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Nuclear weapons and European interests. Discussions in the Assembly of the Western European Union, 1955–1975

Ine Megens

The Western European Union (WEU) was established in October 1954 and was built on the ruins of the European Defence Community. The latter had been an attempt to create a European army, bringing together troops from different European countries, including West Germany.¹ When the French parliament refused to ratify the EDC treaty in the summer of 1954 a new plan was devised to allow German rearmament and prepare the way for German membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. It was decided to accept West Germany and Italy into the Brussels Treaty, which had been created six years earlier as a collective self-defence organization. West Germany promised not to manufacture any atomic, biological or chemical weapons and renounced the production of missiles, warships and bomber aircraft for strategic purposes. The creation of the WEU was a dashing exploit, and historians have invariably pointed to the leadership of the British prime minister Sir Anthony Eden to bring about the deal.² From the beginning, however, there were serious doubts whether any success would be granted to the organization because the North Atlantic alliance occupied a leading position already.

Until 1973 when Great Britain was not yet a full member of the European Economic Community, the WEU acted as a liaison between the British and the Six. Only the first twenty years of the organization will be examined in this article because the European countries undertook tentative efforts from the early 1970s to develop political co-operation and WEU was in principle no longer the sole option to discuss European security interests. In later periods, in particular during the 1980s, the Western European Union offered a platform to discuss further co-ordination of defence policies among the member states. As a rule, these two elements are highlighted in the historical analyses of the organization.³ However, the body of scholarly literature on the WEU is slight, and the organization does not figure prominently in accounts of European defence during the Cold War either as it was never able to develop into a full European defence organization.⁴

This article discusses the role of the parliamentary assembly of the WEU, and deals, first of all, with the power and procedures of this body. Then the reports on
defence come up for discussion with a clear focus on nuclear control issues. Special attention is paid to the successive proposals for a NATO nuclear force. Finally, the article analyses the outcome of the resolutions adopted by the Assembly on the discussions at the national level between parliaments and governments of the member states. By drawing attention to the debates in the WEU Assembly this article attempts to fill a gap in the scholarly literature. A focus on the discussions and actions of the Assembly offers a different perspective on the feasibility of nuclear options which were brought up for discussion at the governmental level and a better understanding of the effect of international cooperation among parliamentarians. Interparliamentary assemblies offered members of the national parliaments a forum to meet and discuss issues of interest to them. Usually not much authority is assigned to these bodies and this study will reveal whether the WEU Assembly fared better in this respect.

*Power and procedures of the WEU Assembly*

The new WEU treaty created a ministerial Council as the main decision-making body of the new organization, and defined the Assembly as an interparliamentary organ with a consultative status. An Agency for the Control of Armaments was installed to supervise West German rearmament, ensuring it was in compliance with the voluntary arms limitations. A Standing Armaments Committee would be formed to deal with problems raised by the common adoption of equipment by the member states. It was also charged with the study of manufacturing items for common production.

The WEU Assembly comprised 89 members, chosen from the representatives of the member countries to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. Both assemblies also met at the same venue, the House of Europe in Strasbourg. During the first years the Assembly was preoccupied with discussions about its precise role. The London and Paris agreements of October 1954, which amended the Brussels Treaty, were drafted hastily, and had left many issues ambitious. The parliamentarians quickly accepted a charter and rules of procedure and stated that their mandate was ‘to proceed on any matter relevant to the Treaty … or upon any matter submitted to the Assembly for an opinion by the Council’. In April 1956 the Assembly discussed their own working methods. Marinus van der Goes van Naters, rapporteur for the organizational committee, put forward a strong argument on this occasion in favour of
a political role for the Assembly. He argued that even if the parliament had no legislative powers, it possessed ‘an indisputable parliamentary competence and a right of sanction. … We do possess the power of “supervision” – in the French text contrôle – in other words, the right to be informed – as fully as is compatible with European public interest’.

It is obvious that the Assembly was feeling out its precise role, a situation rightly characterized by Paul Borcier, the press attaché of the WEU Assembly, as a ‘search for a vocation’. As the Council did not address the issues raised by the parliamentarians a general feeling of frustration was prevalent during the next parliamentary session in October 1956. The Dutch Labour representative Franz Goedhart made the comment that the meeting looked ‘like a wailing wall without an echo’.

The sense of frustration was heightened because the Council was represented by the Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs, Johan W. Beyen. It was generally known at the time that the minister would resign a few days later, and that he had no authority at all to make any promises to the parliament.

