The aim of this article is to examine the development Wittgenstein undergoes between 1929 (the year of his return to Cambridge) and 1951 (the year of his death) in his approach to the other minds problem. Wittgenstein's way of dealing with this problem is in terms of an analysis of the use of psychological concepts in the third person. However, in contrast to his extensive treatment of psychological concepts in the first person in *Philosophical Investigations (PI)* and other posthumously published works, he remains rather reticent about the correct analysis of third-person attributions of sensations, emotions and thoughts. Therefore it comes as no surprise that the little that has been written about this aspect of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind is controversial. For instance, some commentators deny that Wittgenstein was ever a behaviourist and even try to explain away the apparent behaviourism in *Philosophical Remarks (PR)*. Others, instead, read Wittgenstein as a behaviourist even in his later works. According to R. Fogelin, for instance, Wittgenstein takes it for granted in *Zettel* par. 488 that the third person employment of psychological concepts simply give information that can be verified by observation and the position he ascribes to Wittgenstein is "straightforwardly behaviouristic".¹ And to S. Kripke Wittgenstein's 'famous slogan' in *Philosophical Investigations* about our 'attitude towards a soul' sounds "much too behaviouristic".²

In support of their claims commentators often act more on a hunch than by offering extensive exegetical evidence. Consequently, whether or not these claims are correct can rarely be seen from the little evidence accompanying their interpretations. My main reason, therefore, for making a detailed study of Wittgenstein's views about the other minds problem, i.e., his analysis of third-person attributions of mental states, is the fact that there is an extensive array of still unpublished remarks in the *Nachlass* that throw considerable light upon the precise meaning of published remarks. On the basis of the original context of published remarks in the *Nachlass* and many still unpublished remarks about other minds I shall argue the thesis that the development of this topic from *Philosophical Remarks* to *Philosophical Investigations* has to be

viewed as a (rather slow) transformation of a behaviouristic into a non-behaviouristic way of thinking. In particular, I shall try to show that the apparent behaviourism of *Philosophical Remarks* is real and cannot be dismissed so easily. Such is the intent of Section 1. Next I shall argue that forcing Wittgenstein’s remarks about the third person, in *Philosophical Investigations* and later works, into the position of behaviourism is an interpretation for which there is no licence. The burden of Section 2 is that the meaning of Wittgenstein’s emphasis on our “attitude towards a soul” can be grasped only in the context of his repudiation of logical behaviourism in manuscripts from 1941 and 1949/50. I shall end, in Section 3, with a discussion of Wittgenstein’s last, unpublished writings about the concept of pretending, the upshot of which will be that his way of dealing with that problem is quite at odds with a behaviouristic ignorance of the problem.

Before I attempt these tasks, there are some preliminary points about the chronology of Wittgenstein’s writings about the other minds problem that need to be made. The first time Wittgenstein deals, in his published writings, with the other minds problem is in *Philosophical Remarks* chapter VI. The typescript published as *Philosophical Remarks* was compiled in 1930 out of manuscripts 105, 106, 107 and the first half of 108. Unlike many other ‘definitive’ typescripts, most of the fragments in *Philosophical Remarks* have come unaltered from manuscripts 105, 106, 107 and 108. For instance, of the thirty-four fragments composing chapter VI, twenty-eight fragments have found their way unaltered into *Philosophical Remarks*. Changes concern only the order and sequence of fragments. In that respect the status of *Philosophical Remarks* is unique for in all his later writings Wittgenstein continually changes his formulations or thoughts. Maybe this is the reason that G. E. Moore spoke of the ‘confused’ character of *Philosophical Remarks*. That Wittgenstein was not very satisfied especially with chapter VI is proved by the fact that in less than two years later, in 1931, Wittgenstein takes up only half of the fragments (nineteen) in a comparable chapter in *Big Typescript*, called “Schmerz haben”. The remaining bulk of fragments in this chapter of TS 213 were culled from manuscripts of the years 1931 and 1932 and, as we shall see, testify of rapid and fundamental changes in Wittgenstein’s thinking about other minds. The story of this first phase of Wittgenstein’s development will be told in Section 1.

The second phase of Wittgenstein’s development in relation to the other minds problem occurs as late as 1941, in manuscript 123. This
late dating may seem surprising and consequently is in need of some explanation. Apart from a few rather implicit references to the other minds problem in *Notes for Lectures on “Private Experience” and “Sense Data”* and in the *Blue Books*, the first time Wittgenstein occupies himself with this problem again and especially with his own earlier behaviouristic approach occurs in 1941. This is not to say that he wrote nothing about the philosophy of mind before 1941. On the contrary, many of the fragments about private language in *Philosophical Investigations*, par. 243–421 were drafted already as early as 1937/38. But in these paragraphs of *Philosophical Investigations* and the relevant manuscripts, the emphasis is on the first person use of psychological concepts. In MS 123 (1941), however, he devotes himself exclusively to the third person and those remarks shed considerable light upon the history and precise meaning of Wittgenstein’s most condensed aphorism about other minds in *Philosophical Investigations* part II: “My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the opinion that he has a soul”. The most recent source of this remark is MS 169, written in 1949. The story of this second phase of Wittgenstein’s development will be told in Section 2.

The third phase of Wittgenstein’s development is, as the second, a critique of his first phase and is especially concerned with the problem of pretending. These remarks were written between 1949 and 1951, in manuscripts 169, 171, 173, 174 and 176. The latter three are the same manuscripts in which Wittgenstein writes *On Certainty* and *Remarks on Colour* and it is striking to note how he finally applies his philosophy of certainty and doubt to the other minds problem in general and the problem of pretending in particular. The story of this last phase of Wittgenstein’s development will be told in Section 3.

These preliminary deliberations about the chronology of Wittgenstein’s writings are of course no substitute for a concrete examination of their content. Addressing this task will offer more genuine insight into the development of Wittgenstein’s treatment of the other minds problem.

1. THE BEHAVIOURISM OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL REMARKS

In this section I shall give a strongly behaviouristic interpretation of Wittgenstein’s remarks about other minds in *Philosophical Remarks* and the corresponding manuscripts. Commentators have often tried to
explain away the apparent behaviourism in *Philosophical Remarks* as a rhetorical way of endorsing some form of non-behaviourism. However, remarks in unpublished manuscripts unambiguously show that Wittgenstein's endorsement of behaviourism was not just apparent, but real. Furthermore, these remarks explain how a rather bold version of behaviourism was forced on Wittgenstein by assumptions concerning the Ego and the nature of selfknowledge he shared with James and Russell.

