thing must - inasmuch as it is a unity - be a complete substance as well as be compounded of a multitude of complete substances. For this Leibniz uses the term dominant monad, viz. the monad which constitutes the unity of compound things. As he writes to De Volder:

"Distingeo ergo (1) Entelechiam primitivam seu Animam, (2) Materiam nempe primam seu potentiam passivam primitivam, (3) Monada his duabas completam, (4) Massam seu materiam secundam, sive Machinam organicem, ad quam innumeræae concurrunt Monades subordinatae, (5) Animal seu substantiam corpoream, quam Unam facit Monas dominans in Machinam" (G.II, p. 252)

(I distinguish therefore (1) primitive Entelechy or Soul, (2) the truly first Matter, or primitive passive potency, (3) the Complete Monad formed by
these two, (4) mass or secondary matter, or the organic Machine, with which innumerable subordinate monads concur, (5) the animal or corporeal substance, which the dominating Monad makes into One Machine.)

And to Des Bosses he writes:

"Nec video quid Monas dominans aliarum monadum existentiae detrahat, cum revera inter eas nullum sit commercium, sed tantum consensus."

(G.II, p. 451)

(Nor do I see what a dominant monad would detract from the existence of other monads, since there is really no exchange between them, but only consensus.)

It is clear that the circular structure and the mode of a dominant monad does not differ from the structure and mode of a subordinate monad; indeed, every monad is as well dominant as subordinate: dominant to its subordinates, subordinate to its dominant, therefore the difference is relative. And since each monad is united with its body, this means that a complete substance contains an infinite multitude of complete substances, and all have the same structure. In fact, this is the very structure which has been explained by the quantitative aspect in the preceding section. It is the structure of intensional infinity, the quantitative aspect which is expressed in the principles of divisibility and compossibility.

It is also clear that, since there is no quantitative structural difference between substances, their quality must provide the difference, as in fact it does: the actual activity represents the universal harmony and expresses it, thereby forming a distinct part of it.

The 'ultimate' dominant monad would be the monad of the universe as a totality - but since the universe exists in the mode of its parts, there is no such 'ultimate' dominant monad: if one has arrived at the 'ultimate' dominant monad, one has arrived at the multitude of the 'ultimate' subordinate monads. Again, the circularity is unbroken, and Leibniz's system proves to be consistent and conclusive.