The Council argued their case in greater detail for the first time in their annual report, presented in February 1957. According to article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, the Council was obliged to make an annual report on its activities to the Assembly. The Council stated that by its previous decision of December 1950 it had transferred its activities in defence matters to the North Atlantic Council. As NATO had taken responsibility for the preparation of a common defence policy, the only residual tasks for WEU were those specified in the treaty. Apart from the Standing Arms Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments, which accrued to the organization on account of the treaty, the WEU Council had decided to limit its activities to the level of the defence forces of member states, the maintenance of a permanent British force in Europe, as well as matters which partners wished to raise under article VIII. This article provides for consultation in the event of any situation which may constitute a threat to peace. Standardization and control of armaments would be the core functions of the WEU in the view of the Council. The parliamentarians did not succeed to change the mind of the ministers. The Council maintained its view that NATO, not WEU, was responsible for European military matters; a point of view that has been called a limited, or ‘minimalist’ interpretation of the treaty. Others saw the WEU as the general agent of military integration in Europe, irrespective of the role of NATO. Just because of the ambiguities, the road to integrative aims and processes might be open, the political scientist Ernst B. Haas
argued in 1960. His analysis of decision-making within the Council as well as the voting behaviour of the parliamentarians and qualitative analysis of the resolutions, however, showed no such tendency. The Council acted as any other intergovernmental body by making compromises, and the consensus on substantive defence issues within parliament merely reflected a broad political consensus in Western Europe on defence. From the beginning there was also a general consensus on procedure as the Assembly wanted to be heard by the Council and would continue to fight for its right to information. The Assembly would repeatedly call upon the Council to review its interpretation of the Treaty and improve the consultation process. Through the years there were some minor improvements, such as informal meetings between the parliamentary committees and the Council, but relations between the two bodies remained tense. The informal meetings were less informative than the parliamentarians had hoped for and resulted in repeated clashes with no great improvement in procedures. The all-time low came with the rejection of the 1967 annual report of the Council as not being sufficiently informative.

When the Western European Union came into being the formation of political parties at the international level in Europe had already yielded three such groups, the Socialists, Christian Democrats and Liberals. These transnational political groups had been formed in 1953 in the Common Assembly, the parliamentary body of the European Coal and Steel Community. In the WEU Assembly political groups were organized along the same lines and similar rules of procedures applied. The parties held frequent caucus meetings when the Assembly was in session, but between meetings their contacts were limited. The parties were involved in the organization of the Assembly such as planning of the debates and the choice of president and committee chairmen. According to the political scientist Peter Merkl in the early days there was a tendency to nominate British representatives as president in order to tie the British more firmly to Europe. For the chairmanship of the main committees a deliberate partisan formula was maintained among the three political groups. In practice the parties were largely in control of the Assembly procedures. In their voting behaviour the political groups showed less cohesion during the first six years. National delegations were more cohesive when voting on defence issues, but not with issues of organization. Merkl points to the very nature of defence issues, which affect the vital interests of the national states, to explain his findings. Party affiliation and
national adherence will be taken into account in the analyses of the debates on nuclear issues.

The debates on defence policy in the WEU Assembly were initially by procedural questions. The Assembly created a committee on defence questions and armaments to deal with matters of defence. When the WEU Council submitted its annual report to the Assembly this Defence Committee was entrusted to study it and provide comments. Rapporteur Colonel Johannes J. Fens, a member of the Dutch parliament as a representative of the Roman Catholic party, repeatedly stated that he was not satisfied with the Council’s replies to the questions put by the committee. In his view the Council was overcautious because they wanted to limit WEU activities. The committee concluded that the Council kept to a very strict interpretation of the responsibilities of the Assembly. They criticized this point of view in unmistakable terms and argued that they were entitled to answers to questions on any aspect of the defence of the West, either from the Council or directly from NATO, otherwise it would be impossible for them to have an informed debate. The committee specified the rearmament of West Germany as a point on which it wanted to be informed and called upon the Council to reconsider their point of view. During the plenary debates too, several parliamentarians argued that they were able to take a wider view than national parliaments and could ‘turn a truly European eye on the problem of joint defence’.  

The working methods of the committee itself improved over time. As of 1956 they started to visit factories, make tours of inspection of the armed forces of member countries and observe manoeuvres and joint exercises by NATO forces. As of 1959 so-called joint meetings took place, in which the members of the Defence Committee, government representatives and NATO military advisors were brought together for informal discussions. Other requests for information were denied, as was a demand to establish contact between the Defence Committee and the permanent representatives of NATO. The committee, however, had regular consultations with NATO commanders and invited defence specialists to be briefed on particular topics. The official ruling was that the members of the WEU Assembly did not have access to classified NATO information. Whether this lack of information seriously hampered the work of the Committee is difficult to ascertain. The members had often participated in national defence committees or had previous experience of military staff work, being from military backgrounds themselves. The reports of the Defence
Committee give an overview of the meetings, visits, briefings and discussions that the committee organized in preparing such documents. From these documents, in particular the later ones, it is obvious that the Committee had ready access to high-ranking officials across the continent as well as in the United States, both military as well as civilian. In practice, the value of the contacts with NATO authorities, in spite of the restrictive ruling, depended to a large extent on the personalities involved, as Franz Goedhart concluded after investigating the procedure in 1970. In an article published in 1984, Richard Grant, information officer for the North Atlantic Council, made an effort to analyse the influence of the parliamentary councils of the WEU and NATO. According to Grant, the members of the WEU committees themselves judged the meetings to be of little value: ‘The frequency of the meetings is an inconvenience to individual members and attendance is low’. This last point may hold true for the later period but was definitely not so during the first twenty years of the organization’s existence.