Wittgenstein's path to behaviourism has roughly the following form: in the early period of his later philosophy Wittgenstein subscribes to the rather traditional view that mental experiences are known directly from the inside. Given this conception of thought, Wittgenstein feels a difficulty in attributing mental states to others. But whereas he accepts, like Russell, that knowledge of other minds is knowledge by description, unlike Russell, he rejects the argument by analogy and consequently is forced into behaviourism.

In fact the first two remarks written by Wittgenstein about other minds, in 1929, hint at the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description:

Why do I call toothache "my toothache"?
When I say of someone else, he has toothache I mean with "toothache" as it were an abstract [Abstrakt] form what I normally call "my toothache". (MS 107, p. 199)

In what follows I shall interpret the term 'abstract' in the sense that it has to be contrasted with the concrete and direct acquaintance we have with our own pain. Then it will be argued that the transition from concrete to abstract, i.e., the attribution of mental states to others, forces Wittgenstein into behaviourism.

In an important sense the appeal to knowledge by acquaintance was meant by James and Russell to dismiss talk of a metaphysical Ego as pointless. Nonetheless, Russell continues to speak of a cognitive relation between a subject and an object since acquaintance by introspection clearly implies the occurrence of a mental act distinct from the mental event with which the act is acquainted. James is even more explicit in his acceptance of acquaintance and his rejection of the Ego. One passage in *Principles of Psychology* vol. 2 is of special importance in this context, for there James describes how the Ego and its objects may be in large part an artifact of the methods typically used for studying them:
Take the pain called toothache for example. Again and again we feel it and greet it as the same real item in the universe. We must therefore, it is supposed, have a distinct pocket for it in our mind into which it and nothing else will fit. . . . Thereupon of course comes up the paradox and mystery. If the knowledge of toothache be pent up in this separate mental pocket, how can it be known cum alio or brought about into one view with anything else? This pocket knows nothing else; no part of the mind knows toothache. The knowing of toothache cum alio must be a miracle. And the miracle must have an Agent. And the Agent must be a Subject or Ego 'out of time'. (James, p. 5)

Toothache is also Wittgenstein's favourite example in *Philosophical Remarks*. Apart from Wittgenstein's choice of this example, the use of some of his metaphors reveals the philosophical heritage of James. In *Philosophical Remarks* he warns of the misleading comparison between a toothache and a purse (PR, par. 62) or a matchbox (PR, par. 65) — things one typically possesses in one's pocket. The point made by Wittgenstein is that the comparison between pain and an object easily misleads one into thinking that the object is in possession of an Ego, which in its turn leads to the solipsistic inability to make sense of real feelings other than one's own. A purse can have an owner, because it can also be possessed by none. But to speak of pain as something one possesses is pointless precisely because it is pointless to speak of un-owned pains:

What is essentially private, or seems, has no owner. (MS 110, p. 7; TS 213, p. 508)

The word 'I' does not refer to an owner in sentences about having immediate experiences nor does it show that the word 'I', in this metaphysical sense, is superfluous here. Wittgenstein therefore says that we could have a language from which 'I' is omitted from sentences describing immediate experiences. When we leave out the word 'I' and instead say 'There is toothache' we can still describe the phenomenon formerly described by 'I am in pain'.

Now while this shows clearly that it is wrong, from Wittgenstein's point of view, to speak of an Ego that possesses something, the proposed elimination of the word 'I' is not exactly pellucid, for what is expressed by "There is toothache"? In *Philosophical Remarks* par. 58, Wittgenstein says that 'There is pain' "could have anyone at all at its centre . . . but the one with me at its centre has a privileged status". How are we to understand this privileged status? My answer is that this privileged status is the *same as* the knowledge by acquaintance we have of our immediate experiences. The proposition 'I have toothache' is
verified by direct acquaintance with the experience of pain, although an identification of an owner is not required by this verification. In the context of a discussion concerning the differences between propositions which are conclusively verifiable and propositions which are not thus verifiable (i.e., hypotheses), Wittgenstein gives as examples of the former:

"Do you see this indicator move; if it will have reached 10 you will feel headache". Is such a proposition not verifiable?
Or: "The red circle you see now will gradually change into a rectangle". That also seems indeed to be directly verifiable. (MS 107, p. 250)

'I have toothache' is a proposition conclusively verifiable by reference to phenomenal experience. That this verification by reference to phenomenal experience is a form of acquaintance by introspection is clear from this remark:

The proposition 'A is in pain' relates undoubtedly to [bezieht sich zweifellos auf] my experience of pain. (MS 107, p. 271)

Like Russell, Wittgenstein holds that the meaning of 'I am in pain' consists of a relation and thus a relation between a subject and an object. Equally like Russell, he holds that the relation between subject and object is incorrigible ("zweifellos"). Together these two features constitute the nature of acquaintance by introspection. Moreover, this adherence to knowledge by acquaintance is also well conveyed by Wittgenstein's own retrospective account of it in 1932:

One might (falsely) conceive of the matter thus: The question "How do you know that you have toothache" is therefore not being posed, because one experiences this from the toothache (itself) at first hand, whereas that a person is in the other room, is experienced from second hand, for instance through a voice. The former I know via immediate observation [unmittelbare Beobachtung], the latter I experience indirectly. Thus: "How do you know that you have toothache" - "I know it, because I have it" - You learn it from the fact, that you have it; but for that must you not already know that you have it. (MS 113, p. 104)

In this manuscript Wittgenstein for the first time points out that phenomenological propositions are not verifiable at all, and consequently he abandons his earlier position. Meanwhile, however, he was still treating the self-ascription of bodily sensations as it were based on acquaintance by introspection.

These considerations determine our next step. We must examine how
Wittgenstein's introspective and verificationistic approach to the first person comes to be juxtaposed with a behaviouristic approach to the third person. In this he distances himself from Russell but conforms to the behaviouristic doctrine to which Carnap adheres.

The main thesis defended by Carnap, in 1928, is that the epistemological core ("Kern") of our knowledge of other minds consists of observations of behaviour; the content of experience is only a "Nebenteil vom Physischen". Only the observation of physical behaviour is necessary for the justification of sentences about other minds. Alleged claims to knowledge of the content of experience of other persons can all be reduced to what Carnap considers the epistemological core. In a second article dating from 1932 Carnap explicates his behaviourism in more detail by stressing that the meaning of sentences about one's own mind and other minds can be interpreted physically as asserting "the existence of a physical structure characterized by the disposition to react in a specific manner to specific stimuli". The principle behind this translation of psychological concepts into physical language is verificationistic: "A sentence says no more than what is testable about it". Consequently, the meaning of sentences about other minds is entirely exhausted by the observation of physical behaviour.