The state of European security
Up to 1975 inclusive, the WEU Assembly agreed on 283 recommendations, of which, at a rough estimate, slightly over 100 dealt with defence issues. Most observers at the time, as well as later historians, agree that the Defence Committee produced a series of remarkable reports. Every year the Defence Committee conducted a review of the state of European security and the Assembly subsequently formulated political recommendations addressed either to the WEU Council of Ministers or to the member countries. Over the years the Defence Committee also submitted numerous reports on other questions. In most cases these reports contained draft recommendations which often expressed the concerns of the parliamentarians over a topical issue. Many are also comprised of further details ensuing from the actual situation. Periodically, the committee published reports on problems with equipment, logistics or command. The Defence Committee also formulated reports on specific questions merely for information. Some of these reports are extensive documents, such as that on guided missiles, while the status of forces in Europe had been analysed in six successive reports by 1958.

While the WEU Assembly took up a range of topics with regard to Atlantic defence, it developed a strong stand on some matters it deemed of major importance for the defence of Western Europe. Genuine standardization and common
procurement, as well as the need to allocate adequate resources to defence, are frequently mentioned as priorities. Nuclear weapons also figure prominently in the reports of the Defence Committee. The issue is brought up for discussion from two different perspectives. Firstly, following the demand to maintain adequate conventional forces for the defence of the continent, the WEU Assembly discussed military strategy and the respective roles of nuclear and conventional weapons. Secondly, they discussed the Europeanization of nuclear weapons, the subject of a series of the most striking reports from the period 1959–1964.

The very first recommendation adopted by the Assembly on the urging of the Defence Committee in October 1956 dealt with the problem of maintaining conventional forces. This stance would be reaffirmed the following year when the recommendations agreed on, called for the maintenance of thirty divisions in view of the danger of limited aggression. Only a joint effort would enable the European countries to build up the forces to prevent both generalized and limited aggression. In the reports that were at the root of these recommendations, Colonel Fens discussed the role of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons in Western defence. He pointed to the weakness of the European defence system and the loss of the West’s nuclear supremacy over the Soviet Union. Fens also rejected the concept that the West would use nuclear weapons ‘in all circumstances and in reply to any kind of aggression’, arguing that the American nuclear deterrent lacked credibility and that what was needed was a wider range of options than surrender or total annihilation. To retaliate – and thus prevent – a limited Soviet attack, he suggested that sufficient and efficient shield forces were necessary so that the strategic use of nuclear weapons would not be required. He considered that limited aggression seemed more likely. Here Fens questions the strategy of massive retaliation formulated by US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Simultaneously and in line with this argument the Assembly welcomed statements that the US government was considering the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

In subsequent years the recommendations of the Assembly would follow the same line and call for a minimum of thirty divisions or argue that conventional forces in Europe should be capable of discouraging limited offensive action. These recommendations anticipate the concept of flexible response, which was under discussion at the time but not adopted as official NATO strategy until 1967. The reports of the Defence Committee also criticized the failure to integrate the armed
forces into the Central European theatre and addressed other major obstacles for the organization and deployment of conventional forces. In addition to more general matters the recommendations sometimes comprised very detailed points. In 1959, for example, the Assembly called upon the Council to rationalize naval defence and formulated six proposals to that end. Another recommendation requested the Council to ensure that all equipment for tactical air forces in Europe was standardized and common supply depots established, enabling every type of aircraft to be serviced.

The remedies suggested by the Assembly met with little or no enthusiasm from the governments of the member countries. There are some general considerations to explain the hesitance from the governments. National defence is one of the main responsibilities of national administrations and thus national decision-making structures prevail. Defence policy always includes sensitive issues too, politically, economically or of any other kind. According to Richard Grant, governments were generally hostile to interparliamentary involvement in security policies during the Cold War period as they considered defence matters too sensitive or too complex to be publically debated. Another very general explanation is to be found in terms of the financial consequences of the measures suggested by the Assembly. At the end of the 1950s, every Western European country rationalized its defence budget, when the huge increases in defence spending that had followed the outbreak of the Korean War came to an end. Nuclear weapons thus offered a way out for most European governments and they welcomed the deployment of American nuclear weapons on the continent.