An important assumption made by Carnap is that ascriptions of mental predicates in the first person and in the third person would be symmetrical in respect of verification. First-person as well as third-person statements obtain their "rational support" from observation of behaviour. Although Wittgenstein never followed Carnap in his behaviouristic translation of the first person, the same symmetrical assumption is apparent in his early writings, the difference being only a difference in method of verification: first-person statements are verified by reference to phenomenal experience, i.e., via acquaintance by introspection, whereas in the third-person case, statements are verified by observation of physical behaviour. When I ascribe to someone else toothache, Wittgenstein says, I mean by 'toothache' an 'abstract' of what I normally call my toothache. The contrast between 'concrete' and 'abstract' alludes to the problem how communication between me and you about our sufferings is possible. The problem is that, as the meaning of pain in the first person is based on a "zweifellose Beziehung" to the experience of pain eo ipso, one is deprived of this privileged access in the third person. The relation between the first person and the third person is of course symmetrical: I am acquainted
with my pain and not with his as he is acquainted with his pain and not with mine. At best it is only possible to make an inference by analogy, i.e., on the basis of self-observation concluding that the behaviour of other people is in many ways analogous to our own and then inferring that it must have analogous causes. Wittgenstein, however, cuts off this route to any such argument by analogy, and therefore I shall argue, is forced into behaviourism.

In *Philosophical Remarks* par. 62, Wittgenstein opposes the following approach to the other minds problem:

Very simply, I know what it means, that I have toothache, and when I say, that he has toothache, then I mean, that he has now, what I had then.

In this fragment Wittgenstein does not attack the argument by analogy as such but its more broader assumption that ‘He has toothache’ can be explained by reference to what one knows from one’s own case. As Russell, a defender of the argument by analogy, puts it: “What people would say is what we should say if we had certain thoughts, and so we infer that they probably have these thoughts”. Wittgenstein offers two reasons for denying that this appeal to the same makes sense. The first reason is rather obvious from what has been said before about the elimination of the ‘Ego’. Traditionally the difference between ‘I am in pain’ and ‘He is in pain’ has been explained by reference to the one who possesses pain. ‘Pain’ in ‘I am in pain’ and ‘He is in pain’, according to this view, both refers to the same sensation but this same sensation is attributed to different Egos. By precluding identification of an owner, Wittgenstein, of course, cuts off this route. Another possibility to interpret ‘He is in pain’ as referring to the same sensation as ‘I am in pain’ is that, although these sentences are not about an Ego, they are about a body. The meaning of ‘He is in pain’ is then conceived of as locating a pain in his body. Starting from one’s own case one could then simply extend the idea of what is immediately felt into other people's bodies. This possibility is also excluded by Wittgenstein. Believing that one can simply extend the idea of what is immediately felt into other people's bodies is not only based on a false analogy but also will give you only an idea of having feelings in their bodies, not of their having feelings. In a manuscript from 1932 this is expressed very clearly:

Instead of saying the other is in pain we say “His tooth does ouch” [macht au]. “But you don’t want to deny that the other can have what you have”. Surely not. I want to know only how I have to imagine this. I know, for instance, in the case of the grey hair
WITTGENSTEIN ON THE OTHER MINDS PROBLEM

that you and I could have. Also in the case of bad teeth. But when I apply this concept in the case of pain I will never come from my pain to his but from my pain in my tooth to my pain in his tooth. (MS 156, p. 59)

In short, ‘toothache’ in ‘I have toothache’ and ‘He has toothache’ is not univocal. ‘Toothache’ cannot refer to the same sensation in both sentences. It is also obvious that ‘toothache’ cannot refer to different sensations in both sentences, otherwise, one has to be in a position to distinguish between them, and clearly, no one is. But as we have seen in the first person, the meaning of the term is given by acquaintance with some sensation. The consequence seems to be that the meaning of ‘He is in pain’ is not at all about a sensation, but exhausted by the observation of physical behaviour.

A possible way out of the almost inevitable behaviouristic position would be to maintain, as is done by proponents of the argument by analogy, that in order to verify the sentence ‘He has toothache’ it is necessary to use a representation of phenomenal experience or an inner ostensive definition of pain. Wittgenstein's insistence on acquaintance by introspection and his rejection of the argument by analogy cuts off this route. In Philosophical Remarks he says:

If I pity someone else, because he is in pain, I do imagine the pain, but I imagine that I am in pain. (PR, par. 65)

This is a slightly different formulation of the thought quoted above (see p. 230) that knowledge of other person's pain is an abstract from knowledge of our own pain. ‘Pain’ is essentially private ("wesentlich privat") and can only be known from within, via acquaintance by introspection. The implication seems to be that pain with which I am not acquainted is something I cannot represent. In a remark preceding the one just quoted Wittgenstein stresses exactly that point:

A matchbox that the other has I can imagine but not someone else's pain, that is pain I do not notice [spüren]. (MS 107, p. 287)

Consequently, while communicating about our sufferings, we are forced into the same symmetrical position: I notice my pain, but he doesn’t and I do not notice his pain, but he does. But if I can only imagine pain with which I can be acquainted and if in that sense I cannot imagine the pain of someone else, isn’t the only conclusion to draw that the content of experience of other persons is logically redundant and epistemologically a "Nebenteil". Although not expressed in
these technical terms this very same thought is contained in the following remark:

When I say 'A is in pain', then I use the representation of pain in the same way as I use the concept of flowing, when I speak of an electric current flowing. (PR, par. 64)

In MS 107 this is followed by:

When suddenly hearing from the room next to us in an unknown voice the utterance 'I am in pain' we do not understand [verstehen] it. (MS 107, p. 285)

The point of the latter remark is that it would be tempting to use a representation of the pain as it is felt in order to understand the sound coming from the room next to us, but that as a matter of fact it doesn't help at all. On the contrary, in verifying the sentence no representation of phenomenal experience is used and the only way to understand the utterance is to observe physical behaviour and probably the circumstances in which it occurs. The utterance does not inform us of anything unless we understand it, that is, unless we can test it. And we can test it iff we know what physical behaviour would verify it. Deprived of that sort of observation we do not understand the utterance at all.

This constraint upon communication about our sufferings forces Wittgenstein into behaviourism. And this is what we do in fact find:

If I make myself understood by him in language, then it has to be understanding [verstehen] in the sense of behaviourism. That he has understood me is a hypothesis, as is, that I have understood him. (MS 110, p. 8)

In order to specify in more detail what Wittgenstein means by the term 'behaviourism' more must be said about his use of the term 'hypothesis'. What Wittgenstein means here with hypothesis has to be opposed with what he calls 'genuine propositions'. The latter are directly and conclusively verifiable by reference to phenomenal experience. Hypotheses, instead, are not conclusively verifiable and they are not true or false in the same sense in which genuine propositions are. They are probable and have to await future confirmation. Thus conceived, the hypothetical nature of our knowledge of other minds is indeed indistinguishable from Carnap's logical behaviourism, according to which the meaning of sentences about other minds has to be explained in terms of dispositions to behave in specific ways in specific circumstances.

However, the meaning of 'hypothesis' in relation to behaviourism is not exhausted by 'a disposition to behave'. Wittgenstein uses the term
in this context with the extra implication that error or illusion is always possible. One of his many characterisations of 'hypothesis' is:

Propositions for which it counts that one can always be mistaken I call hypotheses. (MS 109, p. 16)

Applied to other minds it is obvious what 'possibility of error' means: the other can always be pretending to be in pain or simply lying. In the language of behaviourism, which restricts itself to the observation of outer behaviour, one cannot account for the distinction between real pain and simulated pain and the case of a perfect imitator cannot even be formulated consistently. Wittgenstein's reference to the problem of pretending has escaped the notice of many commentators. But in the following two fragments his use of 'hypothesis' refers to the possibility of error identified as the possibility of pretending:

(A) The two hypotheses, that other people have toothache, and that they behave just as I do but don't have toothache, possibly have identical senses. That is, if I had, for example learned the second form of expression, I would talk in a pitying voice about people who don't have toothache, but as behaving as I do, when I have it. (PR, par. 64)
(B) The two hypotheses, that others have pain, and that they don't, and merely behave as I do when I have it, must have identical senses if every possible experience confirming the one confirms the other as well. In other words, if a decision between them on the basis of experience is inconceivable. (PR, par. 65)

These two fragments have been the topic of much debate in the critical literature. The upshot of it is very unsatisfying. Several authors have tried to read into (A) and (B) not only a non-behaviouristic approach but also a rejection of behaviourism. No other evidence is cited in support of these interpretations than (A) and (B) themselves. However, (A) and (B) can be interpreted equally well along behaviouristic lines. Consequently, a decision to choose between these conflicting interpretations has to be based upon some other evidence. This is the reason for examining the original context of (A) and (B).

Both fragments occur for the first time in MS 107, (A) at page 270 and (b) at page 287. The context of (A) is different from the context in Philosophical Remarks, the context of (B) is identical, but its initial formulation is slightly different. These facts will make clear that Wittgenstein's use of two almost identical fragments in a 'definitive' typescript, as Philosophical Remarks is, ought to have caused more surprise than it in fact did.

The fragment after (A) in MS 107 is the following:
A proposition so conceived, that it can be true or false without any possibility of controlling this is completely detached from reality, and doesn't function //work// any longer as a proposition. (MS 107, p. 270; PR, XXII, par. 225)

On the basis of (A) and (C) the following behaviouristic position could be ascribed to Wittgenstein. Detached from reality is a proposition like this: ‘One can never know what goes on in his mind for behind the façade of his outward behaviour he can think or feel totally different or just nothing’. In this case our knowledge corresponds only to the observable behaviour, not to the supposed content of experience. Even if we made a mistake here the mistake could never be discovered which means that one cannot speak of a mistake. The inevitable conclusion for Wittgenstein to draw is that the sentence ‘He is in pain’ and the sentence ‘He merely acts as if in pain’ are identical in meaning, i.e., in both cases the epistemological core of our knowledge consists of the observation of behaviour.

But maybe this conclusion is too quick. For from the fact that Wittgenstein explicitly realises this consequence of his verificationistic behaviourism one could be tempted to conclude that, unlike Carnap, he is not willing to identify the two sentences. More can be learnt from the formulation of (B) in MS 107. It is split into two parts:

(D) Is there yet no difference between the hypotheses that the others are in pain and that they are not and just behave as I do, when I am in pain?
(E) According to my principle both assumptions must be identical in meaning if all possible experience confirming the one confirms the other. If that is to say no distinction is conceivable on the basis of experience. (MS 107, p. 287)

The question-form in (D) obviously refers to (A) at page 270 of the same manuscript. Moreover the question suggests even a correction of (A), that is the two sentences can be distinguished after all. Fragment (E) equally suggests a correction, for it says: if every possible experience confirming the one confirms the other, then according to the principle of verification the two sentences must be identical. The conditional seems to imply that it is possible to find experiences that do differentiate between the two.

David Pears remarks in this context that the phrasing of (B) indicates Wittgenstein's reluctance to commit himself to the identity of the two hypotheses, but “there is no hint of any good way of avoiding the identification”. However, Pears, as so many others, forgets to involve the fragment following (B) in the discussion about pretending:
To say that the others are not in pain, presupposes that it makes sense to say, that they are in pain. (*PR*, par. 65; MS 107, p. 287)

Here is a hint of avoiding the identification: to be able to speak about pretending presupposes logically to be able to speak about genuine cases of pain. The statement ‘He seems to be in pain, but is not’ has a sense iff the statement ‘He is in pain’ has a sense. This logical prior status of attributions of genuine pain implies that it must be possible to distinguish between cases of pretending behaviour and cases of genuine pain-behaviour. The conclusion of this reconstruction can be that Wittgenstein, in *Philosophical Remarks*, alternates between a behaviouristic ignorance of the problem of pretending and a confrontation with the problem without committing himself either to behaviourism or introspectionism. In any case, the fact that Wittgenstein did publish both (A) and (B) indicates that his views still had to be cut out, not to say they were in a ‘confused state’.

Conclusive evidence for my interpretation of (B) comes from TS 213 in which Wittgenstein takes up (B) and omits (A) and writes another remark in which he explicitly says that we do distinguish between cases of real pain and cases of feigned pain:

Behaviourism. “It seems to me, I am sad, my head droops so much”. Why does one not pity, when a door is unoiled and weeps in opening and closing? Do we pity the other, that behaves as we do, when we are in pain, – on philosophical grounds, that have led to the result that he suffers, as we? Physicists might just as well make us scared, by assuring us, that the earth is not compact after all, as it seems, but consists of loose particles, that wander around erratically. “But we would not pity the other, if we knew, that it is just a doll, or that he merely feigns his pain?” Naturally – but we do have quite specific criteria for something being a doll, or for someone feigning to be in pain and these criteria oppose those we call criteria for something not being a doll (but for instance a human) and for someone not feigning his pain (but really being in pain). (TS 213, p. 509)

In this important fragment many new lines of thinking about other minds announce themselves but must await further elaboration until 1941 and even 1949/50. The first line of thought is stated in the last two sentences. The sceptical thesis that others can always feign their pain and that the only way to find out what the real meaning of their behaviour is, is rebutted by Wittgenstein: we do not need to infer hypothetically from the outer to the inner because there are in fact behavioural criteria that do distinguish between cases of feigned pain and cases of real pain. From the fact that Wittgenstein takes up at page
507 of this chapter fragment (B) from *Philosophical Remarks* it can safely be concluded that he already meant to distinguish between these two cases in MS 107 in 1930. So concerning pretending, Wittgenstein does not commit himself to a behaviouristic ignorance of the problem like Carnap. As Wittgenstein lets the problem rest until 1949, I, too, shall let it rest and return to it in Section 3.