The German political scientist Gabriele Dransfeld provides yet another reason for why the recommendations had no effect. She argues that Western European governments took the similarities in interests between NATO and WEU members for granted: ‘The Assembly on the other hand starts from the premise of a Western European interest, which is different from NATO, as an alliance created and inspired by the US, on a number of economic, political and geographical factors’. It was not always clear from the beginning what these European interests entailed, but Dransfeld is right in pointing out the main concern of the parliamentarians. They looked into various aspects of Western defence in view of the political implications for Western Europe and this holds true in particular when it came to nuclear weapons.
Nuclear control issues

Within the framework of the annual reports on defence, the Assembly frequently touched upon the question of nuclear control. The report of September 1957 made a plea for some sort of joint decision-making and a basis of equality between the United States and Europe. The rapporteur Colonel Fens suggested that the WEU Council should decide in advance about the circumstances in which the member states would agree to the use of strategic nuclear weapons. On the basis of this agreement it was established that both the US president and the British prime minister should take final decisions on the use of these weapons. At the plenary session of the Assembly, the British Labour representative Kenneth G. Younger agreed that some attempt to reach general principles was the minimum which ought to be accepted, while the French parliamentarian Etienne de la Vallé Poussin demanded by way of question whether it would be sufficient for Europe that only Great Britain possessed nuclear weapons, or whether Europe needed its own. The recommendation urged the Council ‘to establish directives concerning the utilization of strategic nuclear weapons’\textsuperscript{29}, and this was adopted by the Assembly by 45 votes to 2 The opponents were two members of the SPD, the only two members of the German social democrats present.\textsuperscript{30}

In two successive reports presented by Fens in 1958, he repeated his proposal for a joint-control mechanism over the most important weapons safeguarding Western security. He argued that the security interests of Western European countries could only be guaranteed if they participated in the decision to launch these weapons. In addition, the United States was criticized because it was unwilling to relinquish centralized control. Thus, the right of consultation was the main goal pressed for by the Assembly.

In 1959 Fens was succeeded as rapporteur for the Defence Committee by the British Labour representative Fred W. Mulley. In his report of October 1959, Mulley clearly outlined the general premises of Western defence and pointed to the weakening of the American nuclear guarantee in view of the fact of nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{31} This would leave the non-nuclear countries in Europe only two options, the creation of a national nuclear deterrent or the adoption of neutrality. He then examined in greater detail the solutions put forward to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. In the absence of other solutions, he developed the idea of creating a small European strategic nuclear force as a complement to the US strategic force. It was considered that this force should be
under joint control of the WEU until the European and American forces were brought into a NATO pool. A Western European force would eliminate the danger of further national nuclear forces even if it did not diminish the danger of non-European countries acquiring nuclear weapons. This proposal could be interpreted as a bold statement, but the explanatory memorandum and the speech by Mulley at the plenary session of the Assembly suggest that this was not intended. In fact, the second, more extensive part of the report was devoted to an analysis of the air forces, while the recommendation also emphasized the necessity of improving conventional weapons. The idea of a joint strategic nuclear force was put forward as a matter of principle, not as a programme of action. This was no definite plan, merely an idea for the future. Nevertheless, the proposal caused quite a stir in the Assembly and no less than 20 members of parliament took the floor during the plenary session. The recommendation was only adopted with 42 votes in favour, 9 against and 16 abstentions. The opposition came from the German SPD and the French Gaullist party, while most abstentions originated from British Conservatives. Four out of six representatives of Labour voted in favour of the resolution; two withheld their votes. The ministers’ reply was a sharp refusal because NATO was responsible for the defence of both American and European territory, and the creation of a European strategic force would only increase the difficulties of control as well as involve wasteful duplication.

**A NATO nuclear force**

Soon the WEU Assembly and its Defence Committee would turn to more specific proposals for a ‘NATO nuclear force’, with General Raffaele Cadorna, a Christian Democrat from Italy, presenting his report under this title in December 1960. A nuclear force for NATO was a topical subject in December 1960, and the committee had decided that the time was ripe to put forward general proposals because the idea had been gaining ground amongst some sections of the public. The discussion had started earlier that year with the publication of a report by Robert Bowie, submitted on behalf of the US Department of State, comprising a proposal for a multilateral force. At the meeting of the WEU Assembly in December, General Lauris Norstad, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, delivered an address on the problem of nuclear weapons. Only a few weeks before he had made a proposal to establish a NATO nuclear force and later that month US Secretary of State Christian Herter would also
present a plan for an allied intermediate range nuclear force to the North Atlantic
Council.\textsuperscript{36}

The report of the Defence Committee of the WEU Assembly and the subsequent recommendation started to express anxiety concerning how the proliferation of atomic weapons could be avoided once a suggestion had been made to establish a defensive nuclear force within NATO. Such a force would allow SACEUR to ensure the direct defence of Europe in the event of a serious attack. To that end, it was argued that NATO should agree on a procedure by which every country would share control of the nuclear weapons on an equal footing.\textsuperscript{37} In these documents the committee unequivocally expressed a preference for the NATO framework, an issue that had raised many questions and which had been left unresolved in the previous year. As NATO had always been the most important defence organization, and the only one in which the US participated, this support for NATO was wise – being both necessary and inevitable. Nevertheless, this reserved attitude would sidetrack the Western European Union in the discussion about a European nuclear force for some years.