A second line of thought prepares us for Section 2. It is expressed in the first part of the quote above. There Wittgenstein suggests that our knowledge of other minds is at a fundamental level not a question of hypotheses and in that sense he distances himself from an intellectualistic tradition in which both behaviourism and introspectionism share. Wittgenstein's question, if we pity someone else when he is in pain on account of philosophical considerations, expresses doubt with regards to his own earlier solution that our knowledge of other minds is a hypothesis. This can be seen from the analogy he draws with the physicist's notion of nature. The point of the analogy is that our ordinary non-hypothetical conception of space as something we experience which is full of matter cannot come into conflict with the hypothetical conception of space as empty, or is a mere aggregate of electrons. They cannot come into conflict because they are incommensurable, i.e., the fullness of space with matter does not correspond to the fullness of space with electrons (and thus to emptiness) in the physical conception, but to the frequency of electrons. Consequently, the ordinary conception of space is as adequate as the physical one and is certainly not improved upon by the use of physical hypotheses. By analogy, our ordinary conception of other minds is non-hypothetical and is not improved upon by the use of hypotheses concerning inner mental states, or as in Carnap's proposal, the neurophysiological structure underlying dispositions to behave. This insight is as yet not further elaborated by Wittgenstein and is still not incompatible with a form of behaviourism. However as regards the philosophy of mind, the problem of psychological sentences in the first person will want the centre of his attention, especially between 1932 and 1938. Not until 1941 does Wittgenstein resume the thread of his analysis of the third-person case.

2. "*Einstellung zur Seele*"

Having laid the groundwork for some of his later views about the correct analysis of the third-person case in TS 213, Wittgenstein moved
on, roughly between 1932 and 1939, to work out the correct analysis of the first-person case. The upshot of his extensive treatment of the first person is that self-ascriptions of pain are primarily expressions rather than statements and that in expressing one’s pain no claim to privileged access or knowledge is made. That the analogy with natural expressions affords Wittgenstein a means of overcoming the deadlock in the discussion between dualists and behaviourists I simply take for granted here. But this cannot be emphasised enough: the importance Wittgenstein attaches to natural expressions of pain is a clear manifestation of his relativisation of the mainly intellectualistic approach of logical behaviourists and dualists. Realising this pre-linguistic foundation of the concept of pain implies for Wittgenstein that in an important sense it is pointless to speak of knowledge here. My first thesis in this section will be that in 1941 he follows the same strategy with regard to our knowledge of other minds. More precisely: at a certain fundamental level neither the concepts of knowledge nor of certainty and doubt have any bearing on the sentence ‘He is in pain’, and consequently, the meaning of that sentence cannot be exhaustively equated with a claim to knowledge supported or refuted by the observation of behaviour. My second thesis will be that this relativisation of the intellectualistic starting-point for posing the other minds problem has as its result that the behaviouristic translatability of psychological concepts into physical concepts is untenable.

An important part of Wittgenstein’s strategy to show that the other minds problem is mainly the product of a detached intellectualistic view is to abandon the symmetrical construction of the first and the third person and to present an alternate, asymmetrical construction of their relation. Instead of saying that both the first and the third person are about observation and knowledge, Wittgenstein will say that only the attribution of mental states to others is based on observation and implies a claim to knowledge. However, his analysis does not stop here and if it did one indeed could accuse Wittgenstein of naive behaviourism. The following two fragments show that Wittgenstein’s asymmetrical proposal amounts to more than simply observation of behaviour in the third-person case:

The inner is hidden from us means, it is hidden from us in the sense that it is not hidden from him. And it is not hidden from the owner [Besitzer] in the sense, that he expresses it and that we give credit to the expressions under certain conditions and that no mistake
exists there [und es da den Irrtum nicht gibt]. And this asymmetry of the game is expressed by the sentence, the inner is hidden from us /the other/. (MS 169, p. 56)\textsuperscript{17}

Can one know what goes on in someone else, in the way he knows it? – But how he knows it? He can for instance express his feeling /express his experience/. Doubt about the fact whether he really has this experience – analogous to the doubt if he has such or such illness – does not enter into the game, and therefore it is false to say he knows what he experiences. The other, however, can very well doubt it whether he has that experience. Doubt does enter into the game, but precisely because of that it is also possible that certainty [Sicherheit] exists. (MS 176, p. 47)\textsuperscript{18}

The most salient feature of this asymmetrical construction is that even in the third-person case, at a certain level, mistakes are excluded. Normally the term observation does imply the possibility of error. Consequently, the meaning of the sentence ‘He is in pain’ is not exhausted by observation of behaviour. I shall argue below that a significant part of the meaning of ‘He is in pain’ is constituted by what Wittgenstein calls ‘Einstellung zur Seele’.

If at a certain level it is pointless to speak of mistakes in our attribution of mental states to others, it seems impossible for Wittgenstein to accept the traditional epistemological view according to which we have ‘only indirect outer evidence’ of other minds. In MS 173\textsuperscript{19} he rejects precisely this roundabout approach to other minds which readily leads to the sceptical conclusion that we are always in the dark about other minds:

The distinctive feature of the inner [vom Seelischen] seems to be, that it has to be guessed at from the outer of the person and is known only from within. But when through accurate consideration this conception vanishes into thin air, the inner indeed has not become the outer, but for us there is no longer direct inner evidence and indirect outer evidence for the inner. (MS 173, p. 33)

It is not as if I had direct evidence for my inner, he only indirect evidence. But he has evidence for it, (but) I do not. (MS 173, p. 42)

The question to be answered here is what Wittgenstein means by ‘evidence’. The use of the term is not epistemological, for he has eliminated the traditional epistemological properties of ‘evidence’, respectively, ‘direct inner’ and ‘indirect outer’. To the traditional epistemological approach Wittgenstein opposes a logical one:

What I want to say is rather, that the inner distinguishes itself for its logic from the outer. And that it is certainly the logic which explains the picture of the inner and the outer /the expression ‘the inner’/, makes it understandable. (MS 173, p. 34)

The inner is not only connected with the outer by experience, but also logically. (MS 173, p. 36)
From a logical perspective, it seems, the fact that evidence makes someone else's feeling merely probable is irrelevant, for Wittgenstein says:

And the evidence, to the extent that it is uncertain, it is not, because it is only outer evidence. (MS 173, p. 42)

That is, Wittgenstein does not use the concept of the inner to explain the uncertainty and unpredictability of the outer, as is usually done in epistemology. The reverse is true: the indeterminacy of human life provides an explanation for the use of the concepts of soul and inner. What matters from a logical point of view is the fact "that we construct a statement on this involved sort of evidence, and hence that such evidence has a special importance in our lives and is made prominent by a concept" (Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, II, par. 709 [RPP]). The role of the notion of evidence in the case of uncertainty I shall postpone until Section 3, here I shall confine myself to the role of the notion of evidence in the case of certainty. My point will be that Wittgenstein's famous remark that our attitude towards him, as an attitude towards a soul, has to be understood in terms of his application of the logical distinctions between knowledge and certainty to the other minds problem. In the following fragment he makes clear that in a sense we cannot speak of knowing a mental state of another person because of the role of the notion of evidence:

If 'I know...' means: I can convince the other if he gives credit to my evidence, then one can say: I may be as certain [sicher] about his mood, as about the truth of a mathematical proposition, but it is still false to say: I know his mood. (MS 174, p. 13)

If I thus know, that he is glad, I feel myself certain, not uncertain in my satisfaction, and that, one could say, is not knowledge. (MS 169, p. 1).

Wittgenstein wishes to say that the evidence for knowledge is of a different kind from the 'evidence' in the case of certainty. In the latter case he sometimes speaks of 'sure evidence' [sichere Evidenz], meaning that it is evidence we accept as sure and that we go by in acting surely (cf. On Certainty, par. 196). It is precisely this emphasis on acceptance, on certainty of reacting and absence of doubt or error that Wittgenstein wishes to convey with his metaphor 'Einstellung zur Seele'. A very first draft of that metaphor makes this clear:

Instead of saying 'Attitude towards a soul' one could also say: 'Attitude towards a human [zum Menschen]'. I could always say of a human, that it is an automaton (that I could
learn at school during lessons in physiology) and yet it would not influence my attitude towards the other. I could even say it of myself.

But what is the difference between an attitude and an opinion? I might say: the attitude comes before opinion.

An opinion can be mistaken. But how should a mistake look like here? (MS 169, pp. 60–61)

Wittgenstein’s point is that an attitude is logically antecedent to an opinion and thus to a supposition or an hypothesis. A hypothesis about other minds has point only where there is room for doubt and error. An attitude is precisely the absence of such room.

However, even this emphasis on attitude can seem to be a veiled form of behaviourism, as Kripke thinks. Therefore, I shall trace the very first starting point of Wittgenstein’s famous dictum in his manuscripts for there is explicit evidence that Wittgenstein’s repudiation of logical behaviourism was a major theme in the emergence of his later emphasis on attitudes.

According to logical behaviourism, sentences about other minds are hypotheses to be checked by (future) experience. Supposing someone else to be in pain means forming an hypothesis concerning a disposition to behave in a specific manner in specific circumstances. In the following fragment Wittgenstein wishes to stress that the behaviouristic doctrine is a detached and purely intellectual construction which itself is only possible on the basis of something more primitive:

How when I said: supposing someone in pain, means to suppose something that would only be confirmed by that sort of behaviour. Such an attempt at a translation into a behaviouristic way of expressing seems somehow foolish [kindisch]. Why? (The experience that the attempt is foolish must be taken seriously) It is an undertaking to secure [sichern] something, that is secured after all. (MS 123, 23-5-41) 21

What is secured after all comes out very clearly in a passage written two weeks later:

If someone asks: What is the difference between the representing of a pain and pain-behaviour, I would explain: in the former case you imagine something painful, a stabbing pain, a feeling, let’s say in the mouth /tooth/ – in the latter case a position or movement of the body. Now it is peculiar, that when I really represent pain I do not, it is true, represent the other in a painful position, but I pull myself a painful face. (MS 123, 3-6-41)

The point that needs to be made about this passage is that Wittgenstein carefully avoids both the argument by analogy as well as the behaviour-
istic translation of sentences about minds, without professing himself to offer a third theory. What he has to offer is a careful description of the way in which we set up and maintain pain-language in real life. In real life we do not regard sentences about other minds as 'assumptions' or 'hypotheses' to be checked against experience, neither as hypotheses in the sense of inferences by analogy nor as hypotheses concerning future behaviour. The way we act, or better, react, shows what is secured after all when ascribing pain to others. Consequently, the meaning of psychological concepts in the third person is not entirely exhausted by their reference to observable behaviour. The following remark is rather illuminating in this respect:

The objection against a behaviouristic way of expressing of propositions about the immediate experience is not that his way of expressing would not be about experiences but about something else. But that actually we play a different/somewhat different/ game with the expressions of experiences in comparison with the descriptions of behaviour. – Not that is an objection, that this way of expressing is about outward behaviour, for what it is about shows itself not unconditionally in the propositions and their ostensive definitions, but in the system of the use of the propositions. If someone says anxiously: 'He complains awfully', one can say, that he does not speak of behaviour. (MS 123, 3-641)

What is needed to let the problem of other minds dissolve is a careful description of the way our propositions about other minds are interwoven with our daily practices. Such a description will allow us to see beyond the distinction between the inner and the outer. Wittgenstein's objection is that behaviourism as a matter of fact makes the same appeal to ostensive definitions as its opponent and his criticism focuses on the supposed use of such ostensive ceremonies. What he wishes to stress is that we do not describe behaviour when we pity someone else in pain. The reason we don't intend to describe behaviour is the fact that the one in pain is expressing his pain. An expression is not a physical property of a thing, the body, of which a physical description can be given. For example, if someone is wounded in his hand it is not the hand who says that he is in pain. He says it, the person, with his mouth and his eyes. Observing him, we do not react to the body conceived physically as a thing, but to his expressions, to him as a person. For instance, we do not say 'That poor hand is in pain' and we do not console the hand, but rather look the other in the eye (cf. *PI*, par. 286). So the game we are playing while watching someone in
pain is not one of describing but one of reacting to expressions of pain, that is, our attitude towards a soul is part and parcel of the game.

The emphasis on attitude is far from having behaviouristic implications. Our immediate reactions to other people's pain shows that inner and outer are internally related. Insofar as one treats someone else as a human being eo ipso one treats him as somebody with an inner. So Wittgenstein is not a metaphysical behaviourist, for far from denying the inner he connects it more firmly, i.e., logically to the outer. Neither is he a logical behaviourist for the meaning of psychological sentences in the third person in an important sense is not given by descriptions of behaviour.

3. Pretending

The precise meaning of 'Einstellung zur Seele' can be grasped only if we finally involve the problem of pretending in our discussion, for one could still be tempted to argue as follows: even if Wittgenstein's emphasis on attitudes were acceptable, there would still be scope for the other mind's scepticism. There might, in principle, still be pain-behaviour but no pain, that is, we might, in principle, observe people's pain-behaviour and yet not take up the appropriate attitude towards them. Consequently, the reference to attitudes cannot bring out the difference between 'He is in pain' and 'He merely acts as if in pain'.