Within the North Atlantic alliance there was also no immediate follow-up to the American proposal to the North Atlantic Council in December. The new Kennedy administration took its time to study the issue at hand and made no attempts to come forward with a proposal. Obviously they attributed no priority to the plan for a multilateral force. It is probable that they did not abandon the project completely because they hoped French and British nuclear forces could somehow be included in the force. In Europe, and in Germany in particular, there was an increasing fear that US commitment to European defence would diminish.\textsuperscript{38}

By 1962 many politicians in Europe became disappointed that there was no follow-up on earlier initiatives for an allied nuclear force, and thus at the end of the year the topic of a European nuclear force was once more discussed by the WEU Assembly. The report by Anthony Duynstee, a member of the Dutch Catholic party, summed up the problem of a European nuclear force and speaks open of the differences of opinion among the members of the committee. Some members of the Defence Committee considered the establishment of a European nuclear force to be a logical corollary to the creation of a European political union. They preferred a nuclear force that should come into being around existing French and British nuclear resources. Others opposed such a force on purely political grounds. The rapporteur
mentioned no names of the opponents and accentuated that the majority believed a nuclear force was required for the alliance as a whole. The recommendation called upon the member governments to make proposals to the North Atlantic Council ‘for a NATO nuclear executive to be the sole authority deciding on the deployment and use of nuclear weapons’, while also recommending the commencement of negotiations with a view to making a proposal to the US ‘to secure the integration of allied nuclear forces into a single NATO nuclear force, possibly based on a European and an American component, within a single command structure coming under the control of a single political executive representative of the alliance as a whole’. This was a very ambitious plan and it should come as no surprise that the recommendation was only adopted on the basis of 41 votes for, with 12 abstentions. Ten members of the Socialist group withheld their vote, including all German and British representatives, and so did the two members of the German Liberal party. The Council also did not comply with the wish of the Assembly and confined themselves to informing the Assembly that the recommendation had not been brought up for discussion in the North Atlantic Council.

Despite this lack of political success the Defence Committee continued their work and a year later submitted a report calling for a NATO political executive ‘to be the sole authority on the use of nuclear weapons by forces assigned to NATO’. The report also welcomed the mixed-manning trials on a US warship scheduled to take place the next year. It was seen as the nucleus around which integrated NATO forces could be built up in the future. For many parliamentarians, however, this was pushing things too far and the proposal was hotly debated in the plenary session of the Assembly. The political excitement was understandable because international talks on a multilateral force actually took place at the same time. In the spring of 1963, the United States had come up with a new proposal for a multilateral force. The plan called for the creation of a fleet of twenty-five surface vessels equipped with a total of 200 Polaris missiles. The Polaris A-3 was a medium-range ballistic missile with a range of 2,500 miles, armed with a one megaton nuclear warhead. Management, control and financing of the fleet would be the joint responsibility of participating countries. Joint manning was another essential element in the proposals. Each ship would be manned by a crew consisting of at least three nationalities. Although eight European countries had entered into talks about the plan and also agreed to participate in a trial, by the end of 1963 there had been no substantial discussions on the MLF in
the national parliaments and many countries had only reluctantly agreed to participate in the international talks. It should come as no surprise therefore that the parliamentarians seized the opportunity with both hands to state their opinion in the WEU Assembly and there was much diversity of opinion among them. In the end the Assembly refused to adopt the draft resolution and voted in favour of a revised statement proposed by George Brown, a Labour member of the British parliament. The text, as amended by the Assembly, called for a unified planning system aimed at the development of a common strategy rather than a political executive. Every reference to the mixed-manning proposal was omitted. The resolution was adopted on 4 December 1963 with 43 votes in favour and 23 votes against, while 4 members abstained. The arguments of the opponents differed greatly. Some parliamentarians, in particular the French Gaullists, supported a national deterrent, others were satisfied with the European reliance on the American nuclear guarantee, while some like the Italian Christian Democrat Onofrio Jannuzzi argued the resolution did not go far enough to support the MLF. Subsequently nearly all Italian delegates voted against the resolution or withheld their votes. For the Italians national affiliation took precedence over party discipline here, but this was an exception to the rule. Although party discipline in the Assembly was not very strict, the majority of the representatives followed the party line. Voting behaviour on the resolutions on defence matters in the WEU Assembly is thus best explained by the party affiliations.