We have seen above that Wittgenstein, already in 1932, criticises a behaviouristic perspective within which the problem of pretending cannot even be formulated consistently. He suggested that there are quite special criteria that distinguish between real pain and simulated pain. In 1941, in the same manuscript in which he criticises behaviourism, he refers to the problem of pretending in his way:

"But even if all the particularities of behaviour occurred, I could always imagine that he is not in pain". That is what one says, and there must be a ground for it. In that a main feature of the grammar of the expression 'being in pain' has to reside. (MS 123, 23-5-41)

What is striking about this passage is Wittgenstein's unwillingness to formulate the problem of pretending in traditional epistemological terms. He seems to suggest that the problem pertains to the nature of different language-games and is in that sense grammatical and logical. Epistemologically the problem is formulated in terms of the evidential
relation between pain and pain-behaviour, that is the relation between inner and outer. The consequence of this emphasis on the evidential relation is that in the case of pretending one is readily inclined to say that the relation between the inner and the outer is disturbed. When people pretend, an absolute gap seems to be created between observation of behaviour and the true inner facts of behaviour. Pretending seems to devalue, to annul, all evidence.

Wittgenstein's way out of the problem will be to say that pretending is a different kind of language-game from the game in which someone expresses his pain sincerely and somebody else reacts to it sympathetically. The problem now becomes, in the first place, a problem concerning the logical relations between different kinds of language-games.  

Wittgenstein's opposition to the sceptical consequences attached to pretending can be reconstructed in three stages: (i) hidden psychic medium is irrelevant; (ii) there is evidence for pretending; and (iii) pretending is a language-game which logically presupposes more primitive games. I shall discuss these stages in that order.

Of course, uncertainty tends to be thought of in terms of situations where one feels that one is being deceived or duped as in (i). In these situations somebody deliberately conceals something and disguises his behaviour in such a way as to make his inner unrecognisable. But Wittgenstein gives a number of instances where uncertainty is created by exactly the opposite:

Think, that we not only don't understand the other when he hides his feelings, but also often not, not when he is hiding them, indeed when he is doing his utmost to make himself understood. (MS 169, p. 43)

Uncertainty here has nothing to do with a 'hidden' inner which lies beyond one's reach, but rather with an outer which remains closed, like a handwriting that cannot be deciphered. It is also possible to hide one's thoughts from somebody by expressing them in a language unfamiliar to him (RPP II, par. 564) or by withholding one's diary (Last Writings, par. 974). These cases do not involve anything metaphysically hidden, so that it can never be found. On the contrary, there is relevance in what is being hidden here. In all these cases uncertainty cannot be attributed to the fact that one only possesses indirect outer evidence and that what the evidence should prove is elusive. The examples show clearly enough that it is not elusive, so that Wittgenstein remarks:
One might even say: The uncertainty about the inner is an uncertainty about something outer. (MS 174, p. 13)

There is evidence, or signs, for pretending (ii):

Above all has pretending its characteristic outer signs. How else could one speak of pretending at all. (MS 169, p. 68)

Wittgenstein wishes to say that both signs for deception and signs for sincerity 'inside' can be recognised on the outside. So the issue is not an epistemological contrast between inner and outer. There must be signs for pretending, since it would otherwise be impossible to expose somebody as an impostor: one can only expose somebody if one knows, no matter how, that he wears a mask. Thus Wittgenstein has no reason to abandon his idea that inner processes too have meaning only within the rule-guided activities of language-games. He is explicit about this with regard to pretending:

Also what goes on in him is a game, and pretending is not present [gegenwärtig] in him like a feeling, but like a game. (MS 169, p. 49)

In other words, to ask whether somebody is posing or not is to ask about the kind of language-game that is being played, not about our knowledge of the relation between his behaviour and something inside him.

Pretending is a different kind of language-game from the language-game of spontaneous expression of feelings of (iii). As the Hintikkas put it: "Wittgenstein never admits that we can, for instance, drive a wedge between pain and pain-behaviour in primary language-games. What happens is that another (secondary) language-game is superimposed on the primary one". The following two remarks seem to support this interpretation:

The expressions of my feelings can be unreal [unecht]. In particular they can be feigned. That is a different language-game from the primitive language-game of genuine expressions. (MS 169, p. 63).

Thus I wish to say, that there is an original, genuine expression of pain; thus that the expression of pain is not to the same extent [gleichermassen] connected with pain and pretending. (MS 171, p. 1)

That the language-game of pretending is a different game from that of genuine expressions can be seen from the fact that a child has to learn a great deal before it can dissemble, so that we only talk about pretending in a fairly complicated pattern of life. If the pattern were not that
complicated we should be able to imagine a newborn child dissembling. That this cannot be imagined is also clear from the fact that language is constitutive for pretending. For like children, animals do not have the ability to pretend: a dog does not dissemble, nor is it sincere (PI II, xi, p. 229).

The internal relation between pain and expression remains intact, regardless of the possibility of pretence. This language-game does not disturb the original pattern, but makes the concept pain more complex. In 'I feel pain', the sincere expression, the relation between expression and sensation, is internal; the expression is the sensation and cannot be conceived of without the sensation, otherwise, the expression is embedded in the language-game of pretending. The relation between expression and feeling is not internal here; expression and sensation can be separated. That the relation is not internal also appears from the fact that there is no primary expression in this language-game. At any rate 'I am merely pretending that I feel pain' is not regarded as an expression of pretending, in the way that 'I feel pain' is regarded as an expression of pain. There is a spontaneous expression of pain functioning on a more fundamental level than the language-game of pretending, in the sense that the certainty in the sincere language-game is not prejudiced by the possible uncertainty in the insincere language-game. On the contrary, precisely the fact that there is room for doubt and uncertainty in the insincere language-game implies that there is certainty, too, witness Wittgenstein's logic of 'knowing' and 'certainty'. Just as it is meaningless to talk about doubt and therefore about knowing in the language-game of the first person, so it is meaningless not to talk about certainty, if on a different level, where it is possible to talk meaningfully about doubt and knowing: the language-game of the third person.

However, it would be misleading to conclude from this, as the Hintikkas seem to do, that the observation of hiding behaviour does not necessarily change the evidential situation, in the sense that it is "not harder to discover whether someone really is in pain". This is misleading to say because it ignores the very special nature of the evidence for judging whether someone really is in pain. Wittgenstein calls this sort of evidence 'imponderable evidence' (PI II, pp. xi, 228) – such as subtleties of glance, of tone, of gesture – and his question is: What does imponderable evidence accomplish? To answer this question Wittgenstein compares the evidential situation in the case of pretending
with the role of evidence in mathematical judgements and judgements about colours. In the case of the latter two there is in general complete agreement in judgements, whereas "There is in general no such agreement over the question whether an expression of feeling is genuine or not" (*PI* II, xi, p. 227). This lack of agreement does not imply that one is never certain that someone else is pretending; what it does imply is that some third person is not sure and that I cannot convince him (*PI* II, xi, p. 227).

The remarks in *Philosophical Investigations* devoted to the role of 'imponderable evidence' are few in number, but in his manuscripts he says more about it:

Why did I wish to say, '2 × 2 = 4' is objectively sure. 'This man is in pain' is subjectively sure. (MS 169, pp. 35-36)

The meaning of 'objectively sure' is obvious. In mathematics or judgements about colours disagreement may exist, however, total agreement can be reached and is reached more often than not by giving proofs or by checking. Why does this sort of objective certainty not exist in the case of judgements about the genuineness of expressions of feelings? It should be obvious by now what a wrong answer is: it would be pointless to say that objective certainty does not exist here because we cannot look into someone else's mind. That would be appealing to the epistemological contrast between direct inner evidence and indirect outer evidence, whereas Wittgenstein wants to do away with these. The lack of objective certainty is a *constitutive* feature of the language-game in question. Consequently, the presence of subjective certainty and of uncertainty is equally constitutive. More precisely, it is a constitutive rule for our language-games in which we judge about the genuineness of expressions of feelings that they are based on 'fine shadings of behaviour', like subtleties of glance. There is no uniformity or regularity of behavior here and consequently our concepts do not have fixed limits. Therefore, the uncertainty whether someone is dissembling his feelings or not has not so much to do with an inner that conceals itself behind an outer but with the connection between elastic concepts and all but unspecifiable external circumstances. As Wittgenstein puts it:

*We play with elastic, yes also flexible concepts. That means however not, that they can be reformed as one pleases /without offering resistance/, that is that they are useless. For if trust and mistrust were not to have a foundation in objective reality, then they would be only of pathological interest.* (MS 169, p. 37)
For instance, variability and irregularity are an essential part of the human physiognomy, so that the concepts of emotion, which are mainly based on facial expressions, lack focus and have a kind of elasticity. Here evidence includes often 'imponderable evidence', that is, there is no sharp borderline between sufficient evidence and insufficient evidence. Thus there is an elastic margin in which the evidence for real laughter is insufficient, but not so insufficient as to be evidence for the opposite.

So what does imponderable evidence not accomplish? It does not lead to knowledge in the sense that there are no (universally) valid principles from which a proof can be derived:

"I am sure, he is in pain". What does that mean? How does one use it? What is the expression of certainty in behaviour; what makes us sure? Not a proof. That is, what makes me sure, does not make another sure. But there are limits to the discrepancy. (MS 169, pp. 31-32)

This fragment also indicates what imponderable evidence does accomplish: it can make me sure. And the subjective certainty in this case is a form of reacting, in short an attitude towards a soul:

Do not conceive of being certain as a state of mind, a kind of feeling, or something like that. The important thing of certainty is the way of acting, not the expression of the voice with which one speaks. (MS 169, p. 32)

CONCLUSION

My interpretation of Wittgenstein's remarks about other minds has suggested the following view of his development from *Philosophical Remarks* to *Philosophical Investigations*. In the former Wittgenstein endorses a form of logical behaviourism that reminds strongly of Carnap's behaviourism. Together his analysis of the first-person case and his rejection of the argument by analogy provide the main reason for Wittgenstein's behaviouristic approach to other minds. Between 1933 and 1938 Wittgenstein devotes himself to a non-introspectionistic as well as a non-behaviouristic analysis of the first-person case in terms of 'expressions' and consequently he attacks his own earlier analysis of the first person in terms of acquaintance by introspection. In this period he says almost nothing about the third person, in any case, nothing that hints at a criticism of logical behaviourism. Probably he thought that his criticism of acquaintance by introspection and his own construc-
tive account in terms of ‘expressions’ implied automatically a rejection of behaviourism about other minds. However, not until 1941 does he come to realise that he still has to offer arguments that demonstrate the untenability of logical behaviourism. In the last two years of his life he finally succeeds in giving a coherent account of our knowledge of other minds that is compatible with his non-epistemological but logical descriptions of language-games, forms of life and the primacy of human action. If these descriptions of language-games still make a behaviouristic impression to some it is because of the character of language-games: language-games are ‘outer’ phenomena. But they are ‘outer’ phenomena that constitute the meaning of concepts of ‘inner phenomena’.

NOTES

1 I wish to thank the copyright owners of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, Prof. G. E. M. Anscombe and Prof. G. H. von Wright for graciously permitting me to quote from unpublished work by Wittgenstein.


6 This is a more accurate formulation than the quotation of Wittgenstein by Schlick (“immediate data have no owner”), quoted in its turn by Hacker, P. M. S.: 1975, Insight and Illusion, 2d ed. Oxford, p. 195.

7 Usually one refers to Moore: 1955, ‘Wittgenstein’s Lectures in 1930-1933’, in Mind 64, p. 12, for Wittgenstein’s first abandonment of verificationism. However, the remarks of Moore give no datings and their content is only suggestive.

11 In his Scheinprobleme Carnap acknowledges that in the case of other minds the possibility of error always exists. But to him this is only a problem if one makes an appeal to the content of experience. If a case of pretending occurs, Carnap says, the core of our knowledge corresponds to a state of affairs in reality, but not to our putative knowledge about the content of experience. According to Carnap this proves that the content of experience is only an eliminable ‘Nebentell’.
13 See Pears, D., op. cit., p. 313.
14 Strangely enough, this fragment was not selected by R. Rhees for his compilation of Philosophical Grammar, while it occurs in three sources: MS 114 (p. 26), TS 211 (pp. 752-53) and TS 213.
15 See Philosophical Remarks, par. 36: ‘The visual table is not composed out of electrons’.
17 Von Wright underestimates the contribution of this manuscript to PI II, see von Wright: 1982, Wittgenstein, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, p. 134. For instance, PI II, par. viii, ix and x are here drafted for the first time. The main part of MS 169, however, is devoted to an analysis of the concepts ‘inner’ and ‘outer’.
18 In the manuscript of On Certainty, par. 426–637 are written. However, an important discursive stretch of remarks concerning other minds is written between what has since been published as On Certainty, par. 523 and 524.
19 Besides remarks on the inner and the outer this manuscript contains part III of Remarks on Colour.
20 Besides On Certainty par. 66-193, this manuscript contains thirty pages devoted to the inner and the outer.
21 This manuscript was written between 25 September 1940 and 6 June 1941. Between 16 May 1941 and 16 June 1941 Wittgenstein writes about ‘seeing-as’ and behaviourism.
24 Ibid., p. 281.
25 Ibid., p. 283.