A year later the Assembly adopted the idea of a multilateral nuclear force in principle, provided certain conditions were met. As the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons had to be prevented, the force was not to contribute to proliferation. Furthermore, the participating countries needed to exercise strong political control. In the Defence Committee all but three members agreed that a multilateral force should be jointly owned, operated and controlled. In his report rapporteur Anthony Duynstee gave his personal analysis of the various voting arrangements for such a force. Initially it was only reasonable that the US retained a right to veto, he argued, but ultimately any decision to fire should not be obstructed by a veto of the US or any other country. Apart from strong political control by the participating countries, the recommendation also added that the statute of the force should be the prevention of the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The recommendation of 1965 added yet another provision and demanded that the effect of a joint allied nuclear force upon European integration should also be taken into consideration. Thereafter the topic of
an allied nuclear force was no longer of topical interest as the international talks on the MLF had died a gentle death.\textsuperscript{47} Apart from Germany there had never been great enthusiasm among European governments for the plan and at the end of 1964 the American administration had made it clear they did not want to push the multilateral fleet on their European allies.\textsuperscript{48} After the MLF was no longer a political issue the recommendations of the WEU Assembly did no longer comprise any references to an allied nuclear force, even if the reports continued to discuss and analyse the concept.\textsuperscript{49}

\textit{The North Atlantic Council as the addressee}

From 1960 there is a gradual change in the wording of the recommendations on the state of European security; a change that tells its own story. The structure of the texts remains basically the same. All of them start off with the considerations, followed by numbered recommendations. The text then reads: ‘The Assembly … recommends that the Council …’, with the addressee always being the WEU Council. However, over the years there was a noticeable shift in the way the Council is addressed, with the difference mainly lying in the verbs used. Until 1959 the Assembly recommends the Council ‘to assure’, ‘to accept’, ‘to inform’ or ‘to take the appropriate steps’. The wording makes it clear that the WEU Council should act on its own behalf. In 1960 a different expression is employed, with the Council being asked ‘to communicate the proposals of the Assembly to the North Atlantic Council’.

This tendency continued, with NATO playing an increasingly important role, sometimes being mentioned in the same breath as the WEU Council; for example, when the Assembly ‘urges all member governments of WEU and NATO to take the initiative’ (1964). Several times the Assembly uses stronger words and recommends that the Council ‘should make the following proposals to the North Atlantic Council’ (1965), ‘transmit the following proposals to the North Atlantic Council’ (1968), or ‘should urge the following course of action on the North Atlantic Council’ (1969). In the wording of these texts the Council is no more than a conduit, with the real addressee being the North Atlantic alliance.

The change in wording is accompanied by a focus on the political problems that troubled the alliance in this period, first and foremost of course the withdrawal of France from the military organization. New developments within the alliance were also closely scrutinized. This holds true for the nuclear planning group (1968) and the development of a European caucus in the alliance (1969), later known under its
official name Eurogroup (1971). Simultaneously, the Defence Committee remained firm on other issues such as the need for standardization of armaments. They also repeatedly voiced their demand for a greater say in the alliance for the European allies and the need to improve political consultation. To ensure a greater contribution of European countries to the North Atlantic alliance, the Defence Committee came up with more specific proposals. In 1965 they recommended the establishment of a Supreme Executive to be held responsible for the overall direction of the alliance. Two years later they proposed nominating a European candidate for the post of SACEUR ‘when the appropriate conditions have been achieved in Europe and the Alliance’, and in 1972 they recommended that WEU set up a consultative committee of chiefs-of-staff within the framework of the alliance. Nuclear weapons and allied military strategy figure prominently among the recommendations, with the 1968 report being dedicated to the use of tactical weapons and the defence of Western Europe. The recommendation deals with the political role of the weapons, the guidelines for their use and puts emphasis on the importance of communications.

In addition to the more general reports on the state of European security, the committee or one of its members continued to undertake technical studies. These reports deal, for example, with a joint anti-submarine force or compare the conditions of service in the armed services of various European countries. The most striking feature, however, is the increase in the number of reports on political aspects of European defence. In the ten years between 1965 and 1975, the Defence committee published reports on the political organization of European defence, the relationship with the United States and the impact of global developments in East-West relations or arms control on the defence of Europe – all in all there were ten reports. Here the committee lives up to expectations and consistently investigates these matters from a European perspective. Invariably, the Assembly, on the advice of its Defence Committee, then recommends actions to encourage European countries to seek agreement and to safeguard common interests.

The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a good case in point. The Assembly put pressure on the Council to seek a joint position on this subject in 1967 and issued a report two years later. There they urged the individual governments to sign the non-proliferation treaty, meanwhile claiming the right of a future European federation to possess nuclear weapons. Within the North Atlantic alliance the interests of the European member states were also to be taken into account. Therefore,
European countries were to play an active role in allied planning committees such as the Nuclear Planning Group, to exercise influence on contingency planning for the possible use of nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{57} The Assembly also welcomed cooperation among the member countries in the framework of European Political Cooperation, in particular their efforts to bring to life the talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

\textit{The adoption of recommendations by national parliaments}

The WEU parliamentarians always contended that their Assembly constituted the only forum for interparliamentary debate on European defence issues and the ideal framework for encouraging greater cooperation. The sessions of the Assembly, held twice a year, offered an opportunity for the members from all seven European countries to enter into a debate and send political signals to their national governments. However, in the plenary meetings of the WEU Assembly the number of parliamentarians actively involved in the debate was usually limited. Most speakers addressed the meeting on behalf of their political friends because the different political groups met regularly during the sessions to discuss the draft resolutions and provide comments on the reports. As a consultative organization the WEU Assembly had only limited means to influence policy at the national level and none of their decisions were binding. The recommendations were addressed to the WEU Council and were brought to the attention of the national parliaments as well.

From the beginning the Assembly tried to obtain information on the follow-up of their recommendations. The direct impact of a report or a recommendation was often difficult to measure. As early as May 1957 a working party which would liaise with national parliaments was established. It selected which recommendations would be sent to the national parliaments and tried to maintain its influence over any subsequent actions, the committee submitting biannual reports to that end. The main motive was to see whether the parliaments took steps to encourage their own government to accept the recommendations adopted by the Assembly. However, as the rapporteur observed in June 1959: ‘The achievements are still negligible’.\textsuperscript{58} Thereupon, the working party decided not only to send the text of the recommendations, but to add written draft questions for the parliamentarians in their own languages and to request every member of the Assembly to take action in their
national parliaments. As of 1962 a brief report about each parliamentary session was made to act as a basis for reports of activities for individual members.\(^{59}\)

The activities of the working party itself were twofold. Apart from sending information to the national parliaments the committee also kept track of the responses of the national parliaments, initially as part of the report. From June 1963 onwards the information was published in a separate booklet, and from June 1964 in a monthly *Bulletin on European Parliamentary Activity*. The working party urged all members to take action in their own parliaments. Usually, written questions were put to the ministers, sometimes followed by oral questions. On other occasions, issues were raised in the context of discussions about foreign affairs or defence budgets, with the number of these interventions steadily growing. Matters concerning the WEU were discussed mainly in parliamentary committees, as it was far more difficult to arrange a debate in a plenary session of the German Bundestag or the British House of Commons on WEU recommendations.\(^{60}\) Only in April 1968 did the rapporteur observe that the response in the national parliaments ‘can be considered satisfactory’.\(^{61}\) It was abundantly clear this was an exception to the rule because the increase in engagements was caused by the motion to disagree with the annual report of the ministerial Council in the preceding year. The report of March 1969 once again expresses the by then well-known grievances about a lack of attention to the recommendations of the Assembly. A similar image emerges from an overview from 1975, included in the report on relations with parliaments. In the beginning, the number of actions was limited to 10–12, in early 1960 this increased from 40 to 98 in two successive years, and it reached an all-time high of 126 in 1968. Thereafter it fell to 48 and further to 10 in 1972.\(^{62}\)

Although the working party thereupon decided to pay visits to various countries and tried to initiate more contact with members of national parliaments who were not part of the WEU Assembly, the complaints persisted. The Assembly itself had little power and to the disappointment of the WEU representatives their documents were not used by their fellow parliamentarians to put pressure on the national governments. This reduced the chances that these recommendations would be followed, as it decreased the possibility of breaking down the reluctance and hesitancy of the WEU Council by way of pressure from members’ own parliaments. There was a huge gap between the national parliaments and the few defence specialists represented in the Defence Committee of the WEU Assembly, and the direct impact
of their reports on national decision-making remained marginal at best. The reports rather acted as sources of information and called attention to problems in the field of defence. In this sense the resolutions of the WEU Assembly did add weight to the national debate on defence issues. As the resolutions unceasingly encouraged the member states to look for common ground, the question is whether these activities contributed to the development of a common orientation on European defence.

A European defence identity?
In 1975 the Defence Committee submitted a comprehensive report on the state of European security to mark the twentieth anniversary of the WEU Assembly. In the chapter on the future organization of European defence the rapporteur Karl Heinrich Lemmrich, a member of the German Christlich Soziale Union, concluded that ‘the creation of a European defence identity is a worthwhile aim. It increases the importance of Europe’s contribution to western defence and should be a decisive improvement, but much ground still has to be covered’. At the commemorative sitting in Bonn a month later, the then president of the Assembly, the French representative Edmond Nessler, argued that a European identity implied the will to power, but in his view Europe still seemed to be a large body in search of a soul. ‘Western European Union could have provided the framework within which to organize the structure of European security in a rational manner’, he continued, but ‘fair words are not enough. … It is the Assembly’s duty to give our governments a solemn warning and to voice the concern of the public at their ditherings. For our appeal to be heard, we must eschew theoretical debate and political theology and try to adopt practical goals which exactly fit the requirements of the situation’.

Nessler hit the mark here and his comments are appropriate. The parliamentarians had first-hand knowledge and knew all too well that their influence did not extend very far; they did not deceive themselves about their authority. Whenever they brought up the European defence identity for discussion, they invariably pointed to the fact that this could only be the consequence of a common European foreign policy: ‘the last stone to crown the politically-united European edifice’. Of course this argument was valid, but it could not conceal the fact that the parliamentarians themselves were divided on the issue of European security. This holds true for the idea of an allied nuclear force in 1959 as much as for discussions on a European pillar of NATO or a European defence identity. This comes to the fore
when we study the three reports on Euro-Atlantic relations and the three reports on the future organization of European defence as well as the recommendations that rest on these reports. In the General Affairs Committee, which submitted the first of these reports in June 1967, objections were raised when the rapporteur referred to the possibility of a European nuclear weapon in the future. The rapporteur, Hans-Joachim von Merkatz, a Christian Democrat and member of the German Bundestag, nevertheless kept to his opinion that ‘provision had to be made for a future united Europe to be master of its destiny’, and warned that membership of the Atlantic alliance should not jeopardize European cohesion. As his opinion was not shared by the majority of his committee the draft recommendation did not contain a single word about a European nuclear weapon.

Draft recommendations presented by the committee were political compromises of course. During the subsequent plenary discussions these draft documents were often heavily criticized by other parliamentarians and only agreed upon by the Assembly after amendment. The reports on European security for 1957 and 1959, as mentioned above, are good examples of this. Even when amended, several of the recommendations with regard to nuclear weapons for Europe were adopted with a number of votes against, or quite a few abstentions. When all was said and done, party political views were decisive at the voting.

Taking into consideration the arguments above, Ernst C. Lotter, a German political researcher who looks upon the Western European Union Assembly as marking the onset of a European defence identity, tends to exaggerate. The Assembly stepped into the breach for the sake of European interests whenever they thought it was expedient. They took a firm line in this, in particular with regard to nuclear strategy. They argued repeatedly for flexibility as well as for the need to increase the numbers of conventional forces. The Assembly was not a sanctuary for discussion without restraint, it was an interparliamentary and a political body, with its members attempting to establish a dialogue with the government on all matters concerning defence. They regarded it as their duty to point to the ‘constitutional flaw’ in NATO with respect to the control of nuclear weapons, as much as it was their duty to put pressure on the British government to maintain its forces in Europe or to emphasize the need for adequate defence expenditure. It did not necessarily follow that Europe needed a defence identity of its own, or that the Western European Union should develop into a European pillar of NATO.
Notes

1 For a general introduction on EDC see Fursdon, *The European Defence Community*; Ruane, *The rise and fall of the EDC*.
5 For early reports on interparliamentary assemblies: Heidelberg, “Parliamentary control and political groups”; Lindsay, *Vers un parlement Européen*; Lindsay, *European assemblies*; Stein, “The European parliamentary assembly”.
8 This is the title of the first chapter of Borcier’s booklet, *The political role of the Assembly*. This and the other titles he published contain a general overview of the work of the Assembly of the WEU. Borcier, *Eight years work for European defence and The Assembly of the Western European Union*.
12 Haas and Merkl, “Parliamentarians against Ministers”, 40.
20 Grant, “Influence of the Assemblies”, 309.
21 Gordon, “WEU and defence cooperation”; Heuser, “European strategists and European identity”. 

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All in all Colonel J.J. Fens, F. Mulley and Colonel P. Bourgoin devoted six reports to the Central European forces by 1958. [doc 105, doc. 128, doc. 147, doc. 169, doc. 180 and doc. 215].


Ibidem, 156. The two SPD members who voted against the resolution were Willi Birkenbach and Ernst M. Paul.


Bowie, *Tasks for the 1960s*.

Bluth, *Britain, Germany and Western Nuclear Strategy*; Dietl, “In defence of the West”; Schwartz, *NATO’s nuclear dilemma*’.


General introduction on US nuclear policies e.g. Hoppe, *Zwischen Teilhabe und Mitsprache; Steinhoff/Pommerin, Strategiewechsel*


Recommendation 83 adopted 4 December 1962. *Proceedings WEU Assembly*, 8th session, 2nd part, IV, 19, 21 and 100. The text was distributed among NATO members by the Secretary General for information only as document PO/63/100. NATO Archives Brussels.


Priest, “In common cause”.

The last decade witnessed an abundance of literature on the MLF. See among others Gala, “The Multilateral Force”; Haftendorn, “Das Projekt einer multilateralen NATO-Atomstreitmacht”; Megens, “The MLF as an instrument of a European nuclear force?”; Older, but still relevant is Steinbruner, *The cybernetic theory of decision*


353, doc. 365 and doc. 403.


363 Grant, “The influence of the Assembly” 308-314; Lotter, Die Parlementarische Versammlung, 44-46

69 E.g. Recommendation 212 on the further organization of western defence was adopted on 30 November 1971 with 49 ayes, 4 noes and 11 abstentions. Proceedings WEU Assembly, 17th session, 2nd part, IV, 25. Recommendation 252 on consultation and decisions in the Atlantic Alliance was agreed on 19 June 1974 with 34 ayes, 10 noes and 7 abstentions. Proceedings WEU Assembly, 20th session, 1st part, II, 36.
70 Lotter, Die Parlementarische Versammlung Westeuropäische Union, 28, 34 and 46. Lotter’s argument for the period up to 1973 rests on analyses by others such as Dransfeld and Knop but they are less outspoken. See Dransfeld, Die Rolle der Westeuropäischen Union, 156–162; Knop, Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Westeuropäische Union, 278–280.